an analysis of Christian Democracy in the Americas; and, finally, an assessment of how our understanding of Christian Democracy could inform responses to populism. As this brief recapitulation suggests, this is a work of considerable ambition, covering a broad array of topics and providing numerous insights into a shaping element of European political life. And the book surely demonstrates the author's impressive knowledge of this political movement and its history.

Notwithstanding its considerable value, the work's ideal audience is unnecessarily constricted. Here are three reasons experts might not be fully engaged by the text. First, except for emphasizing the relative neglect of Christian Democracy, Invernizzi Accetti does not make fully evident the scholarly stakes of his analysis. No single argumentative thread pulls this work together, and it is not specified whose interpretation is wrong, misleading, or incomplete if the reader accepts that Christian Democracy possesses the ideological tendencies that Invernizzi Accetti describes. Second, Invernizzi Accetti refrains from critically evaluating the coherence of the ideas he discusses—perhaps limiting the normative implications that political theorists might draw from his interpretive work. Third, and finally, the second half of the work covers so many topics, employing so many different frames of analysis, that I fear the arguments it advances will not persuade the best-informed readers. For instance, Invernizzi Accetti suggests that his analysis of Christian Democracy's influence on the creation of the European Union will not describe why European institutions have the shape they do or the actual activities of those who contributed to the establishment of the EU, but is instead intended to serve as a heuristic for interpreting EU institutions. It was not clear to this reader why this "heuristic" approach ought to be preferred to one that explains why those institutions arose and how particular actors put them to work.

Similarly, this book may not serve as an effective, general introduction to Christian Democracy. Principally, this has to do with the methodology used to describe the movement's ideology. Invernizzi Accetti employs the approach familiar from Michael Freeden's work on political ideology. Consistent with the goal of pulling together disparate figures and texts into a coherent ideology, specific authors and works are divorced from their context and presented together as if they were self-consciously elaborating a common idea. But there is a trade-off between formulating a coherent ideology in this way and confronting the differences among Christian Democrats. For instance, relatively little attention is paid to describing who the distinct authors were, the quite distinct circumstances in which they were speaking and writing, the distinct political conditions they faced, and the distinct ends they were seeking to achieve. For example, a reader familiar with the history of Christian Democracy may know Chantel Delsol and Nadia Urbinati, but they are not introduced. And the unversed might miss the fact that the former is a Catholic political philosopher and an ostensible voice of Christian Democracy in France, whereas the latter is a prominent democratic theorist at Columbia University in the United States and someone I believe the reader is not intended to treat as an exemplar of Christian Democratic thought. These limitations mean that one might have qualms about recommending this book to a student unfamiliar with the key actors in the intellectual story of Christian Democracy.

Despite these concerns, this book makes a significant contribution, offering a smart reconstruction of a powerful political movement's ideology. *What Is Christian Democracy?* will therefore be of interest to anyone seeking to comprehend the parlous state of European party politics.

Political Legitimacy: NOMOS LXI. Edited by Jack Knight and Melissa Schwartzberg. New York: New York University Press, 2019. 400p. $65.00 cloth.
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According to a familiar narrative, John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* (1971) prompted a revival of Anglophone political philosophy. Whatever one makes of that narrative, it is undeniable that work on justice dominated the last quarter of the twentieth century and even the turn to global issues that characterized the subfield at the turn of this century. Now that Rawls's influence is on the wane, so is the almost puritanically moralistic focus on justice. Other historically central and more pertinently political concerns have come back to the fore; chief among them is legitimacy, understood not in narrow legalistic terms or as an ancillary to justice but as a central feature of the normative landscape. The renewed interest in legitimacy has borne fruit, for instance, in the form of new conceptual approaches that distance themselves from the old-fashioned notion of legitimacy as the correlate of political obligation (Arthur Isak Applbaum, "Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 38 [3], 2010; N. P. Adams, "Institutional Legitimacy," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2017) or in the growing realist revival that makes legitimacy the central concern of normative political theory (Bernard Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed*, 2005; Enzo Rossi "Justice, Legitimacy and (Normative) Authority for Political Realists," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 15 [2], 2012; and Matt Sleat, "Justice and Legitimacy in Contemporary Liberal Thought," *Social Theory and Practice* 41 [2], 2015).

Now Jack Knight and Melissa Schwartzberg have masterfully edited a *Nomos* volume on legitimacy in the best tradition of this series: it is a solid cross section of work in a burgeoning field. The volume is in three parts. Part I

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contains mostly conceptual work on the philosophical foundations of legitimacy. Part II offers chapters on a range of normative legitimacy problems. The essays in Part III deal with the interface between the conceptual, normative, and empirical study of legitimacy. The editors' introduction does an excellent job of summarizing each of the 12 chapters, so here I focus on just 3 that I take to be representative of the volume's tenor. My selection is inevitably idiosyncratic, so it should not be taken as a judgment on the chapters' relative quality.

