

EREN DUZGUN

*Class, State and Property:
Modernity and Capitalism in Turkey*

Abstract

This paper argues that the class-based analyses that seek to make sense of the recent transformation of Turkish modernity rest on a pre-given duality between the state and the bourgeoisie. This not only jettisons the relational and temporal context in which classes define and articulate their interests, thereby leading to determinist explanations of various sorts, but also obscures the historical distinctiveness and mutual re-transformation of two different modes of socio-spatial organization, modernity and capitalism, in Turkey. Based on a novel historical materialist method known as Political Marxism, I suggest that re-conceptualizing class as property-relations sheds new light on the historical-comparative specificity of Turkish modernity, which, in turn, leads to a radical re-interpretation of Turkey's recent transformation.

Keywords: Modernity; Capitalism; Turkey; Neo-Ottomanism; Empire; Property relations.

TURKEY HAS BEEN undergoing a radical social transformation since the 1980s, which has yielded significant implications on the hitherto prevailing notions of secularism, democracy and citizenship (Keyman 2010). The Kemalist encapsulation of the political and religious imaginary seems to have erupted since then, with the previously excluded social classes moving into the public sphere, redefining the political, the secular and the religious. In particular, the bourgeois classes associated with Political Islam are deemed to be the prime mover behind “a state-making project from below”, reversing the bureaucratically-informed hierarchies of the Republican period (Atasoy 2009, p. 51). Taking advantage of “opportunity spaces” created by global economic processes, Islamist business groups have succeeded in breaking the supremacy of the military bureaucracy, hegemonically linking civil society with political society (Tuğal 2009; Eligür 2010; Yavuz 2003) and moderating the radical elements within the ruling Justice and Development Party (Pamuk 2008b). They have successfully challenged the political and cultural preferences of the Kemalist state elite, thereby

119

Eren DUZGUN, Department of Political Science, York University, Toronto [eduzgun@yorku.ca].

Arch.europ.sociol., LIII, 2 (2012), pp. 119–148—0003-9756/12/0000-000\$07.50per art + \$0.10 per page©A.E.S., 2012

leading to an overhaul of Turkey's "statist" modernity (Gülalp 2001; Keyman and Koyuncu 2005; Keyder 2004; Gümüüşçü and Sert 2009). Indeed, they are now ready to export their liberal-conservative project to the Middle East, finally laying the foundations of, what its enthusiastic proponents call, an "Ottoman commonwealth", a dream that Ottoman and Turkish reformers long strived for, yet could not materialize (Çolak 2006).

Explaining the unfolding of the liberal project in Turkey with the eventual rise of a bourgeois class hints at the final resolution of the conceptual dichotomy used by many scholars to define the relation between the Turkish state and the bourgeoisie. Weberian scholars have long associated the sustained prevalence of illiberal notions of modernity in Turkey with strict state control over the economy and civil society. In this conception, the "strong state", a legacy of the "patrimonial" imperial past, centralized and monopolized the alternative interpretations of economy and civil society, leaving only little room for the development of liberal conceptions of modernity (Heper 1985; Mardin 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). Turkish modernity remained defensive/illiberal for so long as society did not cease to be organized around the patrimonial state, *i.e.* the privileges and status-based networks of a statist past persisted, outweighing the requirements of "rational enterprise". It is therefore the degree of development of "capitalist rationality" and the bourgeois classes that serves as a template by which Ottoman/Turkish modernization is typified.

Marxian perspectives, utilizing conceptual tools provided by the World-System and Dependency theories, accused the Weberian reading of Turkish modernization of turning a blind eye to the spatial hierarchies within the world capitalist system that account for the historical specificity of the Turkish transition to modernity. That is, the persistence of the strong state cannot be explained through the stagnancy of civil society *per se*, as Weberians propounded, but rather has to be seen as "an integral, albeit functionally-differentiated component" of the capitalist world economy (İslamoğlu and Keyder 1977, pp. 55). Thus conceived, World-System and Dependency scholars construe the comparative character of state formation and capitalist development in Turkey through an analysis of Turkey's position in the world market, *i.e.* its "mode of incorporation" into the capitalist world-economy. In this conception, the bourgeoisie is assumed to have been dependent on foreign centers of accumulation for its own social reproduction, to have lacked international connections or been hampered by state classes, thus not seeking to liberalize the political and

cultural space as it did in the core countries. A “weak”/“comprador” bourgeoisie, bastardized by a process of peripherization, conceded the political/cultural preferences of the bureaucratic cadres, hence the sustained prevalence of an illiberal conception of modernity in Turkey (Keyder 1987; Berberoglu 1982; Boratav 2004).

Either way, be it the peripheral character of capitalism or the lack of indigenous sources of “proper” capitalist development, the bourgeoisie/state dichotomy constitutes the conceptual backbone of the debate on Turkish modernity. This essay takes issue with this dominant perception of progress and historical change, or what Ellen Meiksins Wood (1991, Ch. 1) calls the “bourgeois paradigm”, used to make sense of the trajectory of social transformation in Turkey. This paradigm treats the bourgeoisie as the paradigmatic agent of modernity, a class pre-loaded with rationality to carry out its historic mission of transforming society. The Turkish bourgeoisie is assumed to have temporarily deviated from this pattern as a result of its mode of integration into the world market or cultural and political impediments to its development. And yet, for the last ten years, it has finally assumed its historic role, laying the foundations of the alleged liberal turn in state-society relations.

The bourgeois paradigm replaces the relational essence of “class” with a priori assumptions about bourgeois agency. The bourgeoisie is theorized not through its relation to other classes in historically-specific contexts of social reproduction, but primarily based on a pre-given duality between the state and the bourgeoisie. By uncritically equating bourgeoisie to capitalism, these approaches presume that “the fundamental social relations of capitalism are somehow always in the air” (Comninel 1987, p. 87), just waiting to be unraveled once the bourgeois class becomes “strong” enough to challenge the authority of the state classes. This conceptualizes away the very issue that requires most explanation: the fundamental problem of transition from one mode of production to another, *i.e.* the transition from one form of society to another is replaced by an essentialist scheme of historical development led by bourgeois classes programmed to carry out their pre-ordained tasks. The narrative of the “rise” of a new social force obscures the social struggles over the coming into being of a new society (Wood 1991, p. 7).

Furthermore, presuming that capitalism emerges out of “economic” exchange on the shoulders of bourgeois classes, the bourgeois paradigm renders capitalism a natural phenomenon existing at all times, whose seeds are contained in the very act of exchange, only waiting to be released from their external impediments by increases in the volume of economic activity (Wood 1999, Ch. 1). Consequently, capitalism is

externalized to social relations, gaining an abstract/technical/economistic character, to which people respond only a posteriori. Capitalism does not materialize in social relations, but rather it precedes or, at best, interacts with them (Brenner 1977).

All combined, the bourgeois paradigm and its perception of class and capitalism, eventually cripples our understanding of modernity and capitalism, depleting them of their social content. Indeed, associating the modern transformation of politics, the state and social institutions with the level of development of capitalism and bourgeois classes, the bourgeois paradigm blurs the fact that the establishment and generalization of a capitalist form of appropriation brings about a qualitative shift in, and often contradictory results for, modern forms of rule and subjectivity (Bromley 1994, pp. 100-103). That the prevailing form of appropriation gains an “economic” and “private” character under capitalism sets in train a fundamental transformation of the social disposition of state power, which re-makes modernity on the basis of a narrowly-defined politico-cultural sphere with no significant implication on the distribution of social and economic power (Wood 2012). Thus, explaining the changes in modern conceptions of rule and subjectivity on the basis of the gradual “liberation” of bourgeois classes not only fails to recognize that modernity and capitalism refer to two different modes of socio-spatial organization, but also to develop a deeper understanding of their subsequent mutual re-transformation (Wood 1997).

The point of departure for the proposed analyses of Turkish modernity is based on the restructuring of the central concepts of the debate, class and capitalism. Departing from a priori and transhistorical conceptions of class, I seek to re-assert the centrality of class by re-emphasizing its historicity. I argue that class cannot be substantively defined as economic relations or a mode of stratification based on market opportunities. Rather, I treat class as property relations whose content is determined by the specific form in which “unpaid labor is pumped out of the direct producers” (Marx 1991, p. 791). This leads to a “processual” conceptualization of class that recognizes the changes in class relational content over time (Wood 1995, Ch. 3), hence able to capture the historically-varying politico-cultural forms that surplus extraction relations take. Such an approach no longer extrapolates the bourgeois agency back in time as the universal carrier of capitalist social relations, but looks into the ways in which the bourgeoisie reproduces its means of social reproduction in historically-specific social contexts. The bourgeoisie no longer remains in theory by definition, but derives its logic of reproduction in class-structured ways.

In what follows, I attempt to go beyond the generic conceptualizations of social agency by historicizing the socio-temporal processes whereby the Turkish bourgeoisie defined and articulated its interests. Revealing the historically structured links between the bourgeoisie and the state will bring in its train a discussion of the dominant mode of social organization in Turkey in the post-war period. I argue that the post-war project of modern development in Turkey had much to do with a strong bourgeois class and less to do with capitalism, while Turkey's current transformation signifies more the consolidation of a relatively novel capitalist project than a mere transition to another form of modernity. As such, I contend that the transition from Kemalist modernity to the so-called Islamist/liberal modernity today is underlined by the historically unprecedented consolidation of capitalist property relations and the associated emergence of novel forms of rule and subjectivity in Turkey.

