

between the Ottoman and Persian Empires. According to Ahram, these early states provided the building blocks and eventual focal points for contemporary separatist movements.

Despite the many merits of the book, parts of the argument were less convincing. In many ways, Ahram discusses the MENA region in the same manner that Jeffrey Herbst described Africa (*States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, 2000). Both authors argue that the sovereign borders in their respective areas are too strong. They are protected by the emphasis placed by the international community on territorial integrity, even if the borders in question are artificial and imperfectly drawn. The result is a set of weak states where leaders collude with other state leaders to defend their borders just as peripheral populations challenge them. This is a familiar story, and I wondered at points what Ahram was adding to it beyond the rich details. His answer is that the extant literature has overlooked past states and state-building efforts and that “their exclusion is a form of selection bias, examining only cases in which the outcome of interest (i.e. statehood) has already occurred. This yields a blinkered and teleological understanding of how MENA states endured and how they might change” (p. 12). Although I accept that earlier states, autonomy regions, and administrative jurisdictions often serve as the embryos of modern separatist efforts, I questioned the theoretical weight of the argument. Do scholars really have a teleological understanding of these processes? What does it mean that researchers and practitioners have a selection bias? Overall, I thought there was an imbalance between the theoretical importance given to these earlier states in the initial chapters and the role they played in the case studies.

On a related point, I thought the Islamic State was an odd addition as a case study. I understand that leaders from Cyrenaica and Kurdistan made a failed pitch to Wilson after World War I and that both groups had experienced forms of stateness in the past. Likewise, South Yemen had been a sovereign state in living memory, and thus it is easy to see how it could form the basis for renewed separatism. But the Islamic State felt like an outlier. Yes, it originated in the historic region of the fertile crescent, but its claims were universal, and unlike the others, it rejected the modern state system. Can we really say that it was a Wilsonian Orphan?

A lesser critique pertains to Ahram’s conclusion that sovereignty will need to be reconceptualized to achieve a lasting stability in the region. What exactly does his analysis prescribe? At points I thought he might suggest that the international community should begin to recognize *de facto* states that are built on long-running foundations and can provide a surer form of political order. But he avoided that recommendation, perhaps because it would be vulnerable to the charge

that the international community is meddling in the affairs of MENA states. In the end, Ahram’s analysis was quite detailed, and readers will learn a great deal about the problem of separatism in the region from this rich book, even if it remains unclear how to fix that problem.

Beyond the Veil of Knowledge: Triangulating Security, Democracy, and Academic Scholarship. By Piki Ish-Shalom.

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Beyond the Veil of Knowledge wagers that engaged scholars of international relations (IR) can reinvigorate public argument over questions of foreign and security policy. Although parliamentary democracy places great faith in public argument, the terms of such argument have been “hegemonized” in the Gramscian sense: co-opted to serve existing elites and ideologies. Such co-optation proceeds through a hollowing out of the terms of political discourse, strategically emptying rhetoric of its power to create new alliances, positions, or imaginaries. “Public deliberations [thus] ossify into different doxa, and criticism is set aside, weakening democracy”; the “cheap chatter of noise” occludes “the speech of enlightened deliberation” (pp. 196, 33).

On Piki Ish-Shalom’s account, IR’s constructivist turn has become complicit in this state of affairs, whether by oversight or intent. Committed to *documenting* the emergence of “social kinds”—intersubjectively shared, politically “decontested” concepts, practices, institutions, and procedures—IR constructivists have largely eschewed the work of *critiquing* them. And yet, the author avers, “There is rarely any ‘social’ without [a] ‘political.’” A constructivist IR worthy of the name would place not merely *social* facts at the center of its analysis, but the emergence of *sociopolitical* ones: “the sociopolitical construction of sociopolitical reality” (p. 195).

Think here of J. L. Austin’s “moderate-sized dry goods” read against a well-known critique of commodity fetishism (*viz.* Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism at the Crossroads; Or the Problem of Moderate-Sized Dry Goods,” *International Political Sociology* 10(2), 2016). Just as manufactured goods retain no visible external sign of the labor that went into their manufacture, so too the “manufactured” compromises, categories, and self-serving half-truths that comprise our political common sense constitute a “well-wrought veil” that obscures the truths it purports to disclose. Dispelling this veil would require a “politically attuned constructivism” with a “dual analytical gaze” (p. 97).

