

that women are placed as subordinates to be enjoyed by men, these last two markets should also be considered morally suspicious. If they are not, or not to the same extent as prostitution markets are, what explains the difference? It has to be the nature of live sex and its degrading effects when commercialized, especially on those in no position to refuse the transaction. The argument of vulnerability is valid, but it is not unaccompanied. Essentialists do seem to have a point: Objectifying women is wrong per se, because it “silences” them, despite the compounding effects of inequality.

It is hard to disagree with Satz’s objections against child labor markets and bondage. However, there is one theoretical point that could be made. Libertarians like Locke would surely reject the idea that freedom allows the individual to sell him- or herself into slavery. Extreme libertarians would disagree with Locke, but that does not mean they are correct. In the Lockean libertarian view, the most noxious markets would still be considered immoral. Satz apparently fails to draw a helpful distinction in terms of the degree of noxiousness that markets can present.

Lastly, the author’s reference to Ronald Dworkin’s link between the market and egalitarianism is illuminating. She suggests that Dworkin’s idea of an original auction legitimizes the market in ways that are not necessarily the most desirable. However, Satz appears to fail to notice that Dworkin’s idea “that individuals should be treated as equals” (p. 66) can conceptually serve as a limit to some of the noxious markets she objects to in her book. Dworkin’s imaginary auction is not meant to overlook the injustice of specific markets necessarily, especially if these markets are detrimental to equal respect among citizens, a value he emphasizes as central to his theory of equality.

Beautifully written and well organized, *Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale* makes a valuable case for a more humane and just society. It brings back to the fore the fundamental idea that markets can shape people in ways that justice should attend to. This book should be welcomed by all those concerned with protecting the dignity of human life, irrespective of political and theoretical distinctions.

Civil War in African States: The Search for Security.

By Ian S. Spears. Boulder, CO: First Forum, 2010. 281p. \$65.00 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592711003379

— I. William Zartman, *Johns Hopkins University*

Ian Spears sets himself some sound and needed tasks: to show that understanding the insurgents’ self-interest is necessary as the starting point for conflict resolution and that such self-interest is a search for security. Security is shown as a rational basis for action, as opposed to primordial or reprehensible sources of conflict behavior. This security is pursued through a choice among three strategies: integration, domination, and separation, also a commonsense

categorization. At this point, it would be interesting to see some kind of theory of conditional preferences, applying that fundamental question of social science analysis: Which when, why, and how? I am not aware of any convincing or even attempted efforts to tell which strategies will be chosen first, under what conditions, and so the challenge is important and the results would be of major analytical and practical use. Spears then addresses the “why” in outlining the factors that can influence strategic choice: distribution of power, previous experience, internal attributes (resources, demography, geography), and global and regional factors. In a word, everything, although personality, cost/benefit calculations, opportunity, and frustrations are explanatory factors that others have cited in attempting to answer the same question. But the “when” and “how” are not addressed systematically in even implicit hypotheses, a missed opportunity.

The main part of this book is devoted to three case studies: Eritrea’s efforts to achieve independence from Ethiopia, unification and secession in Somalia, and the Angolan civil war. The cases are well-done, comprehensive accounts of the attempts of the variously defined groups to achieve their security in a number of ways. The groups are not simplistically equated to an ethnic protest; the struggles over identity in Eritrea, and the wavering role of the ethnic factor in Angola in Somalia and Somaliland, are carefully treated. A major omission is the role of the external enemy in Somali cohesion and identity; there may be other details of interpretations or small factual omissions that might be signaled, but they do not dominate the accounts. Spears has a good grasp of all three cases.

The analysis of a choice from among the three strategies is less clearcut and convincing, however. Jonas Savimbi supposedly shifted from integration to domination as a strategy, although the first choice is not clearly documented (nor could it be), and so the shift is neither clearly identified nor the reasons explained. The Isaaq of the Somali National Movement moved from overthrow of Mohamed Siad Barre to secession as a means of achieving security against Ogaden dominance (p. 142), but there is much more to Somaliland’s earlier integration with Somalia and then to its own characteristic intraclan fighting after its secession than simple single-minded Isaaq self-protection. The Eritean and Tigrean Peoples Liberations Fronts (EPLF and TPLF) made a cohabitation (scarcely marriage) of convenience to overthrow the Derg, but when the common enemy was toppled, each went its separate ways dictated by the basic identity, so that integration and secession are rather evidence as separate choices. What explains the internecine battles of the various Eritrean nationalist movements until the arrival of the EPLF on the top, other than the failure of one or another to capture the flag, to which little attention is paid? According to Spears, “Survival in many African states requires not simply coercion but vigilance [not one of the posited explanatory variables]. It

