5

The Crosscutting Cleavages

Struggles over Religion, Centralization, Language, Anti-communism, and Gender

As discussed in the previous chapter, Norwegian social democrats and conservative German Christian democrats both managed to decisively shape the outcomes of comprehensive school reform attempts. Their respective ideologies regarding comprehensive and parallel schooling became hegemonic, implying that most people accepted the arguments presented by them. This chapter explores in more detail how they convinced such large parts of the population to consent to their school-political agendas and how they successfully forged reform packages that appealed to different groups. To this end, the chapter analyzes five dimensions of education politics that highly engaged at least some parts of the population: struggles over religion, centralization, language, anti-communism, and gender. It becomes clear that especially the center-periphery and rural-urban cleavages continued to be manifested in Norwegian education politics during the postwar reform period. For the most part, this facilitated coalitions between the rural periphery and the Labor Party. In NRW, the state-church cleavage and the communist-socialist cleavage stood in the way of similar coalitions and instead stabilized the internal cross-interest coalition of the CDU.

STRUGGLES OVER RELIGION

Both in Norway and in Germany, religion was one of the most contested issues in education politics. In Germany, these conflicts overshadowed everything else until a compromise was reached in 1967–8. The Catholic Church played a decisive role. In Norway, Christian education was the

most important educational-political topic for some Protestant laymen, who left their mark on school debates and reforms.

The Norwegian Debate about Christian Education and Christian Private Schools

Of all the Norwegian parties, the Christian Democrats were the strongest antagonists of the de-Christianization of the school. Since the party's foundation in 1933, they had defended the influence of the Norwegian Church on schooling. In their postwar manifestos, the Christian Democrats emphasized the importance of Christian education. This was a crucial issue related to their main political aim: to protect Christian moral values. The party received support from pietistic Christians in the west of Norway, the Home Mission milieu, and similar. It was anchored in the Christian lay population and the rural population to a higher degree than the Conservative Party, which also represented parts of the Norwegian Church but more the upper ranks of the clergy who were concentrated in the cities and integrated into the state (Svåsand, 1994b, 177ff). From a Rokkanian perspective, the Christian Democrats gave expression to the state-church cleavage, but also the rural-urban and center-periphery cleavages.

Despite the Christian Democrats' efforts, secularization of the school progressed over time, promoted by social democrats and, in some periods, by currents within the Liberal Party. The Labor Party did not include secularization as an aim in its manifestos between 1958 and 1978. In most manifestos there were no references at all to the role of Christianity in the school. The only exception was the manifesto of 1969, to which a special supplement was added at the end:

> The Norwegian Labor Party wishes for a society with freedom of belief and tolerance – with the same respect for those who have and for those who do not have a religious faith. [. . .] The Labor Party sees a clear connection between the Christian message and societal politics built on solidarity. [. . .] The Labor Party sees Christianity as an essential part of the cultural heritage [. . .] and the generation which is growing up must receive knowledge about this through the school's education. The Labor Party will continue to unite everybody around its basic view, across differences in beliefs and worldviews.

This is a good example of how the Labor Party maneuvered on this issue. Some social democrats wanted a fully secular school, but many wanted to keep a modernized form of Christian education because of its ethical value (Tønnessen, 2011, 73). Even in the Socialist Left Party some high-ranking

representatives were Christians, notably the education politician Otto Hauglin. Nonetheless, social democrats and socialists agreed that schooling was primarily the responsibility of the state and that children should be taught about other religions as well (Korseberg, 2016, 155ff). This consensus dominated their politics.

The Center Party supported the Christian Democrats in the struggle against secularization and included the importance of Christian education in most of its manifestos from 1957 to 1977. But the issue was not as pivotal for Center Party politicians. The same was true of the Conservative Party. This party also included remarks about Christian education in its manifestos but without insisting that the entire content of schooling had to be in line with and based on the Christian faith. The Liberal Party of the postwar period can be placed in between. In its manifestos, it emphasized the importance of Christian education. From the late 1960s, the manifestos also emphasized that students should be taught about other worldviews as well.

Several other organizations were involved in the conflicts. Christian organizations and institutions supported and sometimes pressured the Christian Democrats, such as the Church Educational Center (*Institutt for Kristen Oppseding,* IKO), the Association for a Christian School (*Landslaget for kristen skole*), and the Synod of the Church of Norway (*bispemøtet*). The missionary societies also played a role. The Association for a Christian School was founded in 1963 and was based on the former Norwegian Christian Teachers' Association (*Norges Kristelige Lærerforbund*), which had been founded in 1909. According to the organization, the 1970s and 1980s were its "heyday," with around 4000 members and fifty-six local chapters (KPF, 2021). The Church Educational Center was founded in 1945 and is owned by the diocesan councils, the Synod of the Church of Norway, and several other Christian organizations (IKO, 2021). The Norwegian Humanist Association (*Human-Etisk Forbund*) is situated on the other side of the conflict. It was founded in 1956 and supported secularization and the separation of church and state; it had around 30 000 members in 1986 (HEF, 2016).

The issue of religion caused conflicts over the *folkeskole* law of 1959, the number of hours taught of Christian education during the 1960s, the primary school law of 1969, and Christian private schooling, which are now discussed in turn. The *folkeskole* law of 1959 was not only contested because it limited experiments to the youth school. It also created opposition because it curtailed the rights of the Church of Norway. In the parliamentary debates, the Christian Democrats underlined their worries.

They were supported by the representatives of the Conservative Party, the Center Party, and the Liberal Party (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959; *Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, March 13, 1959). The preamble of the law (*formålsparagraf*) had been changed. The paragraph still contained a reference to "Christian and moral education," but this had been moved to the second sentence. In the sixth paragraph of the law, the subject of Christian education was listed in third place, after Norwegian and Mathematics, even though it had been listed in first place in the earlier law. All non–Labor Party representatives in the parliamentary education committee objected to this and suggested listing Christian education first. They also wished to add a sentence stating that each school day should start and end with a hymn or prayer.

Their proposition was rejected by the Labor Party majority in parliament (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 111). As the Labor Party representative Rakel Seweriin pointed out, no gym teacher or physics teacher should be forced to begin the day with a hymn or prayer. Such Christian elements of education should not be the result of a "decree." Seweriin accused the opposition of conducting a "superficial [...] struggle about the placement of a single word in a list" and of overreacting (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 106f). The Labor Party representatives downplayed all changes as barely relevant. It would not have served the Labor Party well to say outright that secularization was the aim. Instead, they pointed to the fact that the school laws of the nineteenth century had also listed the subject of reading before the subject of religion, since being able to read was necessary for all further learning (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 102).

Another contested issue was whether the bishops of the Church of Norway should have the right to comment on the curriculum for Christian education. The minority in the parliamentary education committee, consisting of the three Conservative Party representatives, Erling Fredriksfryd, Per Lønning, and Hartvig Caspar Christie, and of the three center party representatives, Olav Hordvik (Liberal Party), Einar Hovdhaugen (Center Party), and Hans Ommedal (Christian Democrats), suggested including this right of the bishops in the law. To this, the Labor Party representatives replied that it was unnecessary to include in the law text something so "self-evident" (*Innst. O. II.* [1959], 9; *Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 113). However, the minority succeeded in convincing all but one of the Labor Party representatives on the committee to include a sentence about the content of Christian education (*Innst. O. II.* [1959], 9). The minister of education,

Birger Bergersen, felt that he was being "strongly attacked on this point, [. . .] completely without reason." He found it unnecessary to include specifications about the content of Christian education in a law but considered that this concession would not do any harm (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 113f). As a result, Hordvik could claim that "the biggest and most dangerous simplification suggested by the ministry" had been avoided and that "Christianity will have its central place as before in the Norwegian *folkeskole*" (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 18). Ommedal was not as enthusiastic and concluded,

> The church has to a high degree been sidelined and this has created unrest [. . .]. The letter from the bishops and the many hundred letters to the parliamentary committee are evidence of this unrest. The bishops are excluded from supervision and have a diminished position on the school boards and there is little left of the right of supervision the church possessed through bishops and local priests in accordance with the old law. (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 37)

He referred to the fact that the local priests, who had been appointed to the school boards by the bishops, had lost their voting rights and were now only allowed to comment on issues that had to do with Christian education. The nonsocialist representatives on the parliamentary education committee had accepted the loss of voting rights but had suggested that the priests should retain the right to comment on all issues broached at school board meetings (*Innst. O. II.* [1959], 15). The Christian democrat Kjell Bondevik put to the vote a proposal according to which the priests would also retain full voting rights. In his opinion, the priests had played such an important role in the school historically that it would be democratic to continue to preserve this role for them (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 142). The conservative Per Lønning was not pleased. He believed that it would make life easier for the priests not to have to vote on political decisions and considered it strategically unwise to split the four nonsocialist parties. Hordvik agreed that decision-making power should be given exclusively to elected representatives. Bondevik reacted irritably, saying that he apparently had "a stronger belief in theologians than Mr. Lønning," which was ironic since Lønning was a theologian himself. Lønning replied that Bondevik had a more "romantic" view of the working conditions of the priests on school boards (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 144ff). These were not the words of close allies. Bondevik's proposal received fourteen votes – five votes more than the nine votes presumably coming from his

own party. It is probable that the five additional votes came from the Center Party. Lønning's proposal, which suggested that priests should be allowed to comment on all issues, received most of the non–Labor Party votes but the Labor Party majority asserted itself.

In the following years, the number of hours devoted to Christian education became the subject of massive debate. The number of hours taught in the old *folkeskole* had varied considerably from municipality to municipality. The urban municipalities could afford to dedicate more hours to Christian education because the total number of hours taught was higher there. In some of the rural municipalities in western Norway, Christian education had also received high numbers of hours in the *folkeskole*, up to three hours weekly. In poor rural municipalities this often implied that other subjects received less time (comment by minister Helge Sivertsen, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3724). In 1959, new minimum standards were devised for municipalities that wanted to participate in the experiments with nine-year obligatory schooling. On the children's level, meaning the first six years, the minimum number of weekly hours taught was set at 135 hours.[1] The minimum standard for Christian education was set at 1.5 hours per week for the first three school years and at 2 hours in the next four years. Grades eight and nine should have one hour weekly (Forsøksrådet for skoleverket, 1960, 9f). In 1963, the minimum number of weekly hours taught was lowered to 123 on the children's level.[2] The minimum for Christian education was increased to 1.5 hours weekly in the first three years and 2 hours weekly for grades four to nine (Forsøksrådet for skoleverket, 1964, 18f).

For some of the poorer rural communities, especially in western Norway, that could not afford to increase the number of hours taught above 123 on the children's level, this implied that they were forced to reduce the number of hours taught in Christian education if they wanted to join the youth school experiments. This created opposition. In 1964, the ministry decided to allow municipalities that followed the minimum standard to redistribute up to three hours between the subjects to strengthen Christian education. Municipalities that had had a higher

[1] During the first three years, the minimum standard was 15 hours taught per week and during the next three years 30 hours per week. This adds up to 135 hours (Forsøksrådet for skoleverket, 1960, 9).

[2] During the first three years, the minimum standard was still 15 hours taught per week, whereas for grades four and five the minimum standard was lowered to 24 hours per week. Grade six were to still receive 30 hours of schooling per week (Forsøksrådet for skoleverket, 1964, 18).

number of hours taught in Christian education could apply to the ministry to reestablish their previous level (*Rundskriv nr. 13* [1964], published in *Innst. S. nr. 233* [1964–5], 539f).

This concession did not have the intended effect of calming the Christian groups and rural municipalities. On the contrary, the debate became more heated, and the issue became highly politicized in the months preceding the elections of 1965. In January 1965, a group of mayors and local politicians of various parties from the western county of Hordaland sent a letter to parliament, asking whether it agreed that around 70 percent of the Hordaland school boards had to apply to the ministry to keep their previous number of hours taught in Christian education (*Innst. S. nr. 234* [1946–65]). The Norwegian Association of Farmers' Women (*Norges Bondekvinnelag*) and the Norwegian Association of Housewives (*Norges Humorforbund*) complained about the reduction in hours taught in Christian education. In March 1965, around 8000 teachers signed a letter of protest. The grand finale was the collection of 725 614 signatures between March and June 1965, delivered to parliament on June 8, 1965. The People's Action for Christian Education (*folkeaksjon for kristendomsfaget*) had been initiated by a group of leading men in the organizations of Christian laypeople, such as the principal of the Christian *gymnas* in Oslo, Hans Bovim; the conservative theology professor Carl Fredrik Wisløff; the chair of the executive board of the Inner Mission Society, Fredrik Wisløff; and the general secretary of the Norwegian Lutheran Mission Society, Tormod Vågen. A committee was created, which organized the campaign. It was led by Bjarne Stoveland, who had a leading position in the Inner Mission Society.[3] All of Norway was divided up into thirty districts, where local committees were founded to organize the collection of signatures (Kvalbein, 1965, 171). Among the first signatories were all the Norwegian bishops. The number of signatures approached approximately 26 percent of the population over sixteen years (SSB, 2014, 52, own calculation). The text to be signed read as follows:

> Our society is undergoing a process of change which seems to confront us with a new era in the history of mankind. [. . .] It is our responsibility to make sure that the generation growing up in this new era can find an anchoring in Christian belief and morals. [. . .] The preamble of the school law underlines that the school shall

[3] This background information was obtained through personal contact with Jon Kvalbein, one of the youngest members of the committee, who was active in Oslo's Christian Students' Association at the time (Kvalbein, 1965).

give children a Christian and moral education. Christian education is therefore a key subject at school and needs a number of hours taught which corresponds to the subject's importance. Christian education must not only be rebuilt but expanded and strengthened. We view with concern and worry that the transition to experiments with nine-year schooling will lead to a strong reduction in the number of hours taught weekly in Christian education in many municipalities. [. . .] As the matter is once again being debated in parliament, we kindly ask the honored parliament to support the following:

1. No municipality must be forced to reduce the weekly number of hours taught in Christian education.
2. All school boards must have the possibility to receive approval for three hours of Christian education per week during the first seven school years, even if they do not increase the normal teaching time at school. In the eighth and ninth grades, there should be two hours of Christian education per week.
3. The minimum number of hours taught of Christian education should be twenty-one hours in the course of nine school years. (quoted in Kvalbein, 1965, 171f)

On the day the signatures were delivered to parliament, a school-political debate was taking place there and the conflict led to fierce exchanges. The Labor Party representatives believed that the regulation of 1964 had taken all justified criticism into account and that the campaign was expressing its criticism one year too late. The real intention, it was said, was to influence the elections of 1965. Several Labor Party representatives accused the organizers of the campaign of misinforming people and pressuring them into signing. It was said that rumors had been spread according to which the Labor Party wanted to force municipalities to weaken or abolish Christian education. It was asked how exactly the supporters of the campaign wanted to increase the number of hours taught in Christian education without increasing the total number of hours taught. The implication was that other subjects would suffer due to Christian overzealousness. Overall, the campaign was deemed by social democrats to be a political campaign against the Labor Party (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965). The two Socialist People's Party representatives supported the Labor Party. The socialist Finn Gustavsen pointed out that the Church of Norway sanctioned the state's right to "kill and go to war" and concluded, "When these are the official morals of the Norwegian Church, it won't help to double the number of hours taught in religious education" (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3748).

The conservative representative Per Lønning showed some understanding for the social democrats' discontent regarding the timing of the campaign. He did not think that the Labor Party aimed at weakening Christian education. However, there were other strong forces at work, he maintained, presumably referring to the radical left and the Norwegian Humanist Association. He showed some sympathy for the petition, without subscribing fully to its demands (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3701). The Center Party representative Hovdhaugen also chose his words carefully, saying that it would "probably be a gain if the minimum hours taught in the subject were increased somewhat," but also pointing out that much had been corrected by the regulations of 1964. He claimed that the issue was problematic due to its relationship with the aim of comprehensive schooling:

> [O]ne is faced with the fact that we shall achieve a nine-year comprehensive school for the whole country, with the same competency and the same exam demands. [. . .] [T]oo great a freedom of choice for the school boards within the framework of the minimum curriculum can come into conflict with this principle of comprehensive education. With good will, I nonetheless believe that the question can be solved satisfactorily. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3705)

The Christian Democrats' representatives defended themselves against the social democrats' criticism by underlining that it was not their party's campaign or even a political campaign; it was a campaign based on justified concerns. Financially weak municipalities would not have the means to increase the number of hours taught above the minimum level and would not be able to retain their earlier levels of three hours weekly, even under the regulations of 1964. The Christian democrat Ommedal considered it a democratic loss not to allow local school boards to decide about curricula (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3710).

It is probable that the petition contributed to the result of the elections of 1965 and to the forming of the non-Labor government. The Christian Democrats' support of the campaign presumably also contributed to the strong reactions to the Christian democrat Kjell Bondevik becoming minister of church and education. Jakob Aano, who became parliamentary representative of the Christian Democrats in 1965, describes in his memoirs how shocked he was at the extreme antipathy Bondevik and his party engendered in the media. Internally, the party was divided into a radical Christian current and a moderate current consisting of people, like Aano, who wanted to turn the Christian Democrats into a reliable

party of government capable of democratic tolerance and cooperation (Aano, 1991, 81ff).

In Aano's opinion, Bondevik proved to his critics in the following years that he was not a marionette of the Christian organizations but was capable of showing "independent political expertise" (Aano, 1991, 123). The minimum number of hours taught in Christian education was raised to only two per week for all grades, even though the Christian organizations had demanded a higher number. This was in line with the suggestion of the *folkeskole* committee of 1963, which had been put in place by the Labor Party and delivered its report shortly after the parliamentary debate of June 1965 (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 165). The local school boards could choose the maximum number, three hours weekly, though only during the first six years. The total number of hours taught had been rising across the country, and the new minimum standard was set to 126 hours (*Ot. prp. nr. 59* [1966–7], 24f).

With the primary school law proposal of 1968–9, new conflicts arose. In the text accompanying the proposal, Bondevik's ministry stated that Christian education served the aim of educating members of the church in their faith (*Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 30). The Labor Party representatives on the committee turned this into a big issue. Some representatives of the center parties were also unhappy. After negotiations between the Christian democrat Jakob Aano, the liberal Olav Kortner, the social democrat Rolf Fjeldvær, and the conservative Kjell Langeland, the committee agreed to point out that it was primarily the church's opinion that Christian education was part of its baptismal education (Aano, 1991, 125; Korseberg, 2016, 163). The committee's report stated that "the church itself has the responsibility to give baptismal education in the ecclesiastical sense" (*Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 32). In Aano's memoirs, it is not clear whether he was aware of the great change he had thus agreed to: the church's representatives had lost the right to consider Christian education part of "their" baptismal education. The bishops and the Christian organizations were not pleased.

Nonetheless, the law of 1969 reversed several of the critical points discussed in 1959. In paragraph 7 of the law, on curricula, Christian education was mentioned in first place again. Local priests regained the right to express their opinion on all topics in school board meetings. They did not regain voting rights (*Besl. O. nr. 33* [1968–9]). Once again there was a massive debate about the preamble. The non-Labor government made sure that "Christian and moral education" was again mentioned in the first sentence. The formulation suggested by the ministry, according to

which the primary school should provide Christian education "with the home," was interpreted by the Labor Party as Bondevik wanting to impose on parents the obligation to raise children in the Christian faith. According to Aano, this had not been the intention (Aano, 1991, 121ff). The Labor Party, on the other hand, considered it a great victory that the sentence was changed; it now stated that the primary school should "in understanding and cooperation with the home, assist in giving students Christian and moral education." The school should also "further freedom of thought and tolerance" (*Besl. O. nr. 33* [1968–9], 63). Despite these changes, supporters of the separation of state and church criticized the law. The Socialist People's Party voted against it and considered the preamble an "unbearable" compromise (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 284).

Another conflict was related to private schooling. In 1965, all four governing parties had included in their manifestos remarks about the financing of private schooling. The Labor Party had intended the school system to be public and had not financed private schools on a general basis, but only by application and from year to year. The few private schools that existed in Norway had precarious financial conditions.[4] When Bondevik became minister of education, he appointed a private school commission, *Privatskoleutvalget*, which was meant to conduct a survey of private schools in Norway and prepare a regular financing scheme for these schools.

In the first report of the private school commission, disagreements between the opponents and the supporters of private schooling became apparent (*Innstilling I fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1967]). For the Labor Party, a school system based on democracy and tolerance was one where all children were taught together. Religious private schools were seen as a means for "an intolerant parental generation [. . .] to educate their children to become as intolerant as themselves" (*Forhandlinger*

[4] In 1966–7, there were thirty-four private *folkeskoler* in Norway, with 1889 students. Of these, five were run by Adventists, eleven by the free Evangelical-Lutheran Church Society, six by various other free churches, and five by the Catholic Church; two were Rudolf Steiner schools, one was for deaf children, one only had one grade, and one was the result of a local struggle to keep the school in the village (*Innstilling IV fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1968]).

There were four private *gymnas* with a total of 1386 students; of these, only two had the right to hold exams, namely the Christian *gymnas* in Oslo run by four Norwegian mission societies and *Tyrifjord høyere skole* run by the Adventists. There were eleven private *realskoler*, but since this school type was being abolished it was clear that they would disappear (*Innstilling I fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1967]).

i Odelstinget Nr. 7, February 17, 1970, 56). For the non-Labor camp, respect for the rights of all parents – including minorities – to educate their children in their belief was an expression of democratic tolerance. They argued that private schools should receive state support so that they would not have to charge tuition fees and thus become "exclusive schools for the financially well-off" (*Innstilling I fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1967], 17ff, 69).

The four governing parties were not in agreement regarding how generous the private school law should be. The Conservative Party emphasized in its manifesto of 1965 that it was "the parents' right and responsibility to choose education for their children" and that "full access" to private schools was necessary. The position of the Center Party and of the Christian Democrats was not as categorical. The Liberal Party was most specific in its demands made of private schools, saying in its manifesto of 1965 that private schools "which work in accordance with curricula and school laws which comply with the demands for teacher training and facilities in the school and which cover a need, [will be] given state support in line with permanent regulations."

The preparation of the law took a long time because the ministry was waiting for the reports of the private school committee and because there was disagreement about the conditions under which schools would qualify for state funding (Aano, 1991, 143ff). In April 1969, Bondevik's ministry presented a law proposal (*Ot. prp. nr. 61* [1968–9]). The Labor Party representatives on the parliamentary education committee opposed the law and, in June 1969, prevented the government passing the law before the elections (*Innst. O. nr. 107* [1968–9]; Aano, 1991, 147). The non-Labor government won the elections by a small margin and the coalition continued. The center parties and the Conservative Party now needed to come to an agreement. This was difficult because of the reservations of the liberal member on the parliamentary education committee, Olav Kortner, who was in charge of preparing the committee's report in response to Bondevik's law proposal. Kortner was skeptical and pressured by a current within his party that opposed private schooling (Aano, 1991, 145). He pushed through several changes.

