

occur. He calls for more listening and less preaching and argues for a public reflective equilibrium that is aimed at improving the consciousness of the public while enriching political philosophy with the complex and relevant views that members of the public hold.

Calvert's book seems to heed this call. He invites a distinguished line of scholars from diverse disciplines, including law, history, economics, and political philosophy to grapple with relevant, contemporary issues as those are reflected in campus life and in the wider political world. The book itself starts with Brian's challenge, and the rest of the authors too start their inquiries mostly with real problems of real people. Most articles are looking for ways to empower and support the development of engaged citizens, and all of them search for possible answers to pressing political issues. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Leroy S. Rouner, and Alan Wolfe all defend the incorporation of religion into character education by letting it be infused into the political discourse and support the process of civic education. Elshtain shares de-Shalit's impulse to incorporate actual public discourse into our theoretical discussions. "How do we talk?" she asks, and replies "just listen" (p. 183). She claims that Americans talk in heavily religious terms and their perspectives are loaded with religious views. This inclination, she suggests, needs to be incorporated into the debate on civic education and engagement for us to create a shared vision of the common good. In a similar vein but with a different perspective, James Stewart offers insights on the characteristics and motivation of individuals who commit supererogatory civic acts, such as the compelling story of Richard Rescorla's heroism and subsequent death on September 11.

Most authors in this volume practice some of the principles that de-Shalit endorses. They are pragmatic, realistic, and directly connected to the discourse and realities they examine and that they aim to change. They employ the tools of their diverse disciplines to tackle contemporary, real-world questions: Todd Gitlin considers the civic effects of the media; Roger Wilkins has a striking discussion of contemporary Black civic engagement; Michael Walzer suggests a revision of the college curriculum to expose every student to the basic aspects of moral and political philosophy. To preserve democracy, he claims, we need to live by our values; we must not shy away from teaching them to our children. Maintaining a commitment to the liberal democratic tradition is the only way to sustain democracy across generations. William Galston too offers a program for college-level civic education. His program aims to enrich students' knowledge through curricular changes, as well as to improve administrative transparency and civic inquiry at the institutional level, and broaden the range of links between the university and the political environment.

Political theorists should be worried about the relevance and efficacy of their methods, ideas, and arguments,

as both these books suggest. Anyone who cares about democracy should care about youth disengagement. Searching for ways to respond to this challenge is vital for preserving the basic values of democracy and for maintaining democracy as a way of life. The two books share the aspiration of educating college and university students to become active, engaged citizens by using the tools of political philosophy. Though de-Shalit offers a radical argument for reconstructing the methods and content of political philosophy to adapt it to the needs of contemporary society, the authors in Calvert's book exemplify this type of scholarship by starting with vital contemporary issues and using analytical and argumentative tools developed in various disciplines to respond to these issues. It seems that de-Shalit constructs his work as a radical take on political philosophy, and that he intends his perspective to shed a new light on the premises and practices of this profession. Calvert's book is structured with a similar sense of urgency and with a comparable critique of university teaching and its impact on students'—future citizens'—attitudes and actions. Whether either of them can fulfill their mission, that is, whether either can engage the general public, mobilize students to engage, or help scholars do a better job in engaging the public, remains to be seen. It is possible that books alone will not do so, although they offer one powerful tool among others in sustaining and advancing democracy.

Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and Beyond. By Daniel Carey. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 276p. \$85.00. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070879

— Eduardo Velásquez, *Washington and Lee University*

Daniel Carey rehabilitates a dispute among John Locke, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, and Francis Hutcheson "focused on the problem of diversity and the question of whether any moral consistency could be located in mankind" (p. 1). Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in distinct ways respond to Locke's attack on innateness, the idea that "God had implanted ideas or predispositions in the soul which guided the moral actions and beliefs of mankind" (p. 51). Shaftesbury and Hutcheson do so by evoking a "Stoic conception which saw nature as a fund of normative ideas, predispositions, or prolepses that embraced benevolence, sociability, disinterested affection, and the divine, explaining our attachments to friend, family, and nation" (p. 200).