State, capitalism and class

Capitalism has been one of the main preoccupations of most post-18th century social theory. And perhaps no two other theorists influenced the debate on modernity and capitalism more than Karl Marx and Max Weber did. Witnessing the socio-historical rupture brought about by capitalism in Europe during the 19th century, both Marx and Weber attempted to uncover the underlying causes of capitalism, offering two distinct, yet at times converging, sociologies of modernity. A debate on Marx and Weber, *i.e.* their similarities and differences, is simply beyond the scope of this paper.¹ What I intend to question in this section, however, is the way capitalism and class have been understood by Marx and Weber's adherents.

Consider the prominent names of Weberian historical sociology. In these accounts, the bourgeoisie, based on the type and level of commerce in a given economy, accumulates wealth and rationalizes profit-seeking action, which in turn leads it to challenge the political/cultural preferences of the aristocracy, the peasantry, the bureaucracy and the associated non-liberal notions of modernity (Moore 1966; Tilly 1990). In non-Western societies, say in the Middle East, due to the prevailing nature of political rule, *i.e.* the "patrimonial" or the "rentier" character of the state, buttressed by sacred law and Islamic

¹ For Marx and Weber on modernity and capitalism, see Sayer 1991.

understanding of justice, frustrates the potential to generate an independent space where bourgeois classes could flourish. The result is the persistence of tribal forms of life and an impenetrable Islamic folk culture, which prevented the emergence or limited the development of modern economic and political institutions, thereby aggravating the “irrational” fusion of politics and Islam (Turner 1984; Springbord 1990; Gellner 1981).

Marxian accounts too utilize a narrative based on the presumed strength/weakness of bourgeois agency to probe the capitalism-modernity relation. Here the emphasis shifts from the non-capitalist obstacles to the bourgeoisie’s rationality to the hierarchies in the world economy. The structure of the “world-system”, argues Wallerstein (1980), allowed the bourgeoisie in the core European countries to develop more liberal forms of labor control than their counterparts in the periphery. The development of the bourgeoisie in the periphery occurred under the auspices of international capital or the colonial state, thus the domestic bourgeoisie was too weak and dependent on foreign centers of accumulation for its own social reproduction. The bourgeoisie in the periphery, consequently, does not seek to transform its own society. It either forms alliance with pre-capitalist social forces for the continuity of the relations of dependence between the core and the periphery as part of an international bourgeoisie or it leaves the leadership of the developmental project to a state bourgeoisie (Alavi 1972; Amin 1976; Evans 1989). In either case, the result is that democratic practices do not take root in the third world, with liberal demands repressed under the conditions given by the requirements of capital accumulation in the core (Cardoso 1980; O’Donnell 1988; Portes 1985).

Weberian and Marxian theories are in agreement in pre-imputing the bourgeoisie as the carrier of economic and socio-cultural development, despite their subsequent disagreement on whether or not the bourgeoisie can lead to a fully-fledged, *i.e.* liberal, modernity in the late modernizing countries. Consequently, Marxian and Weberian accounts seem to be struck from the same ahistorical mold, both sharing an ahistorical view of social agency that replaces the relational context in which the bourgeoisie derives its logic of operation with presumptions about agency itself, *i.e.* its location in the world economy, its culture or its degree of rationalization. Underlying this ahistorical notion of class is the lumping together of capitalism and modernity under the same transhistorical process of rationalization of bourgeois agency, the former simply being its economic component while the latter constituting its political/cultural aspect.

What is in need of further elaboration then is the process of state transformation without pre-labeling any single class as conducive to socio-economic development. I suggest that historicizing the socio-temporal processes whereby class interests are defined and articulated overcomes not only the generic conceptualizations of social agency, making it empirically possible to study the historically structured links between the state and dominant social forces, but also leads to a departure from the dominant perception of modernity and capitalism outlined above.

Re-Conceptualizing class: modernity or capitalism?

The bourgeois paradigm imprints capitalism and modernity over each other. What immediately disappears from the resulting palimpsest is the dramatic historical rupture that produced the capitalist market as a specific social form. Capitalism becomes a natural trait of the bourgeoisie, passing from the earliest merchants through the medieval burgher to the national bourgeoisie, and finally to the transnational capitalist. The question how capitalism arose is explained through the circular logic of the bourgeoisie and the market. The expansion of markets becomes the cause of the rise of the bourgeoisie, and *vice versa*. Evolutionism eventually prevails, with little room left for explanation. With capitalism obscured, the historical distinctiveness of modernity also pales in the mainstream narrative. Modernity is depleted of its social content; merely used to make sense of different phases of an ever-present capitalism, *i.e.* modernity, “second modernity”, “post-modernity” etc. In short, modernity gets lost in the “non-history of capitalism” (Wood 1997).

Re-historicization of capitalism and modernity is firmly tied to re-historicization of the “social class”, one of the most “tormented, transfixed and de-historicized category of social sciences” (Thompson 1995, p. 63). The bourgeois paradigm renders class exclusively an economic phenomenon focused on the moment of production and circulation only. As such, it transhistoricizes the form class takes *only* in capitalist society (Sayer 1987, pp. 20-21). It is only when social reproduction shifts away from the personal/communal relations of reproduction to economic competition, that class takes on an “economic” character narrowed down to the point of production. Through the establishment of a contractual relation between the dispossessed “free” producers and the

propertied classes and the consolidation of the rules of reproduction in a politically-shielded “economic” sphere, capitalism makes “class” thinkable in economic terms. With the historicity of class vanished, the bourgeois paradigm renders utterly unintelligible the non-capitalist history and the transition to capitalism (Godelier 1978; Meillassoux 1972).

Class, in this respect, can prove to be a more useful conceptual tool for the historical and comparative analysis of Turkish modernity if it is re-conceptualized as “property relations”, *i.e.* historically- and contextually-varying surplus extraction relations and patterns of reproduction crystallized in different property regimes (Lacher 2006, p. 37; Wood 1995, p. 76). An historical examination of different property forms can restore the centrality of class in the analysis of the Turkish path to state formation and economic development without presuming the existence of capitalist social relations at all times.

Property relations, in this perspective, allow enough room for historicizing the struggles for access to or control over the means of reproducing society. In non-capitalist societies, the economic power of the ruling class is deeply embedded within its political power, therefore property relations can be analyzed only by reference to variations in political power that allocate differential access to the means of social reproduction. Having a share of, investing in, and being recognized by political/cultural authority secures access to the means of reproduction (Anderson 1974). In a capitalist society, by contrast, property relations are structured in such ways that personal/political/moral relations no longer play the dominant role in accessing surplus.² Economic compulsion and economic competition become the main determinant of the transfer of surplus among competing classes. What underlies the novelty of the capitalist market, therefore, cannot simply be the “production for market” or the presence of “wage labor” *per se*, but that human existence in capitalist market is systematically subjected to competitive reproduction based on an

² The consequent schism between the political and the economic, the foundation of the alleged “independence” of capitalist property, is surely a formal one, ultimately secured by extra-economic power, as any other property form (Brenner 1987, pp. 11–12). Nonetheless, acknowledging the common political essence of different property forms should not obscure the variation in the degree of political power involved in the immediate processes of production and appropriation. It is, after all,

this recognition that allows one to de-naturalize capitalist property and to differentiate among historically-specific property forms (Wood 1981). To quote Marx (1976, p. 174), “in each historical epoch, property has developed differently and under a set of entirely different social relations” and it is only under capitalism that property, stripped of its “former political and social embellishments”, acquires an “economic” character (Marx 1991, p. 755).

overhaul of the pre-existing property relations. In the end, the market no longer remains as a space of “opportunity”, where the surplus product and surplus labor are occasionally sold, but becomes an “imperative” for social reproduction (Wood 1994; Polanyi 2001).

Class as property relations is no longer a meta-explanandum but an explanandum; *i.e.* it requires explanation as its content changes with the reality it seeks to comprehend. This is precisely where one begins to grasp the historical complexity of the relation between modernity and capitalism beyond essentialist assumptions. Class as property relations is able to distinguish between modernity and capitalism as two different modes of socio-spatial structuration, each of which rooted in entirely different class relations. That the struggle over surplus takes the form of “economic” compulsion and competition in the capitalist market requires the restructuring of the prevailing modern conceptions of rule and subjectivity. Put differently, in the course of capitalist transformation, previously-existing conceptions of the political and the cultural lose their centrality in subjects’ social reproduction, which results in a qualitative rupture with the prevailing conceptions of modernity. Confining modern conceptions of nationhood and citizenship to a distinct political sphere abstracted from the relations of exploitation and economic power, capitalism makes thinkable and expandable (but not necessarily realized) a political-cultural space in which all subjects enjoy formal equality. This is what constitutes the very basis of “the separation of the worker into worker and citizen”, which rests on the differentiation of the subject’s relation to the state from his relation to capital (Holloway and Picciotto 1991, p. 114). Thus construed, once the relations of capitalist market are consolidated, modernity, as it previously existed, becomes almost unrecognizable (Bromley 1994, pp. 100–103; Wood 2012).

