

at nominating conventions and break up or bypass state party organizations in favor of congressional district organizations. This is a clear advantage for a presidentialized party, as congressional districts are federal units that can and often do shift every 10 years, unlike the more static manifestation of state parties.

Klinghard's book makes a good central point in each chapter, but it overburdens the reader with repetitive evidence from an exhaustive search of primary and secondary sources. The evidence is not always presented as systematically as I would like to have seen. Why use these particular newspapers? Why these particular politicians' letters? The attempt to be comprehensive can also be overwhelming for the reader, especially in introductory and concluding chapters. While I would recommend the book to political party scholars and advanced graduate students, I think it would be hard-going for even the most sophisticated undergraduate audience.

Mayhew's *Partisan Balance* follows a trend found in his work of clear, succinct arguments, writing, evidence, and conclusions. The author's approach is different from that of Klinghard. Mayhew asks whether political parties have skewed the outcome of policymaking in the United States in contrast to the "Framers' intent." Rather than looking at parties as organizations in campaigns, he looks at the performance of political parties in government. He asks whether political parties, when in control of Congress, the presidency, or both, have managed to distort the direction of policy in their own favor more than the constitutional system would appear to dictate. In particular, has one party had more success at the expense of the other? Mayhew's counterintuitive conclusion is no, that they have not. He writes that "many alleged problems have proven to be nonexistent, short-term, limited, tolerable, or correctable" (p. 190).

Mayhew makes his case on the merits of 60 years worth of policymaking. Looking carefully at proposals championed by presidents, he asks if they got what they wanted. If they did not, did they lose because of the other party? Or did they lose because one legislative chamber (or two) opposed them, even when controlled by their own party? Mayhew selects 184 presidential policy requests that satisfied three criteria—that they were domestic policy proposals, that they were very important to the president to advance, and that they occurred in the first two years of a president's term (whether the president was freshly elected or reelected) (p. 35). While this whittles down the list to a handful of proposals in each presidency, the author recognizes that some efforts monopolize more of a president's time and subsequent reputation than others. To account for this, he weights each request by importance on a scale of 1 to 4, 4 being most important (pp. 49–50).

Mayhew spends the rest of the book evaluating the fate of the 184 proposals, looking at how party control of the presidency and Congress influences their success, how party

control within Congress and therefore between the chambers influences success, whether either the House or the Senate poses more of a problem for presidents, and, in every iteration, whether political parties systematically skew policy in their direction when they can. What makes the book an enjoyable read is the care with which Mayhew outlines the fate of each proposal, his almost stream-of-consciousness discussion of how to handle methodological conundrums and ambiguous results, and his crisp conclusions once all avenues have been exhausted. Not only do political parties not skew policy perpetually, but they also do a poor job of making the government work efficiently, contra the wishes of the Founding Fathers. Mayhew ends by addressing a few potential reforms that would weaken "unfair" partisan power, such as eliminating the Electoral College and the Senate's filibuster, but he finds little to recommend going to the trouble to do so. At the end of the book, I am left wondering whether it is possible for political parties to have a more substantial effect on the American system and if that is indeed desirable. This author's work usually leads me to more questions than answers, but this is of course a sign of a stimulating book.

Clearly, both Mayhew and Klinghard find that the institutional design of the US system does indeed "cure" the "mischief" of faction. But does the cure kill the patient—the exercise of legitimate representative democracy in America?

No Citizen Left Behind. By Meira Levinson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. 400p. \$29.95.
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— Thomas Ehrlich, *Stanford University*

Meira Levinson has written a wise and insightful case for the proposition that schools should be "helping today's students grow into democratically minded and empowered adult citizens in the future" (p. 385). She uses the definition of good civic education adopted in "The Civic Mission of Schools," a report that is too long to quote here in full but whose goal is "helping young people acquire and learn to use the skills, knowledge, and attitudes that will prepare them to be competent and responsible citizens throughout their lives" (p. 43). This aim is important, she stresses, not just for the sake of the students but for the sake of us all and our democracy, which can function soundly only if all its citizenry participate.

In her book, Levinson makes a compelling case that schools should be the primary place for civic learning. But she is equally persuasive that this goal is not being achieved in most schools across the country. By contrast, she notes that a half-century ago, high school students regularly took three civics courses, while today they may take only one in their senior year, by which time many of the students most in need of civic learning—especially poor and minority students—have dropped out of school.

