

non-Jewish intellectuals and public figures in protesting the rising tide of antisemitism during the First World War. *Shchit* symbolizes the strategy of collaboration with progressive Russian opinion-makers to advance the cause of Jewish rights. Competing with other forms of Jewish activism—Zionist, socialist, autonomist—liberals such as Vinaver insisted that Jews must defend their place in Russian society and therefore fight for the kind of regime that would grant them the benefits of citizenship. He resolutely opposed any attempt to separate Jewish issues from the broader liberal-democratic movement.

Echoing the findings of other historians, this book argues that the so-called Jewish Question was not incidental to the liberal campaign for the rule of law and civil rights, but central to it, and acknowledged as such not only by Jewish spokesmen, but by their gentile colleagues as well. It documents the rising power of antisemitism, as a (self-defeating) government policy, as well as an instrument of populist mobilization against the revolutionary and liberal tides. At the same time, it demonstrates the increasing complexity and effectiveness of Jewish attempts to influence Russian and international public opinion and exert political pressure, limited as it was, on behalf of the Jewish cause. As Kel'ner shows, Vinaver played a key role in crafting and leading these campaigns. A native of Warsaw, Vinaver established a career in St. Petersburg as a specialist in civil law, practicing at the highest level permitted for a Jew. A prominent figure in the Kadet Party, he was elected to the Duma as deputy from St. Petersburg. In this role, he represented both sides of what he considered a single fight: for liberal principles and for Jewish rights.

In relation to Kel'ner's own publications and other recent work, the book delivers few scholarly revelations, but it abounds in good judgments and sharp formulations concerning the course of Jewish politics over these years. While charting the stages of Vinaver's career, it provides an overview of Jewish political initiatives at the level of parties, the press, organs of advocacy and propaganda, and individual personalities, largely in the St. Petersburg context. It concludes with a brief survey of Vinaver's continuing activity in emigration. Despite the liberals' defeat in the revolution and civil war, he maintained his guiding principles to the end. As Kel'ner shows, liberalism proved to be both necessary and inadequate for releasing the Jews of imperial Russia from domestic quarantine or, after 1917, establishing the kind of society in which they would not be kept on the margins of public life or threatened in their very existence.

For all its virtues, the book is unfortunately marred by the apparent absence of editorial intervention. Entire passages and phrases are repeated; individual figures and institutions are introduced more than once; excessive quotations and lists of names and publications often impede the narrative flow. An amusing slip involves the title of an émigré publication, given as *Stragglng Russia* (399).

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Bankers and Bolsheviks: International Finance and the Russian Revolution. By Hassan Malik. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. xv, 296 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Tables. \$35.00, hard bound.
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Hassan Malik has written a useful, judicious volume on the financial history of the last two decades of the Russian Empire and the Bolshevik default of 1918. Drawing from the English-language financial press, the archives of leading British, French, and American banks (HSBC, BNP, Barings, Crédit Lyonnais, J. P. Morgan), and their

corresponding financial departments in the Russian and early Bolshevik states, Malik recovers the discussions and judgments of the financiers that made Russia the largest debtor state in the years leading to World War I, which debt then created the largest default in history up to that time—or the largest default in history tout court, the appendix argues. Malik makes the obvious case for the need for such a volume in the continued neglect of financial history in the field, a case he bolsters by gesturing to the centrality of finance in Vladimir Lenin's own thought and revolutionary practice. The historiographical positioning that takes up much of the introduction lays bare some of the limitations of his choice of framework: Malik is interested in contributing to the business history literature of his background, while his contribution to the history of Russia and the Russian Revolution is of the gap-filling variety. Although the prospect of imbricating his financial history with the traditional questions of the field is a missed opportunity, the study is certainly a constructive intervention.

