communities do not protest and all is good. But firms, weighing the cost of the transfer to them against the cost and likelihood of protest, are more likely to renege on the promise if the costs of providing it are high or if they believe that communities are unlikely to protest. If the firm reneges on its promise, at the second decision point local populations must decide whether to protest or acquiesce (do nothing and suffer the externalities of mineral production). Local populations are more likely to protest when the cost of doing so is low, which depends on the vulnerability of the mine to protest (how easily production can be interrupted) and on beliefs about the likelihood and severity of government repression. Frequently, communities will not protest due to fears of government reprisals. But when communities protest, they impose economic costs on the firm and government, compelling the government to intervene. At the third decision point, governments decide whether to support the protestors by regulating the firm to honor its promises to the local population (incurring economic costs, but political gain) or repressing the protestors (incurring political costs, but economic gain). When the economic value of the mine increases for the government (higher taxation rates, larger mines) and local populations are politically marginal, it is more likely to repress protest.

The formal model is elegant, parsimonious, and insightful. We must, of course, accept that the real world is messier, but the simplified interactions of the model give a lot of leverage over understanding the problem of local resource conflicts. My reading of resource conflicts in Latin America, however, leads me to ask how the theory advanced in this book may accommodate certain empirical anomalies to the pattern examined in Africa.

For example, Steinberg sees the distinction between environmental conflicts (defend livelihoods) and distributive conflicts (get a better deal), which is a cornerstone of the Latin American literature, as an "artificial division" (p. 62), allowing her to compensate for both sets of concerns within the single concept of a transfer to communities. Certainly, that makes sense for distributive conflicts. But in the Latin American literature, a certain class of resource conflicts is characterized as "all-or-nothing" conflicts, in which activists reject all compensation and indeed the ideology of capitalist resource development in favor of alternative imaginaries. In these cases, local populations protest before the firm faces its first decision point on whether to honor the promised transfer. Also, in Latin America, states tend not be drawn into militarized repression of protest in ways that Steinberg describes in the African context, but it is true that activists, through protest, often try to pull the state into the conflict as an ally against the firm. Can these regional variations be accommodated within Steinberg's theory?

The case studies are compelling validations of the internal logic of the model, although the game in the Democratic Republic of Congo seems to be overdetermined by activist beliefs that protest will be repressed by the state. The statistical analyses provide convincing evidence for the external validity of the theory, and especially given the data constraints for this type of work, Steinberg comes up with some creative proxy indicators to test key ideas. Some of Steinberg's findings that conflict with the existing quantitative literature from Latin America (for example, that richer areas are more prone to conflict, that foreign firms are not more associated with conflict than local firms) will require further investigation to explain the discrepancy.

Gender and Representation in Latin America. Edited by Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 352p. $105.00 cloth, $36.95 paper.
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Over the last two decades, Latin American countries have seen a dramatic increase in the presence of women in national legislatures. In 1997 the regional average was just over 10% compared to today's average of 30.6%, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The region has also seen the largest number of women elected as presidents. Six countries have elected women as *presidentas*, and 18 have had viable women presidential candidates since 1990.

It is thus unsurprising that gender and politics scholars have looked at Latin America to answer questions about the causes and consequences of women's inclusion, the role of political parties and electoral institutions, and the obstacles women face once formal barriers are lifted and their participation is actively promoted. The wide adoption of gender quotas has been regarded as the most obvious explanation for women's political presence in the region. However, as *Gender and Representation in Latin America* shows, there is great variation in women's presence across the region, even when countries have gender quotas.

The increase in women's presence, which undoubtedly strengthens democracy, occurred concurrently with the rise in populist, antidemocracy leaders in various countries. The "left turn" put an end to democracy in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, and party systems broke down or collapsed in several other countries. Political scientists have studied these phenomena at length, but seldom have they paid sufficient attention to the role of gender in these institutional transformations or to the effect these changes have on women. Schwindt-Bayer's edited volume masterfully fills this gap. The book presents some of the most relevant findings on women and representation in Latin America shows, arguing that women's presence cannot be disconnected from the context of democratic challenges and political crises marring the region in the last 20 years (p. 4).