means understand when one stands to benefit from compromise and cooperation and when one needs to remove challenges forcefully” (p. 978). But this would suggest that in the end (and the beginning), dominance is the only strategy that matters, determining the choice between integration through dominance and secession for dominance. That does not explain why any other strategy is tried, or when the light strikes about the unique need for dominance. But which groups are hell-bent on dominance? And does understanding that the insurgents’ self-interest is necessary as the starting point for conflict resolution mean that every (self-declared) group needs to be given its dominance to settle conflict?

The conclusion does not tell us. It does not pull the three themes or other ends together. It tells us that the international community has three strategies, once the inevitability of African anarchy is recognized: intervene to end anarchy and control its harmful effects, recognize that it can do nothing in the face of local strategies, or invent something to replace the inadequate state. The conclusion states that all three approaches have their pros and cons; it does not refer back to the threefold strategic choice with which the study started, nor a fortiori address the “which when why and how” question. And so it leaves us with three good case studies as examples of different strategies adopted under various conditions, with domination through secession as the dominant strategy, and conflict management a pretty lost cause. That is realism, but it is not much of a guide for how to handle it.

The Politics of Military Occupation. By Peter M. R. Stirk.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. 272p. \$90.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592711003380

— Jasen J. Castillo, *Texas A&M University*

Peter Stirk has written a book that all those interested in the conduct and consequences of military occupations should read. It describes in rich detail the continuities as well as the changes in international legal guidelines for foreign occupiers, including their obligations to the occupied. Tracing the evolution of these international legal standards, Stirk argues that military occupation represents a type of government in its own right. Unfortunately, by emphasizing how occupations should end, international law gives conflicting guidance for the ways that military and civilian officials should conduct them. This confusion played out painfully during the recent U.S. occupation of Iraq, in the author’s view, as officials struggled to find the right strategy for restoring local rule and ensuring stability. Clearly written and easy to read, this book will be valuable to students of international relations, especially those interested in international law.

The book begins with a discussion of the meaning and practice of military occupation, with the core focus on the nineteenth century to the present. In the first two

chapters, Stirk explains how changes in the norms of international politics made occupation a more acceptable international practice for states than outright annexation, reinforcing a point that Paul Schroeder convincingly makes in *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (1995). He then describes, in Chapters 3 and 4, how military and civilian officials often disagree on the methods and goals of occupations. These two chapters will resonate with policymakers involved in military occupations or planning for one in the future. Subsequent chapters depict the tension between the interests of the occupier and pressure from international law to provide for the occupied, restore sovereignty, ensure objective justice, and manage a successful transition to a new regime.

The central argument is that international legal principles treat military occupations as temporary situations, rather than as a distinct form of government. In Stirk’s view, international law emphasizes the restoration of sovereignty but remains unclear about the day-to-day conduct of military occupation. The ambiguous status of occupations helps neither the foreign rulers, struggling to balance competing interests, and the occupied population, suffering in the resulting confusion. Although the author never clearly articulates it, he seems to suggest that the solution to this problem requires two changes in international law: the recognition of military occupation as a type of government and a greater focus on the legal questions surrounding the effective operation of such a polity.

In addition to this central argument, *The Politics of Military Occupation* advances our understanding in two ways. First, it demonstrates how the norms constraining the conduct of occupiers have evolved over the last 200 years. Stirk illustrates how international standards to guide military occupations increased as territorial annexation and the exploitation of foreign populations became rare occurrences. Second, the book demonstrates the multiple struggles confronted by occupiers when they undertake these missions. On the one hand, foreign rulers want to pursue their interests; on the other hand, they face pressure to meet certain international legal obligations that might cut against their goals for the occupation. Still further, occupiers do not always agree on the best strategy for effective foreign rule. These disagreements arise most strongly between civilian and military administrators, a problem plaguing occupations since the nineteenth century. According to Stirk, “Conflict between civilian and military leaders, the confusion of liberation and occupation and lack of clarity about what occupation entails, or should entail, recall the practices of revolutionary and Napoleonic France” (p. 27).

Even though it describes in great detail the constant struggle faced by diplomats and international lawyers in defining military occupations, the book raises several