anguish on account of an ungovernable impulse she had to say "Our Father who art in hell." "I have known patients alternately spit, coax, bite, caress, beat, kiss, vilify, and praise those near them; and to utter one moment sentiments that would do honour to the most orthodox of divines, and immediately afterwards use language only expected to proceed from the mouths of the most depraved of human beings. It is often unassociated with any form of delusion, hallucination, or illusion." Other instances show that such tendencies are the precursors of serious brain disease. Spurgeon relates that at an early part of his career he was obliged to put his hand to his mouth to stay the utterance of blasphemous expressions. In asylum life examples are numerous enough, associated, however, with other mental disease. The same extravagant, indecent, or abusive expressions will be used for years with remarkable monotony and volubility; so that one accustomed to the patient will be able to predict what is to follow after the first few words are uttered.

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*Recent Metaphysics.** By Henry Maudsley, M.D. Lond., Physician to the West London Hospital, &c.

As it appears that man is created in the image of the ape, it cannot but be counted creditable to him that he strives so perseveringly to transcend his apehood.† Certainly, Transcendentalists, who, like Mr. Disraeli, are "on the side of the angels," are not willing to acknowledge their humble parentage; but Transcendentalists like Mr. Disraeli are men of mystery, and not indisposed, consciously or unconsciously, to ingenious tricks of conjuring: one cannot always be sure whether they are acting or are in earnest. To those who do know themselves to be idealised monkeys it must be a matter

* (1.) 'An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings,' by John Stuart Mill, pp. 561. Longmans and Co., 1865. (2.) 'Recent British Philosophy: a Review, with Criticisms,' by David Masson, pp. 414. Macmillan and Co., 1865.

† "If man was made in the image of God, he was also made in the image of an ape. The framework of the body of him who has weighed the stars and made the lightning his slave approaches to that of a speechless brute, who wanders in the forests of Sumatra. Thus standing on the frontier land between animal and angelic natures, what wonder that he should partake of both."—Hallam, 'Int. to Hist. of Europe,' vol. iv.

of great satisfaction to feel how strongly the developmental *nisus* of nature displays itself in them; *this* they cannot but allow, however much averse from any concealment of their lowly origin. Now, the great problem of philosophy has been from time immemorial, and still is, to determine what *names* shall be given to those relics of the angelic nature which a man is supposed by one side to have, or to those laws by which the developmental *nisus* takes effect in him, as the other side thinks. What this fundamental potentiality by which man is enabled to develope into an intelligent being, when he does not happen to become a lunatic or an idiot, shall be *called*—that is the mighty problem which has exercised, and exercised in vain, the highest intellects for more than two thousand years. Assuredly, here, "what was a question once is a question still, and instead of being resolved by discussion is only fixed and fed." On the whole, philosophical mankind may be roughly divided into three classes:

1. There are the Transcendentalists, who hold that they come into the world from afar, "not in entire forgetfulness, and not in utter nakedness," but "trailing clouds of glory" in the shape of primary intuitions. By these they are enabled to impose upon the rough material of experience such forms as impart to certain mental products the characters of universality and necessity. They think to transcend the phenomenal and to know the absolute. O day and night, but this is wondrous strange! "What surmounts the reach of human sense," we may, after the example of the angel in 'Paradise Lost' expounding heavenly mysteries to Adam, so delineate "by likening unknown to known," as may express it best. Conceive, then, a metaphysically minded oyster, no longer content to vegetate in placid lubricity, but zealous to discover the whence, how, and whither of its existence. What knowledge of, or what belief in, the nature of man's life the aspiring oyster may be conceived to have, or to have not, is such as the Transcendentalist has, or has not, of the absolute; to the oyster, as to the man, the absolute is that which surmounts the reach of its senses, that with which it is not brought into any relation by its existing sentiency, that which to it is unknown therefore and unknowable. Now, the absolute of the oyster is the relative of man, forasmuch as he has far wider, more numerous, and complex relations with nature; but we have only to suppose an additional special sense conferred upon him, and the whole aspect of the universe, together with his fundamental intuitions concerning it, would be wonderfully changed. The new revelations of science testify new developments of existing human sense: what then would be the result of a new kind of sense? The world which we have experience of or know, compared with the world of actual existence, may well be as the world within the oyster's shell is as compared with the world known to man. Admitting then with the Transcendentalists, the vast unknowable, may we not in turn claim from them an ad-

mission of the provisional nature of their so-called fundamental intuitions or beliefs?

2. There are the ruthless Empirics, who look back lovingly through the ages to their remote simian fore-elders. These are they who are steadily creeping onwards to a higher stratum of being, and who by their own labours are gradually acquiring and determining forms of thought that shall be inherited or predetermined in the constitution of those who are to come after them. Heirs of but little, they hope to leave their successors heirs of much. They alone have any real foothold in positive science, for they alone offer any scientific hypothesis with regard to man's origin upon earth. The grounds on which they rest their hypothesis are certainly not baseless: if the brain is the organ of the mind, as no one qualified to form an opinion on this subject now doubts; and if with the increase of intelligence there is a corresponding increase in the development of the brain, and with a deficiency of intelligence an observable deficiency in the development of the brain, as scientific research has clearly shown;—then when we find that the brain of the earliest races of men were of inferior development to most of those which now exist upon earth, and are fairly comparable to the brains of the lowest existing savages, we cannot but conclude that the early inhabitants of the earth were much nearer the apes than we are. The differences, indeed, between the brains of the lowest savage and of the European are undoubtedly of the same order as, though less in degree than, those which exist between the brain of the highest ape and that of the lowest savage. In the long series of the manifold productions of her creative art Nature has made no violent leap, but has passed through gradations almost insensible from one species of animal to another, and from the highest ape to the lowest man: such is the creed of the ruthlessly logical Empirics. Accordingly, by them the so-called primary intuitions of Transcendentalism are no longer admitted to be *intuitions* or intuitive truths; they prefer to call them necessary forms of thought or laws of development of the mental organization. Assuredly, to speak of an intuition being innate or primary in the sense of being contemporaneous with birth is no less absurd than it would be to speak of an innate pregnancy; but if all that is meant by such language is that a properly constituted being under due conditions of development will necessarily have certain ideas—as, for example, that two and two make four—then every generic act of human development, physical or mental, is just as much innate. Of writing of books upon this great question, however, there has been no end, nor does there appear likely soon to be an end.

