

the so-called Finnish school around Tuomo Mannermaa, but also Oswald Bayer, Berndt Hamm, and Bernd Wannenwetsch. Along the way he engages Hannah Arendt, Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Stanley Hauerwas, Hans Ulrich, and many others. His diverse citations make the footnotes interesting reading in their own right.

Though I find Laffin's prose and text at times overly dense and worthy of more attentive editing, and though the book addresses a rather particular niche in the Radical Orthodox project, this work is a valuable contribution to the ongoing reassessment of Luther's soteriology and offers us a useful orchestration of the voices identifying relational ontology and faith-as-process in Luther's thought. For this reason the book will also be of interest to theologians working with the Orthodox doctrine of theosis, with process theology's relational ontology, or with the Catholic Church's rich tradition of mystical and corporate ecclesiology. Though beyond the scope of undergraduate or even many graduate courses in theology, the book deserves a spot in advanced coursework and theological libraries.

BRADLEY A. PETERSON

*Episcopal School for Deacons, Berkeley, CA*

*Theology Needs Philosophy: Acting against Reason Is Contrary to the Nature of God.* Edited by Matthew L. Lamb. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016. xxi + 325 pages. \$69.95.

doi: 10.1017/hor.2018.33

As the title of this collection of essays suggests, Matthew Lamb has brought together a group of scholars who are offering an apologetic for the Catholic Church's insistence that faith is both compatible with and in need of reason. More specifically, as Lamb tells it, the assembled group of philosophers and theologians are defending a central tenet of John Paul II's pontificate later picked up by Benedict XVI: in the face of the secular world's attack on reason itself, Catholic intellectuals need to defend reason's (albeit limited) ability to penetrate into the nature of things, and thus its suitability to serve as a handmaid to theology. And, while this is a forward-looking project of philosophically informed theology, the church looks to Aquinas as "a model of the right way to do theology" (*Fides et Ratio*, §43). Even more specifically, this collection is held together as a sort of incidental memorial for Ralph McInerny, who passed away during the organizational stage of the 2011 conference out of which this book comes. Finally, with Matthew Lamb's recent death, his editorial work for this book can be seen as his parting gift to the Catholic intellectual world. Given the limited space of this review, I will outline two

characteristic essays in the collection, and then conclude with some general remarks.

First, in “The Concept of Nature: Philosophical Reflections in Service of Theology,” Joseph Koterski, SJ, shows how a “realist metaphysics and natural philosophy” provides a foundational understanding of the human person that can be taken up by theology in its reflection on the *imago Dei*. By focusing on the dignity that comes with possessing both reason and will, as well as hylomorphism’s insistence that humans are neither spiritual beings nor reducible to matter in motion, this broadly Aristotelian-Thomistic approach helps one appreciate the reasonableness of Catholic moral teaching. After establishing this point, Koterski analyzes the doctrine of original sin in terms of this philosophical conception of the human person, and discusses the need for grace to both restore one’s nature and transcend it.

Second, in “Charles De Koninck and Aquinas’s Doctrine of the Common Good,” Sebastian Walshe, O Praem, revisits the origins of a debate that continues today among Catholic political theorists concerning the nature of the common good. Despite broad agreement on church moral and political teaching, the question is whether the common good is limited and instrumental or final and transcendent. Walshe, in defense of the latter position, rearticulates De Koninck’s claim that the common good is a potential whole, like victory in relation to the army; it is a final cause, “the reason for the determination and specificity in the goods it causes” (272). While this may just seem like a claim about politics, the importance for theology is made clear at the end of the essay, where Walshe discusses how appreciating the primacy of the common good helps to combat errors concerning the salvation of individual souls, predestination, the existence of hell, and so forth.

Speaking now about the book as a whole, one of the challenges of a book honoring someone’s legacy is that the attempt to pay tribute does not readily lend itself to either advancing scholarship or speaking to outsiders. By each of these measures, the value of *Theology Needs Philosophy* is limited: with perhaps a few exceptions (e.g., the essays by Long and Kaczor), these essays for the most part remind us of positions the authors themselves or other recent Thomists have already stated, and they provide little engagement with other schools of thought. With that in mind, one should think of this as a resource for those interested in thinking about philosophy’s role as a handmaid to theology as understood within the Thomist tradition. In either an advanced undergrad or grad setting, this is the type of book one would recommend to a student who is reading Aquinas and in need of an introduction to the terrain of recent scholarship. Beyond that, students, admirers, and friends

of Ralph McInerny as well as of Matthew Lamb himself would find here a fitting tribute and happy reminder that their legacies are alive and well.

MICHAEL P. KROM  
*Saint Vincent College*

*The Fragility of Consciousness: Faith, Reason, and the Human Good.* By Frederick Lawrence. Edited by Randall S. Rosenberg and Kevin Vander Schel. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017. xxviii + 424 pages. \$95.00. doi: 10.1017/hor.2018.35

Perhaps the greatest lesson of the hermeneutic revolution is that the reader brings their world to bear on a text, and that when that reader is authentic, their readings may guide others to greater authenticity. The essays skillfully arranged in the recently published *Fragility of Consciousness* reveal their author, Frederick Lawrence, to be such a reader. As exercises in “dialectics,” the essays model the slow and generous reading of diverse, interdisciplinary sources that Lawrence has taught to more than four decades of students at Boston College, and they ask no less from their reader.

In part 1, Lawrence contextualizes Heidegger’s originary achievements in *Being and Time* in relation to Augustine, whose influence grounded the “post-modern hermeneutic revolution ... based on the realization that the interpretation of the origination classics of Western culture intimately affects and is affected by human beings’ concrete solution to the problem of living together” (11); however, Lawrence argues, Heidegger later “[conflated] fallenness with human finitude” and succumbed to his own “methodological atheism” (19–20). For Lawrence, Gadamer debunks these dubious notions of some particular “language of metaphysics ... because at root any language is dialogical ... and even the so-called language of metaphysics only makes sense in the actual past usages of it, and so in light of those questions being asked and answered in it” (32–33). Gadamer thus liberates language, grounding hermeneutics in *phronesis* and rejoining philosophy to its ethical and political foundations. Lawrence suggests that Lonergan advances further still by showing how the postmodern “concern with authenticity pushes hermeneutic philosophy to the threshold of theology” because, for societies no less than the persons who comprise them, “the question of truth cannot be fully answered without raising the issue of conversion” (70). The remainder of part 1 tests the viability of this theological and political hermeneutics against three alternative models: Leo Strauss’ humanism, the classically informed political philosophies of Gadamer and Voegelin, and