

however, their success on the battlefield was simply down to the fact that they were highly trained professionals fighting in an age of amateurs, and had far less to do with appeals to a bygone warrior ethos.

As for the Romans, L. readily acknowledges that Homer's influence, while undoubtedly present within central Italy, was not prevalent in the field of warfare in the days of the early and mid-Republic. Nevertheless, he is right to argue that the Romans looked back to heroic times as much, if not more, than the Greeks did, taking their inspiration instead from their own ancestors as well as the great generals of the past. Like Homer's Achaians, Romans venerated generals who had fought in single combat and used these stories to encourage competition, within the confines of strict Roman discipline, amongst the legionaries. Moving through the late Republic and into the Imperial period, the author puts forth several sound arguments, all wrapped up in some excellent prose; however, it is in the final chapter of the work that L. makes some truly innovative conclusions. Sketching the eventual decline of the Roman army, he illustrates how a fundamental shift occurred when Romans ceased to take models from the past, but tried, with disastrous results, to directly imitate them. These delusional attempts led to Julian's ill-fated invasion of Sassanid Mesopotamia and the crushing defeat of Valens at Adrianople. Both of these campaigns resulted in the weakening of an already fragile empire.

Soldiers and Ghosts is indeed a groundbreaking work and will serve to fuel further scholarship for many years to come. As such, the above criticisms, most of which are minor, are not meant to distract from the overall quality. The work itself has many favourable aspects, but its greatest strength lies in the prose of the author himself; L. has succeeded in writing the kind of book to which the majority of scholars aspire: one that is strongly academic and well researched, making it useful and necessary for scholars, while at the same time being penned in an easy style with many captivating and deftly worded narratives that will appeal to a more general audience. Certainly, there is something here for all levels; the thesis and the evidence provided will be of interest to researchers, and, although the narrative sections themselves offer little to the established scholar, there is a veritable goldmine of excellent research information presented not only in the endnotes, but also in the forty-seven pages of bibliographic essays that are cross-referenced to pages in the text. Thus the text itself makes for a thoroughly enjoyable read. Even the narrative sections, particularly in the Greek half of the work, provide many new insights concerning tactical developments.

Altogether, L.'s work serves most of all to push out further the boundaries of military history, a movement that already has significant momentum thanks to the aforementioned work by Wees and to V. D. Hanson's *Carnage and Culture* (2001). These works, along with *Soldiers and Ghosts*, re-examine the sources to arrive at fresh conclusions concerning ancient warfare's significant literary, social, and cultural side, in turn doing a great service to scholarship in general, and bringing straightforward military history into the mainstream of current and cutting edge research and thought.

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J. D. GRAINGER, *THE ROMAN WAR OF ANTIOCHOS THE GREAT* (Mnemosyne Supplements 239). Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2002. Pp. xii + 386. ISBN 90-0412-840-9. US\$150.00/€120.00.

Students of Rome's rise to Mediterranean empire have generally found the Seleukid monarch Antiochos III to be among the Romans' less impressive opponents. Antiochos's confrontation with Rome in the late 190s and early 180s B.C.E., conventionally dubbed the 'Syrian War', culminated in Antiochos's disastrous defeat at the Battle of Magnesia, followed by the humiliating Peace of Apamea of 188 B.C.E. in which, in addition to a massive indemnity, Antiochos also ceded his ancestral pretensions to hegemony over Anatolia. Antiochos's ineffectual — and at times seemingly erratic — performance against the Romans, when coupled with his ignominious death the following year (while attempting to plunder a temple), has lent a mocking quality to the nickname *Megas* ('The Great') that he had acquired as a result of his accomplishments prior to facing off against Rome.

Over the past two decades, a steady stream of epigraphic discoveries touching upon Antiochos's activities, especially in Anatolia, has led to renewed appreciation, most notably in the work of R. M. Errington and J. Ma. In his recent monograph, John D. Grainger joins this

re-evaluation, and takes square aim at Antiochos's confrontation with the Romans. G. sees Antiochos caught between pro-Roman sources (primarily Livy) and modern scholars' penchant for seeing ancient occurrences through the prism of the events and issues of their own times; he warns particularly against using terms such as 'Cold War' (employed, e.g., by E. Badian). G. is quite explicit about his desire to rescue Antiochos's reputation by coming at the Seleukid-Roman conflict from Antiochos's point of view (hence his monograph's title). Indeed, G. goes so far as to assert (1) that Antiochos's accomplishments and influence should rank not far behind those of Alexander.

