

# The Origins of the 17-Point Agreement of 23 May 1951 between the Chinese Central Government and the Tibetan “Local Government”

Alex Raymond\*

## Abstract

Immediately following the Battle of Chamdo in October 1950, during the period between November 1950 and April 1951, the leaders of the new People’s Republic of China (PRC) had two priorities in regard to Tibet. The first was to persuade the Tibetan government to send delegates to Beijing as soon as possible in order to start “negotiations,” and the second was to prevent the Dalai Lama from fleeing Tibet. Using Chinese documents that offer a new version of the process that led to these “negotiations,” this study, without addressing the international issues in detail, illustrates how the leaders of the PRC, either with promises, threats or even by bluff, were able to attain their goals.

**Keywords:** PRC government; politics; Tibet; November 1950 to April 1951; promises, threats or bluff; occupation

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The ending of Qing rule and the rise to power of the Republic of China in 1912 saw a new era in Sino-Tibetan relations. Tibet between 1912 and 1950 has often been described as a “de facto independent” country, although most countries did not recognize it as such. However, the new Chinese republic considered itself as a nation and not a multinational state, and the progressive policy of annexation and division of the different nationalities launched by the Qing was continued by the Kuomintang government. The Tibetan cultural area during this period was divided between Tibet under the authority of the Lhasa government and those areas that were gradually being integrated into China. The border between Tibet and China fluctuated until 1932 when it was established along the Yangtze River (Changjiang 长江), where it was to remain until 1950.

\* University of Balamand (Lebanon) and CESPRA (Centre d’Etudes Sociologiques et Politiques Raymond Aron), Paris. Email: [alex.raymond@fty.balamand.edu.lb](mailto:alex.raymond@fty.balamand.edu.lb).

After the Second World War, the Tibetan question was not deemed to be the most urgent priority for Mao Zedong 毛泽东 and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. This changed during the summer of 1949 when the Tibetan government, under the pretext of the threat of infiltration by communist agents, expelled all staff from the Kuomintang office in Lhasa. The CCP leaders reacted strongly, declaring that this expulsion was made at the instigation of the “imperialists.” From then on, Mao changed tack, believing that there was a risk that the “imperialists” would seize Tibet. He considered Tibet’s “international status [to be] very important, we must occupy it and transform it into a popular democracy.”<sup>1</sup> On 31 December 1949, the CCP issued a directive that declared that “the liberation of Tibet is the main and most glorious task for our army during the year 1950.”<sup>2</sup>

In the last three decades, documents have been released in China that present a different picture to the official version of the 1950–1951 takeover of Tibet by the troops of the new People’s Republic of China (PRC). These documents include histories, biographies and compilations of accounts by soldiers, among others. In addition, speeches by CCP leaders concerning Tibet have been published, as have some documents reproduced from the Lhasa archives. Access to some of the recent publications is sometimes limited as they remain *neibu* 内部, and all of those documents provide important information.

In a previous article, I demonstrate that during the summer of 1949, Mao and the leaders of the CCP had decided to militarily occupy Tibet as soon as possible. They had, however, badly underestimated the difficulties of doing so, and the offensive was postponed several times until October 1950. Even then, the logistical and food problems had still not been resolved and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was unable to move forward into Tibetan territory before spring 1951 at the earliest. This delay meant that the CCP was forced to pursue a policy of negotiation with the Tibetan government.<sup>3</sup>

This paper uses previously unmined Chinese sources to show that after the Battle of Chamdo 昌都 in October 1950, the PRC leaders had two main objectives during the period from November 1950 to April 1951. The first was to persuade the Tibetan government to send delegates to Beijing as soon as possible in order to open “negotiations.” Their second priority was to prevent the Dalai Lama from leaving Tibet.

Although the “negotiations” in Beijing have already been described in detail by several authors, the process that led to what would become known as the “17-point agreement” is very little understood. The Chinese sources used in this paper offer a new version of the lead up to these “negotiations,” a version which often contradicts previous accounts. I also analyse some original documents from the Tibetan government, which have been translated into Chinese

1 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 2008, 6.

2 See Wei 2011, 1; Zhonggong Xizang zizhiqū weiyuanhui dangshi yanjiushi 2005, 6.

3 Raymond forthcoming.

and preserved. This paper does not have the scope to tackle international questions in detail; instead it illustrates how the leaders of the PRC, either with promises, avowed threats, or even by bluff, were able to achieve their objectives.