3. This third class may comprehensively include all those who do not belong to either of the two former classes. The varieties of it are too many for enumeration. There are the sceptical or cynical

beings who think it unnecessary to believe anything with any particular earnestness, and who, with an air of superiority, laugh at the serious way in which those not of their fraternity take the great puppet-pageant of human life. They wonder why others cannot be content, like them, to rest quiet in the comfortable indolence of a general scepticism, and, instead of so persistently wooing divine philosophy, to accept the embraces of the divinity only when it comes to them, as it did to Danae, in a shower of gold. Holding that men deceive, that they are deceived, and that all in the world is a delusion, they suspect that any one who takes things in earnest has either a defective liver or a softening brain. Meanwhile, they are sometimes a little mad themselves; or, at any rate, it is necessary to call them so unless we admit that they constitute the sane minority, while all the rest of the world is mad. Most of them do not fail, however, to exhibit considerable method in their madness; though making no account of philosophical inquiries, they take good care to act well their part in life, so as, when the play is over and the curtain falls, to go off the stage amidst great applause. Truly, they are consummate actors, and they know how much to speculate upon the stupidity of mankind.

Another clique of philosophers, of whom we make little account, though they make mighty account of themselves, is that of the *Empirical Psychologists*, or the *Illogical Empirics*. These are they who believe that by observing and reflecting upon the phenomena of self-consciousness they can evolve a philosophy of mind that shall not be vague, obscure, and suicidal, like Transcendentalism; nor shall demand the long, patient, and uninviting researches of true Empiricism.* By putting his own consciousness to the torture, a man may make it confess anything which he desires it to say; and, accordingly, there is no lack of philosophic material in this method. Its disciples, hybrid-like, are intermediate between the first two classes, and, like hybrids, they occupy an untenable position and are commonly infertile in the first or second generation. Like the humble argonauts, too, they have a habit of impregnating themselves.† When any opponent assaults their position with the battery of an unwavering logic, they are driven to take refuge in one or other of the classes from whose unnatural union they have sprung.

Thus much concerning the classes of philosophers at the present day. As a practical classification, the foregoing appears preferable to Mr. Masson's elaborate system; he sets up a number of very formidable names, and then goes about in a persistent and pon-

* Because of the ill meaning commonly attached to this word, Mr. Mill proposes the term Experimentalism in his article on Comte in the 'Westminster Review.'

† The so-called hectocotylus of the argonaut has been discovered by some to be an apparatus which the creature has for impregnating itself.

derously systematic way to bring all philosophers under one or other of his labelled compartments. Now, we can very well imagine a philosopher objecting most strenuously to thus being bottled up as a dried specimen in any one of the compartments of his museum. "Confound your classification," we can conceive the angry subject of his examination exclaiming, "it is not a natural one; I am neither a *Materialist*, nor a *Materialistic Realist*, nor a *Dualistic Realist*, nor a *Natural Realist*, nor a *Pure Idealist*, nor a *Constructive Idealist*, nor any other artificial *ealist*; I deal not with learned names, that are expressive of nothing correspondent in nature, but with realities; and I protest most earnestly against being thrust into one of your drawers, whether I fit into it or not; or against being knocked on the head as a monstrosity, because I cannot be made to fit." We think that more than one of the philosophers whose system Mr. Masson has dissected has a good right of action against him for libel, or at any rate the right of a summons against him; whereas he, the said Mr. Masson, did, by calling him names—to wit, a *Cosmothetic Idealist*—use towards him language provocative of a breach of the peace. Now, the virtue of the foregoing proposed classification is, that it does not deal with names or dried specimens of anatomy, but with realities, with living creatures, who cannot help falling under one or other of the comprehensive classes; and who, if they are not content in one, may easily run into the other.

Of the different species of philosophers, the Transcendentalists and the Psychologists have certainly been the most troublesome to mankind with their ever-recurring "sapless problems of metaphysics, fit only for scholastic uses." The celebrated problem of the race between Achilles and the tortoise is a good example of the sort of work on which they have been engaged: it was one of the arguments by which Zeno demonstrated the impossibility of motion. Suppose the tortoise to have a start of a thousand yards before Achilles, and Achilles to run one hundred times as fast, one might imagine that the swift-footed runner would soon overtake the tortoise. But not so: he cannot logically overtake it at all, though he run as he never ran when he ran away from Hector;* for when he had run ten thousand yards, the tortoise would have run ten; when he had run those ten, the tortoise would have run one tenth of a yard; and as this sort of thing may go on *ad infinitum*, of course Achilles would never overtake the tortoise. Sir W. Hamilton pronounced this argument to be logically correct; and so of course it must be, and

* Did he run away from Hector? Certainly, Homer does not mention the fact; but the probabilities in favour of it are—first, that if he had not, Hector would have slain him long before he slew Hector; and, secondly, that the true cause of his sulking in his tent was the loud laughter with which the Greeks greeted his fear-winged flight.

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everything is nothing, and nothing is everything, and there is nothing new under the sun, and what is new is not true, and what is true is not new, and it is no matter. Under these circumstances, any one who does not see the fallacy in the argument, and cares to have it pointed out, may refer to Mr. Mill's admirable 'System of Logic,' where this will be found done in two lines; though Hobbes was, perhaps, the first to indicate the fallacy. This might well induce a reflection how useless it is to write for men who in thought are running on a different line of rails entirely; they do not read, or, if they do, they do not assimilate. Mr. J. S. Mill need not have written now much of what he has written if much of what Hobbes wrote long since had not been written in vain.

Metaphysicians have a pathological sympathy with one another, but they have no sort of sympathy with any thought that does not bear the impress of their morbid type. It is a remarkable, but perhaps righteous, Nemesis, that when men take to an unnatural taste of any kind it soon enthrals them body and soul; it cuts them off completely from all sympathy with their healthier fellows; it has a fatal fascination for them, and there is no hope of reform; the pleasant sin, at first timidly glanced at with the half-startled look of shrinking modesty, has become a fate against which it is impossible to contend. The regular discipline of an asylum might, perhaps, be of some use in such case, for when men see their own follies or vices uglily reflected in others it sometimes has a beneficial effect. Every one knows that the Spartans used to make their slaves drunk, in order, by this example of degradation, to teach their children to avoid the vice of drunkenness; and most people have heard the story of the lunatic who, believing himself to be the Holy Ghost, was brought face to face with two other lunatics having the same delusion; he thereupon exclaimed, "I am the Holy Ghost, and you are both Holy Ghosts; there are not three Holy Ghosts, but one Holy Ghost," and went his way, and was straightway cured. Now, there are two reasons why it might be well to put all pure metaphysicians into a lunatic asylum—first, because when they saw there a demented patient busily continuing the strangest movements of his arms, and inquired (as from curiosity they certainly would do) what this seemingly purposeless industry meant, and were told that the poor man was engaged in spinning sunbeams into threads, then they might probably, like the Spartan boys, take a very profitable lesson to heart; secondly, because they must be as blind and insensible as the nether millstone if they did not recognise that here was a vast field of mental phenomena of which their system took no notice whatever, but in which Nature supplied exactly those experiments that in such a matter cannot be artificially made, yet are indispensable to the formation of a true inductive science. Oh, purblind pedant, thick cased in the heritage of hardened prejudices,

can you really believe that it is a monstrous error or oversight of Nature to have made so many lunatics? Is it that their primary intuitions need no explanation? When a man shuts his eyes he will see what, according as the spirit of his philosophical school prompts him, he may call Nothing or the Infinite; the metaphysicians call it the Infinite or the Absolute.