The transition to modernity can no longer be equated with the transition to capitalism. The historically specific struggles over the constitution of modern state and modern conceptions of political subjectivity have to be grasped without presuming the existence and necessary arrival of capitalism.³ The constitution of the “modern” required the re-construction of the political on a different basis than

³ This is derived from a Political Marxist position originally advanced by Robert Brenner (1977), further developed by Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995) and more recently expanded by Hannes Lacher (2006), Benno Teschke (2003) and Post (2011). On this view, a transition from feudalism and

capitalism took place only in England, while continental European development, and especially French absolutism, was marked by a fundamentally different form of social organization from which capitalist social property-relations were absent (*cf.* Anderson 1974; Morton 2005).

the hitherto prevailing notions of the “public”, “domestic” and the “religious”. However, this re-organization did not necessarily lead to separation of the political from the economic. Rather, based on the balance of power among contending classes, different “projects of substitution” were adopted that sought to selectively and limitedly generate capitalist forms of sociality without undermining the existing configurations of power (Shilliam 2009). Classes, organized in and as the state, initiated novel development projects in each social context as a response to and in mediation of the dynamics and contradictions associated with the geographically and temporally uneven development of capitalist social relations. Modernity was not the political/cultural component of an ongoing economic rationalization, but rather, emerged as an alternative project of rationalization that substituted capitalism and the capitalist subject for novel political orders and subjectivities (Lacher 2006).

In what follows, I argue that the bourgeois paradigm obscures not only the fact that the post-war project of modern development in Turkey had little to do with capitalism, but also that Turkey’s current transformation signifies more the consolidation of a relatively novel capitalist project than a mere transition to another form of modernity. I provide an historical sketch of the linked processes of capitalist development and state transformation in Turkey, with a special focus on the transformation of property relations in the last ten years. I contend that Turkey has undergone a rapid process of capitalist transformation since the 2000s based on the consolidation of capitalist rules of reproduction in the market. Economic competition, rather than political mobilization, has become the rule in reproducing the means of life, a process founded upon revolutionary changes in the prevalent forms of rule and subjectivity.

Capitalist development, state and the bourgeoisie in Turkey, 1950-1980

The question of how to define the relation between the state and the bourgeoisie in post-1950 Turkey is a contentious one, bearing important consequences on how modernity and capitalism are understood in Turkey. Serif Mardin (2006c, pp. 62-63) describes the post-war Turkish socio-economic system as “late neo-patrimonialism”, a patrimonial system with “an increasing number of characteristics of capitalism”. The political “center”, according to Mardin, fostered the growth of a new class of entrepreneurs, yet the penetration of these new

social elements into the “center” was not strong enough to change the balance of forces at the apex of the state. As a consequence, “power”, rather than “economic production”, remained as the defining feature of Turkish political and economic life, hence the underdevelopment of modern conceptions of rule. In like fashion, Heper (1992) and Kazancigil (1994) emphasize the “timidity” of the bourgeois classes *vis-à-vis* the strength of state cadres, which made impossible the development of an “independent” civil society based on market relationships and economic rationality. Buğra (1994) and Öniş (1992) formulate a milder version of the “weak” bourgeoisie argument. Well aware of the role the state played in the industrialization of the East Asian “tigers”, they highlight the lack of a long-term industrial strategy on the part of the state cadres, which in turn led the bourgeois classes to engage in “rent-seeking activity”. Eventually, they contend that what characterized Turkish society and its non-liberal ways of modernity was not the “strength” of the state per se, but a market-repressing state, instead of a “market-augmenting” one, limiting the “self-confidence” of the Turkish bourgeoisie. Keyder (1987) seems to agree with this view, as he sees bourgeois domination only in the economic sphere, with political and cultural life still shaped by the rather authoritarian practices of the state cadres. This pertains to the “disinterestedness” of the bourgeois classes in enlarging the politico-cultural sphere in Turkey, a consequence of their peripheral integration into the capitalist world economy.

Eventually we find ourselves in a conceptual quagmire. Every attempt at explaining the historical and comparative specificity of the Turkish route to modernity and capitalist development seems to be stuck in some form of essentialism based on the bourgeois paradigm. The presence of non-liberal forms of modernity is linked to the nature of capitalism in Turkey, which is in turn associated with the weakness or the peripheral nature of the bourgeois classes. As Yalman (2009, p. 349) points out, the relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie is transhistorically defined by these accounts, instead of being grasped with reference to the social and historical context of class interests. Then the issue is to unravel the transhistorical association between the bourgeoisie, capitalism and liberal modernity and to specify the historical and relational context in which the bourgeoisie may support a liberal route to modernity.

After all, the alleged “repression” or “misguidance” of bourgeois elements by the state is hardly tenable from an empirical point of view. Ahmad (2002), Boratav (2004) and Barkey (1987) convincingly argue that the bureaucracy was defeated by the emerging bourgeoisie within

the ruling Republican People's Party as early as the seventh party congress in 1947, which later manifested itself in the Democratic Party's ten year rule from 1950 and 1960. Even when the bureaucracy attempted to make a comeback through the coup in 1960, it took only a couple of years for the bourgeoisie to fully turn the State Planning Organization, the political center of the new "planned" economy, into an instrument of the private sector (Milor, 1990).⁴ If the "weakness" of the bourgeoisie does not hold water, how would one understand the domination of bourgeois classes and the seemingly contradictory prevalence of non-liberal forms of modernity in Turkey?

The way out of this conundrum rests on treating class as property relations, which recognizes the changing societal context and the logic of reproduction of the bourgeois class over time and link this to the transforming logic of rule and subjectivity in Turkey. Even a perfunctory glance at Turkish political economy of the period demonstrates that the intra-bourgeois struggles took place not in the market only, but almost exclusively in and through the state over the allocation of politically-determined subsidies, import quotas and scarce foreign currencies. Different fractions of the bourgeoisie, organized in various business associations and political parties, did everything to avoid being subjected to the capitalist rules of reproduction in the market. They fiercely reacted against any plan that would increase their competitiveness in international markets, as this could, in the long run, end their formal dependency on the state. The result was that the easy subsidy regime of the 1950s was re-established in the so-called import substitution years: only 17.9 per cent of the total subsidies received by firms between 1968 and 1980 was invested in accordance with developmental directives (Milor 1989, pp. 255-256). There was no imperative for economic competition behind high tariff walls and an easy subsidy regime, which caused a surge of investment with very weak backward and forward linkages to the rest of the economy. The resultant lack of "vertical" investments kept the overall domestic content of the allegedly import-substituting industries as low as

⁴ This is not to argue that the bureaucracy became the servant of the bourgeois class, nor to evoke a generic "relative autonomy" argument. But that even the partial differentiation of political and economic processes complicated the social reproduction of bureaucratic cadres, as the state accepted, in principle, that it was no longer involved in the immediate processes of production. That is precisely what

led the military cadres to seek ways to retain some of their political and economic privilege through various institutional and legal mechanisms after the 1960 coup, such as their increasing "advisory" role in the National Security Council and the economic privileges their "pension fund" (OYAK, one of the largest corporations in Turkey) enjoyed until very recently.

23 per cent (Barkey 1990, p. 115), hence the chronic need for and ever-intensifying political competition over the hardly-obtained foreign currencies. Worse still, despite the reluctance of international financial institutions to extend further loans and the draining of worker remittances especially after the second half of the 1970s, the private sector hardly succumbed to the political and international demands to restructure the state-provided economic incentives and to devalue the over-valued lira (Evrensel 2004; Kantarci and Karacan, 2008). When the foreign exchange and debt crisis mounted after 1977, they responded simply by decreasing capacity utilization and investment (Barkey 1990, p. 100), which further exacerbated domestic political instability. All this indicates that remaining dependent on the state-generated rents was simply easier and more profitable for the bourgeoisie than becoming dependent on the market. The bourgeoisie prevailed over other social forces throughout the post-war years, yet hardly became a fully capitalist bourgeoisie. Its privileged access to public resources remained the main source of its social reproduction, thereby jeopardizing the differentiation of political processes from economic ones, actively preventing the expansion of civil society and the constitution of a horizontally organized public space. Rather ironically, they were an “infant” capitalist class whose very presence became an impediment to the further development of capitalism in Turkey.⁵

As the bourgeoisie sought to reap the benefits of a politically-protected market and politically-provided subsidies, peasants too took advantage of being in the electoral majority to obtain politically-constituted prices for their products.⁶ Since 1950, the peasantry had gained access to state-provided cheap and long-term agricultural credits,⁷ which gave them the opportunity to buy/rent agricultural machinery without incurring too much debt. In this respect, the

⁵ In the absence of a radical structural change in the Turkish economy, it comes as no surprise that before the 1980s, the contribution of total factor productivity to general economic growth remained either negative or insignificant (Altuğ, Filiztekin, *et al.* 2008, p. 410).

⁶ This is not to argue that the cases of successful late development were achieved without state intervention. However, the state provision of subsidies in such countries as South Korea and Taiwan worked to ensure that capitalists became subjected to the rules of reproduction in the international

markets. Likewise, the provision of subsidies to peasants to enhance productivity was compensated for by charging the peasantry above-market prices for their access to fertilizers and consumption goods, see Amsden 2003; 1985, pp. 86-87, also see Chibber 2003.

