Athens and Rhodes and quarrelling about the territory of philosophers and rhetoricians. At the end, Greek dialectic affects writing on Roman law, and Cicero accompanies his return to politics after Caesar's murder by writing philosophical works defending Roman traditions of glory, liberality, friendship, and social duty. Moles argues that Dio of Prusa's four orations on kingship do not, as has recently been argued, show a purely Greek perspective, being concerned primarily to advertise to the Greek world an idealized picture of Dio's relation with Trajan. He points to similarities they exhibit with Trajan's preferences: the implicit polemic against Domitian, the similarities with Pliny's *Panegyricus*. Trajan would demonstrate his *civilitas* by listening to the criticism of his self-appointed Greek adviser even if he took no steps to heed his frank advice. Scholz switches the focus to Greek city life in the Antonine period, showing how Diogenes of Oenoanda finds a substitute for political activity, denied him by his sect, in putting up a hugh inscription in the agora. He thus presents himself as a public benefactor conferring on his fellow-citizens the benefits of Epicurean teaching against charlatanry and credulity.

The centrepiece of the volume and the longest contribution (with the text occupying barely a quarter of the space allocated to footnotes) is the learned and comprehensive account of the genre *peri basileias* practised by all philosophical schools in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Seeking to mark it off from other related genres (to which its contribution is noted), Haake invokes five criteria: a philosopher as author; a king or his equivalent, the Roman emperor, as addressee; in form, a letter or speech; in content, an account of the qualities that distinguish the good ruler from the tyrant; the implied reader the panhellenic *polis* public. The function of the genre, Haake argues, is to keep the ruler committed to the *polis* ideas of political freedom, freedom of speech and civic liberality, by showing him that he can gain approval and security by eschewing tyrannical behaviour, which includes listening to such advice.

Somerville College, Oxford MIRIAM GRIFFIN

BIOS THEORETIKOS

A. GRILLI: *Vita contemplativa. Il problema della vita contemplativa nel mondo greco-romano.* (Philosophica, Testi e Studi 6.) Pp. 292. Brescia: Paideia, 2002. Cased, €29.50. ISBN: 88-394-0642-5.

This volume is a second edition of a book published in 1953. Much of the material has been reworked or restructured and there are some additions and omissions. The major thesis remains more or less the same. Grilli offers a tour of much of ancient philosophical history with glances here and there to related literary works. His interest is in the ethical ideal of the tranquil and happy life, often characterized by terms such as εὐθυμία, ἀταραξία, *tranquillitas*, and so on: the 'theoretical' and contemplative life, contrasted with the political and engaged life. As such, he is less interested in contemplation in terms of θεωρία, the intellectual contemplative ideal promoted by Plato and Aristotle in certain moods, although there is some brief mention of this early on.

Unsurprisingly, much of his attention is turned to the Hellenistic and Roman periods, and he has two heroes who appear and reappear throughout the story: Democritus and Panaetius. Democritus is taken to be the first serious promoter of this ethical ideal, an ideal also championed in their various ways by the Stoics and

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Epicureans, and Panaetius is offered as the prime conduit through which such ideas were transmitted to later writers such as Seneca and Plutarch. In Panaetius, Democritean and Stoic views are synthesized and combined into a form conducive to Imperial readers and writers. G. is surely to be praised for the breadth of his vision, but there are serious difficulties to be faced by any such project, not the least being our lack of any surviving work by either Democritus or Panaetius except in fragmentary form.

First, G. is surprisingly optimistic about our chances of reconstructing with any degree of confidence the specifics of Panaetian philosophy from works by Seneca (esp. *De tranquillitate animi*) and Plutarch (esp. περὶ εὐθυμίας), following Siefert against the less optimistic van Straaten. Others will want to follow van Straaten and be much more cautious, and it is surely unfortunate that G. has chosen not to update any of his bibliography from the 1953 edition. It would have been interesting to see what he made of, for example, C. Gill's 'Panaetius on the Virtues of Being Yourself', in A. W. Bulloch et al. (edd.), *Images and Ideologies: Self-definition in the Hellenistic World* (Berkeley, 1993), and the comparative conservatism of F. Alesse, *Panezio di Rodi e la tradizione stoica* (Naples, 1994). (Indeed, the lack of any reference to, let alone engagement with secondary material published in the fifty years or so since the first edition is a serious shortcoming of this new publication.) Aside from such problems of *Quellenforschung*, G.'s approach clearly runs the risk of creating a circular argument. He takes Plutarch and Seneca as sources for the reconstruction of Panaetius' work and then claims to find clear signs of Panaetian influence in Plutarch and Seneca.