Sympathising entirely with Mr. Mill in the terrible onslaught which he has recently made on Sir W. Hamilton and his immediate followers, rejoicing with an exceeding great and somewhat malicious joy at the pitiable case in which that most artful philosopher, Mr. Mansel, has been left, and wishful certainly to join in the great jubilation which has followed the well-planned attack, we cannot but confess to a considerable surprise at the character of Mr. Mill's book. No one but will be ready and glad to acknowledge the deep debt of gratitude which this age owes to Mr. Mill. He is now a popular writer, as far as a philosophical writer can be popular. Herein, however, there is a symptom not altogether favorable. As long as an author is in advance of the thought of his age, he is not popular; but as soon as the world has reached his level of thought there is a great cackling raised around him. Though the fact then that a philosophical author is not popular by no means necessarily proves him to be in the van of progress, yet the fact that he is popular is a tolerably strong presumption that he is in close connection with his century, and not much ahead of it. The man who wrote for the fathers with scarce any recognition is applauded to the skies by the children, and is beginning to be forgotten by the grandchildren. Woe unto you, therefore, philosophically when all men speak well of you! Although then we regard Mr. Mill's great popularity as proof that he has lifted the age up to the level of his philosophy, that he has done such more than Herculean work, yet we do not regard that popularity as any evidence whatsoever that his line of thought is the most advanced or the best existing; on the contrary, it is rather a presumption that it lags behind. This is what we should like to explain when the enthusiastic admirers of Mr. Mill insist with earnest energy on eliciting a corresponding enthusiasm from us, as they are rather apt to become offensive in striving to do; only it is impossible to make those who call themselves "advanced thinkers" see anything but their own views once they get on their hobbies; they are quite as one-sided, bigoted, petulant, and intolerant as any religious section, and they unhappily sometimes want either the finer social feelings that spring from culture or the healthy feelings that are produced by a life of practical activity.

Having premised this protest against the attempt to sweep our judgment down a torrent of enthusiasm, we proceed to state the grounds of our surprise. These extend to both what has been done

and what has been left undone—acts of commission and acts of omission. Now, with regard to what Mr. Mill has done: he has demolished Sir W. Hamilton, which is very commendable; but he has done more than that, for he has confounded our just expectations by a most unnecessary exhibition of a formidable quantity of positive metaphysics of his own, which we conceive to be alien to the whole tenor of his previous life and to his genealogical antecedents. It is verily a sort of blasphemy against his philosophical progenitors. Let us trace them roughly from Hobbes downwards. Hobbes begat Locke, who begat Hartley, who begat Brown, who begat J. Mill, who begat J. S. Mill. Of whom begotten it is not so easy to say; only Hume, Kant indirectly, Priestley, certainly Bentham, and more lately Comte, have had their influence. Conceive the issue of this long line of illustrious ancestors, the author of the 'Essay on Liberty,' now descending to pure metaphysics! It is too horrible! In the name of outraged Experientialism protest must be made against this sin of commission.

The second point which we wish to make here is to mark a sin of omission. What reason can Mr. Mill give for ignoring entirely the whole school of physiological inquirers? What possible justification can be set up for leaving psychology not one jot in advance of where it was in the time of Locke. There can be no mistake about this: the psychology of Mr. Mill's book is stagnant where Locke left it, and it is certainly in many points not up to the level of what has since been taught by Hartley, by Brown, and by his own father, Mr. J. Mill. The analysis of the human mind, as made by these philosophers, is the only one which at all harmonises with the recent great discoveries of physiology; and there can be no question that it is on the continuation of the lines laid down by them that the progress of knowledge must take place. Mr. Mill has a great opinion of the psychological method of inquiry into mental phenomena, and thinks Comte to have committed a great mistake in discarding it. Whether that be true or not is not the question here; we may admit it to be so, and still ask whether it is a sufficient reason for ignoring those important results of the physiological method of research which bear vitally on psychology—whether, in fact, because a certain method has some worth, it can therefore afford to dispense with the aid furnished by other methods? That it must be thus exclusive in order itself to live is, some will be apt to think, the strongest condemnation of it. Strange as the assertion may appear, it is the fact that Sir W. Hamilton had more of the physiological spirit than Mr. Mill, while Mr. Herbert Spencer's psychology is rendered in some degree fertile by its inspiration.

Critics have, on the whole, found Mr. Mill's book to be wonderfully effective, and some of them have gone into a sort of convulsion in the unavailing effort to express their full admiration. At the

risk of being thought to differ from an opinion simply because it is the common opinion, we must again give utterance to some disagreement. Not that there can exist two opinions with regard to the profound thought displayed, the admirable management of the weighty argument, the severe energy of the lucid style, and the abundant instruction conveyed—in all which the author is, and always has been, unequalled; but why should Mr. Mill give so much time and labour to such a purpose as the elaborate demolition of one whom the progress of knowledge had already greatly undermined, and who was gently sinking into his true position. It is not every day that the world gets its Stuart Mill, and when it is blessed with such a one has it not a sort of right to demand that he should give his strength to pushing forward as a pioneer the tracks of investigation, leaving the clearing away of rubbish to humbler hands? And in the present case has not the age a more special right of dissatisfaction, seeing that, apart from what is controversial, the greater part of what is positive in the book may be found in the 'System of Logic'? To these questions we can conceive two answers pleadable:—1. That it is a profitable and necessary work to destroy an idol when the worship of it is leading the people astray from the true path. 2. That it was highly desirable in a special way to impress upon this age a fact which it seemed prone to forget —the value of a science of psychology founded on the revelations of self-consciousness.