First, he insisted that the law had to include specifications as to which kinds of private schools could apply for funding. A sentence was added to the first paragraph, according to which private schools had to either be based on alternative pedagogical ideas, or be based on religious or ethical grounds, or fill a quantitative need for schooling. Private schools would not be allowed to pay their teachers more or less, or have smaller class

sizes, than public schools. They would also be obliged to send in lists of students to the ministry, to ensure that no selection took place based on social, religious, or economic grounds (*Innst. O. VII.* [1969–70]).

In the parliamentary debate on the law proposal, the liberal Kortner made it clear that he was not a supporter of private schools. He underlined that no international agreement obliged Norway to give economic support to private schools. This argument had been made by the ministry, but Kortner rejected it. The only obligation was to allow private schools in principle. Thus, one had to make a "political choice" regarding whether one should let the few private schools "starve to death" or help them with public resources (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 49). He gave his consent to the law, but conditionally:

> We have made it clear that we cannot support private schools of any kind. We don't want new class divisions in the people. The law must not include private schools which are created openly or under camouflage to select students, for example on social grounds or with the purpose of being an intellectual elite school. (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 50)

He pointed out that while he respected the rights of parents, these rights were weak compared to the right of the child to learn and make a free choice. He also expressed the hope that, in the future, "all religious and ethical societies [...] will understand the value of the public school and will discontinue private group schools" (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 51). He ended by saying that, while Norway had the resources to allow a small number of private schools to exist, the most important aim was to focus on the expansion of the public school system, to make sure that this system would receive the necessary resources and would not be undermined (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 53).

The Labor Party representatives regretted Kortner's choice to support the law and warned that private schools would indeed undermine the public, comprehensive system. Resources were needed in the public system rather than in the old-fashioned, religious private schools (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 54). The Christian milieu was not completely satisfied with the law either and considered it too strict (Aano, 1991, 149; *Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 55).

Overall, the debates about Christian education do not give the impression of an ideologically united non-Labor block. The state-church cleavage became evident to some extent but was crosscut and partly eclipsed by

other cleavages. For the Christian Democrats, the religious character of schooling was most important, while the conservatives stood closer to the interests of the state elites and the upper class and were more liberal culturally and economically. For example, the former Christian democratic representatives Jakob Aano and Hans Olav Tungesvik both underlined in expert interviews that they did not support the Conservative Party's intention to allow private schooling without conditions and thus unleash commercial interests. The Center Party cared about the quality of schooling in rural areas and in some cases valued this goal more highly than, for example, the number of hours of Christian education taught. The Liberal Party especially represented an element of uncertainty for non-Labor majorities, as it was historically closely connected to the development of the nation-state and its school system and was critical of Christian private schooling. Thus, the Labor Party had opportunities to cooperate with one of the center parties, mostly the Liberal Party; to make small concessions, as in the debate on Christian education; or to ridicule and attempt to split and weaken the non-Labor camp. The Labor Party did not prevent Christian groups from asserting their interests in all regards. But the social democrats succeeded in defending the comprehensive principle against any serious threat from this fold. Curricula became more similar across the country and the final version of the private school law was restrictive enough to prevent a steep increase in private schools during the period in question.

The Debate on Denominational Schooling and Private Schools in North Rhine–Westphalia

In NRW, Christian education was also among the most contested topics. This is especially true of the 1950s and 1960s, when the conflict over denominational schooling still dominated education politics. This conflict dated back to denominational conflicts during the Weimar Republic, to the cultural struggle under Bismarck, and even further to the Thirty Years' War and the Reformation. It can only be understood in light of historical background (Erlinghagen, 1972, 69ff; Schmitt, 1989, 27ff). In contrast to the Protestant Church, the Catholic Church had long stood in opposition to the Prussian state. During the cultural struggle, Catholics had developed a tight fabric of mass organizations in response to the state's attacks. The most important political expression of Catholicism during the nineteenth and early twentieth century was the Catholic Center Party, which was by far the most

successful party in Catholic areas. For the Center Party and the Catholic Church, denominational schooling was an important issue. In 1926–7, 23 313 of the 33 523 Prussian *Volksschulen* were Protestant schools, with 8823 Catholic schools and only 1392 common schools for both denominations. In the Rhine province and in the province of Westphalia, a majority of *Volksschulen* were Catholic, since Catholics were the majority here (Statistisches Reichsamt, 1930, 449).

In Rokkanian terms, the postwar conflict over denominational schooling was a continued expression of the state-church cleavage that had two faces: first, the Catholic Church and milieu wanted to ensure that its members would be educated into the Catholic identity so that their loyalty to the Church and to Catholic organizations would be ensured. Second, both Catholics and religious Protestants wanted to combat the secularization of society. The first motive was more important for the postwar debates about denominational schooling. In the area of NRW, this conflict was especially sharp owing to the religious mix of its population and the comparatively high proportion of Catholics. Until 1958, when it lost its last seats in the NRW parliament, the Center Party remained a fervent supporter of denominational schools. More importantly, the CDU, which was still predominantly Catholic in NRW, supported denominational schooling. The CDU was not quite as tightly connected to the Catholic Church as the Center Party had been. But it was the only party which explicitly represented Catholic interests and was associated with political Catholicism, not least by the Catholic population (Schmitt, 1989). The Protestant Church relinquished its adherence to denominational schooling and instead supported Christian common schools. It thus played a less prominent role in these conflicts.

In other federal states where the CDU organized a higher share of Protestants or where the tradition for denominational schooling was not as strong, the conflict was of less importance. For this reason, the CDU's national manifestos did not contain many comments on the issue. The party's Berlin manifesto of 1968 only stated that "besides Christian common schools, denominational schools and non-confessional [*bekenntnisfreie*] schools can be made legally and materially possible where parents in sufficient numbers wish it for their children." The federal state chapters of the party developed independent policies on the issue. The CDU in NRW did not produce written manifestos before 1970, at which point the conflict had largely been settled. The high importance of this issue for the party in NRW during the 1950s and 1960s was demonstrated in the battles fought over the school articles of the NRW Constitution, and over later school reforms and laws. However, the

CDU in NRW was not entirely united on this issue. Over time, the supporters of denominational schooling became fewer.

Social democrats and liberals had long argued against the denominational separation of students in the *Volksschule*. After the Second World War, the approach of the SPD to denominational schooling gradually became more pragmatic. In its Godesberg program of 1959, the SPD stated more clearly than ever before that Christianity and socialism did not stand in opposition to each other (Schmitt, 1989, 80). Even though some social democrats and liberals still supported a wholly secularized school, most of them now accepted the Christian character of the public school but insisted that children of both denominations should be taught together in "Christian common schools" (*Christliche Gemeinschaftsschule*). The Education and Science Workers' Union (GEW) and the teachers' organization within the SPD also opposed denominational schooling.

There were 3651 Catholic *Volksschulen* in NRW in 1959 but only 1802 Protestant *Volksschulen* and 884 common schools for both denominations (Table 5.1). In the latter, only 13.8 percent of the students were Catholic, the rest were Protestant (Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1960, 49). This illustrates that denominational schooling was more important for

TABLE 5.1 *Number of Catholic, Protestant, and common* Volksschulen *in North Rhine–Westphalia, 1953–69*

Year	Catholic *Volksschulen*	Protestant *Volksschulen*	Common *Volksschulen*
1953	3 519 (5 private)	1 694 (4 private)	823 (none private)
1959	3 651	1 802	884
1963	3 705	1 846	925
1965	3 732	1 835	943
1967	3 439 (4 private)	1 492 (3 private)	1 136 (5 private)
1969[a]	256 (3 private)	38 (none private)	47 (1 private)
	Catholic primary schools	**Protestant primary schools**	**Common primary schools**
1969	1 593 (none private)	362 (1 private)	1688 (4 private)
	Catholic *Hauptschulen*	**Protestant *Hauptschulen***	**Common *Hauptschulen***
1969	75 (none private)	1 (1 private)	1387 (1 private)

[a] These were *Volksschulen* that had not yet been divided into primary schools and *Hauptschulen* in accordance with the *Hauptschule* reform of 1967–8.

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1954, 1960, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970.

the Catholic parts of the population. The teachers of the *Volksschule* were educated in denominationally separate teacher-training colleges. After 1967–8, the upper stages of the former *Volksschule*, now termed the *Hauptschule*, became mostly nondenominational, while denominational schooling was continued in many primary schools. Today, there is still a sizable proportion of denominational primary schools in NRW.

The main conflict pertained to the denominational character of the *Volksschulen*, which were mostly public. In addition, the financing of the mostly Christian private schools was discussed. The debates about private schooling were secondary but related to the conflict over denominational schooling. The *Realschule* and the *Gymnasium* had never been denominational, except for the private schools. Social democrats and liberals agreed that too generous financing of such schools would endanger the public system. The CDU emphasized in most of its education-political documents that parents should have the option to choose a private school and that private schools should receive the same amount of financing as public schools. Its manifesto of 1964, "Education in a Modern World," stated that in private schools, "any selection of students based on the property or income of the parents is to be precluded."

Private *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien* were mostly Catholic and mostly for girls. In 1959, 76.7 percent of the private *Realschule* students and 81.4 percent of the private *Gymnasium* students were Catholics, with 23 percent and 17.4 percent, respectively, Protestants. In the public *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien*, there was a slight majority of Protestants. Around 9 percent of *Realschule* students and 18 percent of *Gymnasium* students attended private schools. The majority of these were girls (Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1960, 49f, own calculations). In 1967, 50 of NRW's 452 *Realschulen* and 114 of NRW's 570 *Gymnasien* were private. The proportion of girls in the private *Realschulen* was about 75 percent and in the private *Gymnasien* about 69 percent (Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1968, 57, own calculations). In 1980–1, there were 43 private *Realschulen*, of which 34 were Catholic and 7 were Protestant, and 103 private *Gymnasien*, of which 85 were Catholic and 14 were Protestant. There were also a few Rudolf Steiner schools but the main operator of private schools was the Catholic Church (Lemper/Westphalen, 1982, 207ff).

The postwar conflict over denominational schooling began almost immediately after the war with the reopening and the reorganization of the *Volksschulen*. Denominational schooling had been abolished by the Nazis. In response to pressure by the Catholic Church, the British military

government decided in 1946 to hold a referendum among parents about the reestablishment of denominational schools. The Catholic population especially voted for such a reintroduction. This was in part a result of a campaign by the Catholic Church, which deployed all its power to ensure a favorable outcome. In some cases, children of parents who voted against denominational schooling were even threatened with being excluded from the local school (Eich, 1987, 81). In the following years, denominational schooling was largely reintroduced. This led in some cases to the founding of small *Volksschulen* with only one class for all age groups (Düding, 2008, 268).

Private schools had also been closed during the Nazi dictatorship. Catholic Church officials and CDU politicians began to lobby for the reestablishment, financing, and legal protection of Catholic private schools after the war (Heumann, 1989, 74ff). They based their demands on the situation of private schools in the Weimar Republic. The Weimar Constitution had permitted private schools but their approval by the state had been conditional on the qualifications of their teachers and on the demand that selecting students based on parents' income was not encouraged. Private denominational schools had only been permitted where public denominational schools were not available or they had to have been based on a special pedagogical interest (Article 147 of the Weimar Constitution, quoted in Heumann, 1989, 75). Many private schools had received subsidies from the federal states of Rhineland and Westphalia or from cities and municipalities. This was not legally regulated. The supporters of private schooling now demanded binding regulations for the financing of private schools. They argued that private schools eased the financial burden on state coffers. In their view, financial support was necessary to make sure that private-school teachers would be as qualified as public-school teachers and as protected socially. From 1945 to 1946, private schools received funding based on agreements between church officials and the school administration that were not legally formalized (Heumann, 1989, 100ff).

In 1950, the conflict culminated in connection with the passing of the NRW Constitution. Against the votes of the SPD and FDP, the CDU stipulated the denominational character of the *Volksschule* in the school articles of the Constitution. Denominational schools (*Bekenntnisschulen*), common schools for children of different denominations (*Gemeinschaftsschulen*), and schools based on other worldviews (*Weltanschauungsschulen*) were equally recognized. In practice, the number of denominational schools was much higher than the number of common schools, and worldview schools did not

materialize at all (Table 5.1). Article 12 of the new Constitution stated that small, one-class *Volksschulen* complied with the requirements of a "well-regulated school operation" (*geordneter Schulbetrieb*). The SPD had opposed this, as social democrats did not think that these "dwarf schools" were capable of offering quality schooling. They had demanded that only eight-class *Volksschulen* – with separate classes for all eight age groups – should be considered "well-regulated school operations" and had offered, as a compromise, that six-class *Volksschulen* could be defined as such. The FDP also opposed denominational "dwarf schools." But the CDU and Center Party insisted on including a sentence in the Constitution that legitimized the existence of the more than 750 mostly denominational one-class *Volksschulen* and made it possible to establish additional such schools in denominationally mixed areas (Düding, 2008, 271).

The NRW SPD had moderated its position compared to the Weimar years. Some leading social democrats, such as Heinz Kühn, argued that common Christian ethics and tolerance between the denominations should be manifested in Christian common schools. Among leftist SPD members, who preferred a complete secularization of the *Volksschule*, this attempt to build a bridge with the CDU was unpopular. It was also unsuccessful, as the CDU was not willing to compromise and refused to add the label "Christian" to the term "common school" in the Constitution. For the NRW CDU of the immediate postwar years, the most important aim was to secure denominational Catholic schools, in which Catholic children would be socialized into the Catholic community (Düding, 2008, 267ff; Eich, 1987, 171ff). However, the CDU supported Christian common schools in other federal states and several Protestant CDU representatives in NRW also did so.

Article 8 of the NRW Constitution, which regulated private schools, also created debate. It referred to Article 7, paragraphs 4 and 5, of the German national Constitution (Basic Law). These paragraphs stipulated that private schools that functioned as a replacement for public schools needed public approval. This would be granted if the schools' learning aims and teachers' scientific qualifications were equal to those of the public schools and as long as a separation of students based on income was not encouraged. The economic and legal situation of teachers needed to be secured. Private *Volksschulen* could only be permitted if they had a special pedagogical approach or based on parental request. If parents requested a private common school, a private denominational school, or a private worldview school, a precondition was that such a *Volksschule*

was not available in the municipality (Article 7, Basic Law). All parties, except the Communist Party, which opposed private schools in principle, supported the inclusion of these regulations in the NRW Constitution.

But the CDU and the Center Party wanted a more private-school friendly regulation. Against the votes of the other parties, Article 8 of the NRW Constitution also stipulated that private schools had the same "authorities" (*Berechtigungen*) as public schools and were entitled to public funding. The SPD and the FDP had suggested that a separate law should regulate the role and financing of private schools (Eich, 1987, 181ff; Lemper/Westphalen, 1982, 88ff). The conflict over the school articles was so serious that the SPD, the FDP, and the Communist Party voted against the Constitution and advised the population to do the same. Nevertheless, the following referendum resulted in a clear majority for the Constitution, due not least to the efforts of the churches to mobilize their members to vote yes (Eich, 1987, 194ff).

The debate continued with the *Schulordnungsgesetz* (Law on the Regulation of Schools) of 1952 (Düding, 2008, 331ff; Eich, 1987, 214ff; Fälker, 1984, 113). This law interpreted the schooling articles of the Constitution in such a way that denominational schooling was strengthened further. The teacher workforce at denominational schools now had to belong almost entirely to the respective denomination. The financing and founding of private schools was regulated in a private-school friendly way. Regulations following the law clarified the details. Private schools needed to finance 15 percent of their costs. But this contribution could be reduced to 7.5 percent, or even waived completely, if the operator of the school had little income, provided school buildings, or employed teachers who did not receive full wages – for example, members of Catholic orders (Eich, 1987, 259ff; Lemper/Westphalen, 1982, 101ff). The SPD attempted unsuccessfully to make it harder to transform nondenominational schools into denominational ones. Both the SPD and the FDP suggested to no avail that schools with denominational minorities of a certain size should be transformed into common schools automatically. They saw the law as an additional step toward the "confessionalization" (*Konfessionalisierung*) and fragmentation of the school system. The Education and Science Workers' Union opposed the law as an attempt to "abolish the state school" (Eich, 1987, 226). Catholic Church officials had direct influence on the law text and regulations, to the extent that even the Protestant minority in the CDU parliamentary group was somewhat dismayed. Even though not all of the Catholic Church's wishes were taken into account, Catholic Church officials were satisfied (Eich, 1987, 221, 258). The main

argument of the supporters of the law related to parents' rights to choose a denominational education for their children.

The SPD-FDP government of 1956–8 did not attempt to pass a new *Schulordnungsgesetz* in order to reverse the regulations on denominational schooling and "dwarf schools" because the social democrats and liberals had included a Center Party minister in their coalition. The support of the Center Party had been conditional on the acceptance of the status quo (Düding, 2008, 392, 395). The coalition passed a law on school financing (*Schulfinanzgesetz*) but the SPD decided, with the support of the FDP and against the votes of the CDU and the Center Party, that this law should apply exclusively to public schools. Presumably, this was a tactical move to avoid a new struggle before the elections. In the discussions regarding school financing, the SPD and the FDP favored higher contributions by private school operators, while the CDU and the Center Party defended the existing regulations (Eich, 1987, 266f).

During the CDU's next period of government, from 1958 to 1966, no further changes to the regulations on denominational schooling were made. In 1961, the CDU government passed a law on the financing of private schools (*Ersatzschulfinanzgesetz*). This law was much discussed in parliament and by the public (*Landtag NRW*, October 18, 1960; *Landtag NRW*, June 20, 1961). It stipulated that private school operators would still have to finance about 15 percent of their costs, but this percentage was reduced across the board by 7 percentage points for the provision of school buildings and by an additional 2 percentage points for the provision of other school facilities. Previously, such reductions had been subject to individual examinations. All private schools now enjoyed these lump-sum reductions. As a result, they only had to finance 6 percent of their costs. This could be reduced further to 2 percent if the school operator faced a difficult financial situation. It was no longer permitted to completely waive the school operator's contribution. CDU minister of education Werner Schütz defended these rules. He argued that the old rules were basically being kept intact but just simplified. A lump-sum reduction in the contribution of all private schools was necessary because many schools could not afford to finance 15 percent of their costs. The minister defended private schools in principle, arguing that they were an expression of "the spirit of freedom" and a "truly democratic institution" (*Landtag NRW*, October 18, 1960, 1696). Banning private schools would in his view be an expression of "totalitarian state thinking, such as we have experienced it in the so-called Third Reich and today in the Soviet zone and in the countries of the Eastern Bloc" (*Landtag NRW*,

October 18, 1960, 1696f). He emphasized that the school administration would make sure that parents' income would not play a role in the composition of private schools' student bodies (*Landtag NRW*, October 18, 1960, 1696).

The law was opposed by the SPD and the FDP. Both parties feared that the public school system would be endangered and that the denominational division of the school system would be increased further, especially among the *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien*. In the first parliamentary debate on the law, the SPD's speaker, Johannes Rau, criticized that school operators now only had to contribute their ideology, while the state would contribute the financing. He warned that the law would open up opportunities for nonreligious, economically oriented private school operators, especially in vocational education (*Landtag NRW*, October 18, 1960, 1700). The Liberal Party representative Liselotte Funcke pointed to the dominance of the Catholic Church in secondary private schooling. She warned that increased confessionalization and increased privatization of the school system would make it harder for children belonging to local denominational minorities to attend a school of their choice and would potentially force them to attend Catholic institutions. This applied especially to girls, for whom public secondary schools were not always available (*Landtag NRW*, October 18, 1960, 1702f). These protests were fruitless, and the law was passed and remained unchanged for decades.[5]

In its manifesto for the elections of 1962, the NRW SPD commented,

> Regarding the question of public support for private replacement schools [*private Ersatzschulen*] [. . .], the CDU majority in the federal state parliament has enforced [. . .] a final regulation which is without precedent in the Federal Republic and in Western Europe: the law on the financing of private schools passed in July 1961 secures private schools a public subsidy of up to 98% of their total costs. [. . .] the SPD parliamentary group fears further fragmentation and confessionalization of our school system – and now, after the fragmentation of the *Volksschulen* as a result of the first school law [of 1952], also in secondary schooling. The low contribution of, in some cases, only 2% is [. . .] too great an incentive for private school operators to found new private schools [. . .]. Especially in smaller municipalities which do not find it easy to keep a higher school, there is the danger of a "clearance sale" of the public school system. [. . .] In all the discussions, the speakers of the SPD parliamentary group have made it clear that they support

[5] In 1981, the SPD attempted to increase the contributions of private school operators from 6 to 10 percent (Lemper/Westphalen, 1982, 238ff). This revision of the law on the financing of private schools was deemed unconstitutional by the NRW constitutional court, which the CDU had appealed to. The respective paragraph of the law thus remained unchanged until 2005, when the law was incorporated into a broader general school law.

private schools as a supplement to the public school system but reject any one-sided, preferential treatment of private schools through full public financing.[6]

Similarly, the NRW FDP made the following demands in its manifesto for the NRW elections of 1962: "The public financing of private schools [should be limited], to preserve their character and avoid any erosion of the public school system; [there must be] an end to the increasing confessionalization of the school system."[7]

The SPD and the FDP also continued to advocate the Christian common school, but only carefully, and connected this demand to a criticism of denominational schools that were too small to guarantee good-quality teaching. For example, in 1964, the national education policy guidelines of the SPD stated,

> [T]he Social Democratic Party advocates the common school because it conveys the experience of the rich diversity of social forces and best ensures an upbringing which furthers constitutional, free and social democracy. The Social Democratic Party respects the decision of parents who give priority to an education defined [. . .] by their belief or worldview. [. . .] Common, denominational and worldview schools must comply with the [. . .] requirements of a well-regulated school operation [*geordneter Schulbetrieb*].

Similarly, the FDP stated in its manifesto for the NRW federal state elections of 1962,

> Youth shall be educated in a sense of community and in respect for the convictions of others. For this reason, the Free Democrats advocate the Christian common school. For the sake of freedom of conscience, the FDP respects the wish of parents for the denominational school. This must, however, not lead to [. . .] the development of [small] dwarf schools.

In 1966, the last CDU government had introduced nine years of obligatory schooling and defined the upper grades of the *Volksschule* as a new secondary school, the *Hauptschule*. However, the primary school and

[6] The far-reaching erosion of the public school system that the SPD and the FDP feared did not take place. The number of private *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien* even decreased a little. Even though NRW had private school friendly regulations, the conditions formulated in the Constitution apparently had a debilitating effect with regard to nonreligious private school operators.

