civil society" to much of eastern and central Europe. This valuable book will inform future discussions of these subjects. One hopes for a companion study of the current state of party politics in eastern Germany, where at least some of the findings might modify Padgett's conclusions.

**States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines.** By Misagh Parsa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 326p. $54.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

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This intriguing volume is a direct challenge to Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions* (1979); by inserting "ideology" into the title, Parsa claims that Skocpol left out something important. He makes good on his effort to demonstrate the importance of ideology in recent Third World revolutions, but the book offers far more than that.

Several authors have compared the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions, which occurred in 1979, but to my knowledge this is the first book-length treatment to add the Philippines revolution against Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. The comparison is especially useful because the mass-mobilizing radical revolutionary movement in the Philippines—the communist New People's Army (NPA)—failed, even though a reformist urban revolution toppled the old regime. In contrast, in Iran and Nicaragua, the middle classes were at first overwhelmed by the more radical mass movements led by the Iranian clergy and the Sandinistas. Why these radical revolutions succeeded and the Philippine events left class structures largely unchanged is one of the puzzles that Parsa seeks to resolve.

The author begins by stating that structural factors weakened all the ruling regimes, setting the stage for revolutionary conflicts. These factors included an increasingly centralized, exclusionary, and interventionist role of the regime in the economy; periods of economic difficulty or crisis; and international pressures. The characteristics of the regimes were such that they received the blame for economic problems but provided no legitimate means for those outside the regime to correct them. Foreign pressure regarding human rights issues from the United States, hitherto a major supporter of these regimes, led to reduced repression of the opposition. Together, these conditions left the dictatorial government vulnerable to concerted attacks.

Parsa goes much farther and uses his comparisons to show that one cannot understand the course of these revolutions without closely examining the leadership, organization, participants, and ideology of the opposition, and how these interacted with the actions of the old regime. Based merely on organizational strength, the Philippine NPA, which had tens of thousands of armed and organized supporters in the countryside and the cities, should have dominated the revolutionary process. Indeed, if Marcos had shut off all peaceful means to reform, as did the shah in Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua, then the middle-class opposition might have been forced into an alliance with the NPA in order to change the regime. In such a coalition, the NPA probably would have dominated due to its popular support and organizational strength.

Instead, Marcos sought to outflank opponents and regain U.S. approval by calling a snap election, and the moderate opposition organized urban workers and rural farmers on a platform of peaceful electoral change. The NPA reacted by boycotting the election and refused to ally with the moderates, with the result that it was reduced to a bystander in subsequent events. When Marcos lost the election and tried to overturn the results, a portion of the army defected, forcing him out of power. The middle-class moderates were credited with the overthrow, and popular support shifted away from the NPA.

In contrast, in both Iran and Nicaragua the mass-mobilizing radicals initially played the role of moderate and subservient allies in an antiregime coalition with the reformist bureaucrats and bourgeoisie. The Sandinistas and Khomeini gathered broadly based followings and wholly isolated the regime and its small circle of supporters. Once in power they adopted a more radical line and distanced themselves from their erstwhile middle-class allies. In sum, variations in the use of ideology and in leadership played a crucial role in steering these revolutionary episodes on distinct paths.

It is one pleasure of this book that, rather than present a thin account of the cases tailored to his theory, Parsa provides unusually rich and detailed information, sufficient for readers to weigh his arguments against the extensive evidence. This very readable volume also casts welcome light on Cardinal Sin and the role of the church in the later stages of the anti-Marcos movement. Moreover, there is an arresting section on the importance of university students to revolution in Third World countries, where their numbers and prestige have been expanding far more rapidly than the number of professional jobs to which they aspire.

Parsa offers a fine combination of careful, nuanced empirical case studies and theoretical propositions regarding key factors omitted from structural theories of revolution. Along with other recent work influenced by the "new institutionalism," this volume points the way toward a new and richer synthesis of structure and agency in our understanding of revolutions and revolutionary processes.

**Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia: Engendering Transition.** By Valerie Sperling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 303p. $59.95 cloth, $22.95 paper.

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In the introduction, Valerie Sperling notes that "Russia's transition from communism toward capitalism and a more democratic political arrangement has been both good and bad for women, presenting both obstacles and opportunities for organizing" (p. 7). She goes on to produce an engaging and thought-provoking analysis aimed at broadening the scope and explanatory power of social movement theory, which, she argues, has been developed by scholars who focus primarily on social movements in the "contemporary core democracies" (pp. 52–3). In contrast Sperling develops "a cross-cultural model of social movement organizing and development that explores five interrelated opportunity structures: socio-cultural or attitudinal, political, economic, political-historical, and international" (p. 53). In each subsequent chapter she tackles one of these opportunity structures and offers a number of fascinating insights into the world of post-Soviet social movements, based on the experience of her sample of women's organizations.

The book demonstrates a genuine concern to highlight the importance of a broader and more inclusive understanding of social movement organizing and practice. Sperling places much emphasis on the importance of cultural heritage and political history as well as contemporary social and political contexts in order to understand the different approaches and tactics employed by Russian women's organizations in the post-Soviet 1990s. The penultimate chapter presents a critical discussion of the effect of international influence; the poten-