⁷ The Agricultural Bank's credits to agriculture increased almost 10-fold between 1948 and 1958 (Varli and Oktar 2010, p. 12). Meanwhile, tax revenues from agriculture were at historically low levels, from 29 per cent of budget revenues in 1924 to 4 per cent in the 1950s (Inci 2009, p. 128).

intensification of credit relations between the state and the peasantry not only increased peasant production and their relative living standards, but also protected them against relations of usury. Combined with the state provision of floor prices to the peasantry,⁸ peasant property was actually strengthened throughout the so-called import-substitution period. Consequently, industrialization in urban areas and mechanization in agriculture did not divorce peasants from their means of production, and the relations of production in the countryside remained by and large unchanged. Indeed, the only transformation prior to the 1960s seems to be one of further consolidation of peasant property: the number of owner occupied farms increased by 30 per cent between 1952 and 1963 while landlessness declined from 16 per cent to 10 per cent of the rural population between 1950 and 1960 (Keyder 1987, p.131). Correlatively, labor productivity in agriculture between 1890 and 1960 did not increase by more than 60 per cent in seventy years (Pamuk 2008a, p. 392). Indeed, through the import substitution decades, despite massive increases in the use of fertilizers and machinery, the inter-sectoral linkages between agricultural producers and agriculture-based industries deteriorated (Kazgan 1999, p. 32).⁹ Furthermore, even when internal migration began to transform the urban landscape, peasants moved to cities without losing their land. This resulted in an upward pressure on urban wages,¹⁰ which removed the possibility of a fully capitalist re-organization of society from consideration.

Equally important, given the oligopolistic character of and the lack of “deepening” in manufacturing markets, most of the newly established industries were capital-intensive, which dramatically limited the absorption capacity of the rural masses by urban centers.¹¹ One way to siphon off the otherwise educated-yet-unemployed mass was to enlarge the bureaucracy and the state economic enterprises. The expansion of the latter was also linked to the increasing reliance of

⁸ Over 25 per cent of the total value of agricultural production was procured by the state throughout the ISI years (Kasnakoglu 1986, p. 132) Also, the domestic terms of trade increased in favor of agriculture by 41 per cent from 1960-1 to 1975-6 (Boratav 2004, p. 136), also see Kazgan (1999, p. 31).

⁹ Koymen (1999, p. 29) supports this view by arguing that the utilization of agricultural products in relevant industries remained as low as 7 per cent, while the world average was around 60 per cent.

¹⁰ For instance, despite significantly lower levels of productivity, manufacturing wages in Turkey were three times the level of South Korean wages in 1974, double in 1977 and still 50 per cent higher than Korean wages in 1979, see Keyder 1987, pp. 159-161.

¹¹ Manufacturing's share in GNP between 1962 and 1980 increased by more than 64 per cent, while its share in total employment rose by only 2.8 per cent, see Barkey 1990, pp. 80-81.

the private sector on state-produced goods at below-market prices. The immediate result was that the state became the employer of one-third of the working population and 36 per cent of the manufacturing work force throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Güran 2011, p. 30). Besides fiscal consequences, this led to the creation of a “stratum of ‘radical’ government employees”, thereby paving the way for (temporary) alliances between the state cadres and the social forces associated with the left (Mardin 2006c, p. 79; Ahmad 2002, p. 158).

Given the persistence of peasant property – the peasantry still constituted 55 per cent of the Turkish population in 1980 – combined with working class radicalism organized in the Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (DISK) and bureaucratic cleavages which found further voice in the political arena through the Republican People’s Party of the 1970s (Mello 2010), Turkey appears to have transformed only partially throughout the alleged state-led economy period. It is true that especially after the 1940s the state and society, through the Republican era, started to emerge as two distinct spheres,¹² with private property no longer under the threat of public confiscation or arbitrary taxation (Boratav 2004, p. 95). Also, the institutional foundations of a capitalist society were to a certain extent set in place, for example: the introduction of Civil Code, special privileges facilitating the private accumulation of wealth, the political regulation of workers’ rights to organize and strike, and the modernization and dissemination of the institutions of education and measurement of time (Ahmad 2009, p. 188; Timur 2001, p. 93). Nevertheless, it is equally true that social reproduction was only partially dependent on the market throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The peasantry, the bourgeoisie and the working class used the state as an instrument of income equalization. A capitalist market was under construction but social reproduction remained, by and large, a matter of political mobilization rather than economic competition. The resultant lack of competitiveness in international markets was mitigated only through the availability of cheap external finance, which further postponed the restructuring of the ruling coalition in a fully capitalist fashion. Turkish society was neither a non-capitalist, nor a capitalist society, *i.e.* a society only partially subjected to the “economic” rules of reproduction.

¹² In the 1950s, State Economic Enterprises had a 50 per cent share of value added in Turkey’s manufacturing and a virtual monopoly in other sectors. The state’s share in

industrial production was still one-third of total manufacturing at the end of the 1970s (Güran 2011, p. 30).

Such a society where the intra- and inter-class struggles took place primarily within and through the state could hardly be a breeding ground for horizontally-articulated relations and could hardly give birth to liberal interpretations of modernity. Every attempt from below at obtaining greater tutelage over the political apparatus endangered the social reproduction of this largely non-capitalist bourgeois class and the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. And this was further complicated by the fact that critiques of the existing order could only be raised through the re-inventing of the ruling ideology, Kemalism. Kemalism's "solidaristic" and "non-class" vision of society (Parla and Davison, 2004) turned into an outcry for "equality" in the hands of the under-privileged who were forcing the gates of the state in the 1960 and 1970s. The irony is that the Republican People's Party, originally established to protect the bureaucratic/Kemalist privileges, became the catalyst for the expansion of political society by invoking the universality of Kemalist principles. Especially after the closure of the Turkish Workers' Party in 1971, a series of attempts was made to include the previously marginalized segments of society, such as the radical working class, the peasantry, leftist university youth as well as Alevis, into the RPP constituency. This was part of a project of "bureaucratic universalism" as opposed to the "bourgeois universalism" of the ruling Justice Party.¹³ Each project had its limits, attentive of the dominant bureaucratic and bourgeois interests, yet they mobilized and gathered different social groups around their struggle for greater access to the state. The widening of the political space alongside the tightening of the "economic" sphere provided the inflammatory, fragile and radical texture of modernity of the 1960s and the 1970s.

¹³ Emerging was somewhat a puzzling incorporation of the "left" into Kemalism. Through a strong anti-imperialist and nationalist rhetoric, a large part of the radical Left argued for the "completion" of what they perceived as an "unfinished bourgeois revolution", a project allegedly initiated by Ataturk, and yet hamstrung by pre-capitalist and "comprador" elements backed by imperialist powers. Rather ironically, the bourgeoisie was accused of having denied its revolutionary role, and military officers and the intelligentsia were thus called on to carry out a bourgeois revolution; see Aydın, 2008. Especially after the closure of the Turkish

Worker's Party in 1971, this initial marriage between the left and Kemalism was further consolidated by the increasing incorporation of Left elements into the RPP cadres, the guardians of bureaucratic privilege. This not only put the RPP to the "left" of the political spectrum in the public view, but more importantly, the "left" gained a statist, nationalist and laicist character. Steeped in culture and religious outlook, the "bureaucratized left" became the guardian of "political society", unwilling to enlarge it beyond its bureaucratically-informed boundaries. By this reasoning, "the Left became the Right, and the Right became the Left" in Turkey, *cf.* Küçükömer, 1994.

The cultural and ideological underpinnings of post-war Turkish modernity were firmly grounded in this partially non-capitalist society. The early Republican notions of citizenship, nation and religion were being re-defined in the post-war period, selectively inculcating/incorporating liberal elements into the existing political institutions and culture. The 1961 constitution, in particular, strengthened the rights of citizens as well as re-formulated their duties towards the state and the “nation”. A broadly and apolitically defined public space (*vatan*) together with a strongly communitarian understanding of nation (*ulus*), began to replace the ethno-culturally defined early Republican mode of public space and nationhood (Yeğen, 2009). “Turkishness” was reformulated so as to mobilize and accommodate the new social forces generated by industrialization and the relative expansion of the political space.¹⁴ The public was no longer the space of the ethno-culturally defined Turks, but of the territorially-defined Turkish “nation” (Üstel 2004, p. 327). This unleashed a project of “impersonalization” of *ulus* that partially substituted and complemented the process of “impersonalization” of the capitalist subject, *i.e.* the “individual” unfettered from wider political and social duties.¹⁵ The political freedom and equality of the individual were affirmed, but those rights were defined in friction with a duty of protecting *the general welfare of ulus* and the indivisibility of the fatherland, *vatan*. Crucially, *ulus* and *vatan* became extremely politicized in the course of capitalist industrialization, as the social forces from below radicalized these two concepts to raise their demands for greater equality around an anti-imperialist nationalist struggle. The response from above came in 1980, when the military regime re-formulated the dominant ethos of sovereignty, perceiving almost everything as a threat to the security of the state and the territorial/cultural integrity of the “nation”. Given the continuing centrality of the state in the social reproduction of the dominant power bloc, any political/cultural issue was at the same time an economic one, endangering the foundations of this partially-capitalist bourgeois modernity.

¹⁴ Two main social groups were marginalized or totally excluded from the political space during this period. Kurds were pushed to underground organizations after the closure of the Turkish Worker’s Party and the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Forum (İDDK), a process further accelerated by the subsequent incorporation of the Turkish left into the RPP (Bishku 2007, pp .82-84). Also, the Islamist political parties, primarily backed by

small-medium sized enterprises that were outside the state-generated credit and subsidy circles, were approached with suspicion by the laicist ruling elite.