[7] Later, the FDP changed its position regarding private schools and became a more active supporter of them. In its manifesto for the NRW elections of 1980, it stated that a "free society needs free schools in private operation" that should serve to develop new forms of learning, which should be publicly financed and supported. It still emphasized that the common school should be the rule and that private schools should be open to anyone independent of denomination and should not discriminate.

the *Hauptschule* were still one administrative unit and still denominational. By the time the SPD and FDP regained power in December 1966, conditions were more favorable for a reform of denominational schooling. According to a poll in January 1967, 65 percent of practicing Catholics and 85 percent of practicing Protestants in NRW now supported common schools for both denominations (Düding, 2008, 559). This was a result of several trends. For one, the influx of refugees after the Second World War and urbanization processes had broken up the geographical separation of the denominations and the population had begun to mix more. For example, marriages between Catholics and Protestants were becoming more common. Processes of secularization within the population were also beginning to make themselves felt and church attendance was becoming less frequent. Moreover, Catholics were no longer a minority in the Federal Republic, owing to the division with the GDR. Even though Catholics were still, on average, somewhat socially disadvantaged compared to Protestants, social inequalities between the dominations had gradually been reduced (Schmitt, 1989, 54ff). For all these reasons, political Catholicism had been weakened. For many Catholics, educating their children as Catholics within a denominational school no longer seemed such a pivotal issue.

The reform of the *Volksschule* became one of the greatest reform projects of the social democratic–liberal government. It entailed a change of the school articles in the Constitution and therefore depended on the CDU's approval. The compromise came about against the opposition of the Catholic Church and its bishops, who thought that the Concordat of the Vatican with the German Reich from 1933 forbade a weakening of denominational schooling and who even threatened to found a new Catholic party. The main argument of the bishops was still that parents should have the right to choose denominational schooling. The Protestant Church accepted the reform (Düding, 2008, 557, 560ff). The *Volksschule* was now split up into a four-year primary school (*Grundschule*) and a five-year secondary school (*Hauptschule*). The primary school would still be denominationally based but the newly founded *Hauptschule* was to become independent of denomination. Denominational *Hauptschulen* could still be founded either as private schools with funding from the federal state or as public schools, if a majority of parents asked for this – as long as a nondenominational *Hauptschule* was geographically reachable and as long as the school was big enough to ensure separate grades for all age groups (Düding, 2008, 555ff).

This compromise was a result of lengthy negotiations between the SPD and the CDU (Düding, 2008, 555ff). For the CDU, Wilhelm Lenz, who was interviewed for this study, was one of the main negotiators. He summed up the conflict as follows:

> In the discussion, the SPD emphasized greatly that we were always supporters of a common school, we have never liked the denominational school and we want a new regulation and so on. The CDU was undecided. The CDU was largely a supporter of the denominational school, though this was a Catholic issue. The Protestants said, basically we don't want to fight over this. Basically we [. . .] support a Christian common school. We don't want any more conflicts with Catholics against Protestants. (expert interview)

Lenz was a Catholic but said in the interview that the Catholic Church had been a much more difficult partner for him in this process than the Protestant Church. He described how the five bishops of NRW had pressured him, especially the bishop of the Catholic diocese of Aachen. The bishops insisted it was their prerogative to "define the position of the CDU" on this matter. However, a generational shift was taking place in the CDU. Lenz was one of the younger CDU politicians, who had joined the party after the war and who thought that the opposition between Catholics and Protestants should be a thing of the past. In this spirit, the CDU had been founded as a union of both denominations. In Lenz's words, he did not want another "cultural struggle." Some of the older CDU politicians, who had defended denominational schooling during the Weimar period when they had been Center Party representatives, did not agree. As Lenz explained,

> I was aware that the position of the old – I would say – within the CDU, for denominational schools, meaning Catholic religious education, [. . .] educating children into Catholics . . . that was somehow after the Second World War [. . .] over. And people [. . .] didn't really care [anymore] about all of this. (expert interview)

For this reason, Lenz and the CDU committee that supported him during the negotiations (which also included former minister of education Paul Mikat, another young and comparatively reform-oriented CDU politician) resisted pressure by the Catholic Church. In the negotiations, they developed the compromise described above, which left some loopholes for a small number of Catholic *Hauptschulen* and which retained denominational schooling at the primary school level. Most of the CDU representatives eventually accepted this. With this compromise, the conflict over denominational schooling was put to rest, though it never vanished

entirely since the public school system of NRW was never fully secularized.

In 1969, teacher training at the Pedagogical Colleges was also decoupled from denomination. The CDU accepted a change in laws and the Constitution in return for several concessions. The Catholic Church was given influence in the appointment of professors of and lecturers in theology. Each Pedagogical College needed to appoint at least two Catholic theological professors. The Catholic Church was also granted the right to establish institutions for further teacher training, which teachers could attend voluntarily (Düding, 2008, 580ff).

Overall, state-church conflicts demanded much time and energy from all education-political actors in NRW during the 1950s and 1960s. Before the compromise of 1967–8, there was hardly any room for debates about comprehensive schooling. Even though the Catholic Church was not satisfied with the compromise, the CDU remained the only party that saw itself as a representative of the Catholic Church's interests in education politics. The CDU ensured that NRW regulations were designed in a private-school friendly way, which was important for Catholic private schools. Catholic Church officials could count on a steady stream of information and stable cooperation from the CDU. In return, the Catholic Church did much to mobilize its members to support the CDU. This is one of the explanations for how the CDU managed to integrate people of different class backgrounds among its members and voters.

The conflict also created an alliance between the SPD and the FDP in NRW education politics. The SPD and the FDP both had sizable numbers of comparatively less religious Protestants among their voters, many of whom opposed Catholic denominational schooling (Schmitt, 1989). Despite the influence of economic liberals in the FDP, the FDP opposed not only denominational but also private schooling during the first post-war decades. The main explanation for this is that private schools in NRW were mostly Catholic and the FDP opposed the far-reaching influence of the Catholic Church. The FDP first adopted a more private-school friendly position when the conflict over denominational schooling had been put to rest. In other words, both the SPD and the FDP stood more on the side of the state in the state-church conflicts.

STRUGGLES OVER CENTRALIZATION

Norway and NRW differ greatly with regard to population density and geographical conditions. In 1960, the average population density in

Norway was 11.6 people per km². About 57 percent of the Norwegian population lived in "densely populated areas," meaning a population cluster with at least 200 residents and with fewer than 50 meters' distance between the houses (Table 2.2). In 1955, the average population density in NRW was 420 people per km² and over 91 percent lived in urban municipalities with more than 2000 inhabitants (Table 2.5). These enormous differences meant that Norwegian school reformers had to deal with a different kind of challenge regarding the quality of rural schooling and school centralization. Centralization, in the sense the term is employed here, implied that school districts and schools were merged into larger units and small schools were closed or relocated. Nonetheless, centralization was an issue in North Rhine–Westphalian politics as well, since there were a few rural municipalities in NRW in which the small, village *Volksschule* had been the norm.

The Centralization Debate in Norway

All three center parties had their strongholds in the countryside. This applies especially to the Center Party, which since its foundation in 1920 represented farmers primarily. It was called the Farmers' Party until 1959, when the name was changed in an effort to represent other groups of the (rural) population too. Decentralization and the economic and cultural strengthening of Norway's rural areas were the party's main political goals. For the Center Party, decentralization implied that decision-making, provision of services, and relevant public institutions should all be maintained locally. Schooling played an important role, since schools in small rural communities functioned as cultural centers. Local schools were also considered important for the local economy. In its manifestos of 1957–77, the Center Party emphasized the importance of a "decentralized school system." It opposed the development toward larger schools and insisted that no rural municipality should be forced to close its primary school against the population's will. At the same time, it supported the improvement of schooling in the countryside and insisted that rural municipalities had to receive as much financial support as possible so that schooling conditions would be equalized. The Center Party's manifestos were most detailed and extensive with regard to these issues, but the two other center parties also supported school decentralization, largely for the same reasons.

This should not be taken to mean that the other parties openly dismissed such arguments. The manifestos of the Labor Party, the Socialist

People's Party/Socialist Left Party, and the Conservative Party also mentioned the necessity of improving schooling, especially in the poorest rural municipalities. The Socialist People's Party was especially clear in its rejection of too much centralization, stating for example in its working manifesto of 1965 that "the first years of the children's school [*småskolen*] should be located so close to the home that transport by car is avoided." Neither the Labor Party nor the Conservative Party included equally categorical formulations in their manifestos, but they too showed an understanding of the needs of the rural population. For the Labor Party, the most important aims were better schooling for working-class and rural youths and increased investment in rural municipalities, especially at the level of the children's and youth schools. In its manifestos of 1961 and 1965, the Conservative Party focused on the importance of expanding upper-secondary schooling in the countryside. They demanded that no municipality should be forced to close its *gymnas* due to centralization. From the 1970s, the Conservative Party and the Labor Party suggested increased decentralization – but by this time, the major changes had already taken place. In the following, the conflicts related to centralization are analyzed chronologically.

Much centralization of the school system had already occurred before the introduction of the youth school, based on the laws of the 1930s. Social democrats had long aimed at equalizing schooling conditions across the whole of the country. In the 1950s, the conditions were still very different. There were separate laws for rural and urban schools. The rural *folkeskoler* were often so small that they could not divide children into different age groups or had to group them in fewer than seven groups. The minimum amount of schooling was much lower, and curricula were different. The law of 1959 became the first school law that applied to rural and urban schools alike. All parties supported this. Everyone agreed that it was necessary to improve the rural schools and lessen the differences in standards by integrating the previously separate laws.

However, disagreements within the parliamentary education committee indicate that the center parties stood in opposition to the Labor Party and the Conservative Party regarding some of the details. The three center party representatives on the committee, Hordvik (Liberal Party), Hovdhaugen (Center Party), and Ommedal (Christian Democrats), suggested a change to the law proposal according to which the state would finance up to 50 percent of the costs of new school buildings. They argued that economically weak rural municipalities would need more state support or else they would be left behind. The Labor Party and the

Conservative Party representatives agreed that state support for weak municipalities had to be increased but thought that 50 percent state financing for school buildings would be too high, considering that the law already contained a paragraph according to which the counties had to pay 50 percent. In effect, it would thus be possible for a municipality to receive up to 100 percent financing from county and state together. The Labor Party and the Conservative Party thought that this would stand in opposition "to the old principle that municipalities should organize their schools themselves" (*Innst. O. II* [1959], 14). The center party representatives also argued that financing of school buildings by the county should be increased from 50 to 65 percent, which the majority of the committee, including the conservatives, rejected (*Innst. O. II* [1959], 14).

Paragraph 2 of the law included regulations for the reorganization of school districts. The merging of school districts often led to the closing of village schools. The school directors, who were appointed by the ministry, played an important role as organizers of comprehensive school reforms and of centralization. According to Telhaug and Mediås (2003, 190ff), the school directors were usually welcomed by municipalities as advisors but sometimes centralization led to conflicts between school directors and other bodies on the local level. In case of such disagreements, both the county school boards and the school directors had the right to appeal to the ministry. The center party representatives and the conservative representative, Christie, suggested a change to the law text. They did not like the fact that the school director, a single individual, could appeal to the ministry by himself, whereas a majority of the county school board had to consist of at least three people. Instead, they suggested that each member of the county school board and the school director should be allowed to appeal to the ministry as long as one more member of the board supported them in the appeal. The two other conservative representatives, and all the Labor Party representatives, thought that there was no reason to change current regulations (*Innst. O. II* [1959], 7). This illustrates that the center parties were critical of attempts by the central government to control reforms in rural areas with the aid of the school directors.

An important reason for the center parties' representatives voting against the law of 1959 was that they were worried that it would lead to excessive centralization, implying long distances to school or an increase in boarding schools. They opposed boarding schools and school centralization, especially in the first six years of the primary school, and argued that reforms had to be based on the existing school infrastructure so that

"elastic" transitions to nine-year obligatory comprehensive schooling would be possible (*Innst. O. II* [1959], 10f).

During the 1960s, school centralization and the discussions about it continued. By 1963, around 72 percent of all students in the *folkeskoler* across the country went to schools divided into yearly age groups. In the cities, this was 96 percent. In the rural districts, the percentage had increased from 41 percent in 1953 to 63 percent in 1963. Still, around 22 percent of students in the countryside attended schools that were divided into only four or five age groups and around 15 percent attended schools that were even smaller, and in 1 percent of the cases without any differentiation by age (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 151). Furthermore, 5076 primary school students lived in boarding schools or boarding homes close to their school (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 282). The *folkeskole* committee projected in its report of 1965 that better roads, improved transport conditions, and the decreasing rural population would lead to even more centralization. The declared aim was to get rid of the smallest village schools, since these were considered pedagogically inferior and too expensive. There was also a lack of qualified teachers, especially in the rural schools (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 151f).[8]

For the youth school, the pressures of centralization were even greater than for the *folkeskole*. The reason was that the *folkeskole* did not have organizational differentiation. The early curricula of the youth school, which were based on tracks, ability groups, and elective subjects, implied that a certain number of students were required. The *folkeskole* committee suggested that a youth school should have at least three parallel classes in each grade (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 155). In some urban areas, the enthusiasm for differentiation led to extremely large youth schools. In Bergen, there was one youth school with fourteen parallel classes (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 279).

To the Center Party, the centralization of the *folkeskole* was the bigger problem. As the Center Party representative Undheim put it in the school debate of 1963,

[8] However, the total number of teachers relative to the number of students was quite high: In 1963–4, there were 16 815 *folkeskole* teachers for 419 441 *folkeskole* students (approximately 25 students per teacher) (SSB, 1966, 269, own calculation). In the *realskole* and *gymnas*, the average number of students per teacher was approximately 21. In the *framhaldsskole*, it was around 17 (SSB, 1966, 269, own calculations).

It has often been said that the nine-year school is of great benefit for the villages in that it places them on a par with the cities in terms of schooling. And there is much truth in this. The youth school exam or the kind of *realskole* exam that all rural young people will now receive in their home village, instead of having to travel further away, is of the greatest value for the villages [. . .]. But the advantage for the villages lies at the youth school level, not as far as the children's school is concerned. The villages already had an equally good or better children's school than the cities and there is no reason to take it from them. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 21, 1963, 3343)

Undheim further argued that the rural *folkeskoler* had managed to teach children just as much even though there had been tuition on just three days of the week. The reasons for this were that the children spent more time studying at home than was usual in the cities, that they were taken better care of at home, and that they were not as "overly schooled" as city children. He was also worried that rural children would lose touch with the local economy and would be raised to become "city youths," uninterested in and incapable of doing "the hard toil on farms tough to cultivate" (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 21, 1963, 3343). Here, the Center Party's opposition to centralization was coupled with an opposition to the city's curricula and cultural standards, which were seen as detrimental to the rural way of life. In this regard, the Center Party was more conservative than the Labor Party, whose politicians enthusiastically supported not only the structural but also the curricular changes that resulted from the equalization of regulations for rural and city schools. Presumably, not many Labor Party representatives would have agreed that the rural schools were actually "better" than the city schools. This was an unusual point of view, for despite some reservations voiced by the center parties there was a broad consensus that a certain degree of centralization was necessary to improve rural schools.

In some cases, the pressures of centralization led to fierce conflicts, for example between the individual schools' boards, the municipality's school boards, the county's school boards, the school directors, the ministry, and the local population. In one instance, namely in the small mountain village of Vats in central Norway, parents and teachers decided to found a private school to replace the fourth to sixth grades of the public *folkeskole*. These upper grades had been closed down and centralized even though the municipal school board had voted against it with a slight majority. The school director had reluctantly accepted the municipality's decision, but the county school board had objected and appealed to the ministry. The Labor Party minister Sivertsen had ruled

in 1961 that the upper grades of the *folkeskole* should be centralized in the village of Leveld, 12.8 km away. This was unacceptable to the parents of Vats, who wanted their children to be able to walk to school and who were afraid that once the upper stage of the *folkeskole* vanished, the lower stage would vanish too (*Innstilling IV fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1968], 24). The report of the private school committee of 1968 included the claim that this conflict is "in many ways typical of the centralization debates across the country" (*Innstilling IV fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1968], 32). It was, however, the only case in which the village population took the matter into their own hands, built a new school building collectively, and hired their own teacher. To the administration, the school was a "difficult case, because it would be impossible to implement the large nationwide plan for the *folkeskole* if all district regulations were annulled" (*Innstilling IV fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1968], 32).

Over time, the enthusiasm for larger schools began to wane. It was now said that very large schools led to pedagogical and administrative problems and made it difficult to develop "a good school atmosphere" (*Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 10). The pedagogical trend of the late 1960s and 1970s was to differentiate less in the youth school. Large schools were therefore no longer as necessary. In its report on the primary school law of 1969, the parliamentary education committee unanimously supported the suggestion of the Christian democratic minister Bondevik that youth schools should have a maximum of six parallel classes. Youth schools with only two parallel classes were allowed but should usually be connected to children's schools. In the case of very isolated areas such as islands, even smaller, one-class youth schools were allowed based on exemptions (*Ot. prp. nr. 59* [1966–7], 38 f; *Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 10). According to Jakob Aano (1991, 124), this was another example of Bondevik's capacity to withstand pressure, in this case from rural education politicians who were disappointed that a minimum of two parallel classes remained the norm and who had expected the non-Labor government to go further in its correction of the "centralized school expansion the Labor Party had initiated." This interpretation is supported by a remark by the Center Party representative Hovdhaugen in the parliamentary debate on the primary school law of 1969:

> Correctly or incorrectly, it has often been claimed that the municipalities at times have been pressured by the government to go further on the path of centralization than they often wished. This has often created antipathy and conflict around the

new school regulation. The new school law should put municipalities in a freer position. But I would like to ask the ministry to assume a liberal stance with respect to exemptions from the demands regarding the size of the youth school, in cases where the geographical and transport conditions indicate this. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 275f)

Representatives of the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats also uttered their concern regarding exemptions for youth schools that had only one class. The minister assured them that exemptions would be granted liberally and pointed out that the number of small youth schools with one or two classes had risen from 62 in 1966–7 to 107 in the forthcoming school year of 1970–1 (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 369). The Labor Party representative Per Karstensen remarked in response to this,

I listened with interest to the information from the minister about the tendency we can see today for smaller youth school units. This is probably a tendency which one can find not least on the pedagogical level. It is becoming easier to manage and easier to make possible smaller youth schools. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 369)

Presumably, he was referring to changes in the forms of differentiation in the youth school. At this point, the Labor Party had begun to support pedagogical differentiation within the classroom and thus no longer saw the need to insist on larger school units at any cost.

The Center Party also suggested a change to the law proposal according to which one- and two-class youth schools would be allowed to remain independent of children's schools. Their representatives argued that such a connection between the children's and the youth school would lead to overly large schools and would weaken the small youth schools pedagogically, leading to a lack of qualified teachers trained for the youth school level. The proposal received no remarks from the other parties. It received thirteen votes, all presumably from the Center Party, and was rejected (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 368ff).

Finally, with regard to the merging of school districts and the relocation of schools, the law of 1969 contained a small change. In paragraph 3, it was specified that the population of the school district should only be allowed to vote on such changes if the municipal board or the municipal school board requested this. In the previous laws, special rules had applied to rural municipalities, which had been allowed to vote on such issues in all cases. The votes were nonbinding. The aim was now to create equal rules for rural and urban municipalities, which was the reason why all parties apart from

the Center Party agreed to the change. The parliamentary education committee underlined that it should remain usual to let the population of rural municipalities have a say (*Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 11f). The Center Party was not satisfied with this and suggested that all school districts should be allowed to vote on such issues in all cases. The proposal received seventeen votes, which indicates that a few other representatives besides the Center Party's voted for it (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 371). However, the Center Party was clearly most concerned about these issues.

In the 1970s, "decentralization" became a buzzword used by all parties. In the name of democratization and decentralization, it was demanded that the individual school, teachers, students, and parents should be given more influence. For the different parties, the term "decentralization" did not have the same meaning. The conservative Lars Roar Langslet (1977, 101) summed up his view of decentralization thus:

> We need a school that has better interaction with the society around it. No more mammoth schools! But school units as small as we can manage and with good distribution [across the country]. [. . .] We must give the local society more decision-making power over the local schools and end unnecessary central management through an unstoppable flood of regulations, instructions and provisions from the ministry and expert councils. If other countries west of the Iron Curtain dare to treat people outside of such organs as adult, responsible creatures, we must also be able to dare to do so.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the conservatives used the decentralization argument to argue for the abolition of the Experimental Council and against the central regulations of 1979 that forbade permanent ability grouping (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979). The regulations of 1979 were, however, not of much consequence for rural schools, which is probably the reason why the Center Party and the Christian Democrats did not oppose them with the same ideological fervor as the conservatives. The Labor Party and the Liberal Party, on the other hand, emphasized that local schools should receive pedagogical influence but not with regard to whether there should be ability grouping.

For the most part, the Center Party and the other center parties accepted the youth school reform, not least because the introduction of the youth school in many cases meant that rural students received two years of additional schooling. This was especially true for the northern counties. In the words of the leftist school reformer Kjell Horn:

> In Finnmark, in the counties furthest north, the school supply was miserably bad. And when the state decided they wanted to start with what they called

> experiments, [. . .] start with nine-year schooling, these counties received full funding to build these fantastic [. . .] school palaces [which were] out of this world. With boarding schools and everything. And I worked in one of these. [. . .] And there was such an enthusiasm for the nine-year school in Finnmark because . . . [from a situation] where there had been almost no school supply, all young people now received a proper nine-year school supply. And that was a fantastic cultural boost out of this world in northern Norway. (expert interview)

It should be added that the Labor Party was strong in the northern counties. In many rural areas, it had local politicians who supported the introduction of the youth school and forged alliances with center party politicians. The youth school was welcomed in the countryside because it was connected to the introduction of nine-year obligatory schooling. Even though the conservatives sometimes succeeded in building alliances with the center parties based on the argument of centralization, the issue overall did not contribute much to the cohesion of the non-Labor camp. The conservatives were still perceived by the center parties as an urban party that did not really prioritize rural interests. The Labor Party's efforts to increase the quality of education in rural areas were more believable from the center parties' point of view. Therefore, the urban-rural conflict over centralization was no obstacle to the prolongation of comprehensive schooling. On the contrary, the trend for decreasing organizational differentiation made it even easier to introduce the youth school throughout the country.