To explore the links between the current political climate and women's presence in politics, the volume analyzes representation in five arenas: the presidency, legislatures, political parties, presidential cabinets, and subnational governments. In the book's first part, each arena has a dedicated chapter analyzing the topic cross-nationally. The second part of the book takes a closer look at these arenas in seven countries.

Looking simultaneously at all of these areas emphasizes the effect of political institutions on women's representation, whereas analysis of how each arena functions in specific countries shows how particular institutional settings interact with sociocultural structures to hinder or increase women's presence at different levels of government. Catherine Reyes-Householder and Gwynn Thomas, for example, show that the rise in left-wing parties opened opportunities for women to become viable presidential candidates. However, they claim that successful bids for the presidency were the result not of more progressive politics in those left-wing parties, but rather of these parties' desire to hold onto power (p. 31). This desire, however, has not been enough to facilitate the election of women to other branches of government. Brazil and Chile, two countries where women have been elected and reelected for the presidency in the context of the left turn, have fewer women in their legislative bodies than the regional average (12% and 23%, respectively). The country-specific chapters by Susan Franceschet (Chile) and Clara Araújo, Anna Calasanti, and Mala Htun (Brazil) explain this contradiction as the result of the party systems, as well as of candidate-centered and adverse electoral systems.

More broadly, the book demonstrates how institutional reforms created to improve democracy, such as decentralization and reforms to the party system, affect women's representation in unintended ways. Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon and Kendall Funk show that the institutions that increase women's presence at the national level do not always have the same effect at subnational levels. Decentralization changes power dynamics that affect women's access to executive offices at the local level. Political parties, Jana Morgan and Magda Hinojosa show, act as gatekeepers by not recruiting women actively or not including women's interests in their platforms and policy priorities. The result is that women are less likely to identify as members of political parties and "do not find substantive representation within the existing set of political options" (p. 95). This contributes to the instability of the party system in the region.

Gender and Representation in Latin America shows that, when analyzing democratic backsliding and political institutions, ignoring women and gender more broadly results in an incomplete picture of the situation. Although both men and women in the region have similarly low levels of confidence in political institutions, the reasons behind those sentiments and the consequences of democratic breakdown affect them differently. Party fragmentation, for example, decreases opportunities for women to be elected (Schwindt-Bayer and Santiago Alles).

The country chapters demonstrate that different institutional settings create variations in women's representation in the region. Several chapters examine two countries that have received the most attention: Mexico and Argentina. Despite overcoming the mythical "critical mass" at which women should be able to transform politics, barriers persist. In both countries, men still hold most leadership positions in political parties and Congress. This undermines women's opportunities for advancing bills or influencing the implementation of public policy (Tiffany D. Barnes and Mark P. Jones). Similarly, cabinet positions and committee assignments are highly segregated by gender, with men having control over more powerful posts as heads of finance, budget, or defense committees and ministries, affecting women's potential to transform policy making in these areas (Pär Zetterberg; Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, and Meredith Gleitz). This explains why women have not been as effective in advancing women's issues (Schwindt-Bayer and Alles).

Other chapters analyze countries often overlooked by the literature on women's representation or democratic institutions in Latin America, such as Costa Rica (Jennifer M. Piscopo), Uruguay (Niki Johnson), and Colombia (Mónica Pachón and Santiago E. Lacouture). Costa Rica and Uruguay have divergent levels of women's representation, even though both countries are stable democratic governments. In Uruguay, the electoral system has negatively affected women's representation, which has been worsened by the male-dominated party leadership that controls access to candidate lists and appointed positions. Costa Rica is the opposite. The leadership has virtually reached gender parity and has elected a woman as president, but informal practices and discrimination constrain women's participation under equal conditions as men.

Missing from the book are countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and the Andes, as well as an intersectional perspective. This leaves the reader with questions about the inclusion and representation of indigenous and Afro-descendant women and about how democratic breakdown affects or interacts with the inclusion of women in legislative and executive bodies. These limitations, which are recognized by the editor, are understandable given the little research done in these countries and the lack of quality data about indigenous and Afro-descendant women's presence in politics. They signal necessary areas for future research.