Such a constructivism, on Ish-Shalom’s account, would comprise a number of interlocking reflexive

practices. At the individual level, Ish-Shalom calls for zooming in and zooming out: “focus[ing] our theoretical rigor on reaching a better definition of our concepts” even as we “affirm the inadequacy of exhaustiveness, exclusiveness, and operationalization as standalone criteria” for such definitions (p. 112). Second, it would involve a commitment to and expansion of the basic values of the academy as a diversely constituted moral community: “public truth seeking” carried out “openly, rigorously, and with a sense of healthy skepticism” (p. 119). Third, it would demand engagement with both state institutions and the public, notwithstanding the tensions inherent in each.

Of particular interest is Ish-Shalom’s experience as the editor of *Migalim Olam* (Discovering the World), a Hebrew-language collaboration between the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University and *Ynet*, one of Israel’s largest news websites. In a brief, programmatically suggestive postscript, Ish-Shalom lays out a vision for a “participatory and deliberative” mode of academic engagement in which “self-reflexive theoretician-citizens” address a wide, popular readership (p. 198).

Although the broad strokes of this argument will ring familiar to many students of normative and critical IR, Ish-Shalom is a deeply individualistic thinker and writer. He is to be praised for drawing on scholars and idioms that are widely overlooked in contemporary international theory (Saul Kripke, Martin Buber), and for teasing nuanced, communitarian sensibilities out of texts often read too narrowly or programmatically as liberal (Will Kymlicka, John Rawls).

At the same time, however, this tendency to ‘go it alone’ means that Ish-Shalom often fails to engage precisely those who might complicate what at times seem like his own rather pat academic proclamations. Consider Ish-Shalom’s treatment of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism in the context of cultural practices such as genital mutilation or the non-education of girls. Given that “IR scholars do not face genital mutilation or schooling prevention,” he explains, one might expect them to take on these issues as ethical questions as well as empirical ones. Critical theorists in departments “overpopulated by positivists” may find that there are professional costs for doing so, “assuming they were hired in the first place” (p. 121). The effect is to create a kind of academic self-censorship that is antithetical to the pluralism that sustains scholarly community.

“True enough—and Ish-Shalom takes care, where others have not, to note that the reverse might also be the case, a point that too often goes unstated. But these arguments, it must be said, have been made before: from DA-RT to perestroika, from the pages of this journal to those of *New Political Science*, *International Studies Quarterly*, and the *European Journal of International Relations*. Ish-Shalom knows this work and cites some of it. A deeper

engagement with it might have yielded more than an admittedly bracing restatement of a problem that already feels well understood, but one for which solutions remain either elusive or unsatisfying.

By way of example: some consider generally-accepted practices of (male) genital circumcision to constitute a form of mutilation, if practiced for religious reasons – essentially similar in kind to the practices alluded to above, and distinguished from them only by degree. One might argue that the practices in question are in fact quite different and that “binning” them together is either ideologically tendentious or a case of conflation-by-nomenclature. This is precisely the sort of thing that zooming in and zooming out might help one to reflect upon. Imagine now that having done that, one remains fast in one’s initial convictions: the practices are, in ethical terms, essentially similar. How to engage “dialogically” with those who systematically abuse children?

One might wish, in that vein, that more had been said about Ish-Shalom’s experience as editor of *Migalim Olam*. There are several reasons for this, but I focus on two. First, the experience seems to have been challenging but invigorating. Although the work was considerable and its practical effects hard to assess, Ish-Shalom remains sanguine: “the audience is out there, and surely larger than our usual academic readership” (p. 209). One wonders if *Beyond the Veil* and *Migalim Olam* competed for his time and if the author’s insights into tensions between academic timelines and the news-and-policy cycle were obtained the hard way (pp. 42–44). More systematic reflection on such tensions, pulled through the book’s scholarly narrative, might have proved instructive.

Second, the title of the series reveals a tension that runs through *Beyond the Veil*, which Ish-Shalom may not have explored fully. “Discovering the World” is certainly a fitting translation for *Migalim Olam*. But the verb in question (*migalim* > *ligalot*) has both an intransitive sense and a transitive one: “revealing” would work about as well as “discovering.” This is not merely a grammatical quibble. Reading prose is not unlike reading music: one must decide what sense is to be supplied to the printed notations. That decision lies with readers no less than authors. Whether the essays published on *Ynet* constituted dialogical efforts in facilitating understanding or expert pronouncements revealed *ex cathedra* by “imperious, know-all. . . philosopher-kings,” is no less its readers’ call than his (p. 198).