1. Now, with regard to the first of these pleas, it is necessary to admit its validity. It is one of the services that false prophets in philosophy or science do, that they make it necessary for some one more truly inspired to demolish them. In this way Sir W. Hamilton has provoked Mr. Mill to a work by which the pedestal on which that philosopher stands has been so shaken that it will require all the skill and industry of his admirers to make it firm again. As in the growth and development of the body there is a correlative degeneration or retrograde metamorphosis of organic element going on—a daily death in strict relation with the activity of life; so in the organic growth of thought through the ages there is a corresponding decay, or corruption, of the erroneous doctrines of the false prophets going on—a death of the false in strict relation with the growth of the true; thus healthy energy throws off effete matter, which itself in the very act of becoming effete gives up force that is available for the development of the living element of truth. Suppose that Mr. Mill, as an element in the mighty organism of humanity, had set himself to an original work of advanced philosophy instead of—what he could not help doing—rebelling against the false philosophy current, and striving with all his might to throw it off as an excretion, what would have happened? Why, plainly that which would happen in the bodily organism under like circum-

stances: while he and certain elements of the same kind, of congenial habit of thought, were going through an exuberant growth in an abnormal hypertrophy, all the rest of the constituents, of humbler kind, would be poisoned by the erroneous doctrines that ought to be made to undergo the retrograde metamorphosis, and thus be got rid of. The consequences would then be either fatal or so grave as to require the acute fever of a dangerous revolution to set matters right again. But by the course which Mr. Mill has taken, and which he could not help taking, because, as an element, he is constrained by the laws of the whole, the degeneration and the development are correlative, as in healthy organic activity; and the mass of people who wear the pattern of their opinions as they do their garments, according to the fashion, are delivered from the danger of a fatal infection by false philosophical doctrine, and are duly enlightened. The first plea then is established; and, so far as it reaches, we retract those timid objections which were striving for entrance into the mind. Effete doctrine, like effete matter, must be got rid of.

2. The belief in a psychology founded on the revelations of self-consciousness, or what he calls the psychological method, is firmly held, and has been strongly expressed, by Mr. Mill. In his 'System of Logic' he has pointed out what he conceives to be Comte's error in discarding it. In his article on Comte's philosophy in the 'Westminster Review' he has reiterated and enforced his arguments; and he now returns to the charge in his 'Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy.' He thinks that there is little need for an elaborate refutation of "a fallacy respecting which the only wonder is that it should impose on any one." This is a heavy blow, coming from one who calculates the force and reach of his blow; but it does not settle the matter. An author whose psychology is not in advance of that of Locke, and who relies entirely on the method which was employed by Locke, will of a certainty be prejudiced in favour of a method which he has used so well, and against a method which has grown up without enlisting his sympathies, and which furnishes results opposed to some of his favorite doctrines. Mr. Mill is not, therefore, a perfectly unbiassed judge; and he would, perhaps, have not done amiss to have entered into a more elaborate refutation than is contained in the two arguments which he does use; for the fallacy has imposed upon many, wonderful as this is, and will probably continue to do so. The two answers which he gives are these:

(*a*) He says that M. Comte might be referred to experience and to the writings of his countryman, M. Cardaillac, and our own Sir W. Hamilton, for proof that the mind can not only be conscious of, but attend to, more than one and even a considerable number of impressions at once—as many as six simultaneous impressions, according to Sir W. Hamilton. Mark well this phenomenon, as it is not of frequent occurrence—that Mr. Mill is driven to call, in his trouble,

upon Sir W. Hamilton, and to take refuge under the shadow of his wing. We hold the refuge to be by no means a secure one. In the first place, we do not consider the presumed fact to be established incontestibly by the assertion of Sir W. Hamilton or of M. Cardaillac, the unknown French author whom he has quoted, and from whom he has borrowed the idea. Many will still maintain, with Müller, that one idea can only call another into conscious activity through its own disappearance, as one wave disappears in the production of another; and it does not appear how those who prefer Hobbes' opinion, that one idea is obscured by a more active one, "in such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars, which stars do no less exercise their virtue by which they are visible in the day than in the night"—it does not appear how they can support Sir W. Hamilton's assumption. In the second place, let there be admitted "*the great multitude of states, more or less conscious, which often coexist in the mind,*" as Mr. Mill expresses it: is anything really gained thereby? Does he seriously propose to base a science, the facts of which confessedly demand the most careful discrimination and the most scrupulous analysis, on what, by his own account, is in great part not simply feebly attended to, but almost out of consciousness?

Assuredly consciousness may exist in every degree of intensity; but can you, therefore, *scientifically* observe by self-consciousness a mental state which is scarce conscious? Instead of a multitude of coexistent mental states, *more or less conscious*, we submit that they would all need to be *most conscious* if they are to supply the foundations of a science. "It is true," says Mr. Mill, "that attention is weakened by being divided, and this forms a special difficulty in psychological observation, as psychologists have fully recognised, but a difficulty is not an impossibility;" and forthwith, without more ado, proceeds to his second answer. No doubt he felt that he was on slippery ground and that he must get quickly over it. A difficulty is not an impossibility, certainly, but an impossibility is always a difficulty; and the difficulty of attending and not attending to a mental state at the same time appears to be one that falls under the category of scientific impossibilities. But the strongest objection against Mr. Mill's answer is yet to come; he has scarce treated his readers fairly, for he has not let them know that this supposed coexistence of mental states has been a long-disputed question; they float along swimmingly on the lucid current of his style, not knowing of the rocks that are in the way. The fact is that many, after elaborate discussion, firmly hold that there is not a coexistence, but a sequence or alternation of states, single at the same instant of time, and succeeding each other with more or less rapidity.* That an actual sequence of thoughts appreciable by time does occur, no one

* 'Chapters on Mental Physiology,' by Sir H. Holland.

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denies; and it is clearly possible in such a matter that a sequence may occur that is not to us measurable by time, because it takes place so rapidly—in fact, with the rapidity of thought, as we say in common language, when we want to express a rapidity that surpasses measurement. The question then may well have relation to the rapidity of succession; and neither hours, nor minutes, nor seconds, are available where time enters as an element almost infinitely divisible. Analogy is undoubtedly rather in favour of those who believe that the mind cannot maintain two distinct conscious impressions simultaneously; that the association of ideas always involves succession; and that the rapidity of change in mental states is such that consciousness can scarce follow the steps, while articulate speech certainly cannot. Of course the difficulty thrown in our teeth will be that we cannot be sure of the exclusiveness of the particular state of mind at each instant. It is perfectly fair to retaliate by saying that the other side cannot be sure of its non-exclusiveness; and it is, at any rate, certain that the closer the examination of the individual consciousness the more does what appeared as co-existent compound resolve itself into sequent parts. We cannot undertake to define the individuality of a particular state of consciousness; it is a task fit only for the scholastic ages. Material objects that are compound and complex have, by simultaneous or successive impressions on different senses, given origin to an idea that has its seat in a higher nervous centre than where sensation takes place, and which is certainly an individuality in consciousness. But we must demand of Mr. Mill how, in the name of fair play, he can claim the very problematical assumption of the coexistence not of five or six, but of a *multitude* of more or less conscious mental states, as evidence so strong in favour of the psychological method as to render it a matter of wonder that any one should have followed Comte in doubting its value. It is easy to foresee that Mr. Mill's way out of the difficulty will be to have recourse to his second answer. To this, then, we now pass, in order to try new conclusions, though much more of what might have been said against the first has not been said.

