

more tolerant of ambiguity, have a greater sense of humor, and express a lesser need for closure, which makes them a more receptive audience to political humor and satire. Liberals tend not to be successful in harnessing the power of outrage, and conservatives tend to fail at the effective use of satire, at least in part due to their audiences' predispositions and media creators' lack of understanding of those predispositions. She finishes the book by contextualizing these arguments within the Trump presidency, where conservatives found a companion in their outrage and liberals found difficulty in locating the humor in Trump's policies.

After providing an abbreviated history of both comedy and talk radio, Young argues that in some ways the history and driving forces behind the consumption of satire and outrage programming are similar: they have "parallel histories, encouraged by the same technological and political transformations, and serve similar political functions for their audiences" (p. 207). They both appeal to the particular psychological tendencies of their audiences, perhaps at two extremes of the same ideological scale. This results in conservatives consuming outrage programming (e.g., Sean Hannity and Rush Limbaugh) and liberals consuming satirical programming (e.g., Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert). Young points out that neither of these types of content, or the psychological profiles that drive them, is necessarily better than the other. Conservatives' penchant for order may help facilitate the play spaces needed for liberals. However, the outrage genre is much more easily used to exploit its audience. Whereas outrage can be used by conservative elites to influence audiences (she calls it a "well-trained attack dog"), satire is a tool best used by satirists alone (she calls it a "wild racoon," p. 214). The juxtaposition between outrage and satire in the current American political landscape has done much to position conservatives and liberals as being at odds with each other, rather than as necessary entities within a functioning democracy.

The book ends with a discussion of how the use of these two forms of media—outrage and satire—and the psychological profiles of their audiences should not be at odds. Young concludes with a call to action: "It is time to recognize these ideologies as overlapping and necessary systems that both contribute to everyone's cultural and societal well-being" (p. 214). Although satire may appeal to liberals and outrage to conservatives, it is OK for liberals to be outraged from time to time and for conservatives to laugh at politics every once in a while.

Interesting extensions of this work include conservatives' and liberals' responses to COVID-19, as well as the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020. First, as Young has addressed on her Twitter feed (which I recommend following!), conservatives, given their psychological tendencies, should have had a strong response to the threat of a global pandemic, resulting in their vigilance and carefulness in dealing with the virus. Instead, conservatives

responded more strongly to the Republican Party source cues, including outrage media, that discounted the threat of the virus. This resulted in conservatives' reluctance to wear masks and engage in social distancing (more so than liberals). In this case, the outrage was directed at Democrats' supposed overreaction to COVID-19, rather than the fact that the virus was killing people in large numbers worldwide. What would it take to get outrage media to acknowledge the importance of scientists' recommendations, and how and when might conservative audience members respond? Second, the Black Lives Matter protests across the world brought increased attention to the issue of police violence, particularly as it disproportionately affects Black Americans. Many liberals responded to these protests by either joining them or contributing resources to them. Can something so important ever be satirized and considered funny, even among those with the greatest levels of tolerance for ambiguity? In her book, Young addresses where comedy and satire fit within more serious political issues. Satirists tend not to make light of very serious issues (e.g., September 11 attacks, separating migrant children and parents). The book does mention a few comedians beginning to joke about some of Trump's more prejudicial policies, but I wonder how far the use of satire can extend into a controversial (to put it lightly) presidency.

As I reflected on Young's arguments, I realized how much I appreciated her conversational and, even at times, personal style of writing. She condenses a great deal of academic research into a readable narrative that should be approachable for many audiences. By discussing the ability of the current fragmented media landscape and political polarization in the United States to drive a wedge between conservatives and liberals, she considers that her audience may include both ends of the political spectrum. This approach allows for audiences not only to understand the psychological predispositions that may drive them toward particular media content but also to consider how that content may try to take advantage of them. In this way, *Irony and Outrage* offers a potential toolkit for each reader to recognize their own political media content selections and how these selections may color their understanding of the world and their ability to connect with other, diverse individuals.

