

clusive property of the Balkans: similar issues have resurfaced in Rwanda and elsewhere, and the book could therefore be useful for scholars of contemporary nation building. There seems to be some problem, however, with the way the author chooses to tell her story. The narrative is factual and loaded with dozens of cases, conversations, meetings, encounters, stories, and debates. The work of collecting and classifying the material is enormous, but its analytical treatment is rather economical, with very brief references to other studies and theories. Broader discussion is mostly saved for the conclusion, which seems a bit too late to reach the conceptual breadth that might evolve from this rich material.

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A Discourse Analysis of Corruption: Instituting Neoliberalism against Corruption in Albania, 1998–2005. By Blendi Kajsii. Southeast European Studies. Burlington: Ashgate, 2014. xvi, 207 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Tables. \$107.96, hard bound.

This book addresses the puzzle of a “corruption paradox” in Albania in 1998–2005: though intensive, successful, and internationally led, anticorruption reform was accompanied by increasing levels of corruption. On one hand, Blendi Kajsii cites reports by the World Bank and the Council of Europe that argue that Albania has one of the best public administrations and anticorruption reforms in the Balkans. On the other hand, according to various corruption indicators, Albanian corruption grew significantly during this period. Kajsii quickly debunks alternative explanations for this paradox, such as lack of political will, the application of reforms by international actors which do not fit local problems, and Albanian culture.

Using poststructuralist discourse analysis, Kajsii tracks how the concept of corruption has changed over time in postsocialist Albania, as it became the dominant explanation of everything that went wrong in the country. Since the concept is not fixed, Kajsii does not attempt to explain its cause. Instead, he conducts quantitative and qualitative analyses of newspaper articles, political speeches, and interviews to identify the ideational effects of the corruption discourse. He argues that the dominant corruption discourse legitimated a neoliberal order in Albania, entailing privatization, deregulation, and a general weakening of state institutions. The anticorruption medicine focused on the public sector and failed to notice that state institutions can take a leading role in developing markets. Neoliberal ideas were applied globally in the 1990s as part of the Washington consensus that emphasizes the liberalization of markets and constraining of states.

Kajsii blames neoliberalism’s market-led reforms for various pathologies in the political and economic development of Albania. In terms of ideas, neoliberalism precluded an alternative path for Albania’s economic development, in which the state intervened to protect domestic industries in order to promote economic growth through industrialization. Domestic and international actors did not therefore consider the East Asian model of economic development appropriate in Albania. This is hardly surprising, however, if we consider that from the 1970s to 1991 Albania practiced autarchy, in which the Communist Party relied on a planned economy and import substitution to promote economic growth while closing the country to international trade. Faced with a repressive and intrusive communist state, many Albanians believed that free markets would provide solutions in the postcommunist era.

Kajsii attributes various pathologies to neoliberal ideas, including the increase

in corruption and the financial and state collapse in 1997. For instance, a perverse consequence occurred when IMF reforms of the public sector in Albania that kept public officials' salaries low led to an increase in bribes. The shock therapy recommended by the IMF restricted bank lending and produced massive unemployment. As economic migrants sent remittances back to Albania, many Albanians put their money in informal banking systems that acted as Ponzi schemes. When that money was lost and the government refused to guarantee their savings, riots broke out and the state collapsed.

In order to highlight neoliberalism's pathologies, the author downplays other factors that could help explain the rich puzzles of the book. For instance, international organizations often focus on the outputs of their anticorruption reforms to judge them successes or failures. However, the creation of new laws on public administration reform does not mean their practical implementation. Calling Albania's anticorruption reform a success is also self-serving for international donors. In addition, the focus on the neoliberal order downplays domestic factors, such as the autarchy under communism that led to economic crisis and unemployment before Albania liberalized in the 1990s.

Kajsiu's book has a tight analytical focus and deserves to be read by scholars and professionals who focus on corruption and anticorruption reform. Chapter 1, "Limitation of Corruption Analysis," provides a succinct overview of the various corruption paradigms. Graduate students and scholars would also appreciate the meticulous discourse analysis, which uses both quantitative and qualitative data to unpack corruption and anticorruption reform. This book highlights the contradictions and minefields of anticorruption discourse and can be used in other contexts as well.

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Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. By Richard Sakwa. London: I.B. Tauris, 2015. xx, 297 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Tables. Maps. \$23.95, hard bound.

Richard Sakwa describes the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2014 as "the worst crisis in Europe since the end of the second world war" (x). Within a year, the crisis had produced several "instant" books. Despite the speed of its execution, Sakwa's work shows a thorough grasp of developments on the ground and proposes a broad conceptual framework to explain the situation. He does an excellent job of telling a complex story with a lot of moving parts. His approach is to apportion blame to all sides—though critics will argue that he is insufficiently critical of Vladimir Putin's role.

Sakwa identifies two deep structural causes of the crisis. First, at the international level, Europe failed to build a new security architecture after 1991 that included Russia. Instead, it was treated as a defeated adversary and faltering student in the transition to market democracy. That set Russia on a "neo-revisionist" path (31), by which Sakwa means Russia wanted a more prominent role but did not want to overturn the whole system of international relations. Hence, Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 were "wars to stop NATO enlargement" (55).

Second, at the domestic level, Ukraine is a divided society, split between a Russian-speaking east and Ukrainian-speaking west—a result of its history as a borderland between competing empires which extended well into the second half of the twentieth century. Sakwa criticizes the post-1991 Ukrainian governments, which pursued a "monist" policy of promoting the Ukrainian language and ethnicity, as opposed to a civic, "pluralist" concept of citizenship that would have guaranteed