

to determine their worth. Lastly, in Chapter 4, Tampio offers an application of the preceding to a pressing political problem: the need to accommodate Muslim minorities in Western societies and Muslim nations in the global order. After rejecting Kant's own approach to religious pluralism as too narrow, dogmatic, and exclusionary to be of any direct use, he turns to the writings of Rawls, Deleuze, and the Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan for guidance; their theories, more faithful to the spirit of Kant's ethico-theology than to its letter, serve the cause of interfaith dialogue and reconciliation.

This emphasis on spirit rather than letter, ethos rather than doctrine, serves Tampio well in his effort to make the historical Enlightenment applicable to our own times and problems. But it also leads to some strange oversights and missed opportunities. For example, although Tampio examines the treatment of Muslims within Western liberal democracies and on the international stage, he has strikingly little to say about Muslims in the very context where they are most likely to be found: Muslim-majority societies. What are these societies like? With important exceptions (e.g., Turkey), they possess many, and sometimes all of the following features, especially in the Arab world, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan: sectarian violence and repression (often of Sunnis against Shia and Sufis); harsh punishment, even execution, for heresy and apostasy; absolute monarchy and other forms of authoritarian government; virulent anti-Semitism; second-class citizenship for religious minorities (e.g., Jews, Christians), often involving ghettoization; exercise of temporal authority by religious leaders, either directly (e.g., Iran) or indirectly (e.g., Saudi Arabia); export of terrorism and other species of violence to non-Muslim countries; and justification of all of the preceding by tendentious readings of Islamic holy texts. I present this list of characteristics not in order to disparage these societies, but in the expectation that it will sound familiar to Westerners with even a rudimentary knowledge of their own history: Christian Europe had similar features before, during, and even after the Enlightenment. This is the Europe to which the great thinkers of the Enlightenment addressed themselves, the Europe they fought so desperately to reform.

Nonetheless, Tampio suggests it would be "unfair to demand that Muslims learn the exact same lessons about religion and politics as Euro-American philosophers did in the 18<sup>th</sup> century" (p. 159). Although the lessons are unlikely to be exactly the same, it would also be remarkable if they were dramatically different, given the parallel political pathologies involved. Consider, for example, the last entry in the above list: scriptural hermeneutics in the service of repression and violence. Kant's response to this feature of the Christian tradition (and other religious traditions as well) was a radical inversion: "since . . . the moral improvement of human beings . . . constitutes the true end of all religion of reason, it will also contain the supreme

principle of all scriptural exegesis" (*Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, 6:112). In other words, we should not first seek moral guidance from holy texts (a dubious source) but instead from pure practical reason, which reveals to us a universal morality, one that can teach us how to read these texts properly, i.e., in the service of toleration and peace, not repression and violence. This is a lesson that Ramadan himself appears to have learned well, as Tampio reveals with the following example of Ramadan's Qur'anic hermeneutics: "If God had willed, He would have made you one community but things are as they are to test you in what He has given you. So compete with each other in doing good." Ramadan interprets this famous verse of the Qur'an (5:48) to say that God has willed diversity and Muslims should appreciate that the world has hermitages, synagogues, and chapels as well as mosques" (p. 183). Other readings of this section of the Qur'an are surely possible—a few verses before, Jews are condemned as deceivers and greedy usurers (5:41–2), and a few later, Muslims are warned not to take Jews and Christians as friends (5:51)—but Ramadan's central concern here is not historical/textual fidelity but moral progress. Muslims must be persuaded that religious pluralism is divinely mandated and thus worthy of celebration, not consternation, and Qur'anic text is duly deployed for this political purpose. Kant would no doubt approve of this interpretive strategy, seeing it as an application of his religious doctrine across confessional lines.

Tampio is right to argue that we need the courage to move beyond the doctrines of the historical Enlightenment when those doctrines fail to speak to our concerns, and his book is an excellent primer on what such courage entails. But we also need the wisdom to adopt (or at times adapt) those doctrines when they do speak to our concerns. The problem of religiously-justified repression and violence was sadly familiar to the Enlightenment's luminaries, and their proposed solutions are worthy of our attention—and nowhere more so than in the Islamic world.

**As If God Existed: Religion and Liberty in the History of Italy.** By Maurizio Viroli. Translated by Alberto Nones. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012. 360p. \$39.50. doi:10.1017/S1537592713000376

— Ted H. Miller, *University of Alabama*

In this wide ranging, stimulating book Maurizio Viroli assumes two burdens. The first is historical in the narrow sense. Using the methods of the Cambridge School historians, he strives to amend the record on the question of religion and liberty in Italy. The legacy of the Enlightenment, the *philosophes*, and the French Revolution predispose one to see a historical landscape divided between the forces of feudal and clerical oppression, and the brash, free-thinking opponents of sanctified authority. The defenders of republican liberty are linked with the latter.

