

and postgraduation social networks) in which symbolic associations between terrorism and out-groups are likely to be weakened.

Brooks and Manza's experiments also show that neither priming perceptions of terrorist threats nor describing the policy target as an out-group member significantly increases support for one key counterterrorism measure: torture (pp. 101–2). This apparent aversion to torture points to the book's major shortcoming, which is its limited attention to the role of the media. During the height of the controversy over Bush administration interrogation practices, mainstream news outlets only rarely used the word "torture" (W. Lance Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston, "None Dare Call It Torture," *Journal of Communication* 56 [September 2006]: 467–85). This may help to explain why torture, even when employed on disliked groups, seemed to many of the authors' survey respondents to be outside the range of acceptable policies. Because of media influences, many Americans may not know that the United States has used torture, or that it was an institutionalized policy (rather than a deviation by a few rogue individuals), and they may even associate "torture" exclusively with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Experiments like those in this book, which use simple descriptive treatments (rather than realistic media portrayals), would do well to attend more closely to the mental associations that respondents may hold from previous engagements with political discourse. It is through the media that the majority of Americans receives "threat priming" messages and learns about public policies outside the experimental setting. The media is also a key socialization agent, helping to form and reinforce stereotypes and to politicize policy target groups (see James Shanahan, Michael Morgan, and Nancy Signorielli, eds., *Living with Television Now*, 2012).

More attention to the media would also help to address the book's occasional tendency to overstate the potential significance of the partisan switch in government in 2008. For example, in setting up their argument, Brooks and Manza assume "a very different framing environment ushered in by a Democratic president" (p. 66), and they later contend that "in the real world, opportunities are ample for rights-oriented or critical considerations to register" (p. 143). But the extent of polarization in elite discourse about this issue (beyond a few high-profile presidential speeches), and the extent to which critical frames actually register in media coverage, are empirical questions whose answers are, at best, unclear. News outlets' well-documented tendency to reflect mainstream elite positioning (especially as defined by the president and congressional leaders), consistent threat inflation (see Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and Robert Y. Shapiro, *Selling Fear*, 2011), and negative portrayals of out-groups suggest that the persistence of bipartisan public support for rights-infringing policies that these experiments causally disentangle

should not be too surprising. Indeed, the authors find that partisan identification generally has negligible effects on this support (e.g., pp. 98, 118). Much political-communication literature suggests the same conclusion, and this book would have been stronger had it engaged more thoroughly with that literature.

Despite these limitations, *Whose Rights?* will be a valuable addition to graduate seminars and to specialized undergraduate courses on public opinion and civil liberties, and it deserves to be read widely by public-opinion researchers and by American politics scholars in general. This book provides a rigorous analysis of public attitudes toward counterterrorism policies, and its findings carry troubling implications for the capacity of ordinary democratic processes to arrest the trend toward policies that infringe on civil liberties. Brooks and Manza's analysis suggests that the trauma inflicted on the American democratic system by September 11 will not be short-lived. This is a message for all of us to take seriously.

The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression. By Angus Burgin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. 320p. \$29.95.
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— Peter Kolozi, CUNY—Bronx Community College

The question that animates Angus Burgin's book is how the ideas of free-market advocates came to play a central role in American politics during the past three decades (p. 5). Burgin's "subnarrative" makes a significant contribution to our understanding of this ideological transformation (p. 223). *The Great Persuasion* is a lively and informative intellectual history focused on the project of "reinventing free markets" by Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, and, institutionally, the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS). Burgin's account, read with Kim Phillip-Fein's *Invisible Hands* (2009) reveals the symbiotic relationship between advocates of free markets and their ideas, on the one hand, and the institutions and business interests that nurtured and bankrolled them, on the other—a formula that ultimately led to the ideological triumph of free-market capitalism.

The narrative begins in 1924 with John Maynard Keynes proclaiming "The End of Laissez-Faire," which the Great Depression made a reality as faith in the inevitable market correction did not resonate with millions suffering from unemployment and impoverishment. Government intervention in the economy was popular, and Hayek's decision not to respond to Keynes's *General Theory* in 1936 proved Keynes's prediction about the end of laissez-faire correct, at least for a time. With the free market out of fashion in the economics profession, Hayek reinvented himself as a philosopher of the free market tasked with crafting both its normative concerns and a positive program. With the publication of *The Road to Serfdom* in 1945, and

its growing popularity, especially in the United States, Hayek's influence expanded. Free-market advocates were still a small and much maligned group, yet with his newfound fame, Hayek endeavored to create an institution where critics of economic planning could meet and "develop a comprehensive revision of liberalism" (p. 103). With funding from the Volker Fund and others, he organized the first meeting of the MPS in 1947. Although its members could not agree on an alternative to New Deal liberalism, the society was an incubator for economists, one that would have great influence over the trajectory of the discipline, including seven recipients of the Nobel Prize in Economics and the ideas that would "reinvent free markets" in the political discourse in the United States and in Europe (p. 204).