### The “Seizure of Power” from the Dalai Lama and his Departure to Yadong

As correctly surmised by Mao Zedong in a telegram dated 23 August 1950, the Chamdo victory upset the ruling elite in Lhasa.<sup>4</sup> Power was transferred from the regent Takdra 达扎 to the Dalai Lama, who was still only 15. The event, as reported by many authors, took place according to the famous divination sessions and was carried out by the Gadong and Nechung State Oracles.

On 9 November 1950, Ngabö Ngawang Jigme 阿沛·阿旺晋美, then a prisoner of the PLA in Chamdo following the Tibetan defeat, sent the Kashag (the cabinet of the Tibetan government) a collective letter signed by him and the main officials in Chamdo. The letter entreated the Tibetan government to embark upon negotiations with the Chinese and send representatives first to Chamdo and then later to Beijing for talks. He set a deadline for sending the delegation – 16 December. If negotiations failed, he expected catastrophic consequences not only for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government but also for “all the Tibetan people.”<sup>5</sup>

On 12 December, the Tibetan assembly met, in the presence of the Kashag and the Dalai Lama, to discuss Ngabö’s proposal. There was a great deal of passionate debate during the meeting, which lasted for several days.<sup>6</sup> According to several witnesses, as reported by Chinese sources, the Dalai Lama advocated right from the start that the Tibetans should engage in negotiations and send a delegation; he even declared “his admiration” for Ngabö’s behaviour.<sup>7</sup> The same sources insist that the Dalai Lama opposed the policy of the ex-regent and his entourage, but his opposition was rendered ineffective because power still rested in the hands of the former regent’s faction. Finally, a compromise was reached: two delegates would be sent to join Ngabö to open the negotiations in Chamdo, but they would not go to Beijing. Moreover, the assembly decided that it was necessary for the Dalai Lama to take refuge “in another place” for his own safety, and that a divine lottery would decide who would accompany him.<sup>8</sup> It was also agreed that the government would be divided in two: Lhasa would remain under the authority of two satsab (chief ministers), Lukhangwa 鲁康娃 and Lobsang Tashi 洛桑扎西, with the remainder of the Kashag travelling to Yadong 亚东 with the Dalai Lama. There would therefore be two Tibetan governments, one in Lhasa and the other in Yadong (referred to as La and Ya in Chinese documents), sometimes making contradictory decisions.

4 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 2008, 23.

5 See, e.g., Ni and Huang 1995, 174; Liao 2009, 244.

6 Partially reproduced in Liao 2009, 246 sqq, and confirmed, e.g., in British Foreign Office Records 1950.

7 Liao 2009, 246.

8 Ibid., 247.

The Dalai Lama was supposed to arrive in Yadong on 2 January 1951. It is clear that the Chinese government was worried. On that day, Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, the then first secretary in charge of the political affairs of the South-West Bureau, sent two telegrams, one to Wang Qimei 王其梅 (the first secretary of the CCP in Chamdo) and the other to Ngabö, asking them to do “everything possible to prevent the Dalai from fleeing to India.”<sup>9</sup> However, there appears to have been less of a threat of the Dalai Lama fleeing at that time – the Indian government was reluctant to host the Dalai Lama and, indeed, it had even advised him to postpone his escape to India “until the Chinese threat becomes more imminent.”<sup>10</sup> Shortly after the arrival of the Dalai Lama in Yadong in early January 1951, the Tibetan government convened an urgent meeting. After several days of debates, the assembly decided to send two delegates to negotiate directly in Beijing. The decision chimed with the wishes of the Chinese authorities, who had been requesting such talks over the course of the year, a request which had until then been repeatedly refused by the Tibetan government. So, what prompted the Tibetan leaders to change their minds?

There was, of course, Shakabpa’s 夏格巴 report to the assembly that the Tibetan requests for assistance from the UN, India and Western powers had failed.<sup>11</sup> But, there was also new information, just received by the government in Yadong, on the imminent threat of the PLA entering Lhasa from Ngari.