The topic is a logical extension of G.'s previous work, which has included multiple studies on Seleukid matters, and, more recently, Antiochos III's primary Greek allies, the Aitolians. G. approaches his task in a straightforward manner, presenting his argument in an Introduction and seventeen chapters, the last of which ('Results') acts as a conclusion. G. includes two appendices ('Roman Army Numbers'; 'The Ptolemaic Raid on Arados') and five line maps.

G.'s account begins with a consideration of the earlier history of Seleukid-Roman relations, arguing that the two states must have been aware of each other from at least the late 270s B.C.E., when the Ptolemies, the Seleukids' inveterate enemies, made diplomatic approaches to the Romans. This is not the only place in the text where G. asserts a historical reality unattested in the surviving sources. G. is quite open and unapologetic about his method, arguing (4) that a historian is obligated to supplement the bare sources with her/his imagination, particularly in cases (such as the current one) where the evidence is sparse and biased. Accordingly, as G., in subsequent chapters, takes his readers through the early stages of Antiochos's career and corresponding developments in the Aegean region and the central Mediterranean; the (in G.'s view very gradual) transformation in Antiochos's relations with the Romans, from cordiality, to wariness, to hostility; the course of the war; and its aftermath, he regularly digresses to consider what various players must have been thinking, or would have done. G. is at pains to present Antiochos as a careful pragmatist, a rational actor pursuing a grand strategy in order to realize to their fullest his dynasty's pretensions to power. G.'s Antiochos seeks for the longest time an understanding, and even an alliance, with the Romans. Romans' reactions to Antiochos, on the other hand, are mixed, and very much influenced by factional politics within the Roman Senate and among Rome's allies, resulting in ambiguous Roman behaviour.

Antiochos's fateful decision in 192 B.C.E. to intervene in Greek affairs, at the behest of a faction within the Aitolian League, was, in G.'s view, a rational misreading of Roman attitudes caused by a lack of up-to-date information about developments in Rome and Italy. G. suggests that, had this information reached Antiochos before he crossed from Asia to Europe, Antiochos would not have acted as he did. 'It can be seen that both sides ended up fighting each other because each misunderstood the other's actions and aims, a problem exacerbated by the slow communications they had to endure ...' (214). Given these circumstances, and Antiochos's previous career and policies, the notoriously small size of the force that Antiochos brought with him is, for G., quite understandable. Moreover, up until the moment in 191 B.C.E. when Antiochos comprehends the magnitude of his misjudgement (and of the Roman presence in and around Greece), he in fact conducts a highly successful diplomatic and military campaign across Greece. Thereafter, Antiochos's withdrawal to the pass at Thermopylai is, according to G., further evidence of Antiochos's prudence and experience. Indeed, G. feels that Antiochos thereby forces the Romans to fight on his terms, and is winning the battle — until forces led by the elder Cato, Herodotos in hand, manage to circumvent the Seleukid-Aitolian defence. Thereafter, Antiochos quickly comes to the reasonable conclusion that his position in Greece is untenable, and so carries out a rapid, but effective, withdrawal. His subsequent evacuation, often criticized as hasty and ill-considered, of the formidable base he had established at Lysimacheia, is for G. a 'minor triumph of planning and execution' (308). Antiochos's combined land-sea strategy in the subsequent campaign for naval supremacy in the eastern Aegean is equally sound, in G.'s view, and nearly lures the Roman fleet into a trap (302). The subsequent defeat of the Seleukid fleet off Myonessos, however, marks the end of that struggle, and is 'decisive for control of the Mediterranean for the next six centuries and more' (304).