Debates about Rural Schooling and Centralization in North Rhine–Westphalia

In NRW, many farmers and Christian laypeople were organized in the CDU. The CDU was strong in rural areas, where small *Volksschulen* were common, and emphasized the value of smaller schools. During the 1960s, the party's position changed and modernized somewhat, but it continued to support decentralization in its manifestos for the NRW elections of 1975 and 1980. In the CDU manifesto for the national elections of 1980, the party stated,

> Schools need to be preserved in adequate local proximity. Children and youths in rural areas are also entitled to a local, varied supply of educational institutions. We will prevent the decrease in the number of students leading to a wave of school closures and more and more students having to be driven to a distant central school.

The SPD continuously opposed small "dwarf schools," as social democrats termed them. Even though the SPD had its strongholds in the cities, it

justified this with the wish to improve living conditions in the countryside. Social democrats did not believe that the quality of small *Volksschulen* could ever be on a par with larger schools. For this reason, the SPD's manifestos suggested using school buses and centralizing schools. During the 1960s, the SPD's irritation was focused on the undivided or little divided denominational *Volksschulen*.

The FDP also favored the centralization of schools and the equalization of opportunities for city and rural youth. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, liberals fought against denominational and private schooling, partly because these schools were too small. During the CDU-FDP coalition of 1962–6, FDP speakers supported some of the SPD's motions for the establishment of central schools. In the following, the debates about the undivided – and in many cases, denominational – *Volksschulen*, the introduction of the *Hauptschule* during the 1960s, and the cooperative school during the 1970s are reviewed once more, this time with a focus on centralization.

There were surprisingly many undivided *Volksschulen* in NRW during the 1960s, compared with both the much less populated Norway and the other federal states. In 1960, there were 895 one-class schools, 1050 two-class schools, 779 three-class schools and 509 four-class schools out of a total 6365 *Volksschulen* (Düding, 2008, 492). In 1959, the average number of students per class was 39.2 and the average *Volksschule* had 5.7 classes, even though it comprised eight age groups or grades (Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1960, 44, own calculations). In 1963, there were still around 2000 one-class or two-class *Volksschulen*, as the SPD politician, and later minister of education, Fritz Holthoff, lamented in several parliamentary debates (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962, 3009; *Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 535). The CDU minister of education, Paul Mikat, pointed out that undivided one-class schools were attended by only 1.8 percent of all students, while 40.4 percent of *Volksschule* students attended schools with at least eight classes; 82.7 percent of the students attended schools with five or more classes (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 545).

In April 1962, the NRW parliament debated the shortage of teachers in the *Volksschule*, in response to an interpellation made by the FDP (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962). Even though the small schools were not the main topic of this debate, they were mentioned several times. The SPD politician Fritz Holthoff and the FDP politician Ernst Günther Herzberg argued that the lack of teachers was partly a result of the large number of "dwarf schools" (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962, 3009, 3019).

These schools bound up too many teacher resources and made the teaching profession unattractive to young people. They suggested that *Volksschulen* should be centralized to overcome the "medieval" structure of the system (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962, 3020). The CDU representative Albert Pürsten defended the small schools and emphasized their value to the village. He thought that it would be an undesirable "mechanization of our pedagogical life" if six-year-old children from fifteen different villages were driven to a central school (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962, 3012). Herzberg replied that the school was no longer the "intellectual center of a village" because more and more teachers commuted from cities and refused to live in the village (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962, 3019).

In its manifesto for the elections of 1962, the SPD NRW included the following sentences:

> The rural child must have the same number of educational opportunities as the city child. Central schools which unite children from several villages in a centrally located school must be established and equipped so modernly that their performance will be wholly equal to the performance of the city schools.

The CDU won the NRW elections of 1962 and formed a government with the FDP. In the following years, the SPD parliamentary group continued to advocate central schools. In February 1963, the issue came up in a budgetary debate (*Landtag NRW*, February 12, 1963). Holthoff (SPD) suggested that the small *Volksschulen* should be replaced by central schools (*Landtag NRW*, February 12, 1963, 251). To this, Pürsten (CDU) replied:

> The central school was contrasted with the schools with not much division and one-class schools by Mr. Holthoff. [. . .] I think that we should never see this question as a matter of principle [. . .]; these questions can only be judged and decided on from the local perspective and based only on the individual case. [. . .] let us not underestimate the value of the school to the village [. . .]. We should really discuss this without rage or zealousness or based on extremes and we should not aim at general regulations, but we should try to achieve an improvement of our school system in the countryside by way of enlightenment and support. But I warn against [. . .] seeking salvation exclusively in the central school. If we equip the small school in the countryside as well as the larger school, if we make an effort so that good teachers come to the small rural schools, then [. . .] we will see that it can be a fine and rewarding task to be involved in the life of a village as a teacher. (Landtag NRW, February 12, 1963, 269)

In response, Herzberg (FDP) remarked again that the school might have been the intellectual center of the village in earlier times, "when one still

traveled by means of the post cart or horse," but no longer (*Landtag NRW*, February 12, 1963, 278). The young SPD representative Johannes Rau argued that the current school system was adapted to the "first half of the nineteenth century." He lamented that young teachers risked being placed in tiny schools "in the dark countryside" without any colleagues and without public transport facilities to maintain contact with family and friends. CDU representatives reacted with yells to his words, suggesting that he should tell the voters during election campaigns that they were living in "the dark countryside" and arguing that the result of centralization would be that all students would have to commute, instead of just one teacher (*Landtag NRW*, February 12, 1963, 287f).

Shortly after this debate, the SPD proposed a motion for the introduction of central schools (*Mittelpunktschulen*) (*Landtag NRW*, April 2, 1963). These schools should comprise grades five to eight of the *Volksschule*. For this level of schooling, the motion suggested, a well-regulated school operation (*geordneter Schulbetrieb*) could only be guaranteed if all age groups or grades were taught in separate classes. The term "well-regulated school operation" referred to the Constitution, in which the CDU had made sure in 1950 that one-class schools were defined as such. All *Volksschulen* that could not comply with this should be shortened to four years so students could attend a central school from grade five. The federal state should pay for the use of school busses. The motion ended with the following remarks:

> During the implementation of the reorganization of the rural school system [...] any coercion or schematization of the school operators is to be rejected. Instead, the open-mindedness and initiative of the municipalities and other participants in school life are to be brought about through the speedy planning and realization of exemplary individual central schools. (*Landtag NRW*, April 2, 1963)

In the parliamentary debate on the motion, speakers of the CDU mentioned this paragraph several times, emphasizing that centralization could indeed not be brought about by coercion and voicing doubts about whether the SPD really understood this. The minister of education, Mikat (CDU), replied carefully. He did not want to "glorify" the rural schools, but was aware of their "great value" (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 546). He supported the merging of small schools "where it seems reasonable" (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 548). On the other hand, to him it was an "open question" whether dividing schools into classes for all age groups always meant better performance (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 547). Transporting students by bus was undesirable and "shrunk

schools" comprising only grades one to four were not sufficient to uphold the "originality of the rural schools" (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 549). He suggested that only grades eight and nine – once the ninth school year had been introduced – should be centralized. Mikat refused "any leveling, not only between city and countryside but also between differently structured rural areas," while claiming that the problem had to be solved in different ways in different places. In his view, "differentness but equal rights and equal value" characterized "the relation of city and countryside today" (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 546). The emphasis on "differentness but equal rights" sums up one of the main arguments of the CDU, not only in this but also in other education-political debates.

Two other CDU representatives, Peter Giesen and Anton Volmert, spoke more passionately about the small village schools than Mikat. Giesen warned against taking the older students from the school and thereby "executing" it and emphasized the pedagogical advantage of teachers living close to the students' parents (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 570). Volmert, who represented the rural municipality of Warburg, explained that the introduction of central schools for grades five to eight would mean an increase in one-class schools in his municipality. The reason was that a two-class school, which would lose its oldest students, would then be reduced to a one-class school for grades one to four. He was appalled by the motion:

> One thing I know – I come from a small village – if such a village loses its school, it loses a center of cultural education. The opposition of very many people out there hangs [. . .] on the following consideration: our village is no longer attractive for anything, not even as an industrial location, if we no longer even have a school. (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 574)

The SPD speakers justified the motion by pointing to the unequal educational results in cities and villages and underlined that their aim was to promote the talents of the rural population. Holthoff (SPD) pointed to the USA, Sweden, and Norway, where centralization of the school system was taking place. One-class schools were an "anachronism" in the twentieth century (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 532f). The FDP representatives Herzberg and Luchtenberg showed sympathy for the SPD motion and rejected the CDU speakers' plea for the small village schools, even though they were in a coalition with the CDU at the time.

In January 1965, the SPD once again attempted to initiate a reform of the *Volksschule*. This time, the social democrats suggested that all *Volksschulen* – not only those in the countryside – should be divided

into a four-year primary school and a five-year *Hauptschule,* which would become an independent secondary school. The primary school could in exceptional cases be undivided but the *Hauptschule* should always consist of at least five separate classes. The SPD proposed a change in the school laws and in the Constitution so that only separate classes for all age groups in the *Hauptschule* would be considered a "well-regulated school operation" (*Landtag NRW*, January 12, 1965a; *Landtag NRW*, January 12, 1965b).

Shortly afterward, Mikat proposed a new obligatory schooling law that prolonged obligatory schooling to nine years and introduced a distinction between primary school and *Hauptschule* but with no real administrative separation (*Landtag NRW*, January 28, 1965). The amendment of the law and the SPD motions were discussed in three parliamentary debates (*Landtag NRW*, February 23, 1965; *Landtag NRW*, May 10, 1966; *Landtag NRW*, May 25, 1966). Mikat now supported centralization more clearly than in 1963. He stated that the students in grades five and six could under no circumstance be taught in the same class as the students of the primary school and declared that those who did not share this view could not claim to be aiming for a higher number of *Abitur* graduates in the countryside (*Landtag NRW*, February 23, 1965, 1831). On February 23, 1966 – exactly a year after the first debate on the SPD motions – Mikat issued a decree for the introduction of central schools (*Landtag NRW,* February 23, 1966). He stipulated that grades seven to nine had to be centralized so that two classes for each grade would become the norm. In rural districts, one class for each grade would be acceptable. Grades five and six should be taught in at least one class for each grade. In exceptional cases, grades five and six could be taught in one class but under no circumstance with grade one to four. The first four grades of primary school should be taught in separate classes, but it was permissible to combine a maximum of two grades in one class. Furthermore, central schools could either comprise all nine grades, so small schools would be disbanded completely, or central schools could comprise grades seven to nine or grades five to nine. These decisions should be made case by case. Mikat's new rules were significantly stricter than previous regulations and meant that great changes had to be made in NRW's rural districts.

However, it was an open secret that Mikat stood in opposition to many of his party colleagues regarding these – and other – education-political issues. In the parliamentary debates this fact was commented

on by the SPD speakers, but Mikat dismissed such comments lightheartedly. He had not given up his personal opinions when becoming minister, he declared:

> The difficulties which I [. . .] have with my parliamentary group are not pleasant for me but they are a sign of a lively debate to me which is possible and taking place in my party; and even if Mr. Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs sometimes slams a door so that it can be heard in your parliamentary group, then you'll know "It's lively over there! They must be on the trail of a new improvement!" That's how you should look at it! (*cheerfulness and applause by the governing parties*) (*Landtag NRW*, May 10, 1966, 2770)

Presumably, Mikat's difficulties with his parliamentary group were the reason why he refused to change the Constitution and to split the *Volksschule* into a separate primary school and a *Hauptschule*. He argued that a change to the Constitution should be an "*ultima ratio*" and that the necessary centralization could be achieved without it (*Landtag NRW*, February 23, 1965, 1827). In addition, he argued that the *Hauptschule* would remain the obligatory school for any child who was not attending the *Realschule* or the *Gymnasium* and that it would not help the *Hauptschule* to be considered a new secondary school (*Landtag NRW*, May 10, 1966, 2776f). Some of his fellow party members became more emotional, stating that the SPD aimed at "breaking up" the *Volksschule* (*Landtag NRW*, February 23, 1965, 1838).

In response, the SPD speakers pointed out that, constitutionally, allowing one-class *Volksschulen* was a real obstacle. Some municipalities continued to build one- or two-class schools because the Constitution sanctioned this practice. A change in the Constitution was necessary. The separation of the *Volksschule* into a primary school and a *Hauptschule* was also more than a matter of wording for the social democrats. Turning the *Hauptschule* into a secondary school was a sign of respect and an upgrading of this school type. This time, the FDP speakers did not side as clearly with the SPD but supported Mikat's argument that a change in the Constitution was unnecessary and that the primary school and the *Hauptschule* should remain one unit (*Landtag NRW*, February 23, 1965, 1840). Presumably, both Mikat and the FDP politicians knew that a change in the Constitution's school articles would not have received a majority from the CDU parliamentary group (Düding, 2008, 494).

Mikat also supported the expansion of *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien* in rural areas. His aim was to "increase the number of higher schools and

Realschulen especially in those urban and rural districts where the relative school attendance for these school types is below the federal state's average" (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1965, 7). Social democrats and liberals, as well as the representatives of rural areas within the CDU, supported this, so the expansion of secondary schooling did not create the same amount of debate.

After the NRW elections of 1966, the SPD formed a government with the FDP. Generational changes within the CDU parliamentary group made a new attempt at a change in the Constitution more likely to succeed. The compromise of 1967–8 between the SPD, the FDP, and the CDU entailed not only that denominational schooling was given up on the *Hauptschule* level but also that the *Hauptschule* should consist of two classes for all grades and be considered an institutionally separate secondary school type. The primary school should consist of at least four classes. In exceptional cases, two-class primary schools and five-class *Hauptschulen* were permitted (*Landtag NRW*, June 20, 1967b; *Landtag NRW*, February 21, 1968b). The Constitution was changed and no longer contained the sentence that sanctioned one-class *Volksschulen* as "well-regulated school operations" (*Landtag NRW*, June 20, 1967a; *Landtag NRW*, February 21, 1968a). This change received 172 of 200 votes, implying that 28 CDU representatives voted against it or abstained (*Landtag NRW*, February 29, 1968, 1106).

Centralization of the school system was now conducted rather swiftly. In the years before the reform, the number of *Volksschulen* had decreased only slightly, from 6530 in 1964 to 6255 in 1967 (Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1968, 52). By 1969, the total number of primary schools was 3643 and the total number of *Hauptschulen* was 1463. The average primary school now had 7.1 classes and the average *Hauptschule* had 12.3. There were 341 *Volksschulen* that had not yet been divided up into primary schools and *Hauptschulen*. These had on average 5.8 classes per school (Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1970, 48, own calculations). In other words, separation into age groups had finally become the norm. This development created some unrest. The CDU was criticized by its political grass roots. It initiated a parliamentary debate about the implementation of the new school laws, during which several CDU representatives complained about the speedy centralization process (*Landtag NRW*, June 12, 1968a; *Landtag NRW*, June 12, 1968b; *Landtag NRW*, June 26, 1968). The CDU representative Peter Giesen made no secret of his dislike of excessive centralization and claimed that the government had not kept its promise to implement the laws in

a cautious way (*Landtag NRW*, June 26, 1968, 1388). The SPD speakers denied the criticism. They pointed out that the unrest created by the new laws had been foreseeable and could have been avoided if the CDU had accepted earlier reforms. These debates were, however, a rather irrelevant footnote in the wake of the decisive battles and negotiations; despite the internal unrest the CDU had to deal with, the compromise held. By 1979, only six *Volksschulen* remained that had not yet been included in the reform and all of these consisted of separate classes for all grades (Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1980, 126).

During the conflict over cooperative schools in the 1970s, centralization again became a topic. For example, the FDP's manifestos appealed to the rural population, arguing that cooperative schooling would make it easier to preserve a good supply of education in rural areas. At this point, the number of students had begun to decline, which implied that rural schools would have to be shut if no other solutions were found. The SPD also advocated cooperative schooling as a compromise designed for rural areas.

Opponents of the cooperative school did not have a united response to this. Some of them denied that the demographic development was a problem, while others argued that cooperative schools would not solve it (Rösner, 1981, 168). A few local CDU politicians in rural municipalities who were worried that their *Realschule* or *Gymnasium* would have to close because of the declining birth rates supported the cooperative school (Rösner, 1981, 139). These were a small minority whose utterances played little role. The petition against the cooperative school received most signatures in typical CDU municipalities, meaning in rural, Catholic-dominated areas (Rösner, 1981, 226). One of the most important arguments used by the cooperative school protagonists was thus mostly ineffectual.

It can be concluded that the CDU for the most part successfully managed to integrate rural interests by giving voice to demands for decentralized school provision to some extent. The FDP and the SPD did not manage to build bridges with the rural population in these debates, even though they tried. However, the centralization conflict was not as dominant as the conflicts over denominational and comprehensive schooling. Rural politicians did not manage to determine the policy of the CDU entirely. CDU minister of education Mikat eventually ushered in the centralization of primary schools. During the cooperative school debate, declining birth rates in rural areas were not considered a valid argument

by the conservative opposition. In other words, the rural-urban cleavage was not as salient as other cleavages and was overshadowed by the state-church and class cleavages to a large degree.

THE NORWEGIAN LANGUAGE STRUGGLE IN EDUCATION POLITICS

The Norwegian language struggle has its roots in the country's long domination by Denmark and later by Sweden and has no comparable equivalent in Germany. It arose in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the farmer's son and linguistic researcher Ivar Aasen and others developed the New Norwegian language standard (*nynorsk*) based on Norwegian dialects and Old Norwegian. The language struggle was, and remains, mainly a center-periphery conflict between conservative urban elites who speak the traditional language standard *bokmål* (literally "book language"), which is more like Danish, and the peripheral rural and urban population governed by these elites, speaking various dialects.

The two language standards are mutually understandable, but they differ in vocabulary and grammar. Over time, both standards have changed. In both camps of the struggle, there were internal disagreements about whether traditional, historical forms should be used or forms based on the spoken language. There was also disagreement about whether the two standards should be developed toward each other and possibly merged into a common standard (*samnorsk*), or whether their distinctiveness should be preserved. In education politics, the language struggle came to be expressed through conflicts over the choice of language standard taught at school, the language of schoolbooks, and whether students should learn both language standards. The percentage of *nynorsk* users in primary schools has been going down since 1944, when it reached its maximum of 34.1 percent (Vikør, 2002, 157).

Of the political parties, the liberals have traditionally been the most important supporters of *nynorsk*. The *nynorsk* language movement was one of several social movements that came together in the founding of the Liberal Party in 1884. The idea of a purely Norwegian language was a unifying factor for the liberal movement and related to the development of the Norwegian nation. Ever since, the party has been an advocate of *nynorsk*, though it has included currents emphasizing either the "pure" *nynorsk* of the villages or a convergence with urban spoken Norwegian (Almenningen, 2002a, 104). In its manifestos of the postwar decades, the party demanded that all schoolbooks should be published in both

language standards at the same time and for the same price. Until 1969, the Liberal Party's political manifestos included a sentence stating that the long-term aim should be a merging of the two standards into *samnorsk*. In the manifesto of 1973, this position had been relinquished.

The Center Party has also been a supporter of *nynorsk* and, until 1965, its manifestos suggested that the two standards should be merged in the long term. The Christian Democrats' manifestos did not include equally detailed demands, but the party agreed with the two other center parties that schoolbooks had to be published in both standards and that *nynorsk* had to be strengthened in the public sphere. In 1977, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party demanded in their manifestos that it should continue to be obligatory for students in youth and secondary schools to learn both standards. The Socialist People's Party and its successors the Socialist Electoral Alliance/Socialist Left Party also supported *nynorsk*. In their manifesto of 1973, the socialists insisted that the two standards needed to be put on a par in all public documents.

The Conservative Party stood on the other side of the conflict. Of all parties, it had the largest number of supporters of *bokmål*. Most of these came from the urban upper class and considered *bokmål* to be the most sophisticated, refined form of Norwegian. In its manifestos of the postwar period, the Conservative Party did not openly attack *nynorsk*; on the contrary, it was argued that both *nynorsk* and *bokmål* should be allowed to "develop freely and naturally side by side." In some of the manifestos, the importance of *nynorsk* schoolbooks and of supporting the development of *nynorsk* were also mentioned. The most important language-political goals of the conservatives were to avoid the merging of the standards into *samnorsk* and to defend the most conservative variant of *bokmål*, Traditional Standard Norwegian (*riksmål*).

The Labor Party did not have a clear stance on language politics in its early decades of existence; even in the postwar period, its manifestos did not contain much about this issue. Language was not one of the priorities of the party. The workers living in urban areas, who spoke urban dialects, were placed in between the rural population and the cities' upper classes in language politics (Almenningen, 2002a, 100). However, from the 1930s, the official line of the Labor Party changed. The Labor Party now gradually took over the Liberal Party's role as a nation-building party, though giving it a social-democratic flavor. This was also reflected in the party's language-political ideology. The new strategy of the Labor Party was to support the development of *samnorsk*, which should be based on the actual language spoken by the common people, both in the cities and in

the countryside. The Labor politician Halvdan Koht played an important role in the development of this policy. He argued that farmers and workers shared an interest in language politics and should force the upper class to respect their language. In Koht's eyes, both *nynorsk* and *bokmål* would have to be adapted (Ramsdal, 1979, 17ff). The Labor Party's manifesto of 1953 still included the development of *samnorsk* as a political aim, but in 1957 the social democrats removed this demand from its manifesto – much earlier than the Liberal Party and the Center Party.

Besides the parties, the most important collective actors in this conflict were the organizations of the language movement, such as the Norwegian Language Society (*Norges Mållag*), founded in 1906, and the Riksmaal Society (Society for the Preservation of Traditional Standard Norwegian, *Riksmålsforbundet*), founded in 1907. The Riksmaal Society had long been a small organization, but it grew, especially from the 1950s, and had about 45 000 members in 1963 (Almenningen, 2002b, 132). Even though most supporters of *riksmål/bokmål* had upper-class or middle-class urban backgrounds, not all of them were conservatives. The Norwegian Language Society was also characterized by variety in the political standpoints of its members. It was rather weak after the war, with around 10 000 members, and grew slightly to around 12 000–13 000 members in the 1980s (Almenningen, 2002b, 138; Vikør, 2002, 168). While the Riksmaal Society continuously opposed *samnorsk*, the Norwegian Language Society was characterized by internal splits regarding this issue. From 1968, the organization relinquished the idea of *samnorsk*, worrying that a merger of the standards would be based primarily on *bokmål* (Vikør, 2002, 167). The Association for Language Integration (*Landslaget for språklig samling*) was founded in 1959 and still supports a form of *samnorsk*.

