

cooperation with other universities to ensure autonomy. As problems of American expansion arose, universities, acting as independent agents, offered research and expertise. Nemec cites the example of the Federal Bureau of Education which lacked the resources and authority to regulate high school and university education. Driven by a desire to enhance their own reputations, universities stepped in. Universities began by creating standards for entrance into the university and then expanded to standardizing credentials for teaching and advanced degrees. Although universities competed with each other for quality students and professors, they recognized the need to work together to create these standards. The measures also represented the collective effort by university officials to keep American students from going abroad for undergraduate and graduate level education. By doing so, universities could control the type of education Americans received, further promoting American liberal democracy over socialism and, in turn, increasing universities' usefulness to the state.

Most of the initial initiatives during the first era resulted from informal networks of personal relationships between university presidents. The formally aligned era of 1900–1920 grew through the creation of the Association of American Universities (AAU) in 1900. Rather than limiting university presidents' autonomy and influence, the AAU provided additional legitimacy. Taking full advantage, the institutional entrepreneurs aligned themselves with private philanthropists, such as the Carnegie Foundation, to obtain new financial resources for their endeavors. The government responded by increasing its reliance on universities for experts and trained workers. Certain government agencies could not have existed without university programs. Nemec cites Yale's forestry school as a key example. The program made the Federal Bureau of Forestry viable by supplying it with trained graduates. The school served a secondary function of promoting America's colonial efforts in the Philippines. The university brought Filipino students to Yale to pursue advanced degrees. Upon completion, the students would return to the Philippines to assist the U.S. civil service.

Throughout the two eras, Nemec highlights the political savvy and vision of the key university leaders. Quoting Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nemec describes institutions as the "long shadow of men" (p. 17). Their influence extended well beyond the ivory towers to all branches of government. University presidents utilized the relationships with governmental agencies, the AAU, and philanthropies to expand their own knowledge and experience. Presidents regularly took sabbaticals to work in outside departments—for example, Angell served three tours of diplomatic service. Universities subsidized presidents' service to the state, viewing this service as good publicity for the university. Each calculated action helped elevate the role and function of the university system. The pinnacle

of university influence came as Woodrow Wilson, former president of Princeton, was elected president of the United States.

Nemec ends the book with a discussion of the place of public policy in university education, arguing that all political science departments should include public policy in the curriculum. Universities continue to be agenda-setting institutions by defining the importance of social and political issues. As such, political scientists must be trained in public policy. Nemec dismisses Jonathan Cohn's charge that political science has forgotten politics and that policy and public policy have parted ways ("Irrational Exuberance: When Did Political Science Forget about Politics?" *New Republic* [October 25, 1999]: 26). Theoretically the two may still be linked, but Nemec must recognize that institutionally they may be distant. As more universities create separate public policy departments, Nemec's hope for policy-oriented political scientists may become more difficult to realize.

State theory scholars or students may find Nemec's discussion of the state a bit sparse. The introduction briefly mentions the works of key theorists such as Mary Douglas and Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Far more attention is placed upon universities and the role of the institutional entrepreneurs. Overall, Nemec's book is well-suited for those interested in public policy, leadership, and education. The case studies provide ample evidence for his claim that strategic actors defined the relationship between the state and universities.

**The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don't Get.** By Benjamin I. Page with Marshall M. Bouton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 336p. \$50.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.  
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— Matthew Baum, *University of California, Los Angeles*

In the November 2006 midterm elections, voters swept Republicans out of power in what was widely interpreted as a rebuke of the Bush administration's Iraq policies. In subsequent polls, nearly two-thirds of the public opposed President George W. Bush's postelection proposal for a "surge" in the U.S. troop presence in Iraq. Undeterred, the president declared on January 14, 2007, "I've made my decision and we're going forward," and his press secretary, Tony Snow, said on January 9, "The president will not shape policy according to public opinion." How can a U.S. president sustain a deeply unpopular foreign policy, seemingly uninfluenced by electoral setbacks or popular disapproval? *Should* the president be more responsive to public preferences? In an important and ambitious new book, Benjamin Page and Marshall Bouton bring to bear an impressive array of survey data in order to answer these

and other questions central to the study of public opinion and U.S. foreign policy.

Page and Bouton offer two core propositions, one descriptive and the other prescriptive. Beginning with the former, they argue that public opinion regarding foreign policy is purposive and rational, both collectively and individually. Concerning collectively, they argue that contrary to the prevailing wisdom, the public's foreign policy preferences are neither volatile nor impulsive, but rather mostly reasonable and consistent over time.