In Burgin's account, no member other than Hayek was more important than Milton Friedman. Friedman was an early member of the society, but in its first decade not a key participant. With the publication of *Capitalism and Freedom* in 1962, he became the leading light in the advocacy of the free market. But his idea of the free market was distinct from that of Hayek and other early members of the society. By the 1960s Friedman was decidedly an advocate of *laissez-faire* and rejected much of the role of the state that Hayek found acceptable. His framing of *laissez-faire* prescriptions in rhetoric that was "populist" and "progressive" and emphasized choice, together with his relationships with elected officials including Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, among others, precipitated the ideological triumph of *laissez-faire*. By 1970 he was the leader of the MPS.

Among the most fascinating parts of the book is Burgin's discussion of the early years of the MPS. In his account, the members failed to agree on much, including a social philosophy and a positive program. They even disagreed on what they ought to call themselves, "neoliberal" or "libertarians" or something else. Instead, that which held them together was not what they agreed on but what they opposed: a planned economy. Most interesting of all were their debates concerning the ethics of capitalism, the free market's compatibility with tradition, the danger of big business and monopoly, and the desirability of *laissez-faire*. As Burgin expertly demonstrates, Hayek and other early members of the MPS held nuanced views about the appropriate role of the state in the economy. Indeed, as the author explains, Hayek "condoned a vigorous role for the state" (p. 90). Ludwig von Mises and other advocates of *laissez-faire* were decidedly in the minority in the early years. In sum, in the early years of the society, free-market advocates could not abandon themselves to the unrestrained market as the economic basis for their alternative liberal vision.

It is interesting to note that American conservatives tasked with crafting a conservative alternative could not

do so either. The debates over the compatibility of the free market with social tradition that took place in the MPS were simultaneously occurring among postwar "New Conservatives" in their attempt to define the meaning of American conservatism. The influence of Frank Meyer's "conservative fusion," though never completely satisfactory to traditionalists such as Russell Kirk, led to the expulsion of Peter Viereck from the conservative movement and pulled conservatism toward economic *laissez-faire*. The MPS, perhaps more organically, did the same to skeptics of *laissez-faire*, as key early members of the society were no longer participating, in disapproval of the society's increasing turn to economic *laissez-faire* in the early 1960s (p. 150).

While the book focuses on Hayek and Friedman, Burgin seamlessly incorporates a discussion of others, including Walter Lippmann, Frank Knight, and Wilhelm Ropke. Burgin's clear approach and accessible writing reveals the complexity, tension, and the richness of ideas among skeptics of economic planning, especially in the 1930s and in the early years of the MPS. Yet that complexity diminishes as Friedman comes to the fore in Burgin's narrative. With Friedman, the triumph of *laissez-faire* seems assured. The rich intellectual debate, so interesting in Burgin's approach in the early chapters, recedes in the latter part of the book. Whereas the author situates Hayek in a milieu of intellectual debate, Friedman's ideas seemed to have few rivals, either from the Left or Right or among other free-market advocates. Even the MPS, the institution that helped "invent" Milton Friedman, as one of the chapter titles is cleverly worded, recedes from the narrative. The final two chapters read more like a biography of Friedman than the institutional approach of the earlier chapters.

If there is a weakness in *The Great Persuasion* it emerges in the conclusion. There, Burgin argues that the global financial crisis of 2008 precipitated a "generational shift" and reevaluation of *laissez-faire* by conservatives. Yet, throughout the book, with the exception of the Great Depression and the elevation of Keynesianism, Burgin pays little attention to "external events," political or economic. For instance, he suggests that free-market ideas gained greater currency in the 1950s, but does not explain why beyond pointing to the importance of the "static dualisms of the Cold War" (p. 223). Furthermore, by the late 1970s, the seismic ideological shift toward free markets could not be attributable solely to Friedman's rhetorical style and institutional support, however important they were. Perhaps situating Friedman's ideas in the context of greater structural changes in the economy, along with the politics of the white backlash against the Civil Rights movement and the Great Society, would have married "the relevance of the history of ideas to the history of politics" with "anxieties about the changing structure of the social environment" (p. 224). Each has much to offer in

explaining the centrality of free-market ideas in contemporary political discourse.