### The PLA in Ngari, or the Power of Propaganda

Over the course of a few days, a rumour was spread in the international press that the PLA had opened a second front via Xinjiang. Although the PLA had called a halt to its advance on the Eastern front, *The New York Times* reported that “the forces from Xinjiang province are moving rapidly through Western Tibet toward Shigatse.”<sup>12</sup>

In reality, this was an audacious bluff by Mao and other leaders of the PRC as they attempted to take Tibet. Only a small expeditionary force had in fact been sent from Xinjiang in April 1950. As it crossed the desert and highest points of the region, nearly half of the members of the detachment had died of hunger, cold or disease.<sup>13</sup> Only around a hundred survivors arrived in Ngari in November of that year, and when they came into contact with two representatives of the Tibetan government, “80 per cent of them were seriously sick.”<sup>14</sup> One of the surviving veterans confessed that “*if the Kashag had sent only 20 to 30 men ... it would have been difficult for us to resist,*” and “*if the weakness of*

9 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 2010, 960.

10 Trumbull, Robert. 1950. “Dalai-lama urged to defer his flight.” *New York Times*, 31 December, 2. See also Ji 1993, 203; Xizang zizhiqu zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 1981, 37.

11 Shakabpa 2010, 951–52.

12 “Dalai-lama seeks red China’s terms.” *New York Times*, 14 January 1951, 10.

13 See, e.g., Gong 2006, 246.

14 Ji 1993, 363.

*our forces had been discovered ... the totality of the detachment could have been annihilated.*"<sup>15</sup>

But, the head of the force, Li Disan 李狄三, managed to convince the two Tibetan officials that this detachment was the vanguard of a much larger army, and gave the officials an impressive demonstration of the detachment's artillery. Li suggested that the Tibetan officials convey their concerns directly to Chairman Mao, and a letter was sent by telegram via Xinjiang at the end of November. The letter contained a petition asking for there to be no armed conflict and for Beijing to come to an agreement with the government in Lhasa. It also conveyed that they were "praying for Mao to give the order to stop the offensive of the PLA."<sup>16</sup> Mao responded personally, via the same channel, on 30 December. If the PLA entered Tibet, he said, it would be to "help the Tibetan people." Furthermore, he hoped that the soldiers would soon become "friends with the Tibetan people everywhere."<sup>17</sup> Mao, of course, understood the propaganda power of that correspondence and, on the same day, he requested that his answer be made public.<sup>18</sup> These events occurred as the Dalai Lama and his government were arriving in Yadong. On 14 January, the two representatives of the Tibetan government in Ngari wrote to Yadong to warn the Kashag: "We have no armed forces in Ngari and if the Chinese army arrives here it will be difficult to send it back."<sup>19</sup> I contend that fear of this supposed attack was certainly one of the main factors behind the Kashag's decision to send a delegation to Beijing.<sup>20</sup> This hypothesis is borne out by the fact that on the first day of the "negotiations" in Beijing on 29 April 1951, Ngabö asked for an undertaking by the PRC government that it would call an immediate halt to the PLA offensive in Ngari; without this assurance the Dalai Lama would go into exile and no negotiations would be possible.<sup>21</sup> Li Weihai 李维汉, who was leading the Chinese delegation, promised to do what was necessary, which was of course an easy enough promise to fulfil considering the true position of the PLA forces in Ngari.

In the weeks following this first contact between Yadong and Beijing, the Kashag came under pressure from the Indian government as well as from the Chinese embassy in India, and was itself divided between Lhasa, which was in favour of a hard line and Tibetan independence, and Yadong, which was much more inclined to compromise.

On 18 January 1951, the kalön (minister) Surkang 索康 left Yadong for Delhi, carrying with him a letter from the Dalai Lama to the Chinese ambassador in

15 Ibid., 363, 368. Emphasis added.

16 Ni and Huang 1995, 158.

17 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 2008, 36.

18 Ni and Huang 1995, 111.

19 Xizang zizhiqiu zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 2005, 54.

20 As it is in fact recognized frankly by Zhonggong Xizang zizhiqiu weiyuanhui dangshi yanjiushi 2010, 94.

21 See, e.g., Ji 1993, 221; and "Diary of Le Yuhong" in Xizang zizhiqiu zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 1981, 51.

India, which he presented on 27 January.<sup>22</sup> In this letter, the Dalai Lama wrote: “when I was young, I did not have power,” and this period corresponded to a “rupture of the friendly relations between China and Tibet,” which the Dalai Lama “deeply regretted.” He went on to explain that he was forced to go to Yadong, because the population was worried about of the presence at the borders “of the Chinese army and in the eastern part and the western part of Tibet.”<sup>23</sup> He also stated that he had sent two delegates from Lhasa to Chamdo to help Ngabö to negotiate; however, owing to “the long distance, and the difficulty of arriving on time,” he proposed to send two other delegates directly from India to Beijing.