My point is not that Ish-Shalom has misrepresented his intentions. It is rather to suggest that the problem of meaning may be more open-ended than *Beyond the Veil* allows. This, at bottom, is why essential contestation has such salience when scholarly knowledge and the diversity of the political intersect. Concepts are at bottom mediations, and the power of I-Thou relations to “overleap” them may be no less a pious dream than was neo-positive

value-freedom or objective history. To be sure, the indeterminacy of language has limits. That said, generalized awareness of those limits does not, on its own, produce a fully worked-out understanding of them, of the full universe of positions that may take root in their folds. The “play” of the sociopolitical lies precisely there. Yet *Beyond the Veil*, even so, substantially clarifies both the scope of the problem and the nature of the need, and for this it merits considerable praise.

Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity. Edited by Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. 408p. \$99.00 cloth, \$34.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592719003542

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Anyone older than 40 working in the field of international security studies will have a well-developed attitude to yet another talk, paper, or discussion of deterrence. Those younger than that are more likely to be confused by or uninterested in the fuss. The Cold War is gone, and so is the bipolar world so amenable to the deterrence literature everyone reads (or at least used to read) in graduate school. It is hard to care how one defines deterrence if one views it as a strategic option whose day is past and whose pursuit is idealistic at best, resource draining at worst. The language used here is deliberately provocative to make the point that a strong deterrence skeptic (for cybered conflict) such as myself was surprised and informed by this book.

In their edited volume, Erik Gartzke and John Lindsay assemble 15 discussions addressing “cross-domain deterrence” to see if this iteration of the more traditional concept is a fit for today’s world. The book contains excellent and compact summaries of the deterrence concept’s logical and empirical evolution, married to the researchable question whether cross-domain deterrence (CDD) can iterate deterrence into usefulness again. A different title might have been “Deterrence: What Needs to Be Researched Today for It to Work Again.” One could design multiple research programs or dissertation proposals on the questions raised in the first half of the book alone.

Given that the edited book is about laying out logic, empirical examples, and questions, each chapter is an exploration, not a solution, and is less a proffered argument than an opening salvo for which future work is much needed. The authors largely tie CDD to their topic, and the coeditors integrate the discussions at the beginning and the end with observations on CDD’s paradoxes, complex systems surprises, whole-of-society threats, and rising uncertainty about defense traditions in implicitly consolidated democracies.

In exploring whether CDD helps update a dated, era-specific topic, the first handful of chapters constitute a particularly nice tour de force summarizing the intellectual, historical, and logical conundrums of applying deterrence theory to today’s major challenges. In their respective chapters, Patrick Morgan, Jacqueline Schneider, Ron Lehman, and the coauthors Michael Nacht, Patricia Schuster, and Eva Ulrike concisely lay out the challenges, historical baggage, and the uncertainties of dragging deterrence into the current and increasingly post-western era. If one had only two slots in the syllabus for articles on deterrence updated for the coming post-western era, any two of these would do very well to inform students about what lay behind and to stimulate discussion of what lies ahead.

In their well-crafted introduction and conclusion, the coeditors incorporate complexity and the ambiguities of changing means, circumstances, or political interests into the discussion of what the “cross-domain” aspect of CDD reflects. Might CDD be a way to name and therefore adapt to the unavoidable uncertainties that the coming international system redefinition will pose to westernized states? In that vein, inclusion of the Chin-Hao Huang and David Kang chapter outlining the more complacent, less militarized approach to the rise of China pursued by most of its regional neighbors is excellent. If cross-domain deterrence would be hard, then in today’s coming world, CDD strategies that require the involvement of friendly non-allied Asian states that do not see a Chinese military threat are likely to be very challenging indeed.

Having said that, several chapters might be better suited for a different collection of essays. Historical explanations or orthogonal conceptual attacks on a topic are always desirable. Of course, one can easily understand how the authors would have endorsed trying CDD out as a reinterpretation of history, as an unacknowledged conceptual child of particular strains of political science, or in unusual applications such as coercive migration. Accordingly, various chapters approach CDD from the history of satellites, strategic bombing, and Athens versus Sparta, as well as international law, linkage politics, and mass human movement as deliberate deterrence. However, some of these chapters were less persuasive as good fits for the volume’s mandate. The chapter on international humanitarian law, for example, presents an argument well known in the modern security studies debate (especially in discussions of cyber norms), but did not exceptionally advance the CDD case. The linkage politics chapter argued for a theoretical approach to CDD that would situate the newly reborn deterrence concept in a known niche in political science. Unfortunately, it is more of a scholarly argument for the modern relevance of “linkage politics” than a test of CDD, and it also belongs elsewhere.

The historical case studies have mixed results with respect to the persuasiveness of their reinterpretation of