Mobilized by Injustice: Criminal Justice Contact, Political Participation, and Race. By Hannah L. Walker. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. 216p. \$99.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592720002844

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Those familiar with social science research on criminal justice contact and political participation could easily feel pessimistic about the potential for reform in the United

States. The reach of police and the carceral state is massive; for example, approximately 45% of US adults have had an immediate family member who spent at least one night in prison or jail during the family member's life (Peter K. Enns et al., "What Percentage of Americans Have Even Had a Family Member Incarcerated? Evidence from the Family History of Incarceration Survey (FamHIS)" *Socius*, 2019). In addition, many scholars have found that contact with the legal system dampens political participation (for example, see Traci Burch, "Turnout and Party Registration among Criminal Offenders in the 2008 General Election," *Law and Society Review*, 2011; Hedwig Lee, Lauren C. Porter, and Megan Comfort, "Consequences of Family Member Incarceration: Impacts on Civic Participation and Perceptions of the Legitimacy and Fairness of Government," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 2014; and Vesla M. Weaver and Amy E. Lerman, "Political Consequences of the Carceral State," *American Political Science Review*, 2010). If the broad scope of criminal justice contact translates to reduced political participation, a sustained push for reform seems unlikely, especially because those most affected may become least likely to engage in political action.

Mobilized by Injustice makes it clear this is not the whole picture. Early in this book, Hannah L. Walker shows that some of the most prominent research—which finds that contact with the criminal legal system leads to political disengagement—has overlooked evidence *within* these same studies that suggests a more complicated story. In contrast to scholars who "either miss signs of citizen resistance or deemphasize them as curiosities" (p. 4), Walker takes seriously the evidence that criminal justice contact sometimes leads to *increased* political engagement. Indeed, the goal of the book is to understand the conditions that lead criminal justice experiences to demobilize and those that lead these experiences to *mobilize* individuals.

Building on work such as Lisa L. Miller's *The Perils of Federalism* (2008) and Michael Leo Owens's "Ex-Felons' Organization-Based Political Work for Carceral Reform" (*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 2013), Walker constructs a theory to explain this variation. Although she is careful to recognize that other factors influence political participation, the theoretical argument focuses on "systemic injustice," which she argues moderates the effects of both personal and proximal contact with the criminal legal system. Proximal contact refers to having a loved one who has had personal contact with the legal system. For personal or proximate contact with the legal system to lead to politicization, the person must believe both that the experience was unfair *and* was the result of systemic injustice; that is, targeting on the basis of race, place, or class. Walker's focus on systemic injustice is closely related to the concepts of group consciousness and linked fate. Thus, the theorizing and analysis

pay close attention to the experiences of African Americans and Latinos. Walker also theorizes how institutional factors, such as community-based organizations, can cultivate awareness, as well as channel feelings of systemic injustice into political participation. Together, these arguments offer a nuanced set of predictions for when those who have directly experienced the criminal legal system or those who have had loved ones with such experiences will become politically mobilized.

Evidence to support the theoretical predictions comes from in-depth interviews with advocates, activists, and community members affected by the system, as well as from five unique datasets, including the National Crime and Politics Survey (NCPS), which Walker conducted specifically for this research. Walker deftly weaves accounts from the in-depth interviews throughout the book to illustrate the theoretical mechanisms and how they apply in various contexts. She also successfully uses the strengths of the various datasets to test the numerous hypotheses that stem from her theory. *Mobilized by Injustice* is theoretically rich and full of detailed and rigorous analysis of qualitative and quantitative data; it offers new insights into the relationship between the criminal legal system and political engagement. Of course, as is typically the case with theoretically driven and important books, this research also raises questions and invites extensions.

Although Walker uncovers substantial evidence of the hypothesized mobilizing effects, what also caught my attention was that the quantitative analyses produced minimal evidence that personal or proximal contact corresponds with political *demobilization*. After conditioning on covariates, there was no evidence of a direct statistical relationship between personal contact and voter registration, voting, or nonvoting participation among the general public; no relationship between personal contact and voter registration among Blacks (though there was a negative and significant relationship for Whites); a *positive* and significant relationship between personal contact and nonvoting participation among Blacks; no corresponding relationship among whites; and no relationship between personal contact and voter registration or voting for Latinos (findings from Table 3.3, Figure 4.4, Table 4.2, and Table 5.4).

Perhaps even more surprising than the lack of direct effects in these analyses (which might be expected given the theoretical argument), when the theory would predict demobilization, we often failed to see such evidence. For example, even when a sense of injustice is at its lowest level, there is no evidence of a relationship between personal contact and nonvoting participation for the general public, or when white and Black respondents are analyzed separately (findings from Tables 3.4 and 4.3). Although surprising, these results do not diminish, and may even enhance, the importance of the book. First, although they are representative, these findings reflect just a portion of

the many analyses. Second, these findings could imply that the evidence for mobilizing effects is even stronger than hypothesized, which suggests important opportunities for further research.