The opposition to *samnorsk* increased over time. In 1951, The Riksmaal Society organized a committee called *Foreldreaksjonen mot samnorsk* (Parental Action against the Common Standard). This committee collected 400 000 signatures against *samnorsk* but for schoolbooks with "moderate" instead of "radical" forms of *bokmål*. In 1953 and 1954, the campaign asked parents to correct the language in the schoolbooks. This campaign was supported by conservatives and business leaders, who hoped to weaken the Labor Party. In 1954, the Ministry of Education allowed parallel editions of schoolbooks with radical and moderate forms. As a result, books with radical forms became less used (Almenningen, 2002b, 132ff).

In 1959, a new language standard for schoolbooks was passed in parliament against the votes of the Conservative Party and the opposition

of the Riksmaal Society. Some *nynorsk* supporters were equally unhappy because they thought that *nynorsk* had been changed too much, while *bokmål* had been changed too little. However, users of *nynorsk* accepted the standard in practice, while many users of *bokmål*, such as the conservative press, big publishing houses, or businesspeople, ignored the rules applied in the new schoolbooks and kept writing a more traditional form of *bokmål* (Almenningen, 2002b, 139ff).

The 1959 *folkeskole* law specified that the school board had the power to decide which of the language standards should be used primarily in the school. A vote had to take place if more than 25 percent of the eligible voters in the school district, or a majority of the school board, requested it. The eligible voters were all voters registered for the municipal elections and parents of children of school age. If a majority of more than 40 percent of the voters wanted a certain language standard to be used, this would be binding. In 1964, the Vogt Committee was tasked with discussing the language situation in the country. In 1966, it suggested that parents should simply let the school know which language they preferred for their children when they started school and that ballots should no longer be held. A minority of the committee suggested that there should still be votes on the question but only parents of schoolchildren under fourteen should have voting rights. This minority position was supported by all parties except for the Conservative Party and included in the 1969 *grunnskole* law. It was decided that schoolbooks had to be published in both languages for the same price and that all students should be taught both language standards during the last two years of primary school. The conflict was becalmed by new rules for parallel teaching: if the parents of more than ten students wanted their children to be taught a different language standard, teaching in parallel classes was allowed (Myhre, 1971, 141ff.).

For the purposes of this book, the most important insight is that, of the parties, the Conservative Party stood alone in the debates about language throughout the period under investigation. Both in 1959 and in 1969, when the center parties were in a coalition with the Conservative Party, the paragraphs of the school laws that regulated questions of language were passed with the support of the center parties and the Labor Party, against alternative suggestions from the conservatives (*Innst. O. II.* [1959], 17f; *Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 50ff). It is hard to grasp from the reports of the parliamentary education committee what these conflicts were about, since the disagreements do not seem very significant. In 1959, the conservatives were the only party that

suggested that only parents of under fourteen-year-olds should have voting rights in local elections about the school language. By 1969, this position had been adopted by the other parties as well, except for a minority of Labor Party and Liberal Party representatives, who still insisted that all eligible voters for municipal and national elections should be allowed to vote on school language, since this was such an "important cultural question" (*Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 38). The conservatives now wanted to make all local ballots on school language binding. The background for this was that most local elections were in favor of *bokmål* (Almenningen, 2002b, 130ff). The center parties and the Labor Party made sure that a majority of at least 40 percent of the eligible voters continued to be required to bind the school board to the voters' decision.

To understand these conflicts, one must look at them in more detail. Language was an emotional, hotly contested issue in Norway. For example, the socialist politician Torild Skard roused anger by speaking a mixture of the two standards – something she did because she had spent her early years in exile in the USA as the daughter of a couple who mixed the standards and the granddaughter of the "*samnorsk* prophet," Halvdan Koht:

> Whenever I said "*nase*" [nose] or "*gras*" [grass] or something like that, they booed at me at school. Still, I didn't want to back down because I didn't understand why "*gras*" was less acceptable than "*gress*." So I was in this war throughout my youth. And even in the student society, if I used a radical form, the right side of the audience sat there booing. And [the newspaper] *Aftenposten* corrected all radical forms in articles, for example. So this was a tough, really tough time. (expert interview)

When asked whether this issue upset people more than the question of differentiation at school, Skard replied,

> Yes, yes, yes, [. . .] The question of differentiation, of using different courses of study or different groupings to differentiate between the students, this was in a way a pedagogical-technical issue, right? [. . .] Whereas the language issue applied to everyone, everyone spoke a language after all. And language is strongly related to identity. So that was the basis for all those emotions. (expert interview)

This assessment was supported by other experts I interviewed. Many of them gave examples that illustrate how controversial the issue was. Kari Lie mentioned that the Norwegian Teachers' Association generally tried to keep a neutral stance in language politics and therefore made sure that

the editorials of its journal were written alternately in *nynorsk* and *bokmål*. She remembered one national congress of the association that started out with a protest by *nynorsk* supporters about the fact that the remittance slip for the membership fee had been sent out to members only in *bokmål*. For this reason, some members refused to pay their fee. Another example was given by the leftist Kjell Horn, who remembered a situation he had experienced when teaching in the western parts of Oslo. There, he was once confronted with complaints by one of his students' fathers, a lawyer, about his spoken language. It was said that he spoke too "radically," meaning that he was not sticking to conservative forms of *bokmål/riksmål*. He had to invite all parents to a meeting at which he made an effort to speak as conservatively as possible in order to undermine this criticism.

Two important former activists of the language movement were also interviewed. One was the conservative politician Lars Roar Langslet, who has written a history of the *riksmål* movement (Langslet, 1999). The other was the former Liberal Party and later Christian democratic politician Hans Olav Tungesvik, who has been active in the *nynorsk* movement all his life and was chair of the Norwegian Language Society from 1965 to 1970. Both opposed the idea of *samnorsk* and regarded each other as allies in this regard, though opponents in others. Two quotes from these interviews illustrate what motivated them and how they viewed their opponents. Tungesvik explained his activism for *nynorsk* as follows:

Tungesvik: [. . .] my natural dialect base is close to *nynorsk*. [. . .] The other [reason] was that my father had also been active for the language cause and encouraged me to participate in this important work.[9] And I have [. . .] always considered it a very important cultural value that as many people as possible [. . .] can use, also in writing, a language that is most natural for them orally. So consistency between written and spoken language is an important consideration. And not least the very rich cultural treasure that we have in *nynorsk* with all the *nynorsk* authors and, in general, the *nynorsk* contribution to Norwegian cultural life is very important [. . .].

Interviewer: [. . .] So what do you think motivated the people from the Riksmaal Society to struggle against this?

[9] Tungesvik's father was mayor of the small village of Skånevik for thirty years, in the county of Hordaland. In 1914, he went there as a teacher. He was a member of the Liberal Party and of the language movement, as many teachers were during this period.

Tungesvik: Well, it was in a way something similar, you might say the finer classes, as we called them … in Oslo … the Oslo area and eastern area especially and in a way also in Bergen … they wanted […] to have a written language as close as possible to their natural "*talesprog*" [spoken language], as they liked to say, with a "g" at the end instead of "*språk*." […] And then there were the most conservative *riksmål* people. There is a difference between *bokmål* and *riksmål*. *Riksmål* is ultraconservative. Almost half-Danish. So they wanted to continue the very traditional, oldest variant of *bokmål/riksmål*. And the goal of the Riksmaal Society was to prevent modernization and what they experienced as a destruction of their formerly strongly conservative form of speaking. […]

Interviewer: So it was in a way the "finer classes" as you put it who placed an emphasis on this, who considered it to be more cultivated or … ?

Tungesvik: Absolutely. That's exactly the way it was, yes. (expert interview)

Langslet, on the other hand, viewed things in this way:

Interviewer: But what motivated you to fight for riksmål?

Langslet: Yes, rather simply [the fact] that it's the main language here in the country. Around 90 percent use it in writing and large parts of our literary heritage are connected to this tradition, which is irreplaceable for me. So it's my language. But I have great regard for the part of Norwegian heritage which is connected to […] *nynorsk*. I write regularly in *nynorsk* myself in the newspaper *Dag og Tid*, so I try to use both, but I see also how difficult it is, because when I write *nynorsk* I need to sit and rack my brain for a long time over each sentence.

Interviewer: So what do you think motivates the *nynorsk* supporters of the Norwegian Language Society? Why are they so concerned about this?

Langslet: The good thing which motivates them is probably that they stand for an important tradition in Norwegian culture […]. And as long as there is a rather large group who feel that their identity is connected to *nynorsk* that should be respected. But I do think the Norwegian Language Society is a bit too sly with their tactical maneuvers which they did in the old days, when they had the Liberal Party as their ally. They use their power as far as they can. To prevent reforms. My position today is that the Language Society belongs to the most highly conservative powers in Norway. Nothing at all is supposed to be changed within the language-political regime which was introduced one hundred years ago. Ultraconservative. (expert interview)

Fascinatingly, both experts, one a Christian democrat and the other a conservative, accused the other side of the conflict of being

"ultraconservative." Clearly, the issue split the political landscape crossways and not primarily to the left and the right. Langslet explicitly stated that there had mainly been opposition between the center parties and the Conservative Party and that the Labor Party had been less consistent in its language-political stance. In his view, the activism of the Riksmaal Society of the 1950s contributed to the change of mind within the Labor Party. The fact that parents affiliated with the Labor Party also took part in the "correction" of schoolbooks according to *riksmål* standards frightened some leading social democrats, he thought. He pointed out that the Labor Party's decision to put in place the language-political Vogt Committee in 1964 had been an expression of their understanding that they needed to "slow down and reposition, for otherwise one could risk losing elections" (expert interview). The committee, it was hoped, would calm people's passions. As a parliamentary representative, Langslet later gladly contributed to the "winding-up" of the *samnorsk* policies and thought that in this process they had achieved "good cooperation with the Labor Party, who also understood that such politics now had to be turned around" (expert interview). It had become clear that the opposition to *samnorsk*, especially in the middle and upper classes of Oslo and the second largest city, Bergen, was too strong to be overcome. The Labor Party had to avoid burning any bridges with the *nynorsk* supporters and social democrats continued to support *nynorsk*-friendly policies. This was presumably not too difficult since the center parties also eventually relinquished the idea of *samnorsk*.

Somewhat in contrast to Langslet, Tungesvik thought that the Labor Party had been in a rather stable alliance with the center parties and the Socialist People's Party in language politics, while the Conservative Party and later the right-wing Progress Party stood on the other side. To understand this view, one should remember that this was partly a class issue, as indicated for example by Tungevik's characterization of his opponents as "the finer classes." The center-periphery, rural-urban, and class cleavages partly overlapped in Norway since the Norwegian power elite, consisting of the upper ranks within the state and the economy, was centered in the cities, and especially in Oslo. The rural periphery was governed by an urban elite. For this reason, the socialist Kjell Horn was of the opinion that the language struggle was primarily an expression of "the bourgeoisie defending its privileges" (expert interview). In his words,

> Fiendishly much power lies in language, right? Since the olden days, the language of the Danish civil service kept its hand over the proletariat and the farmers in a colossally strong way. The sheriff and the priest and all the bailiffs

and the entire establishment spoke Danish. And after a while they spoke *bokmål*, call it *riksmål*. And in this enormous power lies. [. . .] So I think that the language struggle, it's taking from the bourgeoisie their language, which is a means of power; you're taking a means of power from them. And that's not . . . that wasn't popular, no. (expert interview)

The coalition of the center parties and the Labor Party in language politics did not mean that the conservatives were weak on this issue. The conservative Per Lønning even claimed that his party "won the language struggle," in the sense that the idea of *samnorsk* was buried (expert interview). This was a great comfort to many conservatives, since they had perceived *samnorsk* as the greatest danger. As illustrated also by the quote from Lars Roar Langslet above, they could tolerate, and even to a certain degree value, *nynorsk* as long as it remained a minority language used mainly for literary purposes that did not threaten *riksmål*. Nonetheless, *nynorsk* supporters also enjoyed some victories. They certainly contributed to the fact that Norwegian dialects today enjoy higher social standing than German dialects. The idea that children should be allowed to speak dialect at school without having to feel inferior and that their written language should be as close as possible to their dialect is still part of Norwegian "common sense" in education politics. In Germany, this is not the case; the school system and the media, the economy, and the state are dominated by standard German.

Overall, the language struggle should be considered primarily an expression of the center-periphery cleavage that separated the Conservative Party from the center parties and thereby destabilized potential non-Labor alliances. The Labor Party's support for *samnorsk* and later *nynorsk* policies was not only tactical but based on an understanding that the rural population and the urban lower classes both belonged to the cultural periphery and had common interests in the struggle against conservative cultural hegemony.

GERMAN ANTI-COMMUNISM IN EDUCATION POLITICS

While the language struggle had no equivalent in the German case, the great significance of anti-communism in German education politics had no equivalent in Norway. German anti-communism split the labor movement and to a lesser degree the liberals, undermined school reformers' legitimacy, contributed to polarization and emotionalism in German political discourse, and thereby had a detrimental effect for potential school reform coalitions. Of course, anti-communism is not only

a German phenomenon. It has certainly also played a role in Norwegian politics, but the important difference is that it was not manifested in education politics the way it was in Germany. Anti-communist arguments against the comprehensive school and generally against the education politics of the SPD, the unions, and in part the FDP characterized German debates and must be considered an important explanatory factor for why comprehensive school reforms failed. Before this is demonstrated empirically in the following, some historical and theoretical remarks are necessary.

Anti-communism and the communist-socialist cleavage have a long history in Germany, beginning with the suppression of social democracy in the nineteenth century and continuing with the split of the German labor movement during the First World War and the Weimar Republic. After the Second World War, the conflict was intensified by the fact that Germany was divided into a communist East and a capitalist West, which turned Germany into one of the primary arenas of the Cold War. The Communist Party (KPD) was refounded after the war but forbidden in 1956. In 1950, the Adenauer CDU government had issued a resolution, according to which members of the KPD or any of its subsidiary organizations could not be employees of the state (*Beschluss der Bundesregierung vom 19. September 1950*, quoted in Koschnick, 1979, 83). As a result of the party's ban, it has been estimated that around half a million people suffered persecution – many of whom had already suffered persecution under the Nazis (Graf, 1976, 112). In 1968, a new German Communist Party, the DKP, was founded. The DKP and its subsidiary youth organizations, such as the Socialist German Workers' Youth (SDAJ) and the Marxist Student Union Spartakus (MSB), sympathized with the orthodox interpretation of communism of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and received financing from there. Various other communist groups and parties with Maoist, Leninist, or Trotskyist orientations were founded in the aftermath of 1968, known as the "K-groups." These groups were smaller and stood in opposition to the orthodox communists of the DKP. The communist groups were severely split among themselves. In elections, the DKP was unsuccessful. Communist groups achieved influence only within student politics, on a few works councils, and in local union chapters.

Even though communists in postwar West Germany had little political influence, many saw communism, and especially the Soviet Union, as "the danger of our time," as the CDU stated in its Düsseldorf Declaration of 1965. The SPD's Godesberg manifesto and the ideology of the leading

SPD personnel were also clearly anti-communist. However, it was a more divisive and complicated issue for the SPD because the CDU's anti-communism was also directed against the SPD and because there was no agreement within social democracy about how to respond to that. The SPD was split into a moderate or right-wing faction, to which many leading SPD politicians in NRW belonged, and a group of radical, left-wing, and often younger reformers. The conflict was to a high degree a generational conflict, especially after 1968. When the SPD-FDP government under Willy Brandt initiated *Ostpolitik* in 1969, a new external policy that aimed at easing the tensions with the East, the internal split became more problematic. For the leading personnel of the SPD, *Ostpolitik* entailed the problem of having to dissociate themselves (even) more clearly from communists to rebut conservative criticism that the SPD was cozying up to communists. The young reformers disliked such moves to the right. Even though they were not revolutionaries, they did indeed want to use reforms to change society. Acts of terror by groups such as the Red Army Faction, and the reports of former communists who had left the GDR and become "apostates," contributed to anti-communist hegemony. Around 2.4 million people had migrated from the GDR to the Federal Republic between 1950 and 1961 (Koch, 1986). Many West Germans had relatives in the East and were aware of the GDR's weak economic development and the repression of internal critics. People's negative experiences with the communist regime influenced the climate in West Germany decisively.

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the character and extent of anti-communism in Germany in general and about the special role it has played there (for an overview of different contributions, see Schwan, 1999, 19ff, 35ff; see also Graf, 1976; Hofmann, 1967). It should, however, be remarked that authors from different political camps have at least agreed that anti-communism has played an important role in German postwar society as an "integrative" ideology (Schwan, 1999, 17, 40f, 66f). Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich (2007 [1967]) argue that German postwar society was characterized by a denial of the defeat by the Soviet Union and by a denial of Germany's identification with the Nazi crimes against, among others, the Slavic people. As a result of this denial, parts of Nazi anti-Bolshevist ideology, according to which the Slavic people were inferior in culture and "race," prevailed without reflection and were merged with the anti-communist ideology of the capitalist West into "the official civic attitude" of "emotional anti-communism" (Mitscherlich/Mitscherlich, 2007 [1967], 42). To what extent this

diagnosis is correct cannot be discussed further here. It is certainly true that anti-communism remained an extremely emotional issue; this made rational evaluations of anything communist, which would have permitted rational criticism, difficult (Hofmann, 1967). Anti-communism often served as a tool for discrediting egalitarian policies suggested by leftist opponents as "undemocratic," or even treacherous, and for stoking fears against irrational images of the enemy (Graf, 1976; Schwan, 1999, 35ff). From the very beginning of the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, anti-communism has thus represented a challenge to the internal unity of the German left, including the SPD, and diminished the left's prospects of achieving far-reaching reforms. As Graf (1976, 104) points out,

> The – desired and intended – result of the application of such [anti-communist] methods was a great pressure toward social conformity. Accusations of anti-communism needed only to be levelled, not supported; the onus of proof then automatically went over to the accused who, even if he could prove his innocence, was "tainted" by the charge. Political proposals or policies were not judged according to their intrinsic value but by the degree to which they were associated with communist objectives or by the number of "eastern contacts" which their proposers were said to have had. Such defamation almost invariably meant the neutralization of independent-minded persons, particularly those on the Left. Professors, Nobel Prize winners, former anti-Nazis, distinguished public personalities, whole parties and organizations – all saw their influence diminished through the application of the techniques of anticommunism.

The relationship between anti-communism and education politics can be traced in the manifestos of the CDU, especially during the second half of the 1970s, when the debate about the comprehensive school was in full swing. In its manifesto for the national elections of 1976, the CDU and its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), assured voters that they would

> stand up firmly [. . .] against a socialistically shaped Germany in a Europe threatened by popular fronts; [. . .] against a society steered by functionaries and bureaucrats; against the trivialization of enemies of the Constitution, of political radicalism, terror, and violence; for school and education policies which secure future chances for the young generation; against dangerous experiments and socialist education at the expense of our children, their parents and the future of us all.

Furthermore, the manifesto stated, "The school and education policies of the SPD/FDP have failed. The coalition has misused schools and colleges

as an ideological field for experimentation." The cultural-political manifesto of the CDU from the same year concluded,

> Since 1969, the education politics of the SPD and FDP in the federal government and the federal state governments have been designed to assist in a change of society. [. . .] Contents of education [. . .] must not be instruments of social change. [. . .] The institutions of the education system must be defended against ideological misuse.

The CDU/CSU manifesto for the elections of 1980 warned that due to the *Ostpolitik* of the social-liberal government, the "menacing shadow of the Soviet Union over Europe [was] becoming longer and darker" and the "terrible alternative of capitulation or war" was becoming more and more likely. The manifesto also emphasized that "enemies of the state have no place in state service." With respect to school reforms, the CDU manifesto of 1980 stated,

> The SPD and FDP have experimented heedlessly with their school policies and have thus unreasonably burdened parents and students. Socialist system changers are attempting to practice class struggle in the classrooms. Schools should no longer be places of education and upbringing but [reformers seek] opportunities to charge students "conflict-theoretically," to alienate them from their parental home, to push on them a one-sided political worldview based on a distorted and falsified view of history.

The reference to "practicing class struggle" in the classrooms contained a grain of truth in that some of the more radical school reformers indeed wanted to enlighten students about the power structures of society and motivate them to take action. For example, Anne Ratzki, former principal of a comprehensive school, remembered that a left-wing teacher at another school had developed a lesson on the subject of work that ended with a demonstration against the local employer, organized by the students. This lesson had been forbidden by the social democratic ministry. The CDU used the fact that some of the proponents of comprehensive schooling were positioned quite far to the left to present even the most modest educational reforms of the social-liberal coalition as dangerous, anticapitalistic politics.

In the expert interviews, the importance of anti-communist arguments became clear. All the German experts interviewed who supported comprehensive schooling agreed that they could under no circumstances use the term *Einheitsschule* – similar to the Norwegian term *enhetsskole* – as a description of the comprehensive school, even though it was the usual term in the 1920s. The reason was that *Einheitsschule* was now associated with the GDR and the term "socialist *Einheitsschule*" was employed exclusively as an "agent of warfare," as the former CDU politician

Wilhelm Lenz explained in our interview. For example, the leader of the CDU opposition in the NRW parliament, Heinrich Köppler, argued against the cooperative school reform in a parliamentary debate with the following words:

> I know that you don't like hearing about the socialist *Einheitsschule*. But [. . .] the aim of introducing integrated comprehensive schools as regular schools for everyone is a socialist aim after all (*shouts from the SPD*). You decided it at your party convention. (*Schlottmann [CDU]: "Also the minister of education in this house!"*) And a school that wants to take away from other school types their right to exist is an *Einheitsschule*. (*"Very true!" Applause from the CDU*) And both taken together, my ladies and gentlemen, is this socialist *Einheitsschule*, toward which you want to make a decisive step with this cooperative school. (*Landtag NRW*, June 29, 1977, 2893)

Uwe Franke, representative of the Association of Education and Upbringing and left-wing CDU member, thought that this "threat of the socialist *Einheitsschule*" and of "an alternative concept of society" had been the most influential argument against the integrated comprehensive school. It scared people and stood in the way of cooperation between moderate and radical school reformers. Ratzki, who was a member of the SPD and of the Education and Science Workers' Union, agreed that this was one of the most influential arguments:

> Ratzki: One side was the debate about achievement; the second side was the socialist *Einheitsschule*. Your children are brought up to be class warriors. Right and left extremists teach your children, do you want that? They're the kinds of tones we were elated with in 1975. [. . .]
>
> Interviewer: Since you referred to the GDR and the socialist *Einheitsschule*, [. . .] would you say that the comparison with the GDR played an important role in this discussion?
>
> Ratzki: Yes, yes, yes. In the beginning. How did they put it? In the pamphlets [. . .] it was said again and again that one wanted to introduce the socialist *Einheitsschule*. The teachers were communists. It played a great role; this fearmongering against the GDR was transferred to the comprehensive school. Most people actually had no idea about what was going on in the GDR and they only noticed what was said in the papers or by politicians. Where they knew comprehensive schools locally, it didn't work, but in places where comprehensive schools were introduced for the first time, without the possibility of getting an idea of them, it did some damage, of course. (expert interview)

Figure 5.1 is a copy of a CDU pamphlet from 1974 against social-liberal school reforms that Ratzki had among her personal papers and kindly supplied to the author. It is possible that the pamphlet originates from the



FIGURE 5.1 Christian Democratic Union pamphlet against social-liberal education politics from 1974
Source: Anne Ratzki, personal archive. The handwritten notes are by Anne Ratzki.

