

character — and certainly not a concrete, nuanced analysis of the perpetrators and their catastrophe” (p. 36).

Klemperer was in many respects Scholem’s antipode, a German patriot, an anti-Zionist, and an unapologetic lover of *Bildung*. To be sure, he was not without his contradictions, declaring in 1937 that he is “liberal and German forever” and in the following year, that he could “never again feel myself uninhibitedly to be a German” (pp. 88–89). Yet, despite and perhaps because of his refusal to accede to the Nazi’s definition of what constituted a German, Klemperer, in Aschheim’s view, correctly “diagnosed anti-Semitism as the very core, the driving, animating force behind Nazism” (p. 90). Aschheim regards Klemperer’s brilliant study of Nazi language, *LTI — Notebook of a Philologist*, published in 1947 as a classic but neglected work though he understates the degree to which that book was occasioned not only by his fate at the hands of the Nazis, but by his rage at the ways in which the language of the Third Reich (LTI is code for *Lingua Tertii Imperii*) corrupted and impoverished the authentic and poetic German with which he so strongly identified. His prejudices and foibles notwithstanding, it is Klemperer, not Scholem, who manifested a complex relationship to Judaism, and who, despite his anti-Zionism and German patriotism (also not without its ambivalence), “meticulously documented and assessed the various alternative postures he could have adopted” (p. 95).

In short, neither Scholem’s absolutist self-assurance nor Arendt’s affirmation of the autonomy of politics and the plurality of human existence is as compelling to Aschheim as Klemperer’s vacillation and uncertainty in the face of radical evil and terror. As late as 1942 he could write: “I am German and I am waiting for the Germans to return, they have gone into hiding somewhere” (p. 97). In his conclusion, Aschheim suggests that these figures are “emblematic” in the creative responses they fashioned to the cataclysm of the twentieth century. Whether this is indeed the case is a question that all readers of this superb book might productively ponder.

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Bildungsbürger in der Defensive: Die akademische Beamtenschaft und der “Reichsbund der höheren Beamten” in der Weimarer Republik. By Rainer Fattmann. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 2001. Pp. 272. EUR 34.00. ISBN 3–525–35160–7.

This book offers more than its title indicates. The reader who expects a painstaking history of the Reichsbund der höheren Beamten, the professional

organization for high officials in the Weimar Republic, will be pleased to discover that the author casts a wider net, including, for example, a host of interesting data on the high civil service. Fattmann divides his book into three sections of unequal length: the first deals with social and economic characteristics of high officials, such as social background, age structure, and remuneration; the second focuses on the development of the Reichsbund, while the shorter third part highlights the politics of the association, including its attitude toward the republic and the rising tide of Nazism.

In the politically unstable state of Weimar Germany, governed by ever shifting coalitions of parties, a well entrenched civil service provided an important pillar of stability. The sheer number of publications on the subject testifies to the considerable attention devoted to it in historical research. Nevertheless, Fattmann breaks new ground. Based on printed primary sources, such as journals of civil servants' organizations, articles in the extensive civil servants' press, and archival materials in the Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, the author engages in a systematic statistical analysis of Weimar's high officials that is unrivaled in the literature.

Numerically, the Weimar civil service reached its apogee with 1.7 million officials in the employ of *Reich*, *Länder*, and *Gemeinden* in 1923, whereupon inflation and a desperate economic situation necessitating deep cuts reduced the number down to about 1.5 million. The very fact that tenured officials could be terminated struck at the very core of their identity and diminished the already low esteem for a state in which such practices were possible. The "höhere" service, distinctly set apart from the "mittlere" and "untere" service by dint of university training, belonged to the privileged strata of society, the upper middle class and, in some of its leading positions such as Regierungs- and Oberpräsidenten, even the upper class. It was by no means monolithic, but stratified within itself, including as it did *Gymnasium* teachers and the so-called *technische Beamte* (e.g., state-employed engineers or architects), who, in terms of social prestige, were nearer its bottom rungs; the Protestant clergy and judicial officials (public prosecutors and judges) in the middle to upper echelons; and finally university professors and administrative officials at the pinnacle. Fattmann's painstaking research clearly substantiates what the informed observer has always suspected to be the truth, namely, that upward social mobility was greatest among those groups with less social prestige and lowest for those at the upper end of the ladder.

A salient feature of the high service, particularly in Prussia, was its pronounced Protestant character. In 1910, for example, more than 80 percent of all high Prussian officials were Protestant (86 percent of administrative officials and 84 percent of university professors), far exceeding the Protestant share of the population — 61.8 percent. In Prussia, as opposed to Catholic Bavaria where the number of Catholic officials reflected the percentage of Catholics in the popu-

lation, it was a given that the higher the rank, the lower the share of Catholics. Fattmann emphasizes that although Prussian authorities favored Protestant candidates, it was also true that many Catholics evinced reservations about entering state employment. During the republic, higher service branches were all dominated by a disproportionate percentage of older officials; the cohorts of those born in the 1870s and 1880s predominated until the republic's demise.