Despite these criticisms *The Great Persuasion* makes an important contribution. It is carefully researched and well written, and it makes for a compelling narrative of ideological transformation. The general reader as well as students in the fields of intellectual history and political science will find reading this book a rewarding experience.

Blacks in and out of the Left. By Michael C. Dawson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013. 242p. \$24.95.
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— Joshua Miller, *Lafayette College*

In this short, provocative, and elegantly written book, Michael C. Dawson sketches twentieth-century left-radical African American movements and their leaders, criticizes white left activists and historians for not knowing or suppressing this history, advocates for black nationalism as a significant component of a revived Left, defends this ideal from possible criticisms by left political theorists, and, in the conclusion, calls for political action.

The first half of the book “blames” the Left for “failure,” “inability,” “refusal,” and “erasure.” Dawson sharply rebukes sociologist Todd Gitlin and philosopher Richard Rorty, saying of Gitlin’s *Twilight of Common Dreams* (1995): “The startling lack of information he has about those movements is matched only by the vacuousness of his interpretation of that history” (viii). Ignorance of black history, according to Dawson, makes many historians and activists myopic about American history in general. For example, when Beverly Gage in *The Day Wall Street Exploded* (2010) claimed that the first great act of terror in the United States in the twentieth century was a 1920 bombing in Wall Street she misses the waves of terror that were directed at black people, especially in the era of lynching.

The book is not primarily a work of history, although in the first 125 pages Dawson refers to positions of activists and organizations who may be unfamiliar to many, such as Lovett Fort-Whiteman, Otto Hall, Harry Haywood, Cyril Briggs, Hubert Harrison, Chandler Owen, Monroe Trotter, Claudia Jones, the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, the Liberty League, and the African Blood Brotherhood. Those who do not know this history might feel that they are walking into a conversation that has already begun. For example, we learn that Harrison’s misogyny and poor organizing ability undermined the potential of the Liberty League, but we are not sure who Harrison is or what other scholars have said about him.

According to Dawson, black radicals have been ignored or disparaged not only by historians and cultural critics but also by left activists, including socialists, communists,

and the New Left: “[I]deological positions and political practices of the left led, often inadvertently, to the reproduction of structures of racial subordination within the myriad of progressive social movements that came into being during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century” (11). Racism turned blacks off to the Left, and the Left underestimated how much it needed African Americans. “I also demonstrate how the left’s consistent mistakes on race directly led to failures in grassroots organizing and in building leftist organizations,” the author states (44).

The Left has been strongest, Dawson asserts, when it incorporates black nationalism, or at least focuses on the particular concerns of African Americans. He sees a political model in the Communist Party USA between 1920 and 1940 where black and white radicals worked together. Unfortunately, in the late 1940s the party lost contact with the black masses as it began to follow “Soviet-mandated false unity that emphasized working with racist and liberal whites” (52). Thus, the Communist Party created “the great sundering” which jettisoned African Americans in favor of putative class solidarity, papering over the divisions in the working class created by white racism. In addition, it split black organizations like the NAACP into radical and anti-communist factions: “[T]he sundering led to a degenerate form of politics in the United States and the closing off of many democratic possibilities for people both inside and outside the United States” (60). By excluding or disparaging the concerns and actions of black radicals the left lost its “richer base of mobilization” (11). Black and white liberals joined in a tepid political movement, cut off from the black masses, while a few black radicals remained within the inhospitable and largely ineffective Communist Party, and still others joined anticommunist organizations or, later, identified with China. Dawson explains that, ultimately, this is why the Tea Party has a much greater effect on politics today than does the Left: Natural opposition to the Tea Party had fallen apart.

Dawson’s ideal is “the path that sought to fight for human emancipation from within black radical organizations deeply embedded within black communities and movements,” and he wants those organizations to be accepted as part of a resurrected left coalition (37). The Left has mistakenly rejected black nationalism, falsely believing that it jettisons class solidarity, universalism, and Martin Luther King, Jr.’s vision of a beloved community. Yet according to the author, the embrace of black identity is not necessarily divisive. Malcolm X wanted “freedom, political power, and egalitarian redistribution of resources, and other demands that a politicized working class has historically advanced” (136). Similarly, although the Black Panthers sought black liberation, their 10-point program was part of a social democratic agenda that applied to all workers and poor people.