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federal state of Hessen, not NRW, but in any case, it illustrates the anti-communist character of antagonists' arguments. The pamphlet reads as follows:

> The wrong school policies of the SPD-FDP federal government have led to considerable organizational chaos at our schools and to extreme groups increasing their influence on our children. Parents, defend yourselves against the misuse of our school! Don't let our children be turned into the guinea pigs of reform-obsessed educational fantasists! Don't let our children be brought up to be antidemocratic class warriors! Don't let right and left extremists be teachers for our children!

The tone of the pamphlet is characteristic of the emotionalism and polarization of education-political debates in Germany. As the former FDP politician Jürgen Hinrichs stated in our interview, there were "too many emotions involved, less reasoning." Hinrichs described several situations where he was confronted with audiences who were comprised of up to about 90 percent reform opponents and where he felt that he was being "mopped up": "It was really . . . you have no chance, you cannot gain any ground, if you are being booed at after every sentence. So it was terrible. Yes. But that is how it is, when masses are mobilized" (expert interview).

Ilse Brusis, former chair of the Education and Science Workers' Union in NRW from 1975 to 1981, also gave accounts of anti-communist attacks:

> Interviewer: The socialist *Einheitsschule* was something of an agent of warfare of the opponents as well? [. . .] [W]as the argument about the GDR used much?
>
> Brusis: Yes. Very much. No matter where I appeared in public and argued for a longer common length of schooling, or for the introduction of pre-school education, or for more democracy in schools [. . .], the conservatives always countered: "Go to the GDR, there you have it all!" [What one was saying] was always demonized with GDR conditions, it was terrible. One couldn't argue without inhibition. And they were not willing to let something like this get through to them at all. That's GDR, we don't want that. (expert interview)

That Brusis of all people had to face this charge illustrates that conservative opponents drew no significant distinction between whom they attacked with anti-communist arguments. Brusis fought her own battles with the DKP members in the Education and Science Workers' Union, who "were such a pain in the neck with their dogmatism," as she put it. But the fact that she was involved in conflicts with communists to the extent that people thought "at times that I ate a DKP man for breakfast

each morning" did not make her immune to anti-communist attacks (expert interview). Because she led one of the most left-wing unions in NRW, she was perceived as "Red Ilse" by her CDU opponents, which delegitimized any political suggestions she made.

Wilhelm Lenz pointed out in our interview that none of the parties wanted a communist *Einheitsschule*, including the SPD. CDU politicians were aware that the SPD was not promoting communist school policies. Nevertheless, CDU politicians were swift to warn against communist "infiltration" within social democracy, as the CDU politician Heinrich Köppler put it in a parliamentary debate on the employment of "radicals" in the public services (*Landtag NRW*, August 22, 1973, 2930).

To all these charges, the SPD, the Education and Science Workers' Union, and the FDP had no forceful or united response. For the SPD, it was especially difficult to handle the charge that they were conducting "socialist" education politics. The SPD had socialist roots, but it had abandoned a clearly socialist, anticapitalistic program with its Godesberg manifesto of 1959 and had moved considerably to the right (Graf, 1976). In 1960, the SPD had cut its ties to its student organization, the Socialist Democratic Student Union (SDS), but this had not brought an end to internal opposition to the party's adaptation to CDU hegemony (Graf, 1976, 225ff). The successor to the SDS, the Socialist College Union (SHB), and later large parts of the Young Socialists, continued to play the role of a left-wing internal opposition. Left-wing opposition outside of the SPD was also growing in the groups of the New Left after 1968. Among the radical school reformers and teachers, many saw school reform as a step toward a socialist society. Many of the leading SPD politicians, including *Ministerpräsident* Kühn and minister of education Holthoff, had little sympathy for this New Left and its ideas about the purpose of education. In this situation, it was difficult for SPD politicians to agree that their education politics were socialist, but nor could they entirely refute it. For example, in the second parliamentary debate about the cooperative school, the SPD politician Heinz Schwier argued,

> If more cooperation between schools and an improvement in educational opportunities is socialism (*Köppler, CDU: "As if this is an improvement!"*) and if the forced selection of young children to separate schools is freedom, then I am in support of socialism (*applause from the SPD*). (*Landtag NRW*, June 29, 1977, 2885)

Instead of taking ownership of the term "socialism," Schwier only referred to the opposition between socialism and freedom drawn up by the CDU. This was a weak line of defense.

The split in the labor movement and partly in the Liberal Party became even more apparent in the debate about occupational bans. These bans stemmed from a decision by the *Ministerpräsidenten* of the federal states and Chancellor Willy Brandt on February 28, 1972, according to which members of "anti-constitutional organizations" (mainly DKP communists but, in a few cases, also members of the K-groups, social democrats, or Nazis) could not be public employees (see the decision quoted in Koschnick, 1979, 84). This affected around 11 000 activists, among them many teachers, and led to massive public debate (de Lorent, 1977; Düding, 2008, 693; Koschnick, 1979). Within the SPD, and also in NRW, opposition to the bans was significant from the start. Most of the Young Socialists and the Young Democrats, the youth organization of the FDP, opposed them. Large sections of the SPD grassroots in NRW considered the occupational bans illegal (Düding, 2008, 678). In 1973, one of the first occupational bans in NRW, against a young lawyer and DKP member, Volker Götz, led to a parliamentary debate (*Landtag NRW*, August 22, 1973). This gave the CDU a welcome opportunity to criticize the social-liberal government and split the coalition of the FDP and the SPD. Whereas the SPD minister of justice at first insisted that Götz was well-qualified for the job and not dangerous, several FDP ministers disagreed, insisting that Götz could not be hired. *Ministerpräsident* Kühn, with the support of Chancellor Brandt, decided that Götz was not worth risking the coalition with the FDP for, both in NRW and nationally, and Götz was rejected and never became a judge. This decision by Kühn led to indignant reactions from the SPD's left wing (see Düding, 2008, 676ff, for a detailed discussion of this case).

In the following years it became apparent, also to the initial supporters of the bans within the SPD and the FDP, that they had made a mistake, as Chancellor Brandt later admitted (Koschnick, 1979). In CDU-governed federal states but also in NRW – as the case of Götz illustrates – membership of the DKP was often enough for a person to be banned from public employment. Sometimes the bans were repealed later but, in any case, they led to a general feeling of insecurity for young, left-wing activists. Applicants' records with the secret service were checked as a matter of principle and the regulation virtually invited the federal states' administrations to snoop and make denunciations. Both the SPD and the FDP underlined in their manifestos of 1976 and 1980 that they still opposed the employment of "enemies of the Constitution" by the state but that administrative practices were out of proportion. They insisted that the involvement of the secret service in each appointment was unnecessary.

The SPD underlined that mere membership of the DKP should not be a sufficient criterion but that applicants would have to be involved in actual "anti-constitutional activities" to be rejected. This was also a reaction to criticism from abroad.[10] The new – still rather unclear – policy regarding the occupational bans did not overcome the internal split. The anti-communist line of the leadership was still in opposition to a sizable minority of the SPD's and a smaller minority of the FDP's grassroots supporters.

This also became apparent in the SPD's internal conflicts over cooperation with communists. On November 14, 1970, the SPD party executive decided that any type of "popular front" with communists was unacceptable and that any social democrat who issued publications, organized meetings, signed appeals, or in any other way cooperated with communists would have to be "informed about the damaging character of his behavior for the party" (quoted in Hasenritter, 1981, 156f). If necessary, internal disciplinary proceedings were to be initiated. Hasenritter (1981) has studied the frequency of party disciplinary proceedings within the SPD, the CDU, and the FDP and has shown that the SPD had by far the highest number of such proceedings. Most of the proceedings carried out by the Federal Arbitration Commission of the SPD were related to cooperation with communists (Hasenritter, 1981, 157). Members who cooperated with communists in the struggle against the occupational bans or in the peace movement risked exclusion. Many of such members were not excluded but, instead, particularly prominent internal critics were made an example of. On the local or federal state level, such conflicts were sometimes resolved with the imposition of sanctions – for example, loss of voting rights for a few years. Whenever such disciplinary proceedings reached the Federal Arbitration Commission, members who had cooperated with communists were always excluded (Hasenritter, 1981, 162). Party disciplinary proceedings in the FDP and the CDU were rare. The FDP tolerated the Young Democrats' partial cooperation with communists to some extent. No similar problems existed within the CDU (Hasenritter, 1981, 192ff).

[10] The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 1995 that the German practice of occupational bans was a violation of Article 10 (freedom of opinion) and Article 11 (freedom of association) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950. Only then was the practice given up (Düding, 2008, 693).

The unions, especially the Education and Science Workers' Union, were also beset with internal power struggles and splits. There was fierce infighting between K-group and DKP members and between moderate and left-wing social democrats. On October 1, 1973, the Federal Executive Committee of the German trade union federation, DGB, passed a resolution according to which membership of one of the K-groups, such as the KPD, the KPD/ML, or any of their subsidiary groups, was irreconcilable with membership of the DGB. DKP members were not mentioned (Sachse, 1985, 67). The reason was that DKP members did not attempt to organize communist factions but aimed at a broad "popular front" and were thus considered loyal union members. Members of the K-groups were often involved in the organization of internal opposition, for example through the founding of "revolutionary" or "red union" opposition groups. The Education and Science Workers' Union adopted what was dubbed the *Unvereinbarkeitsbeschluss*, a resolution on irreconcilability, on March 8, 1975, but not all federal state chapters accepted this immediately. The Berlin chapter did not manage to produce the necessary majority for a change to its statutes and was therefore excluded in January 1977 (Sachse, 1985, 69). As a result of this resolution, 854 individuals were excluded from DGB unions until 1982, of whom a total of 272 were excluded from the Education and Science Workers' Union (Sachse, 1985, 84, 86). The Education and Science Workers' Union was in other words the DGB union with the highest number of exclusions. Because the Education and Science Workers' Union also organized students and university professors, it became one of the most left-wing unions and thus had to deal with much internal opposition.

Overall, in the Cold War atmosphere of the postwar decades, it was a challenging, if not unsolvable, task to remain ideologically independent of either bloc. This was a problem for the internal unity of the social democrats and the unions. The CDU had chosen to place itself clearly on the side of the capitalist west and employed anti-communist arguments whenever it seemed useful, including in education politics. Within the labor movement, a sizable minority refused to take such a clear stand. People were drawn in both directions and the labor movement was split. Instead of positively and confidently defining the contents of "socialist" education politics, the leading personnel of the SPD continued their strategy of moderating the SPD's goals, seconding anti-communist fears, and stifling internal criticism. This strategy consolidated anti-communist hegemony instead of weakening it. From a Rokkanian point of view, postwar anti-communism thus deepened the internal split of the labor

movement in Germany. This affected the capacity for cooperation between moderate or right-wing social democrats, who were anti-communist, and left-wing social democrats, who considered anti-communism to be a tool against their egalitarian political goals, including the comprehensive school. For potential cooperation partners, such as the Association of Education and Upbringing, anti-communist arguments, the internal conflicts of the reformers' camp, and the leftist orientation of the Education and Science Workers' Union had a deterrent effect. The relationship between the FDP and the SPD suffered as well. Even though the FDP was comparatively tolerant of its left-wing Young Democrats, its leading personnel remained strictly anti-communist and rejected the idea that education politics should be a means to change the social system. For the opponents of reform, this situation opened up various possibilities for ideological attack.

STRUGGLES OVER GENDER

Finally, education for girls and women was also a controversial issue. Women's organizations and organizations of female teachers strove for equal treatment, better education, and better working conditions. In Norway, girls' access to schooling on a par with boys was introduced significantly earlier, in the 1880s. Of all the German states, Prussia was among the last to open the education system to girls. Secondary girls' schools were first put on a par with boys' schools in 1923 (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 100). In the initial decades after the Second World War, girls' educational achievement was still much lower. Both in Germany and in Norway, girls caught up with boys during the 1970s (Danielsen et al., 2013, 281ff; Herrlitz et al., 2009, 191). Coeducation was introduced step-by-step but earlier and more consistently in Norway.

Norwegian Debates on Gender Roles, Girls' Education, and Homemaking Education

The most important actors in the debates on gender and education in Norway were the women's organizations and not least the female teachers. Norwegian male and female primary schoolteachers were organized separately between 1912 and 1966. The story of the Female Teachers' Association is a fascinating piece of organizational history, which cannot be explored in detail here (but see Hagemann, 1992, 135ff). Female teachers were a central element in Norway's first women's movement,

even before they had their own organization. For the female teachers, one of the most important political aims was to achieve recognition for women's work – both their own work but also the work of the many Norwegian women who were housewives. They struggled for an ideological recognition of the contribution women were making in society but also for material recognition, in the sense of equal wages for female teachers, equal representation in the teachers' organizations, and rights to holidays for housewives. To increase the social status and competencies of housewives, Norwegian women founded "housewife schools" (*husmorskoler*) from the 1860s, where girls were trained to become housewives and teachers of homemaking (Fuglerud, 1980). In the first half of the twentieth century, these schools were greatly expanded. Female teachers cared about the living conditions of the population, which they thought needed to be improved with the help of health education, mothering education, sex education, and lessons in cooking and homemaking (*husstellundervisning*) in primary and secondary schools. Many female teachers saw great value in the comparatively new school type the *framhaldsskole* (continuation school), which they considered to be suitable as further education for girls. Many of these schools were for girls only or included homemaking tracks and were important workplaces for female teachers.

The Norwegian women's movement was politically independent, but well connected to political parties. During the first wave, many women activists belonged to the liberal movement. For example, the pioneer in homemaking education Helga Helgesen was a member of the Liberal Party and its only representative on the city council of Kristiania (Oslo) from 1923 to 1925. Another example is the first leader of the Female Teachers' Association, Anna Rogstad, who was also the first woman in the Norwegian parliament. She represented a small liberal party (*Frisinnede Venstre*), which cooperated with the Conservative Party. In 1917, she joined the Labor Party. Most female teachers did not stand this far to the left, presumably due to their higher-class backgrounds.

The class cleavage also resulted in an early split in the Norwegian women's movement. In 1904, the Norwegian Women's National Council (*Norske Kvinners Nasjonalråd*) was founded by various women's organizations. In 1914–15 the newly founded associations of Norwegian housewives and Norwegian homemaking teachers joined. But the Women's Union of the Labor Party (*Arbeiderpartiets Kvindeforbund*), which had been founded in 1901, preferred to remain independent. The conflict behind this was that the labor movement's women supported the struggle of housemaids for better working conditions, while the

Association of Norwegian Housewives opposed it. Nonetheless, from 1914, the Labor Party's women's organization supported the idea of education in homemaking (Fuglerud, 1980, 84f). Until the 1950s, "housewife ideology" remained strong, also within the labor movement (Danielsen et al., 2013, 270; Pedersen, 2001, 22).

The Female Teachers' Association was not as enthusiastic as the male primary schoolteachers about the comprehensive school reforms begun in 1959, even though they supported the idea of extended obligatory schooling. They were worried that the advantages of the *framhaldsskole* would disappear and that education in homemaking would lose ground. Many of them did not have the necessary qualifications to teach in academic secondary schools, so the reforms potentially threatened their jobs (Hagemann, 1992, 270ff). The development of the youth school from 1959 did weaken the Female Teachers' Association because they lost the influence they had had through the *framhaldsskole* (Hagemann, 1992, 274ff). As the expert Kari Lie remarked in our interview, from the 1960s it became less understandable to young female teachers why they should have a separate organization. The reunification of the primary schoolteachers' organizations in 1966 was a logical consequence.

At the same time, a new women's movement was taking shape during the second wave of women's political mobilization, culminating during the 1960s and 1970s. "Housewife ideology" lost ground and the early movement's acceptance of separate gender roles was questioned. New women's organizations were founded that were more radical and leftist. Even though the Association of Norwegian Housewives still had 50 000 members in 1974, with only 5000 members organized in the new women's organizations, they were more active politically and had many sympathizers (Danielsen et al., 2013, 293). Some of the new organizations, such as the Women's Front, had ties to the small Workers' Communist Party. The older women's organizations of the political parties also still played a role. Not least, the labor movement's women gained influence though the Labor Party's rise to power. However, the women's movement continued to exhibit a spirit of independence. For example, in the municipal elections of 1971, women of all parties came together in several Norwegian cities in a "women's coup" with the aim of increasing the number of female politicians on the municipal councils. Female voters were taught how to strike out male candidates on the ballot papers and replace them with female ones. The campaign, which was prepared in secret, succeeded to such a degree that women became a majority on the

municipal councils of Oslo, Trondheim, and Asker. Male politicians were not pleased, but the action contributed to an increase in women on the parties' lists (Danielsen et al., 2013, 313f).

In the party manifestos published between 1957 and 1977, immense ideological changes can be traced. The Labor Party's manifestos went from a long paragraph on the rights and living conditions of housewives in 1958 to suggesting that "married women must receive realistic possibilities to take work outside of the home" in 1969 and asking for "actual equality" and the overcoming of "traditional differences between men's and women's jobs" in 1974. In 1969, the Labor Party suggested that school curricula should be revised so that men and women were no longer represented as assigned with specific roles in society. From the 1970s, the party's manifestos stated that measures had to be taken to induce both genders to choose nontypical types of education.

The manifestos of the Conservative Party also changed markedly. In 1958, the manifesto stated that it was worrying that economic and demographic development would presumably lead to an increase in married women in the labor market since "the housewife is the midpoint of the home and her wholehearted dedication there is of the very greatest importance both for every single family and for society as a whole." It was also suggested that schools should include "elementary consumer economics in homemaking lessons so young girls can learn how to handle money and examine quality and prices." In the 1960s, the manifestos continued to demand that education in homemaking had to be prioritized but, from 1961, the Conservative Party also demanded "full equality with equal wages for equal work and equal advancement conditions for women and men." In the 1970s, the term "housewife" (*husmor*) vanished entirely from the manifesto, which now only spoke of homemakers (*hjemmeværende*). It was stated that the Conservative Party wanted to "work for a change of mentalities and for practical reforms that make it possible to divide responsibilities and rights in society equally between women and men." From 1973, the manifesto demanded that curricula should not include "antiquated gender role thinking" and that the schools should take into account "that girls and boys shall share equal rights to vocational and other further education."

Among the smaller parties, both the Socialist People's Party and the Liberal Party included radical demands for gender equality in their manifestos. In its first manifesto, from 1961, the Socialist People's Party demanded that equal wages for women had to be introduced immediately, "not in the course of the next seven years as intended by the agreement

between *Landsorganisasjonen* and NAF," meaning the unions and the employers' organization. But even here it was stated that "the question of better access to holidays and free time for housewives must be broached," though "access to part-time work for housewives" was also demanded. From 1965, the Socialist People's Party demanded that curricula should become "equal for girls and boys," and from 1969 that teaching material should be "considered carefully so that differential treatment and gender role thinking are changed in accordance with the principles of equality and equal rights."

The Liberal Party was the first party to include the following demand in its manifesto in 1957: "Boys and girls must have the same amount of teaching both in practical and theoretical subjects." This referred especially to lessons in homemaking, which at this point were still mostly reserved for girls. In 1977, the party made the radical demand that gender quotas should be applied in all educational institutions after primary school "in order to create a better balance in the distribution of women and men in our educational institutions." From 1973, it suggested that all discriminatory representations should be removed from schoolbooks and that a change in attitudes was required to overcome "traditional gender role thinking."

A change of rhetoric can also be discerned in the manifestos of the Christian Democrats and the Center Party, even though they more clearly emphasized the housewife ideal and stuck to it longer. The Center Party's manifestos demanded from 1957 to 1965 that "all girls should receive good and adequate housewife education." Otherwise, the manifestos did not include any demands regarding the situation of women. Only in 1977 did the Center Party include a paragraph about gender equality in its manifesto, suggesting that the school system should contribute to a change of attitudes so "both genders shall have the same possibilities and responsibilities with respect to the home, work, public life, and so forth." The manifestos of the Christian Democrats advocated separate gender roles until 1973, when they made an effort for the first time to formulate their demands in a more gender-neutral way. They now demanded that "housewife schools [. . .] must receive increased capacity and necessary equipment in order to provide a modern education, also for male students." They also stated that economic reasons should not force both parents – mentioning no longer only mothers – of small children to work outside of the home and that part-time jobs should be made available for men and women alike. They did, however, continue to emphasize the value of marriage and homemaking, and their support for housewife

schools at a time when the other parties had abandoned the term "housewife."

The development of the school subject of homemaking is a good indicator of how gender issues affected education politics in this period. From 1936, homemaking had been an obligatory subject for girls in the cities' primary schools. From 1946, it had been obligatory for girls in continuation schools (*framhaldsskoler*), if at least four girls attended such a school. In 1949, the commission that had been tasked with evaluating the school system (*Samordningsnemda for skoleverket*) published a report about homemaking. Here, it was stated that homemaking should become obligatory as soon as possible for girls all over the country. This demand had a financial dimension, since cooking classes required school kitchens, which were expensive. Arguments were made as to why strict gender separation might not be the best solution:

> In the continuation school, boys should receive sufficient teaching in homemaking in the school kitchen so that they can be self-dependent and help others with the most usual activities in the house. The girls [...] could perhaps receive some teaching in manual training so that women will no longer be so clumsy when banging a nail into the wall, using a knife, axe, saw, or other usual tools. (*Samordningsnemda for skoleverket* [1949], 4)

This was supported by the Norwegian Teachers' Association, which had commented in a letter to the commission that while girls often received some instruction in cooking at home, boys most often did not. They pointed to studies about the diets of lumberjacks and fishermen that showed that these men ate poorly. They suggested that the municipal school boards should have the possibility of offering homemaking lessons to boys, even if it would be impossible to make the subject obligatory for all boys (*Samordningsnemda for skoleverket* [1949], 9).

