

The Iron Curtain turned out to be a looking glass. The identities of those who stood inside it were artificially rigid and two-dimensional. Now that the Iron Mirror has shattered, it is up to those same inhabitants to establish real multidimensional identities that are drawn and developed through contrast and conflict with those along all of the webwork of boundaries and connections that dynamically define and redefine every man and woman.

While Pelkmans explores these and other implications of his study, the reader sometimes wishes that he did so at greater breadth and depth. His is the intimate, often unself-critical, methodology of an anthropologist. Though frequently engaging, his micromethodology sometimes seems to miss the point. Population surveys and electoral analyses are beyond the scope of his book, but there might have been some effort to show the points at which broader investigations (that incorporate such methodologies and that also place this micro-study within the context of broader regional developments) might productively have been connected to his work. Most strikingly, Pelkmans makes little effort to generalize his conclusions regionally, to the cases of Chechnya and Ingushetia, for example. Still, these are fairly minor concerns in a masterful work that will be of interest to every student of the Caucasus and the post-Soviet sphere.

The Order of Genocide. By Scott Straus. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006. 273p. \$27.95.
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— Martin Shaw, *University of Sussex*

Studies of the 1994 Rwandan genocide have moved, Scott Straus argues, beyond simplistic interpretations in terms of “tribal” or “ancient” hatreds (interpretations that were, in truth, more those of the media and politicians than of the early academic literature) toward a “new consensus” that this was a modern genocide based on elite planning, nationalist ideology, and media manipulation. Straus argues that while this is not wrong, it does not go far enough to explain why genocide happened and why so many Hutus were mobilized to kill their Tutsi neighbors as well as moderate Hutus. Emphasizing the need to link the national, elite level on which most study has focused with the local level in the rural areas where most killing was done, Straus undertook a unique study, interviewing more than two hundred confessed and convicted male perpetrators in Rwanda’s jails.

On the basis of this study, the author argues for a new theory of the genocide that prioritizes three main factors. The first is the civil war, and especially the new phase that broke out between the government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in early 1994: “[W]ithout a war in Rwanda, genocide would not have happened.” It “provided the essential rationale for mass killing: security” (p. 7). Indeed, genocide was predicated on threat; war legiti-

mated killing, created an atmosphere of insecurity, and involved specialists in violence (soldiers, gendarmes, and militias) who were central to the violence against Tutsi civilians. The atmosphere of insecurity was greatly heightened by the assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana (about which Straus inclines toward another new consensus, blaming the RPF, rather than the genocidists). The second factor is the nature of Rwanda’s state institutions, historically centralized (Rwanda was a single kingdom before the arrival of colonializers), based on unified culture and language (Hutus and Tutsis are not differentiated in these ways), with considerable mobilizing capacity in rural areas (manifested in the pregenocide period by mobilization for compulsory labor), and heightened by favorable geography (Africa’s most densely populated state has few inaccessible areas). Thus, Rwanda’s strong state defies the African stereotype of weak or even collapsing state apparatuses operating within artificial colonial-era boundaries. The final main factor is a particular ideology of ethnic categorization that conflated the Tutsi population in general with the armed “Tutsi” enemy, the RPF, and so labeled all Tutsis “the enemy.” This, rather than historic ethnic difference, is the significance of ethnicity for the genocide.

Straus’s unique empirical study carefully, credibly, and fully backs up this interpretation. Despite the obvious dangers in interviewing perpetrators, especially under conditions of confinement—of which he is fully aware and takes account—Straus produces unprecedented information about the local-level spread of violence, its nature, and the reasons for participation in it, which will be invaluable to scholars. Some findings are counterintuitive: Contrary to the stereotype of very young men, even children, mobilized in Africa’s armed conflicts, he finds that those who were in their teens and 20s at the time were (like, less surprisingly, the over-50s) underrepresented (compared to their proportions in the population); perpetrators were predominantly in their 30s. The explanation is the way that the elite sponsors of the genocide mobilized the population, following existing patterns of organization and recruiting participants by household. Another finding is that, though Rwanda’s was the most mass-participatory of major genocides, “only” 14% to 17% of Hutu men participated. Killing was still a minority activity and, although local instigators were considerably motivated by the threat of the Tutsi RPF and the effect of the assassination, most participants were motivated more by fear of intra-Hutu intimidation and violence. Another interesting feature is the inclusion in Straus’s sample of communes of the only one where genocide did not take place: Here he finds that the arrival of the RPF in a neighboring commune stalled the rapid spiral of escalation that typified killing in the localities (though varying considerably among them, in ways that he plausibly explains). This case is significant, he argues, for the prospect of intervention to halt the

killing: A very rapid international response could have made a difference.