The ambassador transmitted this letter to the Chinese government and, on 29 January, Zhou Enlai 周恩来 responded by asking if the ambassador had confidential information concerning the “internal situation” of the Tibetan government. Were there any changes inside the Kashag and “was the real power now in the hands of the Three Monastic Seats?”<sup>24</sup> If so, he advised the ambassador to tell the visitors that if the Dalai Lama were to leave Tibet, he would lose his position definitively.

This telegram indicates that the Chinese government was relying on the political weight of the Three Monastic Seats in order to achieve its aims. The Three Monastic Seats were from the start in favour of peaceful negotiations, and several of their representatives went to the Dalai Lama during his stay in Yadong to beg him to return to Lhasa.<sup>25</sup> Zhou was cautious and wanted to be certain that the “pro-Beijing” faction had gained ascendancy in Yadong before the ambassador laid down the PRC government’s main condition during this time, which was that the ten-point document offered by the Chinese would only be valid if the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa; if he left Tibet, he would lose everything.<sup>26</sup>

It seems that the Chinese leaders were wary of the two delegates sent from Lhasa and wished to have someone like Ngabö as the head of the Tibetan delegation in Beijing. Then, on 2 February, probably after bowing to pressure from the ambassador, envoys of the Dalai Lama sent a telegraph from the Chinese embassy in Delhi with the order for Ngabö to accompany the two Lhasa delegates to Beijing.<sup>27</sup>

22 Zhonggong Xizang zizhiqū weiyuanhui dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui 1991, 51.

23 Ni and Huang 1995, 185. This is further evidence that the Tibetan government was fearful of an invasion via Ngari.

24 “Zhou Enlai wei Zhongyang qicao de guanyu huanying Dalai pai daibiao lai jing shangyi heping jieqie Xizang wenti (yuanjian you Zhongyang dangangan tigong)” (Zhou Enlai for the central government’s draft letter on welcoming the delegation sent by the Dalai Lama to Beijing to negotiate for a peaceful solution to the Tibet issue (Originally provided by the Central Archives), in Xizang zizhiqū dangshi bangongshi 1998, 12.

25 Dalai-lama 1990, 98–99. This is confirmed, e.g., in Dan 1996, 73. This policy of relying on the conservative forces of the Three Monastic Seats was also followed by previous Chinese governments.

26 This plan, proposed by Deng for the Tibetans in 27 May 1950, became the basis for the “17-point agreement.”

27 See Ngabö’s letter to the Dalai Lama, 21 March 1951, in Xizang zizhiqū zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 2005, 50.

On 5 February, the first delegation sent from Lhasa reached Chamdo, where it met Ngabö. Although he had received the 2 February telegram sent via the Chinese Embassy, Ngabö pretended not to have understood it correctly, apparently because he did not want to go to Beijing. The official reason given was that “he was already in a liberated area” and therefore he thought he would not have to be part of a delegation sent by the Tibetan government.<sup>28</sup>

### Negotiations in Lhasa?

The choice of negotiation site is an interesting point about which Chinese sources bring new insights. I will now discuss the problem, as presented by Melvyn Goldstein and Tsering Shakya, who both draw on the official memoirs of Ngabö.<sup>29</sup> Not persuaded by the Kashag’s plans for “negotiation,” Ngabö supposedly suggested to Wang Qimei that they try to start negotiations in Lhasa, and Wang is said to have agreed. Ngabö contacted the two sitsab to ask for authorization to go to Lhasa accompanied by a Chinese delegation headed by Wang. The two sitsab agreed, and the delegation had begun preparations to leave when, on 22 March, Ngabö received the order from the Dalai Lama to go to Beijing to join the other delegation. Presented with two contradictory orders, Ngabö preferred to follow the Dalai Lama’s order.

This raises the question of why the Tibetan government prevented Ngabö from starting negotiations in Lhasa, which would have been the more advantageous choice for the Tibetans. Tsering Shakya posits that maybe the Kashag was fearful that the Chinese delegation accompanying Ngabö would settle permanently in Lhasa, and that the Kashag wanted to “prevent them from gaining a foothold in the city.” However, also according to Shakya, such a decision was a “crucial mistake” on the part of the Tibetan government.<sup>30</sup> Newly available Chinese sources provide a different slant to the problem.