As for individually, Page and Bouton do not consider typical Americans to be ideologues, in *The American Voter* (Angus Campbell et al. 1960) sense. They do not find evidence of prevalent *horizontally* constrained foreign policy belief systems, whereby attitudes in one issue domain (e.g., national security) are functionally related to attitudes in other domains (e.g., trade). Rather, drawing on cognitive schema theory, they argue that most people possess *vertically* constrained, purposive belief systems, whereby opinions on specific issues follow sensibly from broader policy goals, which, in turn, follow from core values, all within the general domain of foreign policy. The authors thus challenge the near-ubiquitous post-World War II "Almond-Lippmann consensus" (Ole Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 [December 1992]: 439–66) that mass opinion is unhelpful—even dangerous—as a source of guidance for policymakers.

Page and Bouton's prescriptive proposition is that political leaders are insufficiently responsive to public preferences in foreign policy. To establish the need for *increased* responsiveness, they demonstrate a shortfall by analyzing two recent surveys by the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations (CCFR), conducted in 2002 and 2004. These unusually comprehensive surveys include separate modules posing identical questions to foreign policy elites and the general public. This allows for wide-ranging comparisons of attitudes across the two groups. Wherever feasible, the authors also employ prior CCFR surveys to investigate longer-term trends.

Page and Bouton first show that the public cares about numerous foreign policy issues, that its priorities have remained largely stable over time, and that where public preferences have changed substantially, such changes were reasonable reactions to external events, like the end of the Cold War. They then turn to individual-level analyses, in order to demonstrate that the opinions of typical Americans are purposive, following logically from their foreign policy goals (e.g., defending national security) and values (e.g., multilateralism). They find that across nearly all areas of foreign policy, individuals' goals and values outperform socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., education, ethnicity, and gender), as well as partisanship and ideology, in predicting their foreign policy opinions.

Although the book is grounded in social science theories, the authors want to reach a broad audience. They state early on that they do not intend to "spell out any very elaborate theory in this book" (p. 39). There is often some trade-off between theoretical rigor and accessibility. Where to draw that line is a judgment call. A consequence of the particular line they draw is that the statistical results *can* frequently be interpreted in ways more or less favorable to their preferred interpretation. For instance, they argue that demographic factors primarily influence opinions indirectly, through their effects on goals and values. However, their approach to hypothesis testing—varying the specifications of ordinary least squares models, and then comparing magnitudes and significance levels on causal variables, as well as model  $R^2$  values—does not allow strong causal inferences. The evidence, though highly suggestive, is thus inconclusive. Stronger causal inference would require stronger theoretical assumptions and more nuanced statistical methods. This, however, could reduce the book's accessibility and narrow its audience. On balance, though not ironclad, the impressive consistency of the authors' findings across a wide array of issue areas makes their argument mostly persuasive.

In the remainder of the book, the authors first compare mass and elite attitudes across identical issue dimensions—finding frequent, large, and persistent gaps—and then consider the normative implications for democracy of elites consistently discounting usually sensible citizen preferences. Though fascinating, and often highly suggestive, the evidence here is somewhat less compelling, especially with respect to normative implications.

Page and Bouton report substantial disagreement between elites and the general public on nearly three-fourths of the issues they investigated. This figure, however, is based on a seemingly arbitrary definition of "disagreement" as any instance where elites and the public diverged in their support for a policy by at least 10%. In fairness, on many issues the gap is considerably larger, averaging around 20%. It is nonetheless unclear that even this larger figure *necessarily* represents a politically consequential "disconnect." If, say, 90% of elites and 70% of the public support a policy, elites would presumably best represent the public by pursuing it. The authors counter that at 90% support levels, elites are likely to pursue "more" of a policy than a 70%-supportive public might want. Yet, this interpretation is debatable. Moreover, many questions—like whether to fight a war or sign a treaty—are dichotomous; either you pursue the policy or not.

Page and Bouton also investigate the proportion of issues on which absolute majorities of the two groups came out on opposite sides of an issue. This is the case for 26% of the issues in the study. Yet, as they admit, this indicates that elites and the public *agree* nearly three-fourths of the time. Is the glass one-quarter empty or three-quarters full? The authors favor the former interpretation. This too is

debatable, as is their assumption that the *opinions* of mostly midlevel foreign policy officials—White House decision makers are largely absent from the elite samples—represent a good proxy for U.S. foreign policy *actions*. Still, the data are illuminating—at times startling—and do reveal significant and persistent differences in the relative magnitudes, if not always the fundamental valence, of public and elite foreign policy preferences.