¹⁵ Concepts used here are borrowed from Shilliam (2009), who accounts for the importation of capitalist sociality and modern subject constitution in France and Germany in comparison to the impersonality of the capitalist subject in Britain.

The political space and subjectivity were to be re-defined once more in order to meet new material realities.

*Capitalist modernity a la Turca:
from Ulus to Commonwealth, from Vatan to Empire*

The 2000s have witnessed perhaps the most revolutionary political, institutional and cultural changes ever made in the history of Turkish Republic. The dominance of the Kemalist bureaucracy in key state institutions has been eliminated, as have the economic privileges enjoyed by OYAK.¹⁶ The main parameters of Kemalist modernity have been opened to public debate, while the exclusionary political and cultural practices effective since the 1980s have begun to be reversed. Secular nationalism, associated with the dominance of military cadres, has been largely overhauled, following significant changes in civil-military relations.¹⁷ The state has adopted a more tolerant approach to religious and cultural freedoms, taking important steps towards resolving the most recurrent problems in Turkish political life such as the Kurdish resurgence and Political Islam.¹⁸ The “revolutionary fervor” of Islam has since declined, shifting from political/collective to cultural/individual manifestations of religion (Göle 2006, p. 5). The state-civil society dichotomy seems to be mitigated, with the previously-excluded social groups beginning to be “absorbed” into political society (Tuğal 2009).

Emerging is a form of Islamic multi-culturalism, inspired by a romanticized Ottoman imperial pluralism and encouraged by the accession process to the European Union. Islamic values and old imperial forms of rule have been reformulated to prepare the ground for a conservative liberalism, which seeks to promote new forms of political community, subjectivity and space. This involves the creation of a new citizenship ethic largely derived from narratives based on

¹⁶ “Parliament to put OYAK under magnifying glass”, *Today's Zaman*, 14 October 2011; “Turkish investigations cast shadow over powerful army-run conglomerate”, *Today's Zaman*, 8 May 2012.

¹⁷ For an overview, see Cizre 2011.

¹⁸ It is important to remind the reader that Kemalist secularism was not hostile to Islam, but sought to control and repress Islamic heterodoxy, or folk Islam, by promoting

a statist understanding of religion. Indeed, the state use of Islamic symbols and references in the public space and popular subjectivity became much more pronounced after 1980 when the state officially embarked on a project of “Turkish-Islamic syntheses” in order to repress the alternative interpretations of religion (Mardin 1989) and citizenship associated with the left, see Toprak 1996.

Prophet Muhammed's life (the Sunna), especially with regards to his "tolerance" for non-Muslims (Türkmen 2009) and the fact that he was a merchant. Meanwhile, Qur'anic verses have been transformed into slogans that provide the moral basis of "economic competition" and "fairness" of market outcomes (Yavuz 2003, p. 95). "Tolerance", "fairness" and "economic competition" relate to a community where the subjects internalize their rights and duties through an unofficial yet religiously-sanctioned network of social responsibility and trust (Atasoy 2009), and are thereby no longer in need of political mediation. Entailed in this re-organization of sociality, thus, is the emergence of a religiously-represented and politically-empowered individuality based on self-discipline and a distinctive ethos of conduct, by and large unencumbered by a *ulus*-oriented organization of social reproduction. It is precisely this "abstract individual" that makes realizable the long-imagined, yet never materialized, rejuvenation of the old Ottoman mode of rule and political community. It is this ground on which a shift has occurred from the monolithically-understood *ulus* towards a new collective subjectivity based on the peaceful coexistence of different ethno-religious and cultural groups, indeed as some commentators like to call it, an *Ottoman commonwealth*.¹⁹

The following is to be asked precisely at this juncture. Where are the principles of so-called Ottoman commonwealth coming from? What has permitted the formulation of new conceptions of subjectivity and political space? Indeed, the bourgeois paradigm, *i.e.* the emergence of a new religious bourgeois class, holds true for the period especially after the 1990s. A new bourgeois class, previously excluded from the official credit channels and political privileges enjoyed by the old bourgeois class, has emerged with a politically/religiously distinct project of societal transformation. Its previous exclusion from state-generated rents forced it to envision a society in

¹⁹ The term was most explicitly used by Huseyin Celik, the minister of education, who called for the establishment of an Ottoman commonwealth under Turkish leadership: "Britain has its commonwealth. So do Russia, France, and Spain. So where is our commonwealth? [...] We are a nation that has created great states. We are not just another state on the earth's surface. But unfortunately most of us are not even aware of Turkey's mission. If the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans are not our hinterland, then our claim to be a great state will remain just words" ("Bakan Celik, 'commonwealth' istiyor", *Radikal*,

15 November 2007). The Ottoman commonwealth, thus, is not only a domestic project, but also an attempt at regional re-spatialization with serious implications on Turkey's foreign policy orientation. That involves the emergence of a "trading state", which seeks to unburden itself from the costs of the most chronic issues in Turkey's international affairs, by promoting economic and cultural integration in the old Ottoman geography while respecting the existing political boundaries (Kirisçi 2009), a policy fashionably labeled as "Neo-Ottomanism". For an historical overview, see Colak 2006.

which economic competition and competitive allocation of resources becomes the rule. In this sense, it represents a capitalist bourgeois class *par excellence* which has become the prime agent of change (Buğra 1998; Atasoy 2009; Yavuz 2003).

And yet, the question still remains. Can all this be reduced to the “rise” of a conservative bourgeois class buttressed by globalization, a neo-liberal restructuring of the world economy, or the EU accession process, as many commentators would have us believe? Would the Islamic bourgeoisie ever “rise” if the underlying organization of society remained the same? Would the bourgeoisie ever seek to make political and cultural life more liberal if the economic policy-making was not “depoliticized”—that is “liberalized” from popular pressures? The argument based on the “rise” of bourgeoisie alone not only extends the rationalist logic of the bourgeois paradigm, but also obscures the wholesale transformation that Turkish society has undergone since the end of the 1990s.

Since the latter half of the 1990s, Turkey has witnessed an immensely rapid period of dissolution of peasant property driven both by neoliberal market reforms and non-market means. Starting from the 5th of April decisions taken in the aftermath of the 1994 financial crisis, and accelerated by a series of standby agreements with the IMF after 1999, the state ceased to provide support for buying at floor prices, input subsidies and subsidized credits to agricultural producers. It totally withdrew its support from the production of widely cultivated crops such as sugar and tobacco. Instead of buying agricultural products at politically-constituted prices, the state provides only temporary income support to peasants, expecting them to produce highly-demanded goods in the world market at competitive rates (Aydin 2005, pp. 158-159). Besides the erosion of the amount of state support,²⁰ the income support took a temporary and “depoliticized” character; increasingly exposing peasants to the imperatives of market competition, thereby precipitating the divorce of peasants from their means of production-land. Equally to the point, long-lasting guerilla warfare in Eastern Turkey is estimated to have forced 3,500 Kurdish villages to migrate to large cities throughout the 1990s. Yoked together, from the end of the 1980s through 2010, the share of employment in the agrarian sector decreased from 51 per cent to 24 per cent, 15 percentage points of which were recorded in the last ten years alone.²¹ Similarly, Aydin notes that the peasantry has exhausted

²⁰ State support for agriculture decreased from 3.2 per cent of GDP in 1999 to 0.45 per cent in 2009, see Gunaydin 2009, p. 183.

²¹ Turkish Institute of Statistics 2010.

traditional survival strategies in the face of neoliberal policies since the 2000s and the dissolution of small peasant family farms, which came to constitute the backbone of Turkish rural society, is almost completed (Aydın 2010, p. 152).

Besides the elimination of the political forms of state support, two key institutional and legal changes put in place since 2000 are worth special emphasis. The first one is the law concerning the Unions of Agricultural Sales Cooperatives (UASCS), which provides the legal basis for the privatization of factories and production units belonging to farmers' organizations. With state support withdrawn and such income-generating institutions privatized, the ability of farmers' organizations to extend credit, provide facilities and organize their members is substantially diminished. Given the increasing inability of peasants to organize against neoliberal policies, the Agrarian and Seeds Laws passed in April and October 2006 respectively have further contributed to the commodification of land and labor in the Turkish countryside. Recognizing intellectual property rights in agricultural crops and seeds, these two complementary laws have not only deprived the peasantry of the traditional seed varieties used for centuries, but also precipitated the dissolution of peasant property without peasants losing access to their own land. That is, in the midst of the insecurities created by the impact of liberalization policies, the independent-looking farmers turn into "contract farmers", increasingly producing crops demanded by agro-industrial corporations in exchange for information, credits, seeds and other inputs. This "contract farming" has put agribusiness firms in a position to determine the conditions of production and impose the type, quality and quantity of production over the remaining segments of rural population. All combined, the subsistence-based, communal and political regulation of production has rapidly faded away in the Turkish countryside, with the consequence that even the remaining independent-looking peasant farmers have lost their autonomy, becoming increasingly subjected to the imperatives of capital accumulation (Aydın 2010; Keyder and Yenal 2011). With large portions of the peasantry dispossessed and the remainder subordinated to market discipline on their own land, the rapid dissolution and subjection of one of the main politically reactionary classes – peasants – to the "depoliticized", that is "economic", ways of ordering society are underway.