(*b*) If there is not an actual coexistence, but a rapid sequence of conscious mental states, Mr. Mill may maintain that the admission would not seriously affect his position, for they may be studied through the medium of memory. Hear what he says in the article in the 'Westminster Review:' "Secondly, it might have occurred to M. Comte that a fact may be studied through the medium of memory, not at the very moment of our perceiving it, but the moment after; and this is really the mode in which our best knowledge of our intellectual acts is generally acquired. We reflect on what we have been doing when the act is past, but when its impression in the memory is still fresh. Unless in one of these ways we could not have acquired the knowledge which nobody denies us to have of what

passes in our minds. M. Comte would scarcely have affirmed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. We know of our observings and our reasonings, either at the very time, or by memory the moment after; in either case by direct knowledge, and not (like things done by us in a state of somnambulism) merely by their results. This simple fact destroys the whole of M. Comte's argument. Whatever we are directly aware of we can directly observe." Are we then to consider ourselves gravelled by this answer? Not without a struggle, certainly. First, then, let us ask Mr. Mill if in his inmost heart he really believes that a man of the vast grasp of knowledge and the acute analytical power of M. Comte —a philosopher whom no one has praised more highly and done more for than Mr. Mill—did actually fail to perceive a fact so simple and plain that a wayfaring man, though a fool, could not miss it? Mr. Mill of course knows quite well that M. Comte did not miss it; that, on the contrary, he entered into a disquisition to prove that consciousness directed to the observation of a particular state of mind falsified it; and that he called as witnesses to the incompetence of the psychological method the two thousand years during which it has been vainly in vogue.* Oh, ye of little modesty, do you dare still to uphold the full value of your method in the face of the direct testimony of two thousand grave and reverend years as to its comparative worthlessness? Will that which was not done by Plato and Descartes be done by you, following the same method? Without doubt it did occur to M. Comte that a fact may be observed through the medium of memory, but there occurred to him also in all probability, what does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Mill, the reflection that the simple observation of a fact through the memory, the remembrance of it, and the scientific study of it as a fact of consciousness, the introspective analysis of itself by the mind, were very different matters, and that a proposition true of the first might be utterly untrue of the last. We are not going to be so mad as to deny, any more than M. Comte did, that we do know something of our intellectual operations through self-consciousness; on the contrary we hold, as M. Comte did not, that, properly used and not abused, this is a method of some value as a help to other methods; but we *are* going to maintain that there is the widest difference in

* "To direct consciousness inwardly to the observation of a particular state of mind is to isolate that activity for the time, to cut it off from its relations, and, therefore, to render it unnatural. In order to observe its own action, it is necessary that the mind pause from activity; and yet it is the train of activity that is to be observed. As long as you cannot effect the pause necessary for self-contemplation, there can be no observation of the current of activity: if the pause is effected, then there can be nothing to observe. This cannot be accounted a vain and theoretical objection, for the results of introspection too surely confirm its validity: what was a question once is a question still, and instead of being resolved by introspective analysis is only fixed and fed."—On the 'Method of the Study of Mind.' The words are our own, but the substance of them belongs to Comte.

the world between simple observation, such as serves us in ordinary life, and the kind of observation necessary for scientific study; and that though the psychological method, fulfilling the first humble office, may furnish valuable assistance, it is by itself utterly incompetent to the formation of a true mental science, for it is utterly incompetent for the latter office. What will be the reply to this assertion? It will certainly be, that what is capable of simple observation may, through proper training, be made capable of scientific observation; and that introspection is a very high kind of art, "an acquired deterity which," as Sir W. Hamilton says, "cannot be taken out of the hands of the philosophers." Why, then, in the name of false doctrine, heresy, and schism, cannot two of them agree? "There is no agreement between those who have acquired the power of introspection; and men of apparently equal cultivation and capacity will, with the utmost sincerity and confidence, lay down directly contradictory propositions. It is not possible to convince either opponent of error, as it might be in a matter of objective science, because he appeals to a witness whose evidence can be taken by no one but himself, and whose veracity, therefore, cannot be tested." *

Now there are two kinds of instrospection—the *Transcendental*, or, as Mr. Mill prefers to call it, the *Introspective*, and the *Empirical*, or, in Mr. Mill's language, the *Psychological*.† The first he absolutely forswears; the second he loves as David loved Jonathan, with a love surpassing the love of woman. But there are other mighty introspectionists, great in fame, who exalt exclusively the first method, regarding the second as a very humble hand-servant.‡ Here then on their own ground there is the blankest contradiction in regard to a most fundamental principle; here is a desperate civil war going on. Under these circumstances we cannot be persuaded by Mr. Mill, charm he never so well, to appraise highly that high kind of introspective art, that acquired dexterity, which philosophers are presumed to attain unto. On the contrary, we rather sympathise with the following words of a great writer. "Consciousness, it will probably be said, is the best evidence; and so it would be, if we were always certain what is consciousness. But while there are so many varying testimonies respecting this; when Sir W. Hamilton himself can say, 'Many philosophers have attempted to establish, on the principles of common sense, propositions which are not original data of consciousness, while the original data of consciousness from which these propositions were derived, and to which they all owed their

* On the 'Method of the Study of Mind,' p. 10.

† An objection to the change of names proposed by Mr. Mill is, that the *psychological* method is *introspective*. There are the *Transcendental Introspectionists* and the *Psychological Introspectionists;* why, then, libel only the former?

‡ Mr. Stirling, for example, in his recently published 'Secret of Hegel,' speaks sneeringly of Mr. Mill, and calls the late Mr. Buckle a "conceited schoolboy."

necessity and truth, the same philosophers (strange to say) were not disposed to admit;' when M. Cousin and nearly all Germany find the Infinite and the Absolute in consciousness, Sir W. Hamilton thinking them utterly repugnant to it; when philosophers, for many generations, fancied they had abstract ideas—that they could conceive a triangle which was neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene, which Sir W. Hamilton and all other people now consider to be simply absurd; with all these conflicting opinions respecting the things to which consciousness testifies, what is the perplexed inquirer to think?" The writer is Mr. Mill;* and one cannot but wish that he had given the reply.