Gender and Representation in Latin America presents a broad and deep analysis of women's representation in the region. It successfully synthesizes an expansive and rich body of research while providing a comprehensive and

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contextualized analysis of the political and institutional causes and consequences of women's inclusion. As such, it is a mandatory reference for those working on democratization, party systems, presidentialism, legislative politics, and electoral systems in Latin America and beyond.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

World Ordering: A Social Theory of Cognitive Evolution. By Emanuel Adler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 394p. $99.99 cloth, $34.99 paper.
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Emanuel Adler has been thinking about cognitive evolution, collective meaning, and social construction for a very long time. This book represents a major statement of his mature views, a kind of theoretical summation of decades of scholarship. Rather than providing detailed case investigations, Adler organizes this very conceptual book around three recurrent empirical examples—European integration, cyberspace, and the invention of the corporation—that he uses to illustrate the mechanisms and processes that make up his theoretical account. Suggestive rather than exhaustive, these examples serve as ways of making the book's abstract architecture somewhat more concrete.

It is impossible to provide a short summary of that architecture, which involves "three sociostructrual processual mechanisms" (p. 28) and "four agential processual mechanisms" (p. 29) that combine and concatenate in an evolutionary way. But the result is clear: it draws a picture of human social action as involved in the selective retention and creative variation of "symbolic, material, and organizational resources" arranged in "competent performances" (p. 217). Adler extends the core constructivist insight—that the world we have is not inevitable, that it did not *have* to turn out as it in fact did—far beyond the all-too-typical resort to ideational variables; he locates the stability of the world we have not in beliefs and not in structures but in ongoing patterns of practice. It is significant that he calls the book "world *ordering*," and not world *order*; much as in Nicholas Onuf's work (especially his *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, 1989), the ordered, stabilized character of social relations at a particular time and place is an achievement to be explained, not a factor that can do the explaining.

For Adler, order comes from ordering, and "social orders are therefore what communities of practice have learned to become" (p. 123). This means both that social order is held in place by ongoing practices that keep variation within acceptable limits, and that changes in that order must come from the community learning—by selectively retaining novel practices—to be something else. This is perhaps clearest in his discussion of the EU's *acquis communitaire* (pp. 168–72), where he makes the point that what is acquired when a country accedes to the European Union is not only a mass of regulations but also a whole bundle of practices. In effect, that country "learns to Europe," because the European social order is sustained by a set of practices that actors engage in, not merely by formal codes into which actors would have to be socialized.

There is some ambiguity in the way that Adler treats "order," however. If a social order is held in place by ongoing practices and thus only remains "metastable"—Adler is clear that "social orders are in a permanent state of nonequilibrium" (p. 32), and as such, stability is not uniformity but is variation with limits—as long as it is practiced, then it is unclear just what a social order *is* and why referring to a temporary fixity as an "order" makes any sense. A more thoroughly relational ontology might instead say this: here is a relative stability in patterns of transaction, but to call it an "order" would be to invest it with too much dispositional weight. (Certainly the actors themselves might call such a relative stability an "order," as part of their ongoing practice of sustaining that relative stability, but it is unclear why we ought to adopt their language.) Adler never provides an operational definition of an order, and he gives us no way to measure whether one even exists; absent such a definition, it is difficult to assess his relatively optimistic appraisal of the EU's resilience in the face of a resurgent populism and the rise of "illiberal democracy" (pp. 262–63). In fact, the very idea of appraising an order's capacity prospectively or in real time seems in tension with the evolutionary thrust of Adler's argument. Although we could say in retrospect that a community of practice learned to order differently, it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish between an analytical claim about the present and a pious hope that things will turn out a certain way.

Similar ambiguities haunt Adler's contention that practices survive and are retained through their "epistemic practical authority." He argues that organized slavery ended because "slavery practices lost their deontic power and anti-slavery practices acquired epistemic practical authority" (p. 270). Yet it is unclear whether this means that varying amounts of epistemic practical authority are the drivers of that process or are endogenous to it. If the latter, then it is unclear how saying that a practice has epistemic practical authority differs from saying that the practice is prevalent. But if it is the former, then we would need some way of assessing or measuring how much epistemic practical authority a practice had, but this is precisely what we *cannot* do inasmuch as epistemic