The brief discussion of policy recommendations in the conclusion is the weakest part of the book. One such recommendation is that policymakers read this book. This begs the question of whether U.S. foreign policy would look very different if elites *were* more responsive to the public. The authors implicitly answer yes. But this is not obvious, at least not in many instances. The proverbial “devil” lies in the often-opaque details of foreign policy. Public opinion surveys are ill suited for capturing the many nuances necessary for connecting general attitudes to specific policy courses of action.

The authors offer a litany of suggestions for increasing elite responsiveness to mass opinion, such as reversing the gerrymandering of House districts, making election day a national holiday, automatically registering all citizens to vote, and fining them for failing to do so. They argue that the media and interest groups should better publicize instances where politicians do not follow the public will. These all appear to be reasonable ideas. But their precise relationship to foreign policy decision making is not spelled out. Given the breadth of the intended audience, it would have been nice to see a weightier discussion of policy implications.

Notwithstanding this last critique, I agree with the authors that foreign policy practitioners, as well as scholars and students, would benefit from reading this book. At minimum, doing so might help to correct some of the misconceptions political leaders clearly continue to hold about American public opinion.

**Afro-Caribbean Immigrants and the Politics of Incorporation: Ethnicity, Exception, or Exit.** By Reuel R. Rogers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 318p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.99 paper.  
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— Kenneth Waltzer, *Michigan State University*

How is the process of political incorporation of immigrants and minorities in the United States changing amid the arrival in recent decades of unprecedented numbers of nonwhite new immigrants from Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean? In this probing case study of Afro-Caribbean immigrants in New York City, Reuel R. Rogers draws on extensive field interviews with elites and immigrants, study of census data and voting statistics, and analysis of historical episodes, and he argues that contemporary immigrant political incorporation resem-

bles neither a pluralist model based on earlier European-origin ethnic experience nor a minority model based on earlier African American migrant experience. Rather, race continues to shape the process as Afro-Caribbean newcomers confront issues of discrimination and exclusion in America. Because Afro-Caribbeans are rooted in a cognitive frame shaped by their status as immigrants and by their ethnic ties and home country attachments, they navigate politics differently from African Americans.

Afro-Caribbean immigrants, Rogers reminds us, are voluntary immigrants with distinctive identities, heritages, and prior experiences. They are classified as black in the American racial order, and they face real racial obstacles that actively complicate their lives. Indeed, Rogers argues that popular views of Afro-Caribbean comparative economic success are erroneous or overstated, and that most inhabit racially segregated enclaves in central Brooklyn, the north Bronx, and southeast Queens alongside African Americans, differing only slightly in status. Most work for wages and have only modestly higher labor force participation, income, and home ownership rates. However, Afro-Caribbean immigrants also are distinctive historical subjects—not just “blacks”—in New York, and their home country experiences, ties, and orientation shape a different cognitive frame in politics. They are excluded or neglected in the normal workings of city politics. Contrary to expectations in classical pluralist theory about urban party politics, New York party politics does not work to naturalize or mobilize the newcomers. As a consequence, Afro-Caribbeans lag in participation and power relative to their potential in numbers and residential concentration. On the other hand, while neglected, they do not join in active intraracial coalition with African Americans focusing on issues of race and benefits in politics. Nor do they seek to organize outside existing party channels for racial inclusion, preferring instead to mobilize and participate in current arrangements along ethnic and panethnic lines.

Rogers defines political incorporation not merely as a set of outcomes—including naturalization, registration, and voting rates—representation successes, and policy outcomes, but also as a dynamic process of socialization, a cognitive learning process. He is highly attuned to what Afro-Caribbean leaders and immigrants think as well as do because of his interviews, although these focus narrowly in central Brooklyn only. He tells us that Afro-Caribbeans bring to politics different perceptual lenses of their situation rooted in their immigrant status and in the salience and utility of their ethnic ties, home country ties, and the possibility they have as immigrants of exit. Hence, while they are affected by race and are sharply aware of it, they nonetheless mobilize—slowly, in delayed fashion, yet deliberately—by ethnicity. Following work by Philip Kasinitz on Afro-Caribbeans in New York, Rogers helps explain the absence of a rainbow (race-based) coalition in city politics for greater black incorporation.