First, the Yadong Kashag tried to persuade the two sitsab in Lhasa to send a delegation to Beijing, to which they were completely opposed. On 12 and 15 February 1951, Yadong sent two telegrams to the sitsab pointing out the risk of the PLA occupying Lhasa via Ngari. They also specified that, in regard to sending a delegation to Beijing, the Dalai Lama was “personally extremely satisfied with this policy.” Furthermore, the first telegram ended by stipulating that the sitsab should not follow another direction, because “for the safety of the state and the religion, it is necessary that the Kashag of Lhasa and that of Yadong have the same policy.”<sup>31</sup>

28 Ji 1993, 209. See also Ngabö’s letter to the Dalai Lama on 21 March 1951, giving the pretext that he refused to go to Beijing because it would be of little interest. See Xizang zizhiqu zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 2005, 50.

29 Goldstein 2007, 89; Shakya 1999, 63.

30 Shakya 1992, 749.

31 Xizang zizhiqu zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 2005, 57.

Yet, at the end of February, Ngabö seemed unaware that he was still officially selected by the Kashag of Yadong to lead the delegation that was supposed to be going to Beijing, where he was still refusing to go. This suggests that, in spite of the two telegrams, the sitsab in Lhasa had continued to encourage Ngabö to go to Lhasa with the Wang delegation and had not informed him of the last Yadong order.

However, a new element was going to change the situation. The US took a fresh interest in the Tibet question, as the US ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, expressed concerns for the Tibetan delegation leaving for Beijing. Henderson hoped to contact the Dalai Lama, via the Austrian mountaineer Heinrich Harrer, and persuade him to go into exile.<sup>32</sup> There was now the risk that not only would the Tibetan delegation not go to Beijing but that also the Dalai Lama would flee into exile himself. The Chinese government soon learned of these moves, and on 21 March, Zhou Enlai summoned the Indian ambassador in China to deliver a very clear message: “The Dalai Lama is at Yadong, [we] hope that he will not leave Tibet, it is in his interest.” He went on to state that “the PLA must absolutely enter in Tibet,” but it would be done peacefully only if the Dalai Lama “does not leave” and “decides to take part in the negotiations.” If the Dalai Lama settles in India, “*it will have negative consequences for Sino-Indian relations.*”<sup>33</sup>

The response was immediate: the Indian government first contacted Yadong, and then the Yadong Kashag warned the Lhasa Kashag. Then, on 23 March, Ngabö received a telegram from the sitsab ordering him to leave for Beijing, something that he felt obliged to do, albeit reluctantly, because the order came from both the Yadong and Lhasa Kashags.<sup>34</sup> In other words, the decision to send a delegation to Beijing rather than to Lhasa was not formed because the Kashag was afraid that the Chinese delegation accompanying Ngabö would settle in Lhasa, but rather because, initially, the Dalai Lama and the Yadong Kashag had been misled about the extent of the PLA threat to Tibet. And, later, the Lhasa Kashag finally accepted the requests of the Yadong Kashag mainly owing to the pressure exerted on the Tibetan government by the PRC, via the Indian government.

On 25 March, Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 and Zhou Enlai sent an important telegram to Mao, which gives weight to my analysis: “We have studied this matter with the South-West Bureau and our ambassador in India and we have decided that it is in our interest to persuade Ngabö to come to Beijing ... If we send Wang Qimei to accompany Ngabö to Lhasa ... it is a personal incentive by the two Sitsab. The dangers would be numerous.” Ngabö must therefore first come to Beijing so that

32 See US Department of State 1983, 1610–13. This is confirmed, e.g., in Zhonggong Xizang zizhiq weiyuanhui dangshi yanjiushi 2010, 151, which believes that the move was a CIA plot.

33 Ni and Huang 1995, 124. Emphasis added.

34 See Xizang zizhiq zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 2005, 50. The telegram was sent by the sitsab from Lhasa, not from Yadong, as both Goldstein and Tsering Shakya contend (Goldstein 2007, 89; Shakya 1999, 63).