The civic learning that Levinson endorses is not what she terms “old school ‘civics’” (p. 53), but rather “action civics” in which students are engaged in “guided experiential education” (p. 216). She gives a number of examples of what she terms “*doing civics*” (p. 279), ranging from serving on a jury for mock trials argued by law school students to various programs in which students engage directly in advocacy to promote improvements in their communities, in the process feeling empowered to participate in democratic processes instead of marginalized, as is so often sadly true. In so doing they can gain the vitally important “skill and habit of viewing the world from multiple perspectives” (p. 85).

Levinson weaves her own experiences as a public school teacher into her arguments for civic education. From the very first page, she demonstrates with powerful examples how challenging the teaching of civic learning can be, particularly in a classroom filled with poor students of color. Why is it so important for those students to learn to be active, engaged, responsible citizens of their communities? It is because they will otherwise fail to be empowered to participate in the functioning of these communities. “[T]he civic empowerment gap harms all Americans,” she wisely writes, “because it weakens the quality and integrity of our democracy” (p. 48).

The author’s arguments seem so compelling. Why then are our schools, with few exceptions, not following her counsel? This is certainly not because she is the first to make the case for civic learning in the schools. John Dewey made that case powerfully in his great book *Education and Democracy*, written almost a century ago, although Levinson does not even include Dewey in her index. In fact, I failed to find more than a passing reference to his influence. Dewey, like Levinson, argued that our democracy requires an engaged citizenry to realize the civic potential of its citizens and that schools should be center stage in civic learning.

Unfortunately, Levinson leaves two crucial questions unanswered in her otherwise thoughtful and persuasive volume. I can suggest a possible answer to the first but am at a loss in terms of the second.

First, why did civics largely disappear from secondary school curricula in the era after the 1960s. A similar disappearing act occurred in higher education and I suspect the reasons may be the same, though I have no firm evidence. To take an example from the institution where I now teach, in the late 1920s and 1930s freshmen at Stanford University were required to take a year-long course called “Problems of Citizenship.” The course was one-fourth of the normal first-year undergraduate curriculum, and was rooted in the judgments of the university’s founders, Jane and Leland Stanford, that education for civic leadership should be a primary goal of an undergraduate education. In the words of Mrs. Stanford, “While the instruction offered must be such as will qualify the stu-

dents for personal success and direct usefulness in life, they should understand that it is offered in the hope and trust that they will become thereby of greater service to the public.”

In the opening lecture in 1928, the first year the course was offered, Professor Edgar Eugene Robinson told students that “citizenship is the second calling of every man and woman. You will observe as we go forward that our constant endeavor will be to relate what we do and say to the facts of the world from which you came and in which all of you will live, and to correlate the various aspects of the modern scene, so that it will appear that citizenship is not a thing apart, something to be thought of only occasionally or left to the energies of a minority of our people, but that its proper understanding is at the very root of our daily life” (based on Chapter VI in W. B. Carnochan, *The Battleground of the Curriculum*, 1993).

What a contrast is this course, as well as many others like it that were taught at colleges and universities around the country in the first half of the twentieth century, with most contemporary courses in political science today. So what happened? A number of forces probably led to the shifts, but I suspect that one was particularly important. In the post–World War II years, disinterested, disengaged analysis increasingly became the dominant mode of inquiry in political science and other social sciences and quantitative methods became the primary tools of that analysis.

I think it likely that this perspective had a powerful effect not just on political science as taught to college students but also on the teaching of civics in secondary schools. A primary aim of high school civics courses had been to prepare young students to be actively engaged, responsible civic leaders in their communities, involved in politics at every level. The new trend, fueled by the new approaches in political science, may well have drained the civics courses of their activist aims. Learning about government was substituted for participating in it, as logical positivism became the mantra among the social sciences in American higher education.

The second question is raised by Levinson near the end of her book. She reports that she participated in writing a “Civics in Action” curriculum for her school but did not follow it because it failed to adopt her views on what and how students needed to learn. “Given this,” she asks, “what reason do I have to expect that my own ideas will have any greater traction?” (p. 257). Unfortunately, she does not suggest an answer to this troublesome question. Rather, she engages in an extended riff on standards, assessment, and accountability in schools and, while her thoughts on these issues are insightful, they do not respond to her question.

My own civic-education focus has been college students and, given the extensive literature on civic learning in higher education, I am surprised that the author does not refer to that literature or the insights it may provide

for K–12 civic schooling. She cites several national organizations that do sponsor civic education in schools, but gives them only passing reference (p. 246). Admittedly, there are many differences between K–12 and higher education, but I think that lessons could be learned from organizations like The American Democracy Project of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities and Campus Compact.