The great argument that may be adduced against Mr. Mill's second answer is founded on the nature of memory. With half the ingenuity that is expended by metaphysicians in disputing concerning direct consciousness and memory, many pages might be filled with every possible kind of objection. One only shall be briefly hinted at. It is founded on what we conceive to be a fundamentally erroneous conception of the psychologists; namely, that they always appear to regard the phenomena of memory as belonging to the laws of *light* rather than to the laws of *life*. They seem to think that a fact of memory is something stereotyped in the mind, of constant nature; whereas it is truly an organic growth after a certain type, and is tinctured with the *subject's* individuality. What a man remembers depends very much upon what a man is: let two persons try to recall a series of events in which they were equally engaged, and had equal opportunities of observation, and, of a certainty, they would not fail to give according to the character of their feelings—and the feelings best express the individuality of a person—different accounts; and even the same person will remember a thing differently according to the mood of mind which, from mental or bodily causes, he may be in. Because a thought grows or matures in the mind—because memory falls under organic laws, and because the organic changes take place in matter so exceedingly sensitive to changes in any part of the organism as nervous element is, therefore the memory of an event is not constant, but variable within certain limits; and therefore also a psychology which converts a name comprising numberless facts of every sort and variety into a fixed entity, and thereupon allows the fictitious creation to tyrannise over the mind, is not in accordance with facts, but rightly belongs to a transitional metaphysical stage of human development. As a matter of fact, the defects of memory which are met with in consequence of disease of the brain are so numerous and so various in kind and degree, that it is impossible to give an adequate idea of them except by enumerating them in detail; and yet these experiments provided for us by nature, these changes in the conditions of

* At page 502 of the 'Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy.

the problem, which are exactly what we should wish to produce artificially if we had them not, are made no use of in mental science, because psychologists insist on discarding the physiological method. Mr. Mill, founding a psychology on memory, would yet ignore the most valuable and undisputed phenomena of memory: is it M. Comte's argument or Mr. Mill's which totters?

In taking leave of this second answer, we must direct attention to the closing sentence of it. "Whatever we are directly aware of we can directly observe," says Mr. Mill. Now, one might venture to deny that point-blank in regard to *subjective* phenomena; a pain in the stomach we are directly aware of, but we cannot directly observe it; we may be directly aware of a shivering feeling of cold when the actual temperature of the body, as shown by the thermometer, is not lowered, or of a feeling of heat when the bodily temperature is not raised; and therefore it cannot be that in such case we can directly observe by consciousness. A like inability directly to observe the real relations of a mental state of which we are directly aware exists also in regard to a multitude of feelings, especially those of subjective origin, that affect the mind. And if he could so direct consciousness to them as truly to observe them, it might still admit of a question whether the effect would not be what it notoriously is when consciousness is strongly directed to some bodily organ, namely, an augmentation of the intensity, or a perversion of the character of the organic action and of the feeling accompanying it. What else than this morbid action do many of the phenomena of so-called electro-biology testify to?

(*c.*) Our third and last objection is, not to any specific argument, but to the whole spirit and method of Mr. Mill's psychology. He ignores the physiological method, rejects entirely the historical pabulum which it has of late supplied in rich abundance, and, as a consequence, stands where Locke stood. In his examination of Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy he is as one who with great labour has raised a complicated scaffolding, in order to pull down an elaborately-stuccoed building, when all the while scaffolding and building are both undermined, and must soon come down in ruin hurled. In the arguments by which he attacks and defeats Sir W. Hamilton he is as one who labours to do with a multitude of blows from a feather what he might do with one blow from a flail. It is true that he refers to Mr. Bain's work with praise; but, unfortunately, Mr. Bain is not a physiologist, nor is his method physiological; he has quoted a number of extracts from physiological text-books that are not up to the present level of science, has promulgated some vague and objectionable theories about "nervous currents" which no physiologist would have done, and has then taken a flying leap into the psychological camp, and followed that method entirely; so that there is not unity in his book, and, as once before said, in it

the living is stifled in the embraces of the dead. An excellent chapter in Mr. Masson's book, one well worth studying by all metaphysicians, is devoted to setting forth the effects of recent scientific conceptions on philosophy, and to showing how different the questions that are referred to philosophy must become with the progress of scientific knowledge through the ages. The present quarrel with Mr. Mill is that he takes no notice of all this new knowledge; that he goes on exactly as he might have gone on had he lived in the days of Aristotle; that at a time when a new method, highly fertile, was available, he persists in trying to do, by the old method, what Plato, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and a host of others have not done. Now, we have not the slightest faith that ten thousand Mills will, following the same method, do what these great men have not done; but there can be no question that had Mr. Mill chosen to avail himself of the new material and the new method which his great predecessors had not in their day, he would have done what no other living man could have done. How Mr. Mill can possibly suppose M. Comte, so sagacious in discerning the course of thought, and so profound in his general method, to be blind or witless in this important particular, completely passes comprehension! Is it not a sufficient condemnation of any so-called science, that in a world where harmony, connection, and continuity of parts exist, it must remain isolated? M. Comte thought so, and many will agree with him.

What, then, is the conclusion which we come to? Certainly that if M. Comte was wrong to discard the psychological method, Mr. Mill has far outdone him in error by discarding the physiological method. Let any one who feels doubt about this read those parts of Mr. Mill's book in which he discusses what is understood by mind and what is understood by matter; and if he fails to perceive the difficulties in which the author is entangled, let him take to his assistance the latter part of Mr. Masson's book, in which the "Examination" is examined. The belief in matter or an external world Mr. Mill holds to be a belief in "our actual sensations and in permanent possibilities of sensation," while the notion of mind he resolves into "a series of feelings with a background of possibilities of feeling." In what the notion of "permanent possibilities of sensation" is in advance of the old notion of matter, and in what the notion of a "background of possibilities of feeling" is different from the old notion of mind, when the realities signified by the words are looked at, that is by no means evident. In view of the difficulty in the way of his theory of mind presented by the mental phenomena of memory and expectation, however, Mr. Mill is compelled to add a curious rider:—"If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past

and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, *ex hypothesi,* is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability at which, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts . . . . . I think by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it takes place, and where we are obliged to speak of it in terms which assume a theory, to use them with a reservation as to their meaning." And this is the end of the severe mental exercitations and acrobatic tumblings through which the introspectionists would have us go! It may be inevitable, but we conceive that they might allow us to accept the fact without insisting on our going through such a purposeless tribulation; not that any complaint can be justly made against them for exhibiting their feats, seeing that it is their profession. Many will agree with Mr. Masson that the above-quoted passage "is the most memorable passage, in its philosophical consequence, in the whole of Mr. Mill's volume. Were I to say that it reveals a trap-door, opened by Mr. Mill himself in the floor of his own philosophy, I should say what others will feel as well as myself. What concerns us here is that Mr. Mill avows that the difficulty he has stated leaves his definition of mind insufficient, unless with the accompaniment of a paradox. What is the advantage, then, of propounding such a definition? Why not adhere to the notion of mind in the older constructive idealism, which regarded it as the unknown substance, or entity, or organism, which feels and thinks?"