Amanda Greene's "Is Political Legitimacy Worth Promoting?" is one of the most ambitious contributions in part I. In addition to answering the titular question, her chapter provides a full-fledged theory of legitimacy as "quality assent." The view is that a regime is legitimate just in case (a) enough of its subjects judge that there is some value in being a subject of that order and (b) those judgments are compatible with the regime's "essential claim of rule," namely "the provision of basic security for all subjects" (p. 72). If, say, someone's assent to the regime is combined with a rejection of the regime's aim to provide basic security to all those subjected to it, then their assent does not contribute to legitimacy. There is much to like about Greene's chapter, especially the worthwhile and largely successful effort to isolate legitimacy from other normative concerns. However, one cannot help but notice a similarity between Greene's view of assent and Bernard Williams's realist theory of legitimacy, centered on what he calls the "Basic Legitimation Demand": the provision of order in ways that are in some non-moralized sense acceptable to the regime's subjects. Or rather, there is at least one difference, but I do not think that it is well motivated. For Williams, acceptance of a political order "does not count if the acceptance itself is produced by the coercive power which is supposedly being justified" (Williams, *In the Beginning*, 2005). Greene rejects such a critical-theoretic enhancement of her notion of assent, because epistemic defects do not necessarily make acceptance incorrect. She identifies two types of epistemic defect: "where the content of the belief is false [and] where the process of belief formation involves manipulation or deception" (p. 82). It is true that neither of those defects guarantees incorrect acceptance, and Greene cautions us against prizing "having correct beliefs at the expense of everything else that might matter" (p. 83). But this move circumvents the most salient question. It is possible that a regime may brainwash its citizens into a correct acceptance, but how likely is that? And why take this epistemic risk?

Moving on to part II, Jennifer Rubenstein's "The Political Legitimacy of International NGOs" provides an excellent example of how normative political theory can fruitfully be brought to bear on issues that are typically the preserve of empirically minded scholars. The chapter's main contention is that applying the tools of political theory to the INGO legitimacy debate "has the potential to (re)politicize those debates in surprising and salutary ways, especially if the criteria for political legitimacy attached to this project include democratic criteria" (p. 251). Although I find Rubenstein's insertion of the normative perspective into the debate valuable, I am left wondering why she chose to retain the standard, state-centric notion of legitimacy as the right to *rule*, rather than relying on more expansive accounts, such as N. P. Adams's idea of institutional legitimacy as the "right to function without coercive interference." For Adams, "legitimacy answers a very specific fundamental question: *must we allow this institution to carry on, or may we coercively interfere with it?*" (Adams, "Institutional Legitimacy," 2017). The suggestion is that it is possible to capture the relevant normative dimensions of an INGO's power without falling into the sometimes forced parallel with a ruling authority.

I found part III of the volume the most refreshing, because it really breaks down the barrier between empirical and normative approaches to legitimacy. Sanford Gordon and Gregory Huber's chapter is an excellent example of how this may be done. Its strategy is to draw on the normative literature to enhance a positive definition of legitimacy. Specifically, justifiability and obligation are deployed to sharpen the generally agreed-on idea that there is more to social cooperation than material incentives: "obligation implies a motivation to comply apart from extrinsic, material motivations; while justification implicates citizens' beliefs about authorities and institutions." On this account, legitimacy is "a feature of an equilibrium in which citizens' intrinsic motivations are enhanced by those beliefs about authorities, and the actions of governing institutions are consistent with those beliefs" (p. 329). Although I am inclined to agree that such an account should prove empirically productive—in fact, the authors' review of a large body of empirical literature in light of their definition sheds much light on some recurring confusions—I would like to point out a normative complication, namely the possible decoupling of justification and obligation. As A. John Simmons argued, whether I have an obligation to comply with an authority and whether that authority's commands are justified are two completely separate questions (A. John Simmons, "Justification and Legitimacy," *Ethics* 109 [4], 1999). However, far from agreeing with Simmons that legitimacy is purely a matter of obligation rather than justification, I wonder whether we could simplify our analytic categories by making obligation redundant: tying legitimacy to the convergence of perceived obligation and justifiability might obscure the fact that beliefs in justifiability might enhance intrinsic motivation without the need to invoke the notion of obligation.

The preceding remarks should give a sense of the import of *Nomos XXI.* There is much to learn from each of the

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chapters that I have not been able to discuss here due to space constraints. Anyone with an interest in political legitimacy—be they a theorist or an empirically minded scholar—would do well to consider this volume a reference point.