The bourgeoisie also, by and large, relied on the state for its immediate social reproduction until the late 1990s. As a response to declining export competitiveness and rising real wages, the state liberalized the capital account in 1989 to finance its deficits. The

holding banks became the central benefactor of state borrowing practices. Lured by high interest rates, these banks, almost all of which were parts of holding companies with industrial bases, made profits by purchasing government securities and exploiting the difference between the exchange rate and the interest rate. That is, they first obtained funds on international markets as credit denominated in dollars, converted this into Turkish lira, and then lent to the government at high interest rates. It does not require great foresight to predict that an increasingly high proportion of profits were obtained in the non-productive – that is financial – activities associated with the holding of government securities. There was eventually only little need for re-investment in the absence of market competition – an indicator of the stagnation of investment levels throughout the 1990s.²² Indeed, prior to 1994, Turkey did not have an anti-trust legislation at all that could induce competition against cartelization and monopolization.²³ Furthermore, the privatization of state economic enterprises took place only very slowly until the 2000s.²⁴

This continued until the conclusion of the standby agreement with the IMF in 1999. The reform program was based on the reorganization of holding companies in such a way as to promote a “productive capital-based accumulation” through increasing competitiveness in the international market. As Oğuz (2008, p. 118) notes, this signaled a departure from the previous pattern of accumulation based on the

²² While real gross domestic product grew only by 3.4 per cent per annum between 1990 and 2000, the annual real rate of growth of banking sector assets exceeded 13 per cent. This enormous divergence between the performance of the real economy and the financial sector was clearly a result of the short-term foreign capital inflows that were made possible by very high rates of interest offered by the state: 100 per cent in January 1996; 60 per cent in December 1998; 80 per cent in March 2000, see Cizre and Yeldan 2005, p. 391-395; Alper and Öniş 2005. This brought in its train catastrophic consequences for public finance. The ratio of interest payments to tax revenues rose from 28 per cent in 1992 to 77 per cent in 2000, while the public sector’s real disposable income declined by 39 per cent through the 1990s (Boratav and Yeldan 2006, p. 424).

²³ The Antitrust Act of 1994 filled an important loophole in the Turkish legal sys-

tem, operationalizing for the first time Article 167 of the Turkish Constitution 1982 that obliged the state to prevent cartelization and monopolization in the economy. The Competition Board, established as an “independent” institution in 1997, further strengthened the rule of competition, upholding it as a constitutional responsibility (Sanli and Ardiyok 2011, p. 76). As a consequence, Turkey ranked thirteenth in the world in terms of the “intensity of local competition”, WEF Competitiveness Report 2011.

²⁴ While annual privatization income amounted to 380 million dollars between 1980 and 2003, after 2003 it reached 6 billion dollars annually. Also, privatization entered the constitution only in 1999, countering for the first time the explicit constitutional references to “nationalization” and “use for public good” (Guran 2011, p. 23, 38).

redistribution of profits through the state towards a mode of accumulation based on production through higher technology and increasing labor productivity.²⁵ The introduction of a series of reforms and institutions, especially after the 2001 crisis with banking reform²⁶ and the deregulation of the energy and telecommunication sectors, further reinforced the tendency towards subjecting the private sector to the rules of competition in an increasingly internationalizing market. Concomitantly, the same period witnessed the centralization of the decision-making power in the executive branch of the state together with the creation of “independent” economic institutions such as the Central Bank, the Competition Board and the Privatization Administration. All this pushed economic decision making beyond popular pressures, rendering the market the immediate means to the bourgeoisie’s social reproduction.²⁷

The result is the consolidation of capitalist property relations for the first time in Turkish history. In addition to the violent crush of the militant working class movement after 1980, the relations of production and reproduction have been further sealed off from popular pressures and the peasantry has been by and large dispossessed since the 2000s. An “economic society” which the bourgeoisie can manage through “economic” compulsion eventually looms in the horizon. With private property secured and reproduced competitively, the bourgeoisie has finally become a fully capitalist class which seeks to shape the form and function of the state apparatus in a liberal fashion.

²⁵ Consequently, average yearly growth in labor productivity between 2002 and 2010 was 5 per cent, while it was slightly over 1 per cent between 1990 and 2001, see <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LEVEL>.

²⁶ Akin *et al.* (2009) note that in the post-crisis period, declining inflation rates, fiscal prudence and the EU’s insistence on compliance with BASEL II requirements forced Turkish banks to assume their intermediation role, transferring the weight in their portfolios from government securities to loans.

²⁷ My intention here is not to exaggerate the performance of the Turkish economy in the post-2001 period (for detailed analyses, see Öniş and Senses [ed.] 2009). And perhaps the growing current account deficit and continuing reliance on European markets for exports would not permit optimistic assessments of the Turkish economy at all. However, the accounts that

reduce the recent transformation of Turkish political economy to a mere transition from one form of “political capitalism” to another based on continuing “corruption” and “organic” linkages between the ruling party and business interests (*inter alia* Karadag, 2010), are equally unconvincing. These accounts remain wedded to an idealized conception of the “market” ruled by “perfect competition” and with no “corruption”, which fails to recognize that corruption is, in fact, an “historically defined problem specific to capitalism” (Bedirhanoglu 2007, p. 1241). Put differently, it is precisely the differentiation of the political and the economic that causes “corruption”, hence the impossibility of a corruption-free capitalism. That said, the transition from mere “rent-seeking” or “populism” to “corruption” remains unexplained from a *plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose* perspective.

And yet, this is no way to argue that extra-economic means are no longer utilized, a statement that would insult thousands of political activists and journalists who faced police brutality and imprisonment in the last ten years. The resultant separation between the political and the economic does not refer to total freedom of capitalist property from political control/support. Instead, it should be thought of in the context of the restructuring of state power, cultural values and human subjectivities in such ways as to guarantee and promote capital accumulation, rather than constituting a buffer against commodification.²⁸ This involves the emergence of a state dedicated solely to the maintenance of the economic rules of reproduction, envisioning a trans-culturally and trans-nationally defined space of accumulation, unbounded by the hitherto prevailing conceptions of nationhood and public space, and formulation of an “abstract individual” conducive to the changing rules of reproduction and contestation in the consolidating economic space. Indeed, that the bourgeoisie seeks to establish the “independence” of the market in such a competitive global context and based on the political and cultural resources of an authoritarian past not only hints at the reasons behind the limited democratic texture of recent political attempts in Turkey, but also shows once more the inherent incompatibility of capitalism with democracy and human emancipation.²⁹

Coming full circle, is all this only another stage of “modernity” marked by the maturation of bourgeois classes? Is this just a shift from Kemalist modernity to Islamist modernity based on new markets, new technologies, new ideologies etc.? Is the *Ottoman commonwealth* just a natural culmination of the eruption of the Kemalist straitjackets, *ulus* and *vatan*? Or are we talking about two fundamentally distinct societal projects, modernity and capitalism, transition from one to another requiring nothing less than an epochal transformation? *Ulus* and *vatan* had less to do with capitalism and much more to do with substituting capitalist forms of appropriation with novel conceptions of space and subjectivity. By contrast, the *Ottoman commonwealth* and *Neo-Ottomanism* have less to do with modernity and much more to do with the universalization of capitalism, its social relations and its contradictions, and the subjection of all human existence and values to its commodifying logic. An historically distinct space of exploitation looms on the horizon,

²⁸ For an example, see Cosar and Yegenoglu (2009) who point out that recent social security reform in Turkey, in fact, corresponds to the consolidation of a system that prioritizes “workfare over welfare”: “The

new legislation is the ultimate step in the exclusion of social security from the rights of citizens... Political space is modeled after the marketplace”.

²⁹ For a discussion, see Wood 1995.

which not only marks a rupture in the socio-spatial organization of Turkish society, but also makes thinkable for the first time in Turkish history a new subjectivity and a political community inspired by the Ottoman imperial past and deeply embedded in the “empire of civil society” (Rosenberg, 1994). Approaching is neither a “second modernity” nor “full of possibilities” as some enthusiastic critics of Kemalism argued (Atasoy 2009; Kasaba 1997), but a capitalist modernity *a la Turca*.

Conclusion

Last year in a meeting with foreign investors, the president of the largest business association in Turkey, gladly proclaimed that “fortunately, our economy is not as much affected by politics as before”. She further added that the parliament had to work studiously on a new constitution in order to fully resolve Turkey’s political and cultural problems, which, she thinks, would much ease the negotiation process with the European Union.³⁰ Indeed, once the staunch defenders of privilege and authoritarianism, the big bourgeoisie today sees democratization of the political space as the key to securing the transparency of market competition and economic rivalry (Ozel, 2012).

This article has sought to make sense of the transformation of Turkey’s bourgeoisie through an analysis of the “great transformation” that Turkish society has gone through in the last fifty years. It has argued that reading a half century of political experimentation in Turkey through the “bourgeois paradigm” produced essentialist/stagist histories based on a pre-given duality between the state and the bourgeois classes. Reconstructing the concept of “class”, the article sought to illuminate the transforming social-temporal context in which the Turkish bourgeoisie defined and articulated its interests.

Re-conceptualizing “class” as property relations has also paved the way for a debate on capitalism and modernity, which has allowed us to approach the post-war modernization and capitalist transformation of Turkey from a novel perspective. I contended that neither Weberian “neo-patrimonialism” nor Marxian “underdeveloped capitalism” is able to explain the historical specificity of the dominant mode of social organization in the post-war period in Turkey due to their ahistorical take on bourgeois agency. Instead, I have suggested that the post-war project of modern development in Turkey had much to do with a strong bourgeois class

³⁰ “Ekonomimiz eskisi kadar siyasetten etkilenmiyor” *Radikal*, 29 June 2011.

and less to do with capitalism. And by the same reasoning, I concluded that Turkey's current transformation denotes more the consolidation of a relatively novel capitalist project than a mere transition to another form of modernity, a process that has brought about a radical transformation in the meanings of work, accumulation, political space and subjectivity.