In 1952, a commission was put in place to discuss homemaking. In its report of 1954, it suggested that the subject should become obligatory for all girls (*Innstilling fra Utvalget til å utrede skolekjøkken- og husstellopplæringa*, 1955). When the youth school reform was prepared in the late 1950s, the Labor Party ministry issued a document that built on the commission's conclusions but suggested that homemaking should become obligatory for both girls and boys in primary schools and in the youth school (*St. meld. nr. 61* [1957] *Om heimkunnskap og husstell*). This was justified by the fact that the content of the subject needed to be expanded

to include not only cooking, handling clothes, and other domestic chores but also knowledge about bookkeeping, housing, furniture, nutrition, and health:

> The ministry cannot agree with the commission [of 1952] that these points of view shall apply only to girls. It might be correct that the woman more than the man has to take responsibility for everything to do with the home and family life. But when the subject is supposed to include so much more than just practical cooking, it is difficult to understand why the boys should not take part in the teaching. Neither does it seem appropriate in today's times that boys shall receive no knowledge about practical cooking. In schools where cooking classes for boys have been tried, the experiences are good. The boys like the subject, the results are equally good as in girls' classes, and the parents appreciate boys receiving such an education. If the majority of boys do not use what they learn in the subject, it is still of great educational value that all children should take such a course in the same way as all children are included in the other practical subjects in school. The housewife must probably take the biggest responsibility when it comes to the home but both the housewife and the housefather [*husfar*] are together in their decisions about and responsibility for the order of and tasks in the house. If the housefather is to [. . .] develop the right respect for the housewife's occupation, it is desirable for him to have the same education and insight into the problems as the housewife (*St. meld. nr. 61* [1957] *Om heimkunnskap og husstell*, 9)

The opposition in the parliamentary committee responsible, meaning the representatives of the center parties and the Conservative Party, thought that it would be too costly for the time being to make homemaking obligatory for boys, even if it would be desirable. As long as homemaking could not be offered to all students for financial reasons, they thought that girls should be prioritized (*Innst. S. nr. 294* [1958], *Tilråding frå den forsterkede landbrukskomité om heimkunnskap og husstell*, 472).

This was debated in parliament in January 1959. It became clear that not all representatives really did consider it desirable that boys should receive homemaking lessons. The Center Party representative Hans Borgen stated that he personally thought that "there is reason to consider in more detail whether it is a reasonable usage of our educational possibilities and of students' school time to press boys through the exact same educational program in homemaking as girls should have and hopefully also will have gradually in the general schools" (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 61). The Labor Party representative Olav Meisdalshagen, who had been the leader of the committee of 1952, expressed doubts about the feasibility of introducing homemaking for all boys and all girls, for whom it was "despite of everything so much more important

that they [girls] receive this education" (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 75). This was not in line with the view of the female Labor Party representative Guri Johannessen, who considered the decision to include boys in homemaking lessons to be extremely important and who praised the ministry under Birger Bergersen for having underlined this. Her main argument was that increased respect for the housewife's occupation required boys to have more knowledge about it (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 79). She was supported by her party colleagues Peter Kjeldseth Moe and Rakel Seweriin. Kjeldseth Moe pointed out that if resources were insufficient to introduce homemaking for all students, it should be introduced for one age group at a time, instead of one gender. In his view, it was about time to "break down barriers built on prejudices that do not belong in our time" (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 91). Rakel Seweriin, leader of the Women's Union of the Labor Party from 1953 to 1963, and one of the few influential female politicians at the time, chose the following words:

> It is a new thought that never before has been presented to parliament that both sexes are to learn to work together and have responsibility together for the home and one should expect this to be greeted with happiness and satisfaction, at least by the majority of women in this country. But the bourgeois [*borgerlige*] parties emphasize in their remarks the old difference. They say that when it comes to practical education, meaning cooking lessons, the boys must be held back, even if experiences show that the boys have at least as much interest in and benefit from this education. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 95)

The conservative Mons Arntsen Løvset and the liberal Olav Hordvik both felt prompted to reply. They rejected the charge that they were in principle against including boys in homemaking and repeated that they merely thought that girls should be prioritized due to a lack of resources (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 98ff).

Since the Labor Party had the absolute majority and the majority of the Labor Party supported the ministry, the caveat was ignored. The *folkeskole* law of 1959 included homemaking (now called *heimkunnskap*) as an obligatory subject for students of both sexes. In the experimental curricula of 1960 and 1964, homemaking was included as an obligatory subject from the fourth until the eighth grade and then became a separate track in the third youth school year (Forsøksrådet for skoleverket, 1960,

369ff; Forsøksrådet for skoleverket, 1964, 288ff). In the upper grades, the curricula included topics such as "a democratic family life," family finances, housing and furniture, nutritional knowledge, and childcare and care for the elderly. The subject of homemaking had to be organized in cooperation with the subjects of manual training (*forming*) and civics (*samfunnskunnskap*), which were supposed to cover additional topics such as handicrafts, family law, and housing politics (Forsøksrådet for skoleverket, 1964, 309).

A related debate in the 1960s was the question of how the upper-secondary housewife schools should be regulated, what they should teach, and to whom. In 1961, the Ministry of Education set up a working group that was to discuss which place these schools should have in the future school system. Based on this group's report of December 1962 and a report by the Council for Homemaking (*Rådet for heimkunnskap og husstell*) of 1964, the Labor Party minister of education, Helge Sivertsen, presented a white paper in May 1965 (*St. meld. nr. 101* [1964–5] *Om yrkesskoler i husstell*). The parliamentary education committee commented on this paper in February 1966, and it was debated in parliament in March 1966 (*Innst. S. nr. 94* [1965–6] *Innstilling frå kirke- og undervisningskomitéen om yrkesskoler i husstell [St. meld. nr. 101]*; *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966). There was now agreement that housewife schools served several aims. They no longer exclusively prepared women to be housewives but also for several occupations on the labor market. The name of the schools was therefore changed to "occupational schools for homemaking" (*fagskolene i husstell*).

The development of the housewife schools, which mostly ended up as one of many tracks in the reformed upper-secondary school in the 1970s, cannot be analyzed in detail here (but see Fuglerud, 1980). But it is interesting to note that the parliamentary debate of 1966 again revealed that the Labor Party representatives, especially the female ones, expressed most clearly their belief that homemaking was no longer only for girls and that these schools should therefore be open to boys as well. They also emphasized that homemaking schools served as a form of vocational education. The Labor Party representative Gunvor Eker remarked,

> The homemaking schools should be a part of an ensemble, in a way that they are attended by both boys and girls. [. . .] It is talked here of the housewife and the girls all the time. I think we should get away from that. Everywhere, we have shared classes. Boys and girls go to school together from primary school on. We can see how young husbands to an ever-higher degree take their share of the housework

and they probably have as great a need to acquire a good base. The married couple together build up a home and raise their children. I cannot see that this is something which lies only on the mother or the housewife. Something has happened also on this front recently and I hope that it can be continued so that there will be equality in this area too. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966, 2314)

The speakers of the Conservative Party did not make such far-reaching remarks, but they were clear in their support for homemaking as a vocational form of education. For example, the conservative Jo Benkow pointed out,

The term "occupational schools in homemaking" is used with an all too narrow meaning. I think what we need is an education which in competition with other occupational schools and also in competition with the academic upper secondary school [*gymnas*] can stand independently and [...] lead to actual vocational competencies both in and outside of the home in the entire large sector connected to the home and the family, to services, consumption, and social work. Education in this sector must never be given the character of being a subsidiary solution because one has no access to other, more attractive choices in the general school supply. Today it is obvious that a great number of young women – and also men for that matter – choose for example the upper-secondary school [*gymnas*] because there are no equal or better suited possibilities in the general school supply. (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, March 10, 1966, 2305)

For this conservative representative, the important matter was to regulate the educational expansion that was also taking place among women in a way that would not threaten academic education in the upper-secondary school. The Center Party politician Karstein Seland insisted that the most important role of the homemaking schools should still be to educate housewives – "the most important of all occupations," as he put it (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966, 2303). He thought that it was strange that the Labor Party ministry had argued in its white paper in 1965 that it was hard to estimate the exact need for spaces in these schools, since one did not know exactly the number of "employees" in the occupation of housewife. In his view, the fact that around 24 000 marriages were registered in Norway each year was a sufficient estimate. Each one of these 24 000 newly wed housewives should have access to a housewife's education, not only a meager 15 percent, as was the case at present (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966, 2303). The reference to the number of marriages was repeated by various nonsocialist representatives, such as the Christian Democrat Jakob Aano. The Liberal Party representative Borghild Bondevik Haga also agreed that it was a shame that so many young housewives could not be offered a housewife's

education. At the same time, she seemed unsure whether only women needed this:

> The goal for the expansion of our housewife schools will not be reached until one can give every single girl – and why not just as well say every single boy – education as to how to take care of and make a home, education which gives knowledge about cooking, about managing the family economy, knowledge about the psychological element in a family's life and in our society in general, some knowledge in sociology. All this is required to be able to build a home and take care of the values which one would like a home to have. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966, 2311)

The additions made by both Bondevik Haga and Benkow with respect to men and boys show that mindsets were changing fast and that politicians felt compelled to adapt their wording. There was a trend in the 1960s toward equal curricula and coeducation on all levels. The *folkeskole* committee of 1963 expressed in its report in 1965 that since the division of labor in the home was now "less marked" than it had been, it was right that curricula should no longer distinguish between boys and girls. All differentiation should be based on interests, not gender (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 116).

In the expert interviews, this trend was confirmed. The introduction of coeducation that took place in many urban municipalities during the 1950s and 1960s had not been heavily debated but had simply been an expression of the spirit of the times. In rural areas, the coeducation of boys and girls had been the norm anyway, since there were not enough children to divide them by sex. Of all the experts interviewed, only Torild Skard could remember that the introduction of coeducation had been opposed by anyone, namely by the school reformer Anna Sethne, who had been the chair of the Female Teachers' Association from 1919 to 1938 and who continued to take part in reform debates until her death in 1961. According to Skard, Sethne argued that girls could easily be dominated by boys in mixed classes and that separate teaching for girls and boys was therefore required in some cases. In the early female teachers' movement, there was no agreement about this question (Hagemann, 1992, 178f). During the 1960s, separation by sex within the school system became a thing of the past. With the curriculum of 1974, it was made officially binding that girls and boys should always attend mixed classes and should not be separated in any subject (Kirke- og undervisningsdepartementet, 1974, 23f). As the expert Theo Koritzinsky pointed out in our interview, the curriculum of 1974 was one of the most radical curricula in Norwegian history with respect to the equality of the sexes.

Overall, it should be underlined that the strong Norwegian women's movement stood for an independent political struggle that sometimes crisscrossed other lines of conflict. During the waves of increased political mobilization by women, the gender cleavage became comparatively more salient. During the second wave, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Labor Party and the Socialist People's Party supported the claims of the radical women's movement. Girls' postwar educational expansion based on a conception of equal gender roles was integrated into the labor movement's school reform project. The Center Party and the Christian Democrats were the most reluctant to give up their insistence on separate gender roles. Presumably this is related to their more rural and Christian voter base. The postwar Liberal Party and the Conservative Party often supported the claims of the less radical, older women's organizations, such as the Female Teachers' Association. Both parties organized some well-educated upper- and middle-class women who belonged to the women's movement. The nonsocialist parties thus had different positions with respect to the gender cleavage. This was an additional factor that weakened non-leftist alliances.

Debates on Gender Roles, Girls' Education, and Coeducation in North Rhine–Westphalia

For the German women's movement, girls' education was also one of the most important aims (Hervé, 1990). From the beginning, the movement was divided into social democratic, liberal, and conservative wings (Hervé, 1990, 12ff). The liberal/conservative wing was united under the umbrella of the *Bund deutscher Frauenvereine* (BdF, Union of German Women's Associations) founded in 1894, but splits existed within it between social liberals, national liberals, and conservatives (Wurms, 1990). In addition, the women's movement was split along lines of denomination. The conservative *Deutsch-Evangelischer Frauenbund* (German-Evangelical Women's Union) became a member of the BdF but the *Katholischer deutscher Frauenbund* (KDFB, German Catholic Women's Union), which still exists today, did not. Membership of the liberal BdF would have been irreconcilable with the rootedness of the Catholic women's activists in the Catholic milieu that had developed during the cultural struggle (Sack, 1998, 38). When a new national umbrella organization, the *Informationsdienst für Frauenfragen* (Information Service for Women's Questions; since 1969, *Deutscher Frauenrat*, German Women's Council), was founded in 1951 the Catholic women's movement was, however, included (Illemann, 2016,

112ff). Besides the KDFB, the Catholic women's movement comprised organizations such as the *Verein katholischer deutscher Lehrerinnen* (VkdL, Association of German Catholic Female Teachers), founded in 1885, which also still exists today. This association had its strongholds in the Rhineland and Westphalia, where there were higher numbers of female teachers than in the Protestant areas of Prussia. The reason was that the coeducation of boys and girls was rarer in Catholic areas. Separate girls' schools meant greater possibilities for the employment of female teachers (Sack, 1998, 115ff). The Catholic women's movement cooperated with the Center Party and later with the CDU.

There was no agreement between the currents of the women's movement regarding the content and structure of girls' education. The liberal and the conservative divisions of the early women's movement supported traditional gender roles and argued that most girls should receive an education that befitted their destiny as mothers and housewives and that would improve the status of these roles. Even though the liberal women also struggled for the admittance of upper- and middle-class women to secondary schools and universities, it was understood that the destiny of most women was to marry, which excluded active participation in the labor market. Only the social democratic women's movement represented the interests of working women from the start. Nevertheless, ideas of the special "character" of women were adhered to here too (Tornieporth, 1977, 221ff). In the decades after the Second World War, the situation gradually changed. Working women became more usual and one spoke increasingly of the "double role" of women as housewives and employees. In the liberal and social democratic parts of the women's movement, more and more women supported coeducation – the further to the left they stood, the more they argued for coeducation in principle, not merely as a workaround (Pfister, 1988, 35). These trends were intensified after 1968, when the second wave of women's mobilization reached its peak and radical women's organizations mushroomed (Doormann, 1990, 255ff).

The Catholic women's movement continued to oppose coeducation in principle and clung to the idea that the freedom of women consisted in the choice between marriage and motherhood or maidenhood and career (Illemann, 2016, 179ff; Pöggeler, 1977, 372ff; Schultheis, 1994, 200ff, 254ff). Until at least the 1950s, the VkdL expected its members to remain single to concentrate completely on their vocation.[11] It opposed married

[11] Christine Teusch, CDU minister of education in NRW from 1947 to 1954, is a prime example. Born in 1888, she became a *Volksschule* teacher and joined the VkdL, several

teachers, even though the celibacy requirement for female teachers had been abolished during the Weimar Republic (Illemann, 2016, 180; Sack, 1998, 128ff). This can only be understood against the background of Catholic theology and practice, which offered limited possibilities of emancipation to women who chose celibacy. Especially in the Rhineland and Westphalia, Catholic female orders had stood for the development of girls' education (Sack, 1998, 30). The VkdL's support of separate education for girls had its roots both in pedagogical convictions based on traditional gender roles and in vested interests. With good reason, Catholic female teachers were worried that they would not receive equally good conditions of professional advancement in coeducational schools (Sack, 1998, 133). The Catholic female teachers also supported denominational schooling, in contrast to the rest of the women's movement. In the expert interviews for this study, frequent derisory remarks about this organization illustrated that many politically active people in NRW did not take the Catholic female teachers very seriously but considered them a relic of the past. Their importance should therefore not be overemphasized. Nevertheless, the VkdL had influence, especially within the many Catholic girls' schools, and it was included in all parliamentary hearings about education politics. It joined the campaign against cooperative schools in 1976 and was thus a part of the conservative anti-reform alliance.

In the party manifestos of the SPD, the CDU, and the FDP from the 1950s to the 1970s, all parties included more and more detailed comments regarding the situation of women. However, significant ideological changes in gender roles can first be traced in the second half of the 1970s. The early party manifestos of the CDU contained almost no references to women. The Hamburg manifesto of 1953 only stated that even though the CDU supported "equal rights of men and women" – which had been proclaimed in the new Constitution after long struggles – the "natural order of family and marriage" was the CDU's principle with regard to a possible revision of the family law. In other words, husbands' legal predominance should not be abolished completely. Indeed, equal rights in family and marriage law first became a reality in 1976, under the

other Catholic women's organizations, and the Center Party, which she represented in the first democratic parliament from 1919. She was active in the Christian unions. Against massive male opposition, she struggled for influence within the postwar CDU and became one of the leading politicians of NRW, responsible for the reestablishment of denominational schooling, among other things. In accordance with the VkdL's principles, she never married (Eich, 1987, 84ff).

social-liberal national government. The CDU managed to modernize its manifestos while continuing to represent traditional ideals of motherhood and homemaking. For example, the manifesto of 1972 stated,

> We want to strengthen the position of women in our society. Women must be able to choose freely whether they want to address themselves exclusively to the tasks of family and household or in addition be employed fully or part-time. Women's rights to fair chances in education, apprenticeship, further education, professional practice, and to equal chances of ascent must be realized. We are – also with respect to women – for equal pay in cases of equal performance. The independent woman's right to sufficient social security is to be ensured for the future. We advocate a strengthening of the regard for the social merit of women in the family and household.

The CDU continued to take it for granted that the "tasks of family and household" were primarily women's but widened its view of women so that the interests of employed women would also be represented. Like the Catholic women's movement, the CDU emphasized in its manifesto of 1976 that "the position of the housewife and mother is of the same value as that of the employed women" and that "the occupation of the woman in the family is to be put on a level with professional occupations outside of the family." "Small children especially need the security of the parental home," the 1976 manifesto also stated. In its manifesto of 1980, the CDU stated that there had been "a lack of progress in the equal rights of man and woman, which must not be limited to the social betterment of the childless employed woman." The CDU also passed a comparatively more radical declaration entitled "Woman and Society" at its party congress of June 1975, in which it was stated that "already in the upbringing of children in the parental home, gender typical role clichés must be avoided" and that boys and girls should receive education in pedagogy and homemaking to be prepared for "their task in the family based on partnership." The declaration suggested that more girls should be motivated to choose nontypical occupations, that housewives should receive possibilities for further training, and that upper-secondary homemaking lessons should be developed further so that they would qualify for various occupations.

In comparison with the CDU, the SPD included more detailed suggestions for women's politics in its early manifestos, but here too the housewife ideal stood strong. In its manifesto for the elections of 1957, the SPD suggested that all girls in general and vocational schools should receive homemaking lessons. Being a housewife and mother was described as "the natural task of the woman." Women were said to be "of equal value" but

not of "equal character" to men, which meant that women had a right to "special protection." In contrast to the CDU, the SPD demanded in 1957 that the woman's status in marriage and family law should be equal to that of the man. As the Godesberg manifesto of 1959 stated,

> Woman's equal rights must be realized legally, socially, and economically. The woman must be offered the same possibilities of education, apprenticeship, choice of occupation, professional practice, and pay as the man. Equal rights shall not call into question the psychological and biological character of the woman. Housewives' work must be acknowledged as occupational work. Housewives and mothers are in need of special help. Mothers of pre-school and school-aged children must not be forced to hold down a job for economic reasons.

In its youth-political guidelines of 1965, the SPD had not come much further. Here, it was stated that "full employment of mothers is difficult to reconcile with the upbringing of infants and school children" and that "part-time work offers the possibility to realize the child's right to motherly care and education and the right of the woman to an occupational development of her own." That the child could also have a right to fatherly care was not considered. In NRW, the SPD prided itself in its manifesto of 1962 on having defended the monthly paid "housework day" for employed women, which had been introduced in NRW after an initiative by the Communist Party in the early postwar years (Hervé/Nödinger, 1990, 202). It was in its manifesto for the NRW elections of 1980 that the NRW SPD first pointed out that part-time work should be available to men and women alike. It was still assumed that combining family and work was mostly a problem for women:

> Reducing prejudices and disadvantages is only possible if the consciousness of society regarding the role of man and woman is changed. The state has the task to create the necessary conditions so that women can reconcile their family and an occupation.

That schoolbooks or curricula should be changed to change gender roles was not a major topic of debate during the 1970s (but see Zinnecker, 1972, 83ff). This was first debated in the NRW parliament in the early 1980s, and in 1985 the SPD-led Ministry of Education in NRW published a regulation on the topic (quoted in Pfister, 1988, 261f).

Like the CDU, the FDP did not include demands for women in its early manifestos. In 1961, the national manifesto merely included the sentence that "social, pedagogical and domestic women's occupations are to be valued more highly socially and economically." From 1969, the FDP demanded independent pensions for housewives. The national manifesto

for the elections of 1976 underlined in more detail that the FDP had contributed to the reform of marriage and family law that finally allowed women to choose freely whether they wanted to work, without needing their husband's consent. Nevertheless, the manifesto conceded that "many disadvantages" persisted and that women needed to receive equal chances in the education system and employment. Here too, it was stated that "the occupation in the household must receive the same value and appreciation as any other occupation." In the manifesto for the federal state elections of 1976, the NRW FDP mentioned that "housewives' work" should be recognized but that "practical life support," such as "company kindergartens" or "day nannies," was also necessary. In its manifesto for the national elections of 1980, the FDP demanded an anti-discrimination law and suggested that "the traditional view of the family hierarchy, for example in schoolbooks," should be dismantled.

In education politics, the 1950s and 1960s were characterized by ideological and structural continuity with respect to gender. Girls' education in the region had long been dominated by the Catholic Church, which had filled the vacuum left by the Prussian state in secondary schooling. In the postwar decades, a large percentage of private secondary schools were still Catholic girls' schools. In 1953, 20 of the federal states' private *Realschulen* were for girls, 8 were for boys and 9 for both sexes. Among the public *Realschulen*, 34 were for girls only, 41 for boys only, and 108 for both sexes. Among the private *Gymnasien*, 50 were for girls only, 19 for boys only, and 10 for both sexes. Among the public *Gymnasien*, 96 were for girls only, 155 for boys only, and 112 for both sexes (Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1954, 80ff). In 1979, 2433 of the 3141 students (77 percent) who passed the *Realschule* exam at a private school were still girls. A total of 25 202 girls passed the *Realschule* exam at a public school, so private school *Realschule* graduates made up about 9 percent of all female *Realschule* graduates. Among the *Abitur* graduates of private schools in 1979, 3469 of 5365 students (65 percent) were girls. A total of 15 896 girls passed the *Abitur* at a public school, so about 20 percent of female *Abitur* graduates had attended private schools (Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1980, 134). Even though some private schools were Protestant or non-religious, most of them were Catholic. In other words, the influence of the Catholic Church on girls' education remained significant.

The NRW *Schulordnungsgesetz* (law on the regulation of schools) of 1952 stated that the different "character of the sexes" should be taken into account in the structure of the school system. Compared to other

West German federal states, NRW was in a leading position regarding the separate education of girls and boys. In 1967, a total of 70.8 percent of all *Gymnasien* were either boys' or girls' schools. Only the Saarland had a higher percentage (Zinnecker, 1972, 67). This was a result of the Catholic Church's influence on education in the federal state but also of the many densely populated areas, which made coeducation for practical reasons less necessary (Zinnecker, 1972, 68).