Though it may then plausibly be insisted by some that Mr. Mill has failed in his arguments against Comte, and that where he has deviated from that philosopher's track he has gone astray into psychological mazes, in which he wanders round and round as others have done before him, making much motion but little or no progress; still the question remains whether he is effective against Sir W. Hamilton. Unquestionably so, on the whole. He has pointed out clearly how much Sir W. Hamilton deals in vague phrases, how apt he is to use the same phrase in different meanings, and how full of inconsistencies and positive contradictions his philosophy is. The supposed great doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge Mr. Mill analyses closely, and concludes that Sir William really "repudiated it in every sense which makes it other than a barren truism. In the only meaning which he really maintained there is nothing to maintain. It is an identical proposition, and nothing more." The term unconditioned, as used by him, is also afflicted with "an incurable ambiguity" and, by placing belief above knowledge, and holding that we have belief respecting the

unknowable, he continues to bring back as belief what, by reason of thought being necessarily conditioned, is rejected by him as knowledge. It is characteristic of him, Mr. Mill says, that if he makes a philosophical statement he seldom or never adheres to it. "Too often what he has affirmed in general is taken back in detail, and arguments of his own found to rest in philosophical commonplaces, which he has himself repudiated and refuted." Mr. Mill's forcible criticism of the "fundamental doctrine" of Sir W. Hamilton, of which so much has been made, the so-called "law of the conditioned," is admirable, and will well repay study. It has always been to us a marvel that any "mortal mixture of earth's mould" could for a moment believe that there was anything more than verbal mystification in Sir W. Hamilton's so-called law,—that the "conditioned," or what is known, lies between two contradictory hypotheses, both of them inconceivable or "inconditionate," but one of which must be true. How in the desecrated name of common sense can you make any proposition with regard to the inconceivable? In so far as you do so you condition it, which by the terms of the proposition cannot be. How can you say that two inconceivables are contradictory; or, again, that two contradictory inconceivables may not be true? However, Mr. Mill has clearly shown, by detailed argument, that this so-called "law of the conditioned" breaks down in both its parts. "It is not proved that the conditioned lies between two hypotheses concerning the unconditioned, neither of which hypotheses we can conceive as possible. And it is not proved that, as regards the unconditioned, one or other of these hypotheses must be true. Both propositions must be placed in that numerous class of metaphysical doctrines, which have a magnificent sound, but are empty of the smallest substance."

Much has been said as to the extreme candour and fairness of Mr. Mill in his controversy, and the admirable spirit in which he has conducted it; and we have an impression of having read somewhere something about the chivalrous courtesy of true knights. Very pretty, no doubt; and the ladies looking on at the tournament will be in ecstasies. But one cannot but confess to a sort of admiration for that earnest, desperate, unsparing warfare which was the fashion in the time of Milton, when a man having to kill another did it as best he could; and we are not aware that in real battles now-a-days men are particularly courteous as to the way in which they deal the fatal blow. Besides, if there is noxious doctrine about, it is not incumbent on a man to be very particular as to how he kills it, any more than it is incumbent upon him to be particular how he destroys a noxious reptile. Be that as it may, however, there is in Mr. Mill's book, notwithstanding the profession and constant display of candour, a practical unfairness in certain regards to Sir W. Hamilton. There is an unconscious bias springing from

the fundamentally different line of thought on which Mr. Mill moves, so that he detects and exhibits inconsistencies and contradictions where one who sympathised with Sir W. Hamilton's spirit, and criticised him from the same stand-point, would not acknowledge them. The proof of this will be found in Mr. Mansel's writings, in Mr. Masson's book, and even in a recent writer in the 'North British Review,' who finds that Mr. Mill has failed to perceive the acuteness and profundity of Sir W. Hamilton's doctrines, and has therefore misrepresented them, finding contradictions, through deficiency of sight, where there are none; this, too, notwithstanding that Mr. Mill is fairly entitled by a "Scotch hereditary connection" to discuss philosophy! The fact seems to be that where words are not used with any exact meaning, where they are often used in a more or less artificial sense, where there are different philosophic phraseologies, as is the case in metaphysics, those who proceed from different stand-points will constantly find contradictions in their opponents; and endless controversies may go on, the only good result of which is that they do tend in time to fix definite significations to words. An ingenious person might, perhaps, if he thought it worth the labour, extract from Mr. Mill special passages that would be found inconsistent not with the broad tenor of his principles, but certainly with particular arguments which he employs against Sir W. Hamilton. For example, in one chapter, Mr. Mill argues at length against what he calls Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine of unconscious mental modifications, in a manner which proves how little he has cared to study physiological science and modern German psychology, but further on in his book, when arguing on another point, he charges Sir W. Hamilton with ignoring the passive side of our mental nature. After pointing out that a mental act becomes by repetition secondarily automatic, and thereupon "has lost the character of an act, and become numbered among passive states," he goes on to say:—"When the mental phenomenon has assumed this passive character it comes to be termed a concept, or, more familiarly and vaguely, an idea, and to be felt, as it were, not the mind modified, but something in the mind; and in this ultimate phasis of its existence we may properly consider it, not as an act, but as the product of a previous act, since it now takes place without any conscious activity, and becomes a subject on which fresh activity may be exercised, by an act of voluntary attention concentrating consciousness on it, or on some particular part of it. This explanation, which I leave for the consideration of philosophers, would not have suited Sir W. Hamilton, since it would have required him to limit the extent which he habitually gave to the expression 'mental act.' It has been said, not without reason, of Condillac and others, that their psychological explanations treat our mental

nature as entirely passive, ignoring its active side. The contrary error may with equal reason be imputed to Sir W. Hamilton, that of ignoring the passive side." Three reflections occur to us in regard to these observations:—First, that they scarcely do justice to Sir W. Hamilton; secondly, that they are rather inconsistent on Mr. Mill's part; and, thirdly, that had Mr. Mill not so completely ignored German psychologists of the physiological school, and, in particular, if he had not ignored Beneke and his followers, from whom mainly Sir W. Hamilton borrowed his doctrine of the unconscious mental modifications, he would not have thought it necessary to "leave for the consideration of philosophers," in so crude a form, a suggestion which had already been deeply considered. Is it not, too, a part of the same apparent neglect of what does not belong to his own immediate school that he asserts, unjustifiably as regards Germany certainly, that "the best informed German and French philosophers are barely aware, if even aware, of the existence" of the law of inseparable association, long since insisted on by Hartley?

It is not difficult to perceive the reasons of the inconsistencies of Sir W. Hamilton. He was far more learned as a writer than he was profound as a thinker. As he read he either adopted the views of his author, more fully expounding and illustrating them, or, dissenting from them, they furnished the occasion of an elaborate refutation, or of an eclectic appropriation. Hence his many inconsistencies and contradictions; hence also much vagueness of thought lurking beneath an appearance of philosophical precision. Mr. Mill has justly said of him that he should have been the historian of philosophy.