To regret that Levinson is not able to offer strategies for effectively implementing her sound ideas for “action civics” is not to diminish the major strengths of this fine work. She charts a way forward for those who care about future generations learning to be responsible citizens of our democracy. That is a great gift.

The Politics of Race and Ethnicity in the United States: Americanization, De-Americanization, and Racialized Ethnic Groups. By Sherrow O. Pinder. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 258p. \$89.00.
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— Matthew Wright, *American University*

In this book, Sherrow O. Pinder tackles race relations past, present, and future, with emphasis on the role of multiculturalism in fostering a mutual respect for America’s long-standing cultural “manyness.” The theoretical core of her argument taps Frantz Fanon’s notion of “cultural hierarchy” and to make her case she draws on a broad swath of normative theory, historical accounts, and empirical studies. Pinder’s account of US political culture is critical and pessimistic. While I have questions about her approach, there can be no doubt that the themes she presses are important ones.

Pinder’s largely pessimistic story contains three main arguments: First, America’s core identity is premised on “whiteness,” with racialized minority groups “de-Americanized” from the outset (Chapters 2 and 3). Second, multiculturalism is a flawed coping strategy (Chapter 4), as it “does not resolve assumptions about identities that are formulated from racialized differences, and thus it remains limited as a racially charged strategy” (p. 5). Finally, the only redress involves the complete renunciation of whiteness as a key element of “Americanness,” with “post-multicultural” America celebrating cultural inclusiveness rather than “otherness” (Chapter 5).

The author’s case rests on the synthesis of an eclectic body of source material: sociological and anthropological theory, the founding documents and court cases, popular culture and political/social commentary, research on public opinion, and so on. While the analysis centers for the most part on secondary rather than primary sources, the scope of the evidence—both in terms of substantive range and historical breadth—is impressive. Using this as a foundation, Pinder lays out her argument in a logical progression: first demonstrating America’s whiteness, leading to

the propagation of multiculturalism as a political ideology, then criticizing the multicultural idea on a number of fronts, and finally attempting to point forward to a post-multicultural future.

Each of these provocative arguments merits some criticism. First, is America really a “white” nation? To Pinder, “[a]ll documents that defined America, including the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, contributed to promote a white America” (p. 40) and her account ably links white ethnocentrism to slavery, Jim Crow, socially Darwinist immigration policies, and other examples of institutional racism tracing back to the founding. The conclusion? Gunnar Myrdal’s “American Dilemma” is no dilemma at all: Whites are comfortable being racist because it is in their interest as societal hegemons (pp. 50–51).

This is oversimplified; “white” America is real, but it has always butted against more liberal, egalitarian, and communitarian ideals (e.g., Rogers Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 1997) and these have fueled the expansion of civil rights, the liberalization of immigration policy post-1965, and multiculturalism. As such, political institutions have also constrained the behavior of racist elites and empowered the better angels of America’s nature. Justice Stephen Field, here serving as an exemplar of racist views against the Chinese (p. 58), also struck down the “Pigtail Ordinance” in *Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan* because its discriminatory intent violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In public opinion, too, US identity (even among whites) is not as ethnocentric as Pinder would have us believe (e.g., Deborah Schildkraut, *Americanism in the 21st Century*, 2011). While racial prejudice still exists in the wake of the Civil Rights movement and its aftermath, social desirability has drastically undercut its outward manifestations (Paul Sniderman, Gretchen C. Crosby, and William G. Howell, “The Politics of Race,” in David O. Sears, James Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo, eds., *Racialized Politics: The Debate About Racism in America*, 2000).

One can question whether outward behavior reflects private belief (Abigail Thernstrom and Stephan Thernstrom, *America in Black and White*, 1999), but the extent to which discourse has changed over the past half-century is unmistakable. In short, the America Pinder envisions, where “the prevailing assumption is that nonwhites are invested with essential characteristics and blemishes that contaminate the public culture [and are] perceived as a threat to the public culture” (p. 126), is one unfairly shorn of its most inclusive elements.

From Pinder’s vantage point, multiculturalism is just another tool by which whites keep racialized minorities de-Americanized. At best, it sanctions a regime of tolerance vis-à-vis minorities, but this is not enough because “in the end, tolerance cannot exist without intolerance” (p. 102). Conceptual muddiness surrounding the term makes multiculturalism’s putative chauvinism contestable. Some