Plato's Caves: The Liberating Sting of Cultural Diversity. By Rebecca LeMoine. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. 288p. $74.00 cloth.
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Plato's dialogues tend to be read against a predominantly Athenian backdrop. After all, his central protagonist, Socrates, is rarely depicted venturing outside Athens, and Plato's rendering of the trial and death of his teacher is widely understood as a searing indictment of contemporary Athenian political practice. Yet foreign characters and references abound in Plato's work—from the Chalcedonian sophist Thrasymachus in the *Republic*; to the Egyptian myth of Theuth in the *Phaedrus*; to the Cretan setting of the *Laws*, where, much like the setup to a joke, a Cretan, a Spartan, and an Athenian "Stranger" are walking toward a cave sacred to Zeus, the god of foreigners.

What would it mean to take these references seriously? This is the endeavor undertaken by Rebecca LeMoine in her admirable book, *Plato's Caves: The Liberating Sting of Cultural Diversity*. The project proves to be extremely fertile: once one starts looking, Plato's corpus teems everywhere with foreign people, places, and things. When we examine them carefully—Plato's Caves suggests—we recover a more complete understanding of Plato's views on cultural diversity.

Plato, according to LeMoine, is an advocate of cultural diversity. This is because encounters with different cultures have the effect of what LeMoine calls a "liberating sting." If Socrates once defended his philosophical project as the work of a gadfly stinging awake the drowsy horse of Athenian society, foreigners can find themselves filling a similar role. Much like a philosophical encounter with Socrates, interactions with foreigners can help expose the internal contradictions in one's system of beliefs, which often reflects the beliefs that are taken for granted in one's culture.

Plato's Caves stresses that reconstructing Plato's defense of cultural diversity is all the more timely because extant portraits of a xenophobic Plato—including Karl Popper's infamous depiction of the original architect of "the closed society"—are ripe for appropriation by white nationalists and Eurocentric movements. Plato's views, furthermore, constitute a novel supplement to existing arguments for cultural diversity. Taking her cue from Plato's critique of democracy as a regime especially vulnerable to tyranny, LeMoine suggests that democratic citizens today can look to cultural diversity as a resource that can help temper democracy's "knee-jerk reaction" to infringements on individual freedoms, which often leads democracies to undermine their own values (p. 243). The provocation of foreign cultures, for Plato, cultivates in citizens a "better disposition or attitude toward knowledge." A disposition grounded in epistemic humility—one that better equips citizens to "pause and reflect"—is what *Plato's Caves* identifies with Socratic wisdom (pp. 245–46).

One way of summing up the many contributions of this book is to describe it as a rich and suggestive effort to draw out the role of culture in Plato's political thought. A guiding metaphor that frames the book is borrowed from Plato's Allegory of the Cave. The cave, on LeMoine's reading, represents the *polis*, and being steeped unreflectively in one's own culture is akin to the predicament of the prisoner in the allegory. *Plato's Caves* devotes a chapter to making a convincing—if at times belabored—case for reading the Allegory of the Cave, not only as an illustration of Plato's epistemology and metaphysics, but also as a study of political culture and upbringing. This lesson could just as easily be applied to what theorists ordinarily take to be the scope of Plato's philosophy and its political relevance. If Plato has, in recent years, been a valuable source of insight on topics in politics ranging from citizenship to democracy, *Plato's Caves* reminds us that we also yet have much to learn from him as a theorist of culture.

LeMoine is an especially engaging guide to the multicultural world evoked in four Platonic dialogues: the *Republic*, *Menexenus*, *Laws*, and *Phaedrus*. We learn, for instance, about the fascinating political history of the festival at Piraeus that forms the backdrop to the *Republic*, the detail that Thrasymachus was a diplomat who prominently spoke out against Athenian imperialism, and the finer aspects of Athenian foreign policy and changes in its citizenship laws in fifth century BCE. Chasing down the significance of these passing details makes for a rewarding journey, even if the connections that LeMoine extracts from them are not always entirely convincing.

Necessarily baked into the project of applying such scrutiny to Plato's foreign references is a methodological commitment to reading in "dramatic context" (p. 32). On the approach adopted throughout *Plato's Caves*, every choice on Plato's part to allude to a foreign place or saying, or to cast a non-Athenian character as the mouthpiece for a particular view, has to be taken as both deliberate and significant. One consequence of this approach is that *Plato's Caves* often ends up focusing on how surface claims in Plato's text are complicated by their context—be it the foreign status of a character voicing a xenophobic claim, or the foreign setting in which a trio of city planners are discussing the merits of closing their city to outside influences.

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