Secondly, many of the ideas which G. wants to track from Democritus through the centuries are so very general that it becomes difficult to sustain any strong lines of specific influence. Gems of ethical advice such as 'don't do too much' or comparisons of the good life and the tranquil soul with a gently flowing stream or a calm sea do indeed appear rather frequently in this genre of writing, but it is very difficult to pin them down to particular sources and trace with any certainty definite lines of imitation and influence, particularly when the writings of many of the major figures in G.'s story (Democritus and Panaetius, for example) are lost or very fragmentary. (The Cyrenaics and Pyrrhonists similarly use such images and metaphors, but are not part of G.'s account.) G. does his best to make his case, but many will want to retain a healthy degree of scepticism about his more specific claims.

It is also disappointing to see cited once again as the explanation for this apparent interest in the apolitical life the 'decline of the polis' at the end of the fourth century B.C. (e.g. 20–2). Not only does this make Democritus look oddly prescient and/or remarkably ahead of his time, it seems to ignore the obvious and numerous opportunities for committed political activity offered to Greeks and Romans in various spheres and at various levels throughout the Hellenistic period and into the Roman empire. There is good evidence for civic associations and political activity of all sorts at this time, even though the time of the classical Athenian democratic citizen assembly had indeed long gone. G. is by no means alone in offering such a picture as a way of explaining a perceived move to a more retiring ethical ideal but he is very fond of this mode of explanation for changes in ethical philosophy. So not only were Epicureanism and Stoicism born 'dalle esigenze del tempo' (p. 47), but Panaetius systematizes the 'old' doctrine of εὐθυμία 'secondo le esigenze dei tempi nuovi' (p. 170), and imperial Stoicism returns to the school's orthodoxy and rigidity 'per necessità dei tempi' (p. 138). No doubt the times do indeed influence how we think about a good life, but those lines of influence are surely more subtle and complex than envisaged here.

These are significant concerns which cast doubt on the whole enterprise. Nevertheless, there are positive and important points made too. In particular, G. is

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prepared to cast his net wider than many when looking at trends in ethical reflection. He is keen, for example, to include poets and dramatists at least as signs of the times, if not active contributors to the discussion. G. has also made a brave attempt to tell the story of an ethical idea through most of antiquity which, for the most part, bypasses Plato and Aristotle, the two philosophers with whom much modern study of ancient ethical thought begins and ends.

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METAPHOR AND ALLEGORY

G. R. BOYS-STONES (ed.): *Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition. Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions.* Pp. x + 305. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Cased, £45. ISBN: 0-19-924005-1.

Emerging from a seminar on metaphor and allegory held at Corpus Christi College Oxford in 1997, this collection of eleven essays plus introduction is considerably more than a commemoration of that event. It proposes to 'contribute to a fairer picture of classical approaches to language' and to do so 'by considering philosophical approaches to allegory next to rhetorical discussions of metaphor, and by placing studies of classical theory alongside analyses of literary practice that draw on the terms of contemporary theory' (pp. 4–5). This summary goes a fair way toward characterizing the disparate but fascinating contents, hinting as well at the editor's agenda. It also points to some real differences that qualify, if they do not spoil, the apparent symmetry of the book's two parts, one devoted to metaphor and the other to allegory.

Metaphor and allegory, if they belong together at all, do so as two tropes, that is, two strategies of self-consciously ornamented texts, as variously defined by ancient rhetoricians. Metaphor (the seminal discussion of which in Aristotle antedates its definition as, and reduction to, a rhetorical trope) has, thanks in large part to Roman Jakobson, had a rich history in twentieth-century theorizing about literature and about language itself. Allegory, on the other hand, was a trope from the day the term was coined (probably in the first century B.C.E.). The term was virtually never, in the polytheist traditions of antiquity, used to refer to the allegorical *interpretation* of texts—which may legitimately be said to be co-extensive with the interpretation of texts *tout court* (see e.g. Laird, p. 174)—and which, as Mark Edwards discreetly observes, 'had no dominant affinity with metaphor' (p. 236). It is allegory in this last sense that is the subject of all of the essays in the second section of this book. In contrast to metaphor, allegory (both the trope and the strategy of interpretation that invokes it) has in fact generated little memorable theorizing, ancient or modern—the major ancient (polytheist) exception to be found in the Neoplatonist Proclus, and a twentieth-century exception perhaps in the young Walter Benjamin.

Boys-Stones in his introduction insists that we must especially beware of the narrow, reductive treatments of allegory in the rhetorical writers, because theorizing on allegory 'began with the philosophers', while allegory itself 'always remained . . . a philosopher's tool' (p. 3). This claim strikes me as indefensible, and in fact it is undermined by at least one of the contributions to this collection (Donald Russell's—see below). It is consistent, however, with the view of ancient philosophical tradition developed in B.-S.'s *Post-Hellenistic Philosophy* (Oxford, 2001; see the review by Harold Tarrant, *BMCR* 2002.02.03). That view is in turn characterized by an

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