

result, it is difficult to imagine that the present book will become a classic: it is too dense with jargon and too long, both factors that feed its tiresome strain of repetition. In the end, as Luna himself stresses, this trailblazing book's great contribution is to suggest a new research agenda, offering potential answers to two puzzles: why do high levels of social inequality persist alongside democracy? And why does democracy tend to remain stable even when there is enduring social inequality? If Luna's peers heed his exhortation to study linkage segmentation patterns as part of distributive policy, we could well learn a great deal about the relationship between democratic representation and redistribution. And from *Segmented Representation's* successors, a true classic may yet come.

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Stephen Offutt, *New Centers of Global Evangelicalism in Latin America and Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Map, tables, abbreviations, appendixes, bibliography, index, 192 pp.; hardcover \$90, ebook \$72.

One of the conventional explanations of the rapid growth of Evangelical Protestantism, particularly Pentecostalism, in Latin America since the late 1950s attributes this expansion to the work of U.S. missionaries, who, taking advantage of the dislocation produced by uneven modernization, civil wars, and natural disasters, advanced a religious version of American imperialism. Buttressing this reading, David Stoll, in his *Is Latin America Turning Protestant?* (1990), and Enrique Domínguez and Deborah Huntington, in their "Salvation Brokers: Conservative Evangelicals in Latin America" (*NACLA* 1984), pointed to how the missionary work of key actors in the U.S. religious right, such as Pat Robertson and Jimmy Swaggart, dovetailed with the Reagan administration's counterinsurgency agenda in Central America during the 1980s.

This explanation was often appropriated by progressive Catholics, who contrasted the sustained repression of military regimes in Guatemala and El Salvador unleashed against pastoral agents and activists in base Christian communities to the favorable treatment received by Evangelical missionaries. The underlying assumption, thus, was that Evangelical Protestants were at best apolitical, more interested in otherworldly salvation than this-worldly social transformation, and at worst politically reactionary, upholding a dominion theology that resonated or even reinforced longstanding patriarchal and class-based hierarchies.

Without ignoring the continuing influence of what he calls the Western Centers of Evangelicalism (WCEs), sociologist Stephen Offutt goes a long way toward offering a more sophisticated and nuanced account of the dynamics of the growth of Evangelical Protestantism in the region. He does so by showing that local and national religious actors in Latin America are not simply mindless purveyors of a "made in the USA" ideology that runs counter to the socioeconomic interests of poor Latin Americans, who have been one of the sectors most attracted by Evangelical Protestantism. Focusing comparatively on El Salvador and South Africa, two

important “New Centers of Evangelicalism” (NCEs), Offutt effectively highlights the innovative role of local religious actors, who blend creatively global resources with their own beliefs, practices, and institutional patterns to give rise to forms of Evangelicalism well attuned to the needs of believers at the grassroots. In Offutt’s words: “*global religious forces can be imperial, but they can also be sources of empowerment*” (158, emphasis in the original).

Much of the strength of Offutt’s explanation comes from the fact that he eschews a reductive approach that is unfortunately all too common in the social scientific study of religion: the notion that religion is simply an epiphenomenon, a reflection of deeper and more “real” social, economic, and political dynamics. By introducing the concept of “religious social forces,” Offutt is able to provide a detailed portrait of the internal sources behind the growth of Evangelicalism, including the material and symbolic resources deployed, the types of religious national and transnational networks, and the diverse media—electronic and conventional—involved, as well as the organizational strategies that circulate globally and are creatively adapted by various local religious entrepreneurs. Moreover, Offutt shows how these religious social forces interact with economic and political processes, like disorderly transitions to democracy and the crime and violence that permeate everyday life for many Salvadorans and South Africans, to produce multiple outcomes.