G. claims that Antiochos's offer at this point to negotiate is not heartfelt, and that the Romans' hardline response merely confirms Antiochos in his belief that the Romans want a decisive battle. G. suggests that Antiochos's preparations for that battle, which ultimately takes place at Magnesia late in 190 B.C.E., are hampered by a Ptolemaic attack on Arados in Phoenicia, which

compels Antiochos to leave a substantial body of troops in Koile Syria. As a result, G. argues, Antiochos's infantry at Magnesia is outnumbered by that of the Romans. As for the battle itself, G. suggests that Antiochos performs well, but that his lieutenants do not. Further, according to G., the lethargic Roman pursuit after the battle implies that it was not the cakewalk victory for the Romans that our sources suggest. Antiochos is able to rally his army at Apamea/Kelainai, and there to reconstitute a respectable force quickly, so as to carry on the war if armistice negotiations fail. The Roman general, Manlius Vulso's campaign against the Galatians in 189 B.C.E. is designed to undercut Antiochos further by weakening his Galatian allies — and their ties to Antiochos, who cannot come to their aid due to the truce during post-Magnesia negotiations. G., further, connects the outcome of Vulso's campaign to the end of Aitolian resistance to the Romans in Greece. Having thereby lost two potential sources of support, Antiochos determines to settle with Rome.

For G., Antiochos's decision is 'an act of great statemanship'(356). Antiochos could have continued the struggle, drawing on the resources of his remaining Asian holdings and forcing the Romans to fight on fields ever more remote from Italy. Instead, Antiochos chose, in G.'s view, to accept the galling terms of the Peace of Apamea in order to break contact with areas of Roman sensitivity. As G. notes, Antiochos had earlier sought an alliance with the Romans and a division of the world between themselves. Eventually he got that division, albeit on less favourable terms. Nonetheless, G. insists, Magnesia and the Peace of Apamea were not fatal blows to the Seleukids. When the dynasty later collapsed, it was as a consequence of internal conflicts.

The above represents but a brief overview of G.'s narrative, which is extensive. The very detail of that discussion, however, heads the list of this work's defects. The text proceeds on a chronological basis, but beyond the chapter divisions and titles, G. offers no organizational markers or headings to aid the reader in following the argument. As the sources and events at issue are often tangled, the reader is equally often left confused and frustrated. This problem is compounded by G.'s fondness for digression. In keeping with his views on the responsibility of a historian to imagine and speculate, G. does so, regularly and not always necessarily. Nor does G. consistently connect these intellectual peregrinations to the larger themes and goals of the work. Indeed, at times the reader can forget that the work is about Antiochos III and his conflict with the Romans; G. sometimes seems to be engaged in a commentary on Livy's account of events of the later 190s and early 180s B.C.E., rather than a history *per se*. Given Livy's centrality as a source, some such skewing is unavoidable. What is surprising, and problematic for the entire work, is that G. never systematically addresses the issues that Livy's work raises. G. makes it clear at numerous points that he does not trust Livy's reporting; but G. does not explain how he thinks Livy went about assembling his account, and what implications that assessment has for G.'s own work.

G.'s engagement with the work of other scholars is equally problematical. G. has largely done his scholarly homework in identifying and consulting the basic modern bibliography on the topic, and he regularly takes issue with the conclusions others have reached. Unfortunately, rather too often G. fails to identify his interlocutors, settling instead for broad generalizations unaccompanied by references. G.'s text includes copious footnotes, but these often consist of bare citations of ancient sources, most often Livy.

G. does reference Ma's recent work, but has little else to say — presumably because it appeared when G.'s study was close to completion. The date Ma establishes for the death of Antiochos's wife, Laodike, is close enough to that of Antiochos's initial heir to raise questions about Antiochos's emotional state at the time of the crisis with Rome. It is unfortunate that G. could not consider this new evidence; for while G. consistently presents his actors as rational, he does not entirely drain them of humanity.

A book of this length and complexity is bound to contain a few cosmetic blemishes. Even a reader whose standards are less than Teutonic, however, will probably find the number of such mistakes in G.'s text to be excessive. Some are minor: bibliographical lapses, errors in spelling and grammar, etc. Some, however, are more substantive, leaving the reader with a mistaken impression about what a modern scholar or an ancient source says (235 n. 27), or confused by seemingly contradictory statements or assessments (compare pp. 351 and 357). Given the ambition of G.'s intentions and the generic historical importance of his topic, it is unfortunate that the ms. did not receive more attention from a fresh set of eyes, which might have enhanced this study's strengths, and mitigated its deficiencies.

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