This is but a small sample of many fascinating and important findings. Straus's study is comprehensive, thorough, and cogently and carefully argued, and it engages stringently with the literature. It is altogether an impressive work that will be compulsory for specialists and invaluable for students. Straus is a former journalist and his writing is a model of clarity and economy; this book will be accessible to most readers. Generally, *The Order of Genocide* supports the emergent theme in genocide studies that war is crucial to causation; in terms of the debate on participation, it supports the position of Christopher Browning (*Ordinary Men*, 1993), rather than Daniel Goldhagen (*Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 1996), emphasizing group pressure rather than racial ideology.

I have two criticisms, one of which is serious. The lesser point is that the title emphasizes the extent to which geno-

cide was produced by the "order" that Rwanda's deep state penetration produced, and to which it mobilized in accordance with given patterns of obedience, while the argument in the end prioritizes *disorder* and insecurity, which are not reflected in the title. The more serious point is that Straus's definition of genocide equates it with killing. This has only minor methodological and analytical consequences in this study, as when he excludes those who looted but did not kill from his category of "perpetrators." But from the point of view of comparative study this is a narrow definition, which would exclude episodes where perpetrators did not simply and unremittingly focus on killing—like the "ethnic cleansing" of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was contemporaneous with Rwanda's genocide—from the scope of genocide studies. It is unfortunate that such an exemplary study should sustain a misleading idea of the field and its concepts.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Feminist Methodologies for International Relations.

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— Mary Caprioli, *University of Minnesota, Duluth*

This volume presents a marvelous account of feminist methodologies. Mainstream scholars might find it all too easy to dismiss when confronted immediately with its refusal to define feminist methodologies and its jabs at quantitative methodologists for presumably assuming their work to be value neutral. Such a dismissal, however, would be a grave mistake. For the book presents a collage of perspectives on feminist methodology. The essays address the questions feminists ask, why they ask such questions, what we learn from these approaches, and how this research contributes to our knowledge. This is not a "how to" book, as you do need to reach your own conclusions—to find your own way methodologically. But this apparent lack of direction is more of an invitation to experiment and to add to our knowledge. And this unrestrained quest for knowledge is precisely the point of feminist methodology as conceived by the authors.

The various chapters relate to one another either by directly addressing the topic of feminist international relations methodology or by offering an example of a feminist methodology. The first section focuses on what feminist methodologies are, mainly in juxtaposition to more typical IR methodologies. The second section is a treasury of feminist research examples that allows the reader to begin to understand what feminist methodologies are. There is an informative chapter by S. Laurel Weldon, who makes a

clear case for feminist standpoint epistemology. Annica Kronsell provides an argument for deconstructing knowledge and for hearing "silence" by focusing on what is not said. And Tami Jacoby offers a self-reflective account of conducting fieldwork—a primer for those about to conduct fieldwork.

Yet, the reader is almost left believing that feminist methodologies can be identified when seen but not defined. Fortunately, the last section, particularly the last two chapters, brings the book back into focus. The chapter by Fiona Robinson, "Methods of Feminist Normative Theory: A Political Ethic of Care for International Relations," highlights some of the norms behind feminist methodologies. And "Studying the Struggles and Wishes of the Age: Feminist Theoretical Methodology and Feminist Theoretical Methods," by Brooke A. Ackerly and Jacqui True, serves as a quite measured summary of the various arguments concerning feminist methodologies as presented in the book. From the last chapter, the reader gains an understanding of how feminist methodologies, with their focus on skeptical scrutiny, exclusionary inquiry, choosing a deliberative moment, and conceptualizing the field as a collective, extend critical IR theory. Readers further realize why feminist methodologies defy rigorous definition.

In spite of these accomplishments, however, the essays are unlikely to convince the uninitiated. The authors make a solid argument concerning the value of feminist methodologies for understanding gendered aspects of the world, but fail to convincingly demonstrate their direct contribution to international relations. The discussion begs a definition of international relations, which is clearly criticized as being far too narrowly construed. Part of the problem here is the way many of the book's chapters situate feminist methodologies in opposition to