A narrower point relates to the measurement of political engagement in the analysis of community-based organizations (CBOs), which uses the Chicago Area Survey (2014). To measure political participation, the survey asked respondents if they had done a variety of activities (up to seven) in the past 12 months, including having “donated to a political cause” or “volunteered for a political campaign” (p. 69). CBO contact was measured with a question that asked respondents if they currently belong to, volunteer with, attend meetings of, or pay dues to any of the following groups (up to six), including “an organization that focuses on a specific political cause” (p. 69). The focus on how institutional factors, such as CBOs, can moderate the effects of criminal justice contact offers a major theoretical and empirical contribution. At the same time, if some respondents viewed volunteering for a political campaign as similar to volunteering with an organization that focuses on a political cause, or donating to a political cause as analogous to paying dues to an organization that focuses on a political cause, the finding that those with CBO contact were more likely to participate politically could be explained, in part, from the two measures capturing the same behaviors.

Of course, one of the values of combining in-depth interviews and multiple datasets is that no conclusion rests on a single measurement strategy or analysis. Further, because Walker has made her NCPS and other data available (<https://mobilizedbyinjustice.com/details-and-data/>), scholars can continue to build on this important research. In sum, *Mobilized by Injustice* is an exciting and accessible book that not only advances the scholarly literature by taking seriously the potential mobilizing effects of injustice, but also charts a potential path from mass incarceration to mass-led reform.

Presidential Elections and Majority Rule: The Rise, Demise, and Potential Restoration of the Jeffersonian Electoral College. By Edward B. Foley. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. 256p. \$29.95 cloth.
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Most critics of the Electoral College would replace this relic of eighteenth-century constitutional thinking with a popular vote that would take place throughout a single national constituency that, for convenience’s sake, we can call the United States of America. In his new book, Edward B. Foley stakes a different criticism: our working Electoral College was not the one that the Constitutional

Convention cobbled together at the tag end of its debates, but the one that was fashioned with the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment in 1803–4. The well-known result of that amendment was to allow presidential electors to “designate” separate votes for president and vice president, thereby solving the problem of the inadvertent tie between Thomas Jefferson and his ostensible running mate Aaron Burr that threw the 1800 election into the lame-duck House of Representatives. But an equally important consequence, Foley proposes, lay elsewhere: in the establishment of a Jeffersonian consensus that victors in presidential elections should acquire a “federal conception of a compound majority-of-majorities” (p. 37), meaning a majority of electors formed with a coalition of states wherein the winning candidate gained majority support.

It is this “electoral college of 1803” principle that has largely prevailed ever since, with a handful of exceptions led by James K. Polk’s election in 1844, which occurred only because in New York the antislavery candidate James Birney siphoned enough votes from Henry Clay to allow Polk to carry the state. But the spark igniting Foley’s book comes from three recent elections (1992, 2000, and 2016) when third-party candidates (John Anderson, Ross Perot, and the combo of Gary Johnson and Jill Stein, respectively) allowed the winning candidates to carry a number of states essential to their victory by mere pluralities. Where many commentators are driven to political madness when there is a disparity between national popular and electoral vote winners, Foley’s commitment to a state-based system of presidential elections leads him to a different conclusion. It is the danger of third-party candidacies preventing majoritarian decisions that drives Foley to analytical distraction. The solution to this ostensible dilemma does not lie through an Article V amendment to the Constitution, Foley concludes, but rather by having the states individually adopt electoral laws that would produce popular majorities. The most obvious of these would involve ranked-choice voting, redistributing the second-plus-*n* choices of voters supporting losing candidates until a majority is produced. But Foley ingeniously identifies several other methods that turn the majoritarian trick, including (to take one example) something like the French presidential runoff.

Foley is a distinguished scholar of American electoral law, and his expertise is evident in his careful review of problematic presidential elections and the alternative results to which rules for producing state-based majorities could have led. Yet, although one can be impressed with his imaginative parsing of electoral contingencies and procedural reforms, some elements of his argument remain subject to qualms, reservations, and outright objections.

Foley’s argument rests on a fresh reading of the Twelfth Amendment that is politically plausible but constitutionally problematic. He forces us to recognize that the debates over the amendment were not limited to providing a