come through liberalization, not mobilization (181). The Russian government's stabilization policies were generally successful, though they relied heavily on social spending and loan guarantees for enterprises (129)—recycling oil rents to produce social stability. Rather than embark on serious supply side reforms (a more flexible labor market, for example), most of the elite hoped that a return to higher global oil prices would reflate the economy. Meanwhile rising labor costs made Russia less competitive (150, 164), a situation that demographic trends will only exacerbate. A relatively low savings rate, 22% of GDP, also constrains growth (170). Yet, the elite remains complacent: "demand for modernization has notably fallen in the past decade" (189). Even before the imposition of sanctions and fall in oil price that occurred in 2014, it was clear that the Russian economy was stagnating (178). Mau does not give us any grounds for optimism that Russia will be able to break out of its economic impasse.

There are some prominent factors that Mau passes over in his analysis. He does not devote much attention to China, either as a model or as a partner, contending that "China has not become a significant factor in the overcoming of the global crisis" (110). And he does not directly address the role of Vladimir Putin in Russia's political economy, beyond the delicate observation that "by 2000 . . . the macroeconomic stabilization had been synchronized with political stabilization" (6). It remains an open question, therefore, whether Putin's eventual departure from the political scene will lead to another crisis, or a breakthrough to a new economic model.

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Russia-EU Relations and the Common Neighborhood: Coercion vs Authority. Irina Busygina. Post-Soviet Politics Series. Abingdon, Oxon, Eng.: Routledge, 2018. viii, 249 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $149.95, hard bound.
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Irina Busygina is a highly respected scholar of Russian politics in general and EU-Russia relations in particular. In her new book, which she herself describes as "the culmination of over ten years of research" (1), she thoroughly analyzes the distinct characteristics of the two great powers of Russia and the EU, the interplay between them, and their influence on the third countries located between them. The main argument is that Russia and the EU, due to differences in their institutional arrangements, represent separate types of great powers: while the former is a "coercive power," the latter is a more distinct type labeled an "authority-based power." Busygina argues that the type of power a state or international organization is largely determines both its foreign policy goals and the influence tools it applies to pursue these goals. This explains why Russia and the EU have largely incompatible goals for the common neighborhood in-between them, and it is also the reason why the countries located in this region face such great difficulties walking the tightrope between Moscow and Brussels. The book is not only timely and topical but also empirically and theoretically rich. As such, it makes for a good starting point for scholars and policy-makers interested in getting the full overview of the evolutions of Russian and EU foreign policies and relations. For area experts who are familiar with the relevant academic literature and the cases under study, however, there is, I am sad to say, less to learn.

In the first five chapters, Busygina lays out the theoretical framework of the book. Building on work by David A. Lake, she makes the distinction between "powers of coercion" and "powers of authority" in international relations. While the former subjugates other states to its will through force, the latter is capable of making

subordinate states follow its command out of a sense of duty (15). Busygina convincingly argues that Russia represents the traditional, coercive type of power, while the EU is a good, and if not the only, example of an authority power. These are important and well-defined conceptual differences and it definitely makes sense to analyze Russia-EU relations through such a lens.

The book is less convincing theoretically in terms of explaining why Russia and the EU ended up looking this way and why different types of third-party states react differently to the levers applied by the two types of great powers. Regarding the first question, Busygina argues that the answer lies in differences in domestic institutions (autocracies vs. democracies) and their ability to display success and effectiveness to the outside world (18–25). What I missed here was a discussion of what might change the status quo: which factors and developments (if any) could push Russia towards more authority-based external relations, and which could make the EU resemble more a traditional coercive power? As for the second question, Busygina does not provide an elaborate theory as to what makes this or that influence attempt by this or that great power effective across different domestic contexts. I understand that this is perhaps beyond the scope of the book, but if we are to understand the doings of authority-based powers, the question of why the EU's power, and Russia's coercive power for that matter, resonate unevenly across different domestic contexts is pivotal.

Following this, Busygina turns to four case studies: Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, and Turkey. In each case, she sums up domestic political trajectories and analyzes the developments of relations with both the EU and Russia. While the first three represent cases that we frequently see analyzed in volumes on Russia-EU relations, the Turkey case is an interesting new pick.

Russia-EU relations and the Common Neighborhood is a stimulating, highly readable, and information-rich, up-to-date introduction to Russia-EU relations and their impact on countries located in what Busygina refers to as the common neighborhood. It should be a go-to book for those who need an overview of and a reference guide to a vast empirical and theoretical literature. For readers with more experience in the field, I missed theoretical sharpness and a more innovative, elaborate argument. There is, in my view, too much going on across the many pages of theory, and at the same time, there are too many lose ends in the arguments. The author could compensate for this if the empirical chapters introduced a lot of new material or presented a new and interesting reading of what we already know. I must admit that I was somewhat disappointed here.

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