Malik begins by setting his crosshairs on two bits of received wisdom basic to textbooks on Russian history. In the first chapter he tarnishes the somewhat lustrous reputation of Sergei Witte among historians by noting that the late imperial political economy, the success of which is celebrated in the textbooks, did not originate with him, but with his maligned predecessors. Witte emerges from Malik's narrative as a merely competent finance minister whose failure to network with financiers in London and New York created problems down the line. Malik also uses this historical case to make an intervention of interest to political economists by arguing that formal participation in institutions like the gold standard, into which Witte steered Russia—following the policy established prior to his leadership—is not the good seal of financial housekeeping it is often considered to be. Borrowing costs had been dropping for Russia well before its adoption of the gold standard in 1897, and before Witte's appointment to the finance ministry five years earlier, for that matter. Following the episodic narrative based on bank communications he establishes early on, Malik then moves to undo another bit of well-ensconced historical datum, though this time perhaps more equivocally: the 1906 French “loan that saved Russia” was a much more contested, ambivalent affair than is usually given credit for in the textbooks. This second-chapter argument is blunted by the author's emphasis on the “voiceless and ignored” financiers (3). Surely, an assessment of the effect of that loan should follow its socio-political consequences rather than the rhetorical use the regime's opponents made of it; it should be a discussion of what it was the loan was saving. Recovering the critique of the loan made not only by revolutionaries, but also by liberals and the liberal press, however, will pay dividends for Malik later in the text.

Malik continues these critical revisions of the literature as he moves on with his narrative. He finds Russia's economy to be fragile in the immediate years before the war, and counterintuitively argues that the war was a financial boon. The Keynesian effect of the defense buildup shored up the economy when it seemed on the verge of a cyclical downturn, and the war itself brought foreign capital as well as more financial room to maneuver with the end of the gold standard straightjacket. Banks continued pouring good capital after bad through the war and well into 1917, especially after the February Revolution seemed, in the eyes of liberal investors, to be moving Russia to a higher stage of social development. When the default came, Malik convincingly argues that any state, Bolshevik or otherwise, would have done similarly. A potential default, in fact, had also been signaled by some liberal members of the Provisional government the author earlier has on record opposing the 1906 French loan. And so, Malik decouples the default from its usual textbook explication as purely an ideologically motivated statement of anticapitalist purpose.

Keeping with his mission to give voice to the ignored financiers of yesteryear, Malik ends his narrative lamenting the fate of those of his elite protagonists caught up

in the revolutionary upheaval. With their voice so sympathetically recovered, it is now time to connect this rarified world to the social concerns of most historiographical debate. If this study is delimited by the concerns and sympathies of the author's chosen framework, his critiques and historiographical revisions will help the field move forward with the integration of finance into the general narrative of Russian history, and hew closer to Lenin's own forebodings about the primacy of finance.

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Uplotneniie granits. K istokam sovetskoi politiki 1920–1940s. By Sabine Dullin. Trans. E. Kustova. *Historia Rossica*. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2019. 414 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. Plates. Tables. Maps. P450, hard bound.

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Sabine Dullin works at the Institute of political studies, which is part of Sciences Po in Paris. The French edition of her book appeared in 2014, based on her well-researched doctoral dissertation, defended in 2010. But French does not belong among the standard skills of those who do Soviet history. So, this careful translation into Russian is very welcome.

The book consists of an Introduction, five chapters, and conclusion. The Introduction briefly discusses historiography and formulates the key element of the author's methodological approach. It is based on an asymmetrical comparison, which allows Dullin to show which elements of Soviet policy were similar to the policy of the neighboring states, and what was really unique in the Soviet approach to how the border was conceptualized, administered, and consolidated since the establishment of Soviet state until the early stages of the Second World War. This way Dullin, while avoiding trivialization of Soviet experience, manages to show how many elements of Soviet border policy were typical for the interwar practices of the USSR's neighbors also. Dullin shows multiple functions of the border in Soviet policy: as a defensive line, as a front of ideological confrontation and expansion, as a showcase of socialist achievements. She shows how the border zone was consolidated and transformed into a world with a special legal regime and norms of behavior.

Dullin's focus is on the European borders of the USSR, and she worked in central Russian archives, in the archive of Vyborg, and in the archives of Belarus. Asian areas also get some attention, however. She studies the policy of the central authorities' ads concerning local administration and the ways in which ordinary people had to accommodate themselves to the conditions of the border zone.

Dullin also studies the public image of the Soviet border guard in Soviet art, including film. The first chapter is mostly focused exactly on the exceptionally prominent role of a heroic border guard in Soviet imagery. It also discusses the role of Soviet border guards in transformation of local life in the border area.

The following four chapters are organized chronologically. Chapter 2 covers the period of 1920–1923, when Bolsheviks in their anti-imperial drive and in hope for new revolutions made significant concessions to the newly-emerging states in the former imperial borderlands. Following the Soviet approach to nationality politics and principles of national self-determination, Moscow also made significant concessions at the expense of Russian Federative Republic when drawing the borders between newly-created Soviet republics. At that time, the very concept of a border as rather broad space (border zone) was taking shape.