Carey is not solely interested in ideas confined to time and place. By looking to the present in light of the past, Carey argues that "we not only *historicize* the present, but we also gain some added perspective on the powers and limits of current configurations, as well as an assessment of the strength and weaknesses of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century legacies to the present" (p. 201, my emphasis). In this light, he contends that the struggle

prefigured by the British Enlighteners is evident today in the clash between anthropologists Clifford Geertz and Tzvetan Todorov. Geertz “asserted that the vocation of anthropology is not to seek out a specious *consensus omnium* but rather to locate the truly salient differences marked by culture” (p. 12). Geertz is a contemporary version of Locke. “An alternative approach that attempts to define some common resources in human nature, even if they are not fully moral, appears especially in the *philosophical* anthropology of Tzvetan Todorov” (p. 12, my emphasis). Todorov is a contemporary version of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Todorov accomplishes this, we are told, by “emphasizing ‘sociality’ as a unifying force, although he defines it in ways that avoid the pitfall of normative or teleological reasoning” (p. 13). A final accommodation among the various positions old and new seems to rest with Chandra Kakathas’s *The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom* (2003). The virtue of Kakathas’s work is that it attempts “to recover a unifying concept of human nature . . . although [Kakathas] *wisely* avoids determining, prescriptively, the ‘content’ of conscience or the moral sense” (p. 30, my emphasis).

As an attempt to recover the differences among Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson and to consider the prospects for accommodation, Carey’s book succeeds. He provides a lucid reading of the Enlighteners and, in so doing, reminds us that the Enlightenment did not usher in a totalitarian project. By harking back to Greeks and Stoics, Carey shows that our perennially vexed ruminations about the relationship between difference and sameness were not recently discovered by postmoderns. Common sense alone speaks to a ubiquitous human diversity as well as to shared thoughts, feelings, and experiences that seem to indicate that we are encased in something like an ongoing human condition. That Carey reads forward and backward testifies to his own belief in the dictates of common sense. Here lies the rub.

As an attempt to come to terms with the tension between sameness and difference, Carey is less successful. His work is stamped firmly with the imprint of Quentin Skinner’s volatile and wavering assertion that ideas are the product of time and circumstance. Is this an untenable position? If each thinker is confined to context, is this not true of Carey himself? Also of every author he reads, ancient and contemporary? Do we contextualize Carey and every author he reads in infinite regress? How is the infinite regress intelligible if we are insulated by “history”? What does Carey mean by saying that his argument about old and new historicizes the present? If historicizing is the product of the historicist who claims that we can only understand “ideas in context,” has not the historicity of the present ruled out access to the past? If historicizing the present means that we situate present disputes about sameness and difference in the context of an historical argument that is not confined to any particular time and place, has Carey escaped the historicist premise?

That Carey ignores arguments of nonhistoricist political philosophers in favor of anthropology is revealing. Carey wants to preserve the notion that we are malleable historical beings but in ways that do not commit him to a fixed, permanent, and ubiquitous human nature. Carey’s language and sources are telling. Todorov unlike Geertz is supposedly a proponent and adherent of a “*philosophical* anthropology.” In what way, to what end, in what character has philosophy emerged in the historical anthropology? Carey immediately shies away from pursuing the difficult question of what the new anthropology is willing to say about the enduring features of our nature by complementing Kathakas’s wisdom in avoiding the “content” of conscience or moral sense. He heaps equal praise on Todorov’s nonteleological (though somehow philosophical) anthropology. Shying away from content saves Carey from having to specify what features of human nature persist through history. In so doing, does Carey call into question the very thing he seeks? The overarching appeal to human “sociability” may not save the day. Thomas Hobbes reminds us of why humans are driven into society: We love contemplating and exercising our own relative power; we seek honor; we relish conquest; we love to tame the superior beasts and issue preemptive strikes because we cannot judge the “wit of another.” Sociability cuts a number of ways. Nor would we know in the absence of a penetrating philosophical argument why the sociability referred to here is as present in the past as it is in the present. Do we mean what Shaftesbury and Hutcheson mean by sociability? As long as the ideas remain in context, the answer to the question is most likely no. So once again, the content of our socializing nature needs to come to the fore. In this enterprise, philosophical anthropology is no substitute for philosophy itself.

Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship. By Susan D. Collins. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 206p. \$70.00.

Plato and the Virtue of Courage. By Linda R. Rabieh. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. 224p. \$45.00. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070880

— Frederick Vaughan, *University of Guelph*

Why do we need books about courage and civic virtue, written by ancient philosophers in an idiom so difficult for moderns such as ourselves to understand? How could such books be relevant in post-9/11 days? The whole world *saw* civic courage right before their eyes in the aftermath of the Twin Towers’ attack. The last thing one would think Americans needed today is instruction in what constitutes courage or civic virtue more generally. Yet Americans would be decidedly wrong in thinking so skeptically. The books under review demonstrate why.

As Linda Rabieh shows in the opening chapters of her splendid book, it is precisely because of events such as