The bulk of these middle-aged and older men (except among *Gymnasium* teachers, 10 percent of whom were female in 1927, women virtually played no role), whose values and politics had been shaped in the empire, never made their peace with the republic. This distrust toward the republic deepened when, after 1918, they saw their relative status vis-à-vis the middle and lower service rapidly decline. Before the war, an academically-trained *Gymnasium* teacher had earned more than twice as much as a *Volksschullehrer* (a member of the *mittlere Dienst*); by 1920 his remuneration was higher by a mere third. Even the substantial salary increases that came in the wake of the 1927 salary reform rewarded other groups more in terms of percentage gain than high officials: in 1913, a high official had earned on average 3.9 times as much as an *Unterbeamtler*. That figure shrank to 2.7 by 1932.

High officials distinguished themselves from lower groups by dint of their all-pervasive conservatism. During the 1920 Kapp Putsch, when the other civil service groups endorsed a general strike to bring down Kapp, high officials condemned it. The professional organization of high administrative officials, the most conservative subgroup of all, went so far as to take exception to the formulation of the oath of allegiance its members were to make to the Weimar Constitution. And the Reichsbund der höheren Beamten, created in 1921 and soon to include 70–90 percent of all high officials in the Reich (the percentage differed from state to state), refused to caution its members against taking part in the Hugenberg and Hitler-sponsored campaign against the Young Plan. The Reichsbund, though officially neutral in party politics, was inimical toward the SPD, Center, and DDP, more open toward the DVP, and closest to the conservative DNVP, which, under Hugenberg, became the advocate of officials' rights and privileges and the only party to reject Brüning's painful cuts in civil service salaries.

The final and potentially most interesting chapter, dealing with the politics of the Reichsbund, is, unfortunately, the one that adds least to our knowledge. This is not entirely the fault of the author, since his sources cannot possibly address the questions raised, for the publications of the Reichsbund and other organizations studiously avoided comments on day-to-day politics (the "People's Rebellion against the Young Plan" being the exception), making it difficult to analyze the issue of high officials' support for National Socialism. New insights would require a widening of the author's primary sources. Fattmann's tenuous statements referring to a supposed shared ideological outlook

with National Socialism, unsupported by sufficient evidence, remain unconvincing. By March and April 1933, when the victory of Nazism had become self-evident, the Reichsbund threw neutrality to the wind and joyously declared its solidarity with the new government, adding that it had helped blaze the trail for the *Nationale Erhebung*, a statement correct only insofar as the organization stood behind the DNVP. The Nazis, on the other hand, initially smacked too much of the gutter and their rhetoric was altogether too violent and uncouth to resonate with high officials who, if nothing else, took pride in their high breeding and refinement. Once the Nazis had won the day, however, those who were not purged from the civil service under the terms of the 1933–April law threw in their lot with the new masters. As the author remarks with justified disapproval, their professional organization, the Reichsbund, showed no concern whatever with those ousted, but passively accepted the purge and dispensed even with hidden forms of protest. In December 1933, the organization dissolved itself.

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Max Weber und die Stadt im Kulturvergleich. Edited by Hinnerk Bruhns and Wilfried Nippel. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 2000. Pp. 201. EUR 26.00. ISBN 3–525–35746–X.

These essays address what many consider to be one of Max Weber's most elusive works, *Die Stadt*. Published posthumously in 1921, *Die Stadt* was heavily edited, first by Weber's widow and then by Johannes Winkelmann, who included the work in the third edition of *Economy and Society*. Considering *Die Stadt*'s complicated genealogy, this collection, compiled from the papers of a 1997 conference, develops a surprisingly coherent analysis of the work's reception, how it fits into Weber's broader scholarly oeuvre, and, finally, its impact on the historiographies of the ancient, European, and nonwestern worlds.

Wilfried Nippel's opening piece provides a first-rate introduction to the themes of the volume and a broad outline of Weber's arguments. As Nippel emphasizes, Weber's analysis is unique in its ambitious scope to develop both a diachronic comparison of different Western epochs (ancient and medieval, for example) and a contrast between "occidental" and "oriental" urban cultures. The single term that appears to integrate Weber's disparate survey then is his universal definition of the "city" — that is, a settlement combining the functions of both fortress and market. If complex, Weber's typologies are overly schematic, Nippel argues, and provide — at best — a stimulating theoretical framework, but rarely compelling history. In short, Weber divides the ancient