The productive focus on religious social forces enables Offutt to foreground the central role that a rising “professional Evangelical class” plays in NCEs (67–87). This class is constituted by middle- and even upper-class, well-educated, urban Latin Americans and Africans who find the Evangelical ethos of personal responsibility, self-improvement, and hard work appealing. Operating in rapidly globalizing cities, such as San Salvador and Johannesburg, leaders in this locally grown professional Evangelical class serve as mediators in regard to national civil societies and as gateways and administrators for transnational flows of material and symbolic resources, including books, tapes, DVDs, TV programs, denominational support, disaster relief, church partnerships, growth strategies, organizational models, and traveling missionaries and speakers. As Offutt puts it:

Evangelicals who work for multinational corporations, such as Anglo American, General Electric, JP Morgan, and Maytag, are seamlessly integrated into transnational business models. Evangelicals who have started their own companies or who work for local businesses also regularly source goods, services, and personnel internationally. (71)

A good example of the professional Evangelical class at work is Elim, a church that started originally in Guatemala but in 1977 planted a congregation in El Salvador. In San Salvador, the church started with 9 members, but in a little more than five years it was able to fill a 1,500-seat hall. By 2006, Elim reported a membership of 129,000, surpassing by far Joel Osteen’s famed Lakewood Church in Houston, Texas. In 2002, Elim held an event that gathered 200,000 people, filling five stadiums to capacity.

Elim's success is in large part due to the flexible megachurch organizational template implemented by Sergio Solorzano, the church's founding pastor in San Salvador, which provides congregants both the supportive intimacy of small cell groups and the effervescence of emotive services and large gatherings. The model also combines rapid, context-sensitive response to personal everyday predicaments with a centralized, pyramidal structure. This is a winning strategy in the midst of a Salvadoran urban scene characterized by unrest and violence, much of it generated by gang activity. "The level of discipline imposed at Elim reinforces the idea that a need for order is one of the drivers of evangelical growth in the chaotic lower class of Latin America" (115). Offutt observes, "Discipline of congregants during the service is accompanied by efficiency in other aspects of worship," such that Elim's organizational culture is "strikingly like that of an army or of a highly efficient corporation. This is one of the keys to Elim's growth in the chaotic environment of lower-class San Salvador" (114).

Central to Elim's success story is that Solorzano adopted the megachurch model from David Yonggi Cho's Yoido Full Gospel Church, which is the largest in the world. In 1986, he traveled to South Korea to learn firsthand about this church. This fact shows that it is now more implausible than ever to think of the growth of Evangelical Protestantism in Latin America as a mere symptom of Americanization.

Elim illustrates the payoff of Offutt's concept of New Centers of Evangelicalism within what I have termed an emergent polycentric cartography of the sacred. This cartography cannot be characterized through a center-periphery model, since the flows and networks that crisscross it go in multiple directions, not just from the Global North to the Global South but from South to North in a process of "reverse missionization." Latin American missionaries and immigrants establish transnational churches in New York, Los Angeles, Miami, London, Madrid, and Lisbon, but also increasingly from South to South. The Brazilian Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, for example, has many of its four thousand-plus temples in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and throughout Latin America, the United States, and Europe.

Elim's Sergio Solorzano and its current head pastor, Mario Vega, also illustrate an important ingredient in Evangelical entrepreneurship: the charismatic *poder de convocatoria* (power to convene), which gives certain leaders the ability to mobilize crowds. "Evangelicals enjoy crusades and mass rallies, but they cannot be called together by just anyone—it takes a particular persona to stage such an event" (101). Max Weber tended to understand charisma in psychological terms, as the authority that issues from one's personal disposition. Offutt shows that this charisma is shaped by the leader's embeddedness in particular networks, which allows him to access legitimate religious goods. Here, Pierre Bourdieu's notions of habitus and social capital would have deepened Offutt's analysis of the inculcation of entrepreneurship in the professional Evangelical class.

What are the political implications of the Evangelical *poder de convocatoria*? Once again, Offutt makes significant contributions to our understanding of Protestantism and politics in Latin America, showing diverse outcomes. One the one hand, we see Brother Toby's Baptist Tabernacle, the second-largest Evangelical

church in El Salvador, which seems to fit the conventional explanation, supporting the right-wing ARENA party and representing the interests of the business class. On the other hand, Elim declined to endorse ARENA's candidate and was quite sympathetic to Mauricio Funes, the FMLN candidate in the 2009 presidential election. In fact, Offutt cites a reliable 2008 poll that showed the FMLN garnering 41.8 percent support from Evangelicals, with only 30.9 percent backing ARENA.