Acknowledgements

I thank Feyzi Baban, Thomas Chiasson-Lebel Julian Germann, Jeremy Green, Hannes Lacher and Ellen Meiksins Wood who read and gave comments on an earlier version of this paper. The responsibility for any remaining errors as well as for the overall argument of the article is my own.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AHMAD Feroz, 2002. *Modern Türkiye'nin Olusumu* (Istanbul, Kaynak Yayınları).
- , 2009. "Kemalizmin ekonomi politikliği", in AHMAD Feroz, ed., *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme* (Istanbul, Kaynak Yayınları, pp. 178-198).
- AKIN G. Gulsen, Ahmed Faruk AYSAN and Levent YILDIRAN, 2009. "Transformation of the Turkish Financial Sector in the Aftermath of the 2001 Crisis" in ÖNIS Ziya and Senses FIKRET, eds., *Turkey and the Global Economy: Neo-liberal Restructuring and Integration in the Post-Crisis Era* (London, Routledge).
- ALAVI Hamza, 1972. "The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh" *New Left Review*, 74, pp. 59-81.
- ALPER C. Emre and Ziya ÖNİŞ, 2003. "Financial Globalization, the Democratic Deficit, and Recurrent Crises in Emerging Markets: the Turkish Experience in the Aftermath of Capital account Liberalization", *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 39 (3), pp. 5-26.
- ALTUĞ Sumru, Alpay FİLİZTEKİN and Şevket PAMUK, 2008. "Sources of Long-Term Economic Growth for Turkey, 1880-2005", *European Review of Economic History*, 12, pp. 393-430.
- AMIN Samir, 1976. *Unequal Development: an Essay on the Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism* (New York, Monthly Review Press).
- AMSDEN Alice H., 1985. "The State and Taiwan's Economic Development" in
- EVANS Peter, Dietrich RUESCHEMEYER and Theda SKOCPOL, eds., *Bringing the State Back in* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 78-106).
- AMSDEN Alice, 2003. *The Rise of "the Rest": Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
- ANDERSON Perry, 1974. *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London, Verso).
- ATASOY Yildiz, 2009. *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism* (London, Palgrave Macmillan).
- AYDIN Suavi, 2008. "Sosyalizm ve Milliyetçilik: Galiyefizm'den Kemalizm'e", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik* (Istanbul, İletişim, pp. 438-447).
- AYDIN Zülküf, 2005. *The Political Economy of Turkey* (London, Pluto Press).
- , 2010. "Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish agriculture", *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 10 (2), pp. 149-187.
- BARKEY Henri, 1990. *The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey* (Boulder, Westview Press).
- BEDIRHANOĞLU Pinar, 2007. "The Neoliberal Discourse on Corruption as a Means of Consent Building: Reflections from Post-Crisis Turkey", *Third World Quarterly*, 28 (7), pp. 1239-1254.
- BERBEROĞLU Berch, 1982. *Turkey in Crisis: from State Capitalism to Neo-Colonialism* (London, Zed Books).
- BISHKU Michael B., 2007. "The resurgence of Kurdish Nationalism in Northern

- Kurdistan-Turkey from the 1970s to the Present" in AHMED Mohamed M. A. and Michael M. GUNTER, eds., *The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism* (Costa Mesa, Mazda Publishers, pp. 78-97).
- BORATAV Korkut, 2004. *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi* (Ankara, İmge Kitabevi).
- BORATAV Korkut and Erinc YELDAN, 2006. "Turkey, 1980-2000: Financial Liberalization, Macroeconomic (In)-Stability, And Patterns of Distribution" in TAYLOR Lance, ed., *External Liberalization in Asia, Post-Socialist Europe and Brazil* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 417-455).
- BRENNER Robert, 1977. "The Origins of Capitalist Development: a Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism", *New Left Review*, 104 (1), pp. 25-92.
- , 1987. "The Agrarian roots of European Capitalism" in ASTON T.H. and C.H.E. PHILPIN, eds., *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 213-327).
- BROMLEY Simon, 1994. *Rethinking Middle East Politics* (Austin, University of Texas Press).
- BUĞRA Ayşe, 1994. *State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study* (Albany, State University of New York Press).
- , 1998. "Class, Culture, and State: an Analysis of Interest Representation by two Turkish Business Associations", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30(4), pp. 521-539.
- CARDOSO Fernando Henrique, 1980. "On the Characterization of Authoritarian regimes in Latin America" in COLLIER David, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 33-57).
- CHIBBER Viveck, 2003. *Locked in Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India* (Princeton, Princeton University Press).
- CIZRE Ümit, 2011. "Disentangling the Threads of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Promises and Perils", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 22 (2), pp. 57-75.
- CIZRE Ümit and Erinc YELDAN, 2005. "The Turkish Encounter with Neo-Liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001 Crises", *Review of International Political Economy*, 12 (3), pp. 387-408.
- COMNINEL George C., 1987. *Rethinking the French Revolution: Marxism and the Revisionist Challenge* (London, Verso).
- COSAR Simten and Metin YEĞENOĞLU, 2009. "The Neoliberal Restructuring of Turkey's Social Security System", *Monthly Review* 60 (11).
- ÇOLAK Yılmaz, 2006. "Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42 (4), pp. 583-598.
- ELİĞÜR Banu, 2010. *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
- EVANS Peter, 1989. "Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia: lessons for Latin Americanists" in DEYO Frederic C., ed., *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (New York, Cornell University Press, pp. 203-226).
- EVRENSEL Ayşe, 2004. "IMF Programs and Financial Liberalization in Turkey", *Emerging Markets Finance & Trade*, 40 (4), pp. 5-19
- GELLNER Ernest, 1981. *Muslim society* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
- GODELIER Maurice, 1978. "Infrastructures, Societies, and History", *Current Anthropology*, 19 (4), pp. 763-771.
- GÖLE Nilüfer, 2006. "Islamic Visibilities and Public Sphere" in GÖLE Nilüfer and Ludwig AMMANN, eds., *Islam in Public: Turkey, Iran and Europe* (Istanbul, Istanbul Bilgi University Press).
- GÜLALP Haldun, 2001. "Globalization and Political Islam: the Social Bases of Turkey's Welfare Party", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 33 (3), pp. 433-448.
- GÜMÜŞÇÜ Sebnem and Deniz SERT, 2009. "The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie: the Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45 (6), pp. 953-968.
- GÜNAYDIN Gökhan, 2009. "Türkiye tarım politikalarında yapısal uyum: 2000'li Yıllar", *Mulkiye*, 262, pp. 175-222.
- GÜRAN Mehmet Cahit, 2011. "The Political Economy of Privatization in Turkey: an evaluation" in ÇETİN Tamer and Fuat OĞUZ, eds., *The Political Economy of Regulation in Turkey* (New York, Springer, pp. 23-50).
- HEPER Metin, 1985. *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, Eothen Press).
- HOLLOWAY John and Sol PICCIOTTO, 1991. "Capital, Crises and the State" in CLARK Simon, ed., *The State Debate* (New York, St. Martin Press).
- INCI İbrahim, 2009. "1923-1960 "Döneminde Türkiye'de Tarım Faaliyetleri Üzerinden