Viroli objects when this approach returns to the Italian Renaissance and tells the story of republics fighting for liberty using the language of classical Greek and Roman texts primarily, and only incidentally drawing on biblical reservoirs in their fight against outsiders and the treacherous powers of the papacy. Wasn't Machiavelli a model, a humanist student of ancient history who combined a love of republican self-rule, Italian patriotism, and a hatred of the Church? It's not that simple, says Viroli. Not only must we pause to register the revolutionary saints of the English Revolution and the republican instincts lauded by Tocqueville in his descriptions of the New England colonies, but Italy, too, has its own, less triumphant, contribution to make. The modern histories of Italians struggling in the nineteenth century for liberty and unification (the *Risorgimento*) and those in the twentieth century who resisted fascism (the *Resistenza* or *Second Risorgimento*) force upon us a set of historical facts and distinctions that, he insists, cannot be denied. To be against Rome, the Church, and even Catholicism is not to be against religion or even Christianity. Even those who sacrificed, fought, and died for freedom, who were decidedly secular or even anti-Christian, pursued their patriotic causes and the dictates of their conscience with an impetus, he declares, that must be described as religious. Significant elements of modern movements for Italian liberty were explicitly Christian. They wished to make clear that their claim to Christianity was truer than that of the masses and leaders in and of the Church—they stand here convicted of centuries of hypocrisy, cynicism, and moral complacency. The intellectual champions of the *Resistenza* adapted willfully religious appeals. Benito Mussolini had turned the state into an object of worship; those fighting for liberty, Viroli notes, needed to revive “the religion of liberty” as a counterforce.

The book is thus divided into three sections covering medieval and Renaissance Italy, the *Risorgimento*, and the twentieth-century resistance to fascism. The second and third document how religion, of a typically reformist, anti-clerical persuasion, was an elemental part of modern Italian liberation struggles against a complicit Church and the demos it corrupted. The first section recovers and emphasizes their counterparts in the Italian Renaissance and the Middle Ages. Without trying to capture all that this thematic chronicle of the languages of the religion of liberty recounts, this capacious survey includes the mystification of the Renaissance republics in arts and letters; Machiavelli and his contemporaries; the late eighteenth-century Italian “Jacobin” efforts (inspired by Rousseau) to repudiate Christianity and reinvent a religion suited to a free people; the chastened, more Christian (if no less reform-minded) nineteenth-century efforts of those such as Luigi Lambruschini to reinvent Italian culture through religion, and the various civic religious components of the programs of Vincenzo Gioberti, Giuseppe Mazzini, and

Giuseppe Garibaldi. The efforts to revive the religion of liberty by anti-fascists including Benedetto Croce, Peiro Martinette, and Adolfo Omodeo are also critical to Viroli's project. Nearly all regard their cause as more Christian than the Church and its followers.

Viroli's dominant dichotomy is thus not religion/irreligion but the spiritually and morally “dead” Italians that live in servile submission and complicity with the tyrants who receive the Church's blessing, and those who were reawakened to a mission infused with a religious spirit to defend liberty, the nation, and even human dignity. The latter were moved by this religious spirit to make the heroic sacrifices necessary to this challenge. The former stood by and sunk into degradation abetted by cynicism and indulgence. Viroli's Machiavelli looks in admiration at the pious Christians in Germany encountered during his travels in 1508, and like his anti-Papal contemporaries, salutes them as true Christians, a study in contrast to corruption at home. The religion of liberty therefore opens its doors to zealous reformers. Its heroes include Girolamo Savonarola, who blessed the Florentine Republic in its struggles with foreign powers in league with the Church, and nineteenth-century Italian intellectuals who, notwithstanding the curse of individualism, looked with envy upon peoples who experienced the Reformation that Italy never did.

Viroli's history is a contextualist rereading of Benedetto Croce's declared mission to revive the “religion of liberty” as a counterforce to fascism and servility—the vice Viroli also associates with Berlusconi's Italy (a major theme of his recent book *The Liberty of Servants: Berlusconi's Italy*, 2011). Viroli's liberals, although he does not describe them as such, set about to create their own political theology. This relates to the book's second, theoretical, and more broadly defined historical burden. It is to make the case not merely for the existence of a religious component in the struggle for liberty, but for the indispensability of that religious component. At root is a Machiavellian question: What does *necessity* dictate for the preservation of liberty? Whereas Machiavelli is often associated with irreligion and immorality, Viroli's framework appears to invert the question. Isn't religion, it asks, necessary for liberty's survival and defense? That Croce himself had earlier described religion's relation to philosophy as akin to error's relation to truth is not fully explored. In meeting its second burden, Viroli's text does what a good, provocative work of history does: It raises still more questions. In that these were, as Viroli notes, actual wars of religion in the struggle between liberty and its opponents, we do not hear an answer to what must arise as an obvious question. Is religion indispensable to those who fight to preserve liberty for the same reason that it is indispensable to liberty's opponents? In short, is religion's most important contribution that it produces those who are willing to fight? If so, we might find need of a distinction between