But it is time to come to an abrupt end, though the complete programme has by no means been carried out. Had we not already outrun our limits, there are three questions in particular to which some attention might have been given. First, might have been quoted, with considerable sympathy, Mr. Masson's criticism on Mr. Mill's postulates, in order by its help to have displayed the illogical position which Mr. Mill occupies; secondly, we should, from a survey of the lines of progress of philosophy, have tried to show that Mr. Mill's post is entirely untenable, and must before long be abandoned, as it is outflanked on both sides by enemies; and, thirdly, it was part of the audacious design to have positively charged Mr. Mill with a want of imagination, not merely what is called poetical imagination, but of the true scientific and philosophical imagination —the highest outcome of a scientific training on a good foundation. Mr. Mill seems to have an admirable eye for the angles of life, but no eye at all for its curves; to delight in a sapless precision, which might be all very well if men did act from reason, or think logically —if the world was a world of Malthusian philosophers, and not a

weltering world of passion-driven creatures. A mechanical philosophy simply ignores the driving forces of humanity, the dynamical aspect of existence—those great depths of human feeling on which rests the acceptance of poetry, and even of religion, by mankind. How is it that, as a simple matter of fact, the old metaphysicians, Leibnitz, for example, and, great among the greatest, Spinoza, may be read by a lover of Shakespeare, Goethe, and even Richter, with pleasure and profit, while modern metaphysicians are often unreadable except in the way of a self-imposed penal servitude? Is it not because the former have a sap moving through their living limbs, while the latter are dry and withered trunks? Let us make appeal to the common instinct of mankind; which, so long as men are what they are, must have due acceptance. That is not necessary, however, for as long as one man exists whom a mechanical system of philosophy does not embrace, but who contradicts its principles, that system is condemned. Will any one say that it is a great impertinence thus positively to disparage recent metaphysics? An unanswerable reply is easily forthcoming: in this regard one had rather be damned with Goethe and Bacon than saved with Hamilton and Reid.

One word more concerning the lines of philosophical progress. Half a century ago, philosophy passed over into Germany; and from Kant it passed through a luxuriant transcendental development in Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, and their disciples. No attempt was made to transplant it into this country, if we except the desultory efforts made by Coleridge. But it has flourished well in Germany, and still flourishes, though not so vigorously as at one time. Side by side with it, however, there has gradually sprung up in that country a physiological school of psychology, which is developing most vigorously, and has supplied the material, acknowledged or unacknowledged, of all the latest progress in psychology. But what can be said of English philosophy, transcendental or empirical? That neither one nor the other has profited by union with its more vigorous German representative, and that both are, in consequence of a foolish isolation, now dwindling miserably, capable only of being galvanized now and then into a semblance of life. Does any one doubt this? Let him refer to the way in which Mr. Stirling, the most recent philosopher of the Transcendental school, ventures to speak of English Idealists. And of the materialistic or empirical school it may be truly said that it is not really so far forward as it was when Hartley or Priestley represented it; for it is at present a hybrid philosophy, labouring to combine incompatibles, and rejecting union with its most vigorous and fertile foreign representatives, those that are of its own species. But its fate is surely marked out, the signs of the times being already sufficiently plain to show that the current of German physiological psychology must soon sweep over England.

To those whose fearful ears catch with horror these faint footfall-echoes of the coming of what they regard as the great Antichrist, and who rise up in earnest and indignant warfare against the foreshadowed reign of evil, a fable shall be related. Once upon a time, and not long ago, as the sequel will show, a bull, big with the pride of power and disdainful of the slight bounds of its pasture, broke through the feeble hedge and with royal step wandered on to an adjacent railway. Arrived there, it gazed around with superb front, tossed its haughty head, and roared defiance to gods and men. Suddenly in the distance appeared, disappeared, then steadily flared a red glare, odious to bulls; nearer and nearer it approached, shaking red defiance in the face of insulted bovine majesty. Oh, sacred god that took the form of bull and meekly bore away Europa is such dire insult to be endured? No; by the shades of tauric ancestors, no! Straightway the enraged animal bent its royal head, poised well its bloodthirsty horns, firm fixed its angry sinews, and with stiff outstanding tail, and with a mighty rush, like that of mountain torrent, or enraged cat or female, bore down in bellowing fury upon the approaching enemy. Terrific was the crash of the meeting foes; but who shall relate the issue of the battle? Scattered fragments of bull's limbs strewed the ground around; its sorrowing master heard no mention more of his truant animal; there was deep grief amongst the widowed herd;—and the express train arrived punctually at its destination.

Our last words must be apologetic. To have discussed so freely and positively the opinions of a philosopher standing so high as Mr. Mill stands, may be deemed presumption; but there are two excuses pleadable—first, that it has been done out of a sense of gratitude, because there is no living man to whose writings this age perhaps owes so much as to his; and, secondly, because this review has been written hastily as a duty, thought being put into writing as it arose in the mind, and that which was once written standing as it was first written. Under these circumstances, what is energetically expressed will be explicable, and what is superficial will not excite surprise. We make the reader sure amends by concluding with a remarkable passage from the chapter in which Mr. Mill criticises the philosophy of the conditioned as applied by Mr. Mansel to religion—"If," says Mr. Mill, "instead of the 'glad tidings' that there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive, exists in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that 'the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving' does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express

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and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do—he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go." Should this come to pass, then, reverently be it spoken, "may we be there to see!"

CLINICAL CASES.

Cases illustrating the use of Digitalis in the treatment of Mania, recent and chronic. By S. W. D. Williams, M.D., L.R.C.P. Lond., late Acting Medical Superintendent, Northampton General Lunatic Asylum.

Dr. Robertson published in the January number for 1864 of this Journal, a series of cases on the efficacy of digitalis in the mania accompanying the early stages of general paresis. Since then, digitalis has been regularly used at Hayward's Heath Asylum, and its beneficial effects have been made apparent in the various cases of mental alienation accompanied by cerebral excitement.

With a view to further illustrating the use of this drug, Dr. Robertson has allowed me to have access to his case-books and notes on the subject, and given me permission, during my temporary residence at Hayward's Heath, to test the efficacy of the medicine in all suitable cases.

As Dr. Robertson's paper, already referred to, tends to show the almost specific action of digitalis in allaying the excitement of impending general paresis, I have not considered it necessary to give any cases of that kind, especially as both Dr. Robertson's experience since he wrote that paper, and my own at Northampton, clearly confirm the views he then enunciated. The following cases, therefore, will be found to be confined to illustrating the use of digitalis in the excitement accompanying mania in its acute and chronic forms, and also when complicated with epilepsy.

Case I.—*Acute mania; only partial benefit from morphia and the wet sheet; quieting effect of digitalis; ultimate recovery.*—C. B—, No. 716, male, æt. 30 years, married, admitted at Hayward's Heath, February 5th, 1865.

History of case.—Has always been a steady hard-working man, and has enjoyed, generally, very good bodily health. There is no hereditary taint. The attack has lasted about two weeks, and was preceded by an unusual and

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