- Alınan Vergiler”, *SAÜ Fen Edebiyat Dergisi*, 9 (1), pp. 101-130.
- İSLAMOĞLU Huri and Çağlar KEYDER 1977. “Agenda for Ottoman History” *Review*, 1 (1), pp. 31-55.
- KANTARCI Hasan Bülent and Rıdvan KARACAN, 2008. “Mali Disiplinin Sağlanması Açısından Türkiye IMF İlişkilerinin Değerlendirilmesi”, *Maliye Dergisi*, 155, pp. 144-158.
- KASABA Resat, 1997. “Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities” in BOZDOĞAN Sibel and Resat KASABA, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Washington, University of Washington Press).
- KARADAG Roy, 2010. “Neoliberal Restructuring in Turkey: From State to Oligarchic Capitalism”, *MPIFG Discussion Paper 10/7*.
- KASNAKOĞLU Haluk, 1986. “Agricultural Price Support Policies in Turkey: an Empirical investigation”, in RICHARDS Alan, ed., *Food, States, and Peasants* (Boulder, Westview Press, pp. 131-157).
- KAZANCIGIL Ali, 1994. “High Stateness in a Muslim Society: the Case of Turkey”, in DOĞAN Matter and Ali KAZANCIGIL, eds., *Comparing Nations* (Oxford, Blackwell).
- KAZGAN Gülten, 1999. “1980’lerde Türk tarımında yapısal değişim” in BAYDAR Oya, ed., *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere* (İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları).
- KEYDER Çağlar, 1987. *State and Class in Turkey: a Study in Capitalist Development* (London, Verso).
- , 2004. “Ulusal kalkınmacılığın iflası ve demokrasi” in KEYDER Çağlar, ed., *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası* (İstanbul, Metis, pp. 160-183).
- KEYDER Çağlar and Zafer YENAL (2011) “Agrarian change under globalization: markets and insecurity in Turkish agriculture”, *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 11 (1), pp. 60-86.
- KEYMAN Emin Fuat (2010) “Modernization, globalization and democratization in Turkey: the AKP experience and its limits”, *Constellations*, 17 (2), pp. 312-327.
- KEYMAN Emin Fuat and Berrin KOYUNCU, 2005. “Globalization, Alternative Modernities and the Political Economy of Turkey”, *Review of International Political Economy*, 12 (1), pp. 105-128.
- KIRISCI Kemal, 2009. “The Transformation of Turkish foreign Policy: The rise of the Trading State”, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40, pp. 29-57.
- KÖYMEN Oya, 1999. “Cumhuriyet döneminde tarımsal yapı ve tarım politikaları” in BAYDAR Oya, ed., *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere* (İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, pp. 1-30).
- KÜÇÜKÖMER Idris, 1994. *Batılılaşma ve Düzenin Yabancılaşması* (İstanbul, Baglam Yayınları).
- LACHER Hannes, 2006. *Beyond Globalization: Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of Modernity* (London, Routledge).
- MARDIN Şerif, 1989. *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey* (Albany, State University of New York Press).
- , 2006a [1967]. “Historical Thresholds and Stratification: Social Class and Class Consciousness” in MARDIN Şerif, ed., *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey* (New York, Syracuse University Press, pp. 1-22).
- , 2006b [1969]. Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire, in MARDIN Şerif, ed., *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey* (New York, Syracuse University Press, pp. 23-43).
- , 2006c [1980]. “The Transformation of an Economic Code” in MARDIN Şerif, ed., *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey* (New York, Syracuse University Press, pp. 60-82).
- MARX Karl, 1976 [1847]. *The Poverty of Philosophy, Collected Works*, Vol. 6. (New York, International Publishers).
- , 1991 [1894]. *Capital*, Vol. 3 (London, Penguin).
- MEILLASSOUX Claude, 1972. “From Reproduction to Production”, *Economy and Society*, 1 (1), pp. 93-105.
- MELLO Brian, 2010. “Communists and Compromisers: Explaining Divergences within Turkish Labor Activism, 1960-1980”, *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, 11, pp. 2-21.
- MİLOR Vedat H., 1989. *A Comparative Study of Planning and Economic Development in Turkey and France: Bringing the State back in* (Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of California, Berkeley).
- , 1990. “The Genesis of Planning in Turkey”, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 4, pp. 1-30.
- MOORE Barrington, 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, Beacon Press).
- MORTON Adam D., 2005. “The Age of Absolutism: Capitalism, the Modern States-System and International Relations”, *Review of International Studies*, 31, pp. 495-517.

- O'Donnell Guillermo A., 1988. *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina in Comparative Perspective* (Berkeley, University of California Press).
- OĞUZ Şebnem, 2008. *Globalization and the Contradictions of state Restructuring in Turkey* (Unpublished doctoral thesis York University, Toronto).
- OKTAR Suat and ARZU A. VARLI, 2010. "Demokrat Parti'nin tarım politikası, 1950-1954" *Marmara Üniversitesi İ.İ.B.F. Dergisi*, 28 (1), pp. 1-22.
- OZEL Isik, 2012. "Is it none of their Business? Business and Democratization, the Case of Turkey" *Democratization*, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2012.674369
- ÖNİŞ Ziya, 1992. "The East Asian Model Development and the Turkish Case: a Comparative Analysis", *Metu Studies in Development* 19, p. 4.
- ÖNİŞ Ziya and Fikret SENSES, eds., 2009 *Turkey and the Global Economy: Neo-Liberal Restructuring and Integration in the Post-Crisis Era* (London, Routledge).
- PAMUK Şevket, 2008a. "Agriculture and Economic Development in Turkey, 1870-2000" in LAINS Pedro and Vicente PINILLA, eds., *Agriculture and Economic Development in Europe since 1870* (London/New York, Routledge, pp. 375-395).
- , 2008b. "Globalization, Industrialization and Changing Politics in Turkey", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 38, pp. 267-273.
- PARLA Taha and Andrew DAVISON, 2004. *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press).
- POLANYI Karl, 2001 [1944]. *The Great Transformation*, 2nd edition (Boston, Beacon Press).
- PORTES Alejandro, 1985. "Latin American Class Structures: their Composition and Change during the Last Decades", *Latin American Research Review*, 20 (3), pp. 7-39.
- POST Charles, 2011. "The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-Structure, Economic Development and Political Conflict" (Leiden, Brill, pp. 1620-1877).
- ROSENBERG Justin, 1994. *The Empire of Civil Society* (London, Verso).
- SANLI Kerem Cem and Şahin ARDIYOK, 2011. "The Legal Structure of Competition Policy in Turkey" in ÇETİN Tamer and Fuat OĞUZ, eds., *The Political Economy of Regulation in Turkey* (New York, Springer, pp. 75-120).
- SAYER Derek, 1987. *The Violence of Abstraction: the Analytic Foundations of Historical Materialism* (London, Basil Blackwell).
- , 1991. *Capitalism and Modernity: an Excursus on Marx and Weber* (London, Routledge).
- SHILLIAM Robbie, 2009. *German Thought and International Relations* (London, Palgrave MacMillan).
- SPRINGBORG Robert, 1990. "Agrarian Bourgeoisie, Semiproletarians, and the Egyptian State: Lessons for Liberalization", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22(4), pp. 447-472.
- TESCHKE Benno, 2003. *The Myth of 1648* (London, Verso).
- THOMPSON Edward P., 1995. *The Poverty of Theory* (London, The Merlin Press).
- TILLY Charles, 1990. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Oxford, Blackwell).
- TİMUR Taner, 2001. *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası* (Ankara, Imge).
- TOPRAK Binnaz, 1996. "Civil Society in Turkey" in NORTON Augustus R., ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East* (Leiden, Brill, pp. 87-118).
- TUĞAL Cihan, 2009. *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism* (Stanford, Stanford University Press).
- TURNER Bryan S., 1984. *Capitalism and Class in the Middle East: Theories of Social Change and Economic Development* (London, Heinemann).
- TÜRKMEN Buket, 2009. "A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of 'Religious Culture and Morality' Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 29 (3), pp. 381-397.
- ÜSTEL Füsün, 2004. *Makbul Vatandaş'ın peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet'ten bugüne vatandaşlık eğitimi* (Istanbul, İletişim).
- WALLERSTEIN Immanuel, 1980. *The Modern World System*, Vol. 2. (New York, Academic Press).
- WOOD Ellen Meiksins, 1981. "The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism", *New Left Review* 127, pp. 66-95.
- , 1991. *The Pristine Culture of Capitalism: a Historical Essay on Old Regimes and Modern States* (London, Verso).
- , 1994. "From Opportunity to Imperative: the History of the Market", *Monthly Review*, 46 (3).
- , 1995. *Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).

- , 1997. Modernity, Postmodernity or Capitalism?, *Review of International Political Economy*, 4 (3), pp. 539-560.
- , 1999. *The Origins of Capitalism* (New York, Monthly Review Press).
- , 2012. "Marxism and Democracy" in Musto Marcello, ed., *The Marx Revival* (London, Palgrave).
- YALMAN Galip, 2009. *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s* (Istanbul, Bilgi University Press).
- YAVUZ M. Hakan, 2003. *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (London, Oxford University Press).
- YEĞEN Mesut, 2009. "Prospective-Turks or Pseudo-Citizens: Kurds in Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, 63 (4), pp. 597-616.

Résumé

Cet article avance que les analyses de classes qui cherchent à expliquer les récentes transformations de la modernité turque reposent sur la présupposition d'une séparation entre l'État et la bourgeoisie. En plus d'écarter le contexte relationnel et temporel dans lequel les classes définissent et articulent leurs intérêts, menant à diverses formes de déterminisme, ces perspectives brouillent, pour la Turquie, la particularité historique de la transformation mutuelle de deux modes différents d'organisation sociospatiale que sont la modernité et le capitalisme. S'appuyant sur une méthode originale du matérialisme historique, connue sous le nom de marxisme politique, cet article soutient qu'une re-conceptualisation des classes, en tant que relations sociales de propriété, offre un éclairage nouveau sur la particularité comparative et historique de la modernité turque, ce qui mène par conséquent à une réinterprétation radicale des récentes transformations de ce pays.

Mots clés: Modernité ; Capitalisme ; Turquie; Néo-Ottomanisme; Empire; Relations de propriété.

Zusammenfassung

Eine klassenorientierte Untersuchung der jüngsten Veränderungen der türkischen Moderne geht nicht über eine vorgegebene Dualität zwischen Staat und Bürgertum hinaus. Dieser Ansatz vernachlässigt sowohl die Umstände, in denen Klassen ihre Interessen definieren und organisieren, was zu deterministischen Erklärungen verschiedenster Art führt, als auch die geschichtlichen Besonderheiten einer gemeinsamen und gegenseitigen Veränderung zweier soziospatialer Organisationsformen in der Türkei, die Moderne und der Kapitalismus. Dieser Beitrag ist den Forschungen des politischen Materialismus verpflichtet, der die Klassen als Beziehungssysteme betrachtet. Er setzt die türkische Moderne in ein anderes Licht und führt zu einer radikalen Neuinterpretation der jüngsten Veränderungen.

Schlagwörter: Modernität; Kapitalismus; Türkei; Neo-Osmanismus; Empire; Beziehungssysteme.