

Face to the Village includes excellent maps, photographs, and tables. For my stylistic preferences, McDonald writes too often in the passive voice and explicitly states her argument too frequently within and across chapters. She could also have reduced the text to a more assignable length by shortening her synopses of existing scholarship and eschewing some of her excursions into methodological issues. Readers who anticipate these additions to an already detailed study will find *Face to the Village* an illuminating examination of the still-more-Russian-peasant-dominated-than-Soviet-controlled countryside of the 1920s.

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Would Trotsky Wear a Bluetooth? Technological Utopianism under Socialism, 1917–1989. By Paul R. Josephson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. ix, 342 pp. Notes. Index. Figures. \$65.00, hard bound.

As a historian, Paul R. Josephson is an explorer and an adventurer. In earlier publications, he was at his best when visiting offbeat places, exploring unopened archival collections, and reporting previously untold stories. This book undertakes a very different task: to offer a synthetic review of socialist societies' experiences with advanced technology and industrial modernity. Alas, the text shows obvious signs of being composed in a hurry, as if the author was filling up pages without pause, having lost his patience for careful analysis of sources and disciplined thinking. What the book lacks in the former, it substitutes with vague generalities, touristic memories, and superficial anecdotes.

The reading is nevertheless instructive in a different sense, for behind its inconsistencies and contradictions, one senses the familiar intellectual trauma of a scholarly generation still shell-shocked from the collapse of communist power in eastern Europe twenty years ago. That momentous experience and its strong passions have become a fixation for a new variety of whig historiography. The popular "we now know" genre derives its primary lesson from 1991, as if the latter were the end of history and the ultimate criterion through which to understand, teleologically, two centuries of socialist ideas and movements. I will leave aside for now the wishful futurological aspect of this approach and focus instead on its historiographic problems and rhetorical tools.

Earlier generations of anticommunist historians acknowledged, if grudgingly, that the USSR had managed to transform itself from a largely agrarian into a highly industrialized country, without the advantage of external resources or investments, by imposing severe deprivations on its own population, especially peasants. The Soviets accomplished this stressful task in record manner, just barely in time to match technologically the looming military onslaught by Nazi Germany. Historians writing under the influence of the 1991 shock wish to reinterpret the above story into a failure of some kind. Josephson achieves this goal easily, without recourse to statistics or economic data, simply with a rhetorical shift of focus. "Granted," the Soviet Union industrialized, but it is much more important, he declares, to understand that the effort "fell short" (10, 13) of the exaggerated utopian expectations of its leaders.

Any committed undertaking in world history can be dismissed in a second with such a trick, given humans' notorious penchant for wishful thinking, and the Soviet case is no exception. Still, Josephson hastily ascribes to early Soviet leaders a deliberately crude version of "technological utopianism." Vladimir Lenin and Lev Trotskii urged their followers to adopt and master bourgeois technology because they were keenly aware that Russian socialists had come to power prematurely, in a country that lacked a fully developed capitalist industry. Josephson claims, however, that they saw bourgeois technology as "value-neutral," a "panacea" (7) capable just by itself of liberating workers—a technocratic view that the Bolsheviks did not share but ridiculed as non-Marxist and utopian.

The second chapter focuses on Nowa Huta near Kraków and other model towns, flagship sites of postwar industrialization in eastern Europe. The Polish architects who designed this visionary urban project with its improved living conditions for workers proudly looked down upon the slums typical of western European cities during the earlier periods

of industrialization. In his turn, Josephson looks down upon the east European “proletarian aesthetics” (chapter 2) through the eyes of a typical American tourist. He does not notice the extraordinary amount of designated green space that preceded the supposed birth of modern environmental consciousness, instead reproaching the city for its “grayness” (69) due to reliance on concrete as a building material. I can partly understand his feelings: from my own office window I also see not only the West Coast mountains but rectangular concrete, the same international 1950s fashion locally called “modern brutalism.” But Nowa Huta was built, not for upper-middle-class professors from the postindustrial era, but for industrial laborers, mostly yesterday’s peasants coming from impoverished places devastated by the war, and they saw its dwellings in a very different light.

For the third chapter about technology in North Korea, Josephson relies on secondary English-language sources that are few and far between and guesses much by analogy. The discussion substitutes for the conspicuous absence of a key example—China—for which incomparably more detailed sources can be found. Arguably the largest case of technology transfer in history, Chinese industrialization was also the most Stalinist of all, assisted by massive socialist aid, complete engineering blueprints and know-how, thousands of visiting Soviet specialists, and tens of thousands of Chinese students educated in the USSR. For the teleological approach to history, however, the story lacks the required finale and the “we now know” moment, because instead of collapsing in 1989, the Chinese Communist Party suppressed protesters at Tiananmen. What can one do if a crucial example of socialist industrialization does not fit preestablished conclusions? The fastest way is to ignore the case altogether.

Further chapters deal with nuclear power, environmental problems, industrial safety, and socialist efforts to achieve women’s equality. To an interested reader, they offer additional illustrations of how one can substitute historically sensitive analyses with ahistorical comparisons based on criteria deliberately drawn from a much later cultural epoch, exaggerated propaganda, an unrealistic ideal, or the mythological “west,” all in order to reconfirm rhetorically the ideological “end of history.”

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Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism. By Juliane Fürst. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. xiv, 391 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Glossary. Index. Illustrations. Photographs. \$99.00, hard bound.

For a long time, the postwar Stalin years were the least studied, least understood period in all of Soviet history. Recent scholarship has begun to fill this void, and Juliane Fürst’s new book makes an important contribution to our understanding of this crucial era. Fürst focuses in particular on Soviet youth who came of age immediately after the war. This generation, although deeply affected as children by their experiences on the homefront, had not fought in the war and had an outlook distinct from that of the wartime generation. To portray postwar Soviet youth, Fürst explores a range of topics, from crime and hooliganism, to social and sexual mores, to fashion and dancing. She finds that youth of this era were preoccupied with consumption, western-influenced subcultures, and shirking the system—all hallmarks of the systemic decay that emerged full-blown during the Brezhnev era.

Fürst argues that the war, not Nikita Khrushchev’s thaw, was “the decisive turning point that set Soviet society on a trajectory leading to increasing alienation, failed reforms, stagnation, and eventual collapse” (6). In particular she highlights the generational tensions sown by the war. Due to enormous wartime casualties, the generation that had fought in the war was depleted, but its surviving members wielded a disproportionate degree of authority. Returning veterans were awarded leadership positions in virtually all Soviet institutions. Fürst’s examination of the Komsomol, for example, reveals that women and young men who were leaders during the war were replaced by male veterans after the war. The demographically small cohort of veterans in the Komsomol lorded it over