“the negotiations can be held *on our terms*.” As a second step, he will return to Tibet accompanied by Wang Qimei, which “*is in our interest*” [sic].<sup>35</sup>

Reading this text, it is possible to conclude that those who regret *a posteriori* that the Tibetan government lost the opportunity to open negotiations in Lhasa have, in fact, nothing to regret. The leaders of the PRC *never* countenanced the idea that negotiations could be held in Lhasa, even if it appeared at the local level that the leaders of the 18th army in Chamdo were not informed of this and had indeed begun preparations for departure. It was only necessary to give the illusion to Ngabö that he might be able to go to Lhasa, while at the same time exerting pressure on both Kashags to accept the Beijing delegation plan.

The Tibetan delegation left Chamdo for Beijing on 29 March. Two days prior to this date, Ngabö sent a long letter to the Dalai Lama, in which he stated clearly that he felt obliged to obey orders but that he regretted that his attempt to bring about negotiations in Lhasa had failed.<sup>36</sup> Having no alternative but to go to Beijing, it appears that he had come to the conclusion that the Tibetan delegation would have to adopt the “ten-point document” in the hope of gaining more concessions from Chinese government. Ngabö wrote that, “for the success of the strategy when I will be in China,” the Tibetan government must “publicly proclaim that Tibet is a Chinese territory.” Furthermore, he added that it would be necessary to accept “PLA troops being stationed at the Indian border.” Ngabö had been promised that if the Tibetan government accepted these two conditions, “whatever the Tibetan government demands, the Chinese government promises to satisfy them” [sic].<sup>37</sup> In spite of censorship, Ngabö wrote that in the end it was preferable that there should be two delegations “with two different routes” because he “had fallen into enemy hands and was not free in his movements.” He let it be understood also that if he had gone to Lhasa, maybe some (in other words, the Chinese government) would have suspected it was because he wanted to flee.

On 22 April, the Chamdo delegation reached Beijing by train and was received by Zhou Enlai and Zhu De 朱德. The two Yadong delegates arrived by plane four days later. The “negotiations” could therefore begin.

## Conclusion

The Battle of Chamdo had been won by the PLA in October 1950 *in extremis* and with a lot of difficulties. Aware of the forthcoming problems, and despite the fact that much of the Tibetan army had been eliminated, the PRC leaders were particularly concerned that any local resistance might delay the further progression of the PLA into Tibet, especially as logistical and food supply problems had still

35 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, zhonggong Xizang zizhiqiu weiyuanhui bianji 2005, 39–40. Emphasis added.

36 Xizang zizhiqiu zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 2005, 48 sqq.

37 *Ibid.*, 50.

not been resolved. The new offensive, originally planned for spring 1951, was postponed until the summer of 1951 in the hope that a new military campaign could be avoided if the Tibetan government voluntarily accepted what was so difficult to obtain on the ground: this was the principle of the so-called “peaceful liberation.” In addition, the departure of the Dalai Lama and the possibility of a Tibetan government-in-exile was a particularly alarming prospect for the leaders of the young PRC. In spite of these handicaps, six months after the battle of Chamdo, a Tibetan delegation arrived in Beijing to engage in “negotiations,” the outcome of which the Tibetan government should have been capable of predicting. The two main demands imposed by the Chinese government – the integration of Tibet into the PRC and the acceptance of the PLA in Tibetan territory – had already been accepted, at least by the head of the Tibetan delegation, Ngabö, before the start of the “negotiations.”

Retrospectively, the historian can only admire the skill of the leaders of the PRC who understood so well how to use the weaknesses, divisions and the amazing credulities of the Tibetan elite and knew also how to take advantage of the divisions and indecisions of the leaders of the “imperialist countries.”

### Biographical note

Alex RAYMOND gained his PhD in history from EHESS (Paris). He currently teaches East Asian history in universities in the Lebanon and is an associate researcher at CESPRA (Centre d'études sociologiques et politiques Raymond-Aron), Paris. His current research focuses on the Tibetan policies of the PRC in the early 1950s.

**摘要:** 昌都之战（1950年10月）之后，1950年11月至1951年4月期间，中国领导人的主要目标之一是试图说服西藏政府尽快派代表去北京开始“谈判，”同时，尽一切努力防止达赖喇嘛离开西藏。在本研究中，我们使用为这一“谈判”过程提供新视角的中文文档。不需详细解读国际形势，我们将了解到中国领导人是怎样或通过许诺或通过威胁甚至虚张声势来实现他们的目标的。

**关键词:** 中华人民共和国政府; 政治; 西藏; 1950年11月至1951年4月; 许诺; 威胁或虚张声势; 占领。

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