The postwar years saw the reestablishment of the *Frauenoberschule*, a secondary school exclusively for girls with roots going back to 1908, when girls' education had been regulated for the first time by the Prussian state. During the Weimar Republic and under the National Socialist regime, this school type had been developed further. It was revived only in NRW, the Rhineland-Palatinate, and Lower Saxony (Zinnecker, 1972, 72). The reestablished *Frauenoberschule*, from 1966 dubbed the *Gymnasium für Frauenbildung*, did not award a general qualification for university entrance but qualified students only for entrance to a pedagogical academy in order to become a primary schoolteacher, for university education as a secondary schoolteacher in specific subjects, and for some administrative state careers, for example in public libraries. Talented students could take an additional exam in Latin or French and mathematics to acquire a full *Abitur*. Under the National Socialist regime the *Frauenoberschule* had awarded a general qualification for university entrance – dubbed "*Pudding Abitur*" by contemporaries (Eich, 1987, 166; Neghabian, 1993). The first female minister of education of NRW, the Catholic teacher Christine Teusch (see footnote 11), was responsible for the demotion of this school type's leaving certificate and enforced this policy against considerable protest. Eich (1987, 170) suggests that Teusch preferred a more scientific girls' education and opposed the *Frauenoberschule*. If that is correct, Teusch was unsuccessful in reducing the importance of this school type. The *Frauenoberschule* remained a relevant, downgraded version of the *Gymnasium*. In 1965, 133 such schools had 23 879 students, which made up almost 22 percent of all female *Gymnasium* students (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1965, tables 6 and 7, own calculation). Its curricula did not include Latin and "the scientific subjects ma[d]e way from the ninth grade on for the subjects of women's work," meaning homemaking and pedagogy (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1965, 13). As the Ministry of Education under Mikat (CDU) declared,

> There is no comparable [school] type for boys. This can be explained by the dual task of all girls' education, which is defined by the goals of the specific school type

and the tasks of the future housewife and mother. In the area of secondary schooling, this led to the creation of a school type which accentuates the second task. (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1965, 12)

In 1967, SPD minister of education Holthoff proudly declared that educational expansion had affected girls to the extent that they now made up 50 percent of all *Realschule* students and 44.4 percent of all *Gymnasium* students (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1967, 28). The last number, however, included 29 215 students at the *Frauenoberschule*, now termed the *Gymnasium für Frauenbildung*, so a significant number of female *Gymnasium* students still did not take a full-value *Abitur* exam. Furthermore, 22.5 percent of girls left the *Gymnasium* after the tenth grade, compared to 11.2 percent of boys (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1967, 33). Only in 1972 was the *Frauenoberschule* abolished in the course of the *Gymnasium* reform. Until then, many different *Gymnasium* types had existed. Girls had mostly attended modern languages *Gymnasien* or *Frauenoberschulen*, while boys more often attended classical or mathematical–natural scientific *Gymnasien* (Zinnecker, 1972, 70). All these types were now merged and reduced to elective subjects in the upper-secondary level. Homemaking and pedagogy became elective subjects open to boys and girls alike. They were still chosen mostly by girls, so they became a type of "women's school within the comprehensive *Gymnasium*" (Neghabian, 1993, 216).

The curricula of the *Volksschule* and the *Realschule* were also dominated by traditional gender-role thinking throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The curricula of the NRW *Volksschulen* of 1955 included eight hours of "life-practical education" for girls during the eighth grade. During the same time, the boys had three hours of manual training, one hour of mathematics, three hours of physics and chemistry, and one hour of German (Hagenmaier, 1988 [1969], 250). When the ninth *Volksschule* year and the *Hauptschule* were introduced in 1966, coeducation became the rule in this school type; centralization also made this necessary. Nevertheless, the curricula differentiated between the sexes. For grades seven, eight, and nine, girls were allotted five to six hours of "life-practical education" (including homemaking, biology/physics/chemistry, needlework, and art) and two to three hours of physical education. During the same time, boys were taught three hours of biology/physics and chemistry, two hours of manual training, and three hours of physical education (*Landtag NRW*, June 13, 1966; *Landtag NRW*, November 29, 1966, quoted in Dowe/Frommberger, 1968,

303ff, 309f). In the NRW *Realschule* curricula of 1965, two hours of needlework and three hours of homemaking were reserved for girls in the ninth grade. During the same time, the boys had two hours of mathematics, one to two hours of physics and chemistry and one hour of biology (Hagenmaier, 1988 [1969], 250).

The NRW curricula for the *Hauptschule* and the *Realschule* of 1968 and 1973 gradually included boys in homemaking lessons, though at the beginning this was elective. In 1968, Holthoff stated in a parliamentary debate that even though he thought it could be useful for boys to learn how to cook, he thought that their participation should not be obligatory (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1595). Homemaking was given up as an individual subject and instead included in a broader subject named work studies (*Arbeitslehre*) (Tornieporth, 1977, 340ff). Only in the *Hauptschule* and in the integrated comprehensive school did elements of homemaking remain obligatory parts of the curricula for both sexes. Subjects that included homemaking elements remained girls' subjects in all other educational institutions because they were chosen mostly by girls (Bartsch/Methfessel, 2012, 203; Methfessel/Kettschau, 1994, 90). Methfessel and Kettschau (1994, 90) conclude with respect to homemaking lessons that "coeducation, even where it is realized formally, is undermined in real terms, or only takes place in adaptation to male biographies."

In the *Realschulen* and the *Gymnasien*, coeducation was realized from the late 1960s onward. This was not so much a result of purposeful political decision-making but mostly a result of changed preferences in the population. In October 1968, the topic was discussed in the NRW parliament because the SPD representative Bargmann had directed a question to the minister of education, Holthoff. The question was, "Does the federal state government welcome the tendency of many school operators to introduce coeducation also at *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien*, analogous to the development of the secondary *Hauptschule* school?" (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1593). Holthoff replied that he supported coeducation because boys and girls grew up "into the same cultural, social, and political reality" and should be made capable of realizing "the political-legal equality of the sexes" (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1594). To this end, they needed to practice cooperation in school. At the same time, Holthoff emphasized that coeducation was only desirable if it was ensured that "potential gender-specific interests" could come to expression (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1594). For this reason,

one had to make sure that the number of female teachers was sufficient and that the principal and the vice-principal of the school were, if possible, a man and woman. Holthoff stated,

> It must be ensured that the education in physical education and needlework is secured for the girls and that separate education within the bounds of possibility is given in single subjects which are especially characteristic – of girls' education for example. Under these conditions, the federal state government will support coeducation at the *Gymnasien* and *Realschulen*. (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1595)

In the following exchange, SPD representative Bahr asked whether this meant that the ministry would now decree that coeducation had to be introduced at the public *Gymnasien*. To this, the minister replied that he would not do so because he thought it was better to let things grow:

> My perception is that especially the school operators, parents, and teachers are going in for coeducation to an increasing degree. I have received numerous applications which I will examine. So far I have not found a reason to refuse any application. The development is definitely heading in this direction. But to do so with a decree [. . .] would mean underestimating the different situations in the teachers' bodies [. . .] and so on. I openly declare my sympathy for such a development but without imposing any obligations by decree. (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1595)

Anne Ratzki, former principal of a *Gymnasium* in Cologne that was founded in 1967 and turned into one of the first comprehensive schools in NRW in 1975, described the development at her own school and at other similarly newly founded schools in our expert interview:

> Well, the conditions were rather modest [. . .] but – and that was the really great thing – it were the first coeducational *Gymnasien* in Cologne. [. . .] Until then there were only boys' and girls' [*Gymnasien*]. So [. . .] in 1967 these were founded [. . .]. And it was greeted by the parents – I can only speak for Cologne, I have no overview of the federal state but assume that it was similar in other places – so enthusiastically that we had 450 applications the following year for three classes . . . and in shacks with really bad conditions. And the old boys' and girls' *Gymnasien* had just 25 to 50 applications. So the city of Cologne of course urged other *Gymnasien* to convert too. And then from year to year it became . . . [. . .] well, there were still some boys' *Gymnasien*, some girls' *Gymnasien* but they grew fewer year on year. (expert interview)

Other experts agreed that by the late 1960s, opposition to coeducation had been greatly reduced and the only antagonistic force at this point was the VkdL. As the former chair of the Education and Science Workers' Union Ilse Brusis put it, any remaining opponents gave up their opposition

because "they were just making fools of themselves" (expert interview). By 1980, there were 600 coeducational *Gymnasien* in NRW (65 of which were private schools), with 14 boys' *Gymnasien* (11 of which were private schools) and 31 girls' *Gymnasien* (28 of which were private schools) (Philologen-Verband NRW, 1981, 620). A small number of boys' and a slightly higher number of – often Catholic – girls' schools remain now.

Overall, women's demands were not prioritized by any of the parties from the 1950s to 1970s (Doormann, 1990, 272ff). While the social democratic women's organization suggested many policy changes, few of these made it into the agendas of the social-liberal governments (Doormann, 1990, 274). It therefore seems that the influence of the German women's movement on party politics was relatively limited. Changes in the situation of girls in the education system took place from the late 1960s onward, but the ideal of the housewife remained strong throughout the period. Conservative opponents of school reform found willing partners within the women's movement, such as the VkdL. Even though the VkdL represented mostly *Volksschule* teachers, social democrats and liberals could not forge an alliance with this group because of its connection to political Catholicism. The Catholic women's movement belonged to the Catholic milieu, which, historically, had sympathized with economic policies serving the working class. But culturally, the Catholic female teachers were too far removed from social democracy. Social democrats and liberals only forged a weak alliance with more radical parts of the women's movement. In other words, the dominant state-church cleavage undermined the unity of the women's movement and the gender cleavage remained comparatively latent. The women's movement did not represent a threat to the conservative alliance against school reforms; on the contrary, the Catholic women's movement was integrated into this alliance.

COMPARISON: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CROSSCUTTING CLEAVAGES

One can conclude that crosscutting cleavages resulted in both cases in crosscutting struggles in education politics that, for some actors, were more relevant than conflicts over comprehensive schooling. In Norway, these crosscutting struggles stabilized the cooperation between the center parties and the Labor Party, or at least did not sabotage it. In Germany, they stabilized the internal unity of and cross-interest alliance within the CDU. The fact that social democrats in Norway managed to build a stable

reform alliance while German social democrats did not can therefore be explained as due to the unequal cleavage structures of the two countries (Table 5.2). In this section, these findings are discussed in more detail.

In Norway, the most important cleavages, which crosscut the class cleavage, were the center-periphery and rural-urban ones. In terms of class politics, the Norwegian Liberal Party, the Center Party, and the

TABLE 5.2 *Education policy expressions of cleavages in Norway and North Rhine–Westphalia during the postwar reform period*

Cleavage	Expressions in Norway	Expressions in NRW/ Germany
Worker-owner	Conflicts over the introduction of the youth school and the abolition of the *realskole*, tracking, ability grouping, and the abolition of grading in the youth school	Conflicts over the introduction of the integrated comprehensive school and the cooperative comprehensive school
Center-periphery and rural-urban	Conflicts over the centralization of rural schools, school language, and the number of hours of Christian education taught in west Norwegian schools	Conflicts over the centralization of rural "dwarf schools"
State-church	Conflicts over the number of hours taught in Christian education, the content and role of Christian education, the Christian preamble of the school law, and Christian private schooling	Conflicts over denominational schooling, denominational "dwarf schools," the influence of the Catholic Church, and Christian (especially Catholic girls') private schooling
Communist-socialist		Conflicts over the political standing of teachers, occupational bans, supposedly socialist curricula, and the conservative claim that comprehensive schools were "socialist"
Men-women	Conflicts between male and female teachers' organizations, over equal curricula for boys and girls, and over coeducation	Conflicts over equal curricula for boys and girls and coeducation

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Christian Democrats represented the political center. But in terms of the rural-urban and center-periphery cleavages, they represented the rural periphery. The Conservative Party was mostly an urban party, while the Labor Party stood in the middle, as it was strong in the cities and countryside alike. The Labor Party also represented urban outsiders linked to the peripheral cultural movements. Nevertheless, these cleavages were potentially threatening for the Labor Party because it could not have held on to power in the political center, Oslo, if the periphery, potentially including non-central cities such as Bergen, had decided collectively to rise up against it. This was illustrated by the struggle over EC membership.

In education politics, these cleavages came to expression in the conflicts over the centralization of small rural schools and in the conflicts over the language used in schools and schoolbooks. The rural periphery opposed far-reaching centralization and disliked the urban elites' traditional views of language. Conflicts over Christian education were also to a certain degree a manifestation of the rural-urban and center-periphery cleavages, as illustrated by protests by west Norwegian mayors against the central governments' regulations limiting the number of hours taught in this subject. The Labor Party usually managed to prevent these conflicts seriously obstructing its school reforms. Only in 1959 were rural worries the reason why the center parties did not vote with the Labor Party for the abolition of the old school types. After this, the Labor Party government financed the introduction of the youth school in rural municipalities so generously that it became viewed as a formidable educational boost in these areas, because it was connected with the introduction of nine years of obligatory schooling. The trend toward less organizational differentiation within the youth school accommodated the center parties' dislike of centralization because schools without tracking or ability grouping could be smaller. In language politics, the Labor Party also maneuvered smartly in not repelling the peripheral movement even after it had relinquished the aim of *samnorsk*. Even regarding Christian education, the Labor Party government made concessions. The Conservative Party opposed the center parties in the language struggle. With regard to centralization and Christian education, it attempted to build bridges, but this did not lead to any stable alliance. The center-periphery and rural-urban cleavages thus strengthened the coalition of the center parties and the Labor Party.

In NRW, the rural-urban cleavage manifested to a certain extent in the conflicts over the centralization of small rural schools, termed "dwarf schools" by the SPD. Centralization in NRW progressed more slowly than in the much less populated Norway. In Norway, only 1 percent of students

were taught in one-class schools in 1963, compared to 1.8 percent in NRW in the same year (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 151; *Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 545). This difference is remarkable, considering that NRW was one of the most highly populated federal states.[12]

The NRW social democrats had little sympathy for small rural schools. They were supported in their struggle for centralization by the liberal FDP. Both parties considered centralization to be in the interests of the rural population because only schools of a certain size could guarantee the quality of education. The rural population did not necessarily share these concerns. On the contrary, the CDU was strong in many of NRW's rural areas. Within the CDU, some parliamentary representatives were especially known for their support for small rural schools. In debates, these representatives emphasized the small schools' advantages and their cultural and economic value for rural communities. At the same time, other CDU representatives, such as Mikat, supported centralization. But they also knew that they had to avoid provoking unrest and thus did so very carefully. In other words, even though a certain amount of ideological division existed within the CDU, the rural population's dislike of centralization was integrated into the CDU's program and its internal cross-interest coalition was maintained.

The struggle over "dwarf schools" was also related to the more important struggle over denominational schooling, which can be considered a manifestation of the state-church cleavage. This cleavage had long been dominant in the region of NRW, where the Catholic Church continued to enjoy significant power in the postwar decades. The SPD and the FDP not only disliked denominational schooling as such but also disliked the fact that it made it harder to get rid of the many small schools. The high number of Catholic private schools was another point of discord. The Protestant Church was to a certain degree involved in these debates, but it ran a much lower number of private schools and gave up its support

[12] One explanation for the many one-class schools in NRW was the lack of teachers. Even though there was a lack of teachers in Norway as well, there were on average 25 students per teacher in Norway in 1963–4 (SSB, 1966, 269, own calculation). In NRW, there were 42.8 students per *Volksschule* teacher in 1963 (Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1964, 52). During the 1970s, centralization in NRW progressed. The shortage of teachers was finally overcome, and the average number of students decreased to 22 students per teacher in the primary school and 19.4 students per teacher in the *Hauptschule* in 1979 (Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1980, 126). In Norway, there were 18.9 students per teacher in children and youth schools in 1978–9 (SSB, 1980, 347, own calculation).

for denominational schooling. The CDU was the party closest to the Catholic Church. Even though it eventually had to accept a compromise over denominational schooling, the CDU managed to push through exceptions that safeguarded some Catholic influence. The state-church cleavage and the rural-urban cleavage thus overlapped. Both these cross-cutting cleavages, but especially the highly salient state-church cleavage, strengthened the internal alliance of the CDU, rather than offering the SPD and the FDP any means to weaken it.

Ideologically, the struggles over denominational schooling and Catholic private schooling were in many ways paradigmatic for later struggles over comprehensive schooling. The argument that parents should be able to choose freely which education they wanted for their children was one of the most important conservative arguments in these debates, as was the argument that everybody should receive "equally valuable but different" education. The CDU saw the education politics of the SPD and the FDP as an attack on parental rights driven by an excessive belief in the state. In these debates, representatives of the Catholic Church especially warned in drastic terms against supposedly totalitarian tendencies in social democratic and liberal education politics.

In Norway, the state-church cleavage manifested in the conflicts over the number of hours taught in Christian education, the financing of Christian private schools, and the Christian preamble of the school law. It overlapped with the rural-urban cleavage. The Norwegian Christian Democrats especially struggled for a Christian influence on schooling. The Christian Democrats sometimes received support from the Center Party and the Conservative Party, while the Liberal Party was placed more in the middle. The Labor Party and the Socialist People's Party represented the other side of the conflict. These conflicts contributed to the electoral victory of the four nonsocialist parties in 1965, which illustrates that they were politically dangerous to the Labor Party. Regarding comprehensive schooling they were, however, not a great obstacle for social democratic policies. In some cases, the Labor Party managed to split the nonsocialist parties by cooperating with the Liberal Party. The Christian Democrats' demands for Christian education were sometimes so far-reaching that even the Center Party and Conservative Party could not agree. On other issues, the Conservative Party stood alone in the coalition of 1965, for example regarding deregulation of private schooling. The center parties wanted Christian schools to have stable financing, but they did not support private elite schooling. The nonsocialist bloc was thus not entirely united, and the Labor Party made the most of these divisions. Neither the regulations on

Christian education nor those on Christian private schooling could seriously threaten comprehensive school reforms, at least during the period in question. Compared with the German case, there were also no equally obvious ideological similarities between the struggles over Christian education and the debates about comprehensive schooling.

In the Norwegian case, anti-communism and the communist-socialist cleavage did not become apparent in education politics. This cleavage might have played a role in local conflicts here and there, but on the national level anti-communist arguments cannot be found in school debates. There were communists in all teachers' unions, but this did not split them to a degree that would have diminished their influence. The Norwegian teachers' organizations had no problem studying the GDR school system with an open mind. Even though anti-communism and communist-socialist divisions played a role in other areas of Norwegian politics, this line of investigation can therefore be disregarded with respect to school reforms. This cannot be said about the German case.

In NRW, the communist-socialist cleavage was a serious obstacle for reform protagonists. Conflicts over teachers' convictions, occupational bans on teachers, and conflicts over cooperation between social democrats and communists split them internally. The fact that Germany was a divided country and that the GDR had instituted a more comprehensive school system played a role. The Education and Science Workers' Union especially was split into factions of social democrats, more radical socialists, and various groups of communists. The SPD was also ridden with internal disagreements. Within the SPD, the split was not between communists and socialists but between a moderate or right-wing current comprising many leading SPD politicians in NRW and a current of younger, leftist reformers. The reformers' camp considered the comprehensive school to be an anticapitalistic tool aimed at teaching students to be critical of the capitalist system, develop solidarity and so on. Less radical social democrats wanted the comprehensive school to be less concerned with class struggle and to have more of a harmonious character, aiming at social and national integration. For the reform antagonists, this opened up possibilities for ideological attack. The integrated comprehensive school was dubbed the "socialist comprehensive school" (*sozialistische Einheitsschule*) and warned against in drastic words. This scared off potential reform allies, such as the primary and lower-secondary schoolteachers organized in the Association of Education and Upbringing and probably many parents and voters. Anti-communist

arguments also played a role in the movement against the cooperative school. They created a lot of fear and emotion.

The manifestos of the German parties were generally characterized by a higher degree of polarization compared to the Norwegian manifestos. They were formulated less matter-of-factly and were often extremely critical of the other parties. The Norwegian manifestos were focused on detailed suggestions for reforms and only included slight criticisms of the other parties here and there. It is especially striking how much space German party manifestos of the time devoted to foreign politics and the Cold War and how emotionally charged the manifestos were with respect to this. This illustrates that Germany's separation and the Federal Republic's position on the border of the Western alliance shaped German (education) politics decisively.

Finally, the gender cleavage came to expression in both cases but again with unequal results for coalition- and decision-making. The comparable strength of the Norwegian women's movement is illustrated by the fact that coeducation and the equalization of curricula were achieved much earlier and with fewer exceptions than in NRW. Norwegian female primary schoolteachers had their own organization until 1966, which also reflects their strength. The gender roles expressed in curricula became a topic of debate in Norway at an earlier point than in Germany and the "housewife ideal" came under greater criticism. The radical women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s was connected to the political left and supported by the Labor Party. The gender cleavage did not overlap exactly with the class cleavage as the Christian Democrats and the Center Party were the clearest antagonists of the radical women's movements' demands, while the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party more often supported reforms that were in the interests of the women's movement. The Labor Party profited from this cleavage because it split the four nonsocialist parties.

In the German case, too, social democrats stood most clearly on the side of the postwar women's movement, but the German SPD was not as modern in this respect as the Norwegian left was. The German manifestos contained less extensive demands than the Norwegian manifestos with regard to gender roles in education. In 1957, the SPD suggested that all girls should receive homemaking lessons – this coincided with a time when the Norwegian Labor Party was introducing homemaking as an obligatory subject for both sexes, despite the skepticism of the other parties. In NRW, a special *Gymnasium* for girls existed until 1972 and did not award a full-value *Abitur* so a significant percentage of girls

continued to be channeled away from high-status university education and toward typical female occupations. There was no comparably strong female teachers' organization as in Norway. Female Catholic teachers had and still have their own organization, which was originally dominated by primary schoolteachers. This organization is an expression of the state-church cleavage as well as the gender cleavage and results from the special and somewhat contradictory role the Catholic Church has played in girls' education. The state-church cleavage split the German women's movement not only along party lines but also along denominational lines, which weakened the movement. The CDU had ties to the Catholic parts of the women's movement and managed to build an alliance with them. As a result, Catholic female teachers became a part of the antagonists' camp in the comprehensive and cooperative school debates. As with the other crosscutting cleavages, the gender cleavage did not undermine the internal unity of the CDU and did not considerably strengthen the reformers of the SPD.