According to Offutt, the notion that a prominent Evangelical church can support a party on the left should not surprise us, as many Evangelicals increasingly see themselves as involved in an "integral mission" that addresses the whole person. While it is true that many Evangelicals continue to see their social role as pursuing a moral crusade, seeking to transform corrupt societies through the conversion and redemption of individual souls,

today, Salvadoran and South African evangelicals run programs designed to alleviate poverty, protect the environment, recover from disasters, provide medical care, promote leadership development, facilitate racial reconciliation, and improve business ethics. They reach out to victims of crime and violence, alcoholics, drug addicts, gang members, and prisoners. (132)

Offutt cites Elim's Vega in this regard: Elim is no longer "a church that is only dedicated to the salvation of souls . . . [it is now] a church that sees its mission in a more complete form and searches for the salvation of people, not only souls, but of human beings that [*sic*] are immersed in social problems" (141). It is, then, high time that scholars recognize the role that Evangelicals play in reweaving the frayed fabric of civil society in Latin America, particularly in view of the deepening crisis of the welfare state and other secular institutions.

Acknowledging these contributions to politics and society, Offutt rightly warns not to take the gospel of prosperity—the appeal to the supernatural to obtain immediate health and wealth, which some scholars see as a compensation for the inequalities produced by neoliberal capitalism—as the hallmark of Evangelicalism in Latin America. Nevertheless, as Kevin O'Neill's work on the spread of religiously run rehabilitation centers and the emergence of a new panopticism in Guatemala shows, we should also be careful not to assume that the prosperity gospel and integral mission will come to a seamless synthesis that will strengthen critical citizenship and produce a more inclusive civil society.

Methodologically, Offutt's arguments are well supported by a wealth of empirical data, including 115 formal and informal interviews with Evangelical leaders and entrepreneurs in El Salvador and South Africa. These interviews allow him to engage the multiplicity of religious forces in each country. However, although Offutt includes a chart of the various religious organizations he studies, the reader may get lost in the profusion of names and acronyms. In a similar way, he sprinkles quotes from his informants throughout the book, with the effect that sometimes these testimonies feel decontextualized. Offutt's arguments would have been strengthened and the testimonies would have been more compelling if he had traced the trajectory of one or two exemplary religious entrepreneurs in each country to

show how they developed their *poder de convocatoria*, and if he had used a network analysis to show interconnections and the flows of resources across various key webs. He could also have mapped out these networks and flows within and across urban centers to give us a better a sense of the spatial architectures informing NECs. Tools and research strategies of this sort are becoming indispensable to generate multi-scalar studies of Evangelicalism, or religion in general, for that matter.

Despite these shortcomings, *New Centers of Global Evangelicalism* is highly recommended. It takes the study of religion and politics in new, fruitful directions, introducing helpful and novel concepts and demonstrating the need to develop textured accounts of religious social forces and their differential interactions with cultural, economic, and political dynamics.

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Mariela Szwarcberg, *Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2015. Figures, tables, maps, notes, bibliography, index, 185 pp.; hardcover \$89.99, paperback \$32.99, ebook \$26.

In this excellent book, Mariela Szwarcberg draws on extensive ethnographic research to bring the reader the most sensitive, nuanced portrayal of how clientelism works on the ground since Javier Auyero's *Poor People's Politics* was published in 2000. The 15 years since that time have seen an explosion of research on clientelism—the individualized exchange of goods and services for political support—in Latin America, especially Argentina. Yet even as scholars have debated what types of citizens are targeted via clientelism and why the practice works to accrue votes, the role of political intermediaries (brokers) has remained relatively understudied (though see Stokes et al. 2013). In this book, Szwarcberg illuminates the role of these brokers—their preferences, practices, and career trajectories—in clientelism. To do so, she draws on participant observation, extensive interviews, surveys, and data collection in a group of important cities in two Argentine provinces, supplemented with additional fieldwork in Lima, Peru.

In her book, Szwarcberg demonstrates that political brokers are embedded in networks of two different kinds. On the one hand, brokers are part of the social networks of the (usually poor) neighborhoods in which they live and work. In that capacity, brokers provide services, assistance in solving everyday problems, and even a sympathetic ear to citizens who come to rely on their support. The larger the circle of citizens who turn to a broker when in need, the greater the broker's network. On the other hand, brokers form part of explicitly political networks made up of party activists, candidates, and elected politicians in their municipality and even beyond. Brokers are often at the bottom of these political networks, seeking to advance their careers by becoming candidates for local office.

In her book, Szwarcberg shows how clientelism is a tool that enables brokers to serve both networks. By making assistance to local citizens part of an implicit