the reforming content of the religion(s) of liberty that Violi celebrates and the use of religious sentiments in politics generally. Moreover, in spite of all that this history covers, Violi's argument doesn't confront the historical evidence of what happens when reformers who fight for a religion of liberty gain power. Violi laments that the religion of liberty has always faded away, but he does not here consider the potentially negative consequences of a world where the reformer's zealous spirit becomes a lasting, dominant voice, or where these enthusiasts compete amongst themselves for the title of most holy or patriotic. To do that may have required him to reach beyond Italy and again to the question of the dangerous patriot; he might have gone down this road had he more than marked the differences between what were, after all, the religions of liberty. In general, however, the book is a very welcome addition to ongoing debates and will remind readers of a strand of Italian history deserving of attention.

**Art in Public: Politics, Economics, and a Democratic Culture.** By Lambert Zuidervaart. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 354p. \$92.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper.  
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— Donna M. Binkiewicz, *California State University, Long Beach*

Lambert Zuidervaart is a philosopher as well as a former president of the Urban Institute of Contemporary Arts. His previous publications have taken up Theodore W. Adorno's aesthetic theory and the conceptualization of artistic truth. In this latest book, Zuidervaart offers a highly philosophical and theoretical justification for government support for the arts. He proposes that the arts foster critical and creative communication that is essential to a properly functioning democratic culture and social economy. Zuidervaart concludes, "Direct state subsidies for the arts are warranted on the basis of both public justice and societal need" (p. 310).

The text begins in a familiar time and place by addressing the culture wars of the 1990s. Zuidervaart states that debates about government funding for the arts have been mired in "three conceptual polarities" (p. 5). The first is the conflict between advocating government support for the arts and relying on a free market system. The second is that between free expression and traditional values. The third is the tension between a view of the arts as questioning the status quo and one that sees the arts as ushering in a breakdown of societal norms. The author claims that such arguments bypass important philosophical issues and contribute to a deficit in culture and democracy (p. 17).

Zuidervaart then proceeds to examine the existing philosophical and theoretical frameworks of these debates. It is beyond the scope of this review to detail his intricate analysis of the literature regarding the arts in economic, political, and modernist theory. To provide a brief overview: The author examines the economic theories of Ruth

Towse, John O'Hagen, Russell Keat, and David Throsby. Zuidervaart proposes moving the economic discussion beyond their focus on benefits and merits of the arts and beyond the tendency to pit state subsidies for the arts against free market forces. He calls for recognition of a "three-sector economy" that includes a civic sector (p. 47). He analyzes political theorists Joel Feinberg, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin, who he believes ignore the socio-cultural character of art and make art dependent upon only economic and political considerations. He also points to David Schwartz as one theorist who provides a better analogy between enhancing the arts and democratic education. Still, Zuidervaart argues instead for a concept of the arts as essential to public justice and for the *relational* autonomy of the arts (p. 69). Zuidervaart's assessments are impressive. He clearly dissects a wide range of texts and proposes his own theoretical frameworks, which he acknowledges are most indebted to the ideas of Adorno and Jürgen Habermas.

Discussions of economic, political, and aesthetic theories remain highly abstract throughout this book. Aside from a brief mention of the Urban Institute for Contemporary Arts and its artists' and administrators' collaborations with the public and local government in Grand Rapids, Michigan, the section where Zuidervaart examines a stronger connection between theory and any practical application of these ideas is in his discussion of feminist theory and new genre public art. He considers Nancy Fraser, Seyla Benhabib, and Suzanne Lacy, and notes the element of engagement in their work. New genre public art aims at social intervention, and its artists question "modernist notions of authenticity in favor of a new emphasis on social responsibility" (p. 251).

The main concepts Zuidervaart advances are those of a civic sector, *relational* autonomy of the arts, authenticity, and social responsibility—the realization of which will advance a truly democratic culture and society. He defines civic sector as "an economic zone of nonprofit mutual benefit, and non-governmental organizations" (p. 132). He argues that theories of nonprofits as a result of "government failure and contract failure" "assume the factual and normative primacy of the proprietary market. To my mind this is a fatal flaw" (p. 142). Rather, "solidarity . . . [is] the primary societal principle governing civil society and the public sphere" (p. 147) and the civic sector must include this social economic basis. Government should support arts in public because they constitute a sociocultural good: Artists often challenge money and power and strengthen the fabric of civil society; thus, they need support to keep them independent of the economic system as well as the administrative state. Zuidervaart asserts that the place for the arts lies in the civic sector. However, his concept of relational autonomy proposes an interface between art in civil society and the economic and political systems (rather than arts maintaining individual or