Bolivia. The nature of the party system, legislature, civil society actors, and other components of the PMP is essential in accounting for this difference. The absence of truly encompassing peak business associations or institutionalized business representation in the party system (weak instrumental business power) may well facilitate the job of enacting discrete direct tax reform initiatives, as the book convincingly shows, but what is the effect of such institutional features on the intertemporal quality of tax policymaking? Standard accounts (see Mariano Tommasi's scholarship or the 2006 IDB Report *The Politics of Policy*) tell us that the quality of tax policymaking will suffer in many important dimensions in the absence of robust state institutions, organized civil society, and strong party systems. *Private Wealth and Public Revenue* does a formidable job in tackling an essential question that has been surprisingly underresearched: prospects for the taxation of elites in Latin America. But it is important to bear in mind that the research question it pursues, while very important, is narrow in scope. The scope for future research on Latin American taxation remains vast.

Beyond the important role it plays in explaining outcomes in the realm of direct taxation, there are strong reasons to think that Fairfield's theory can wield important explanatory leverage in other substantive areas of economic policy reform, as the author herself points out (but does not elaborate). It should also be able to travel across space to other developing regions with ease. In fact, one wishes the author had addressed in a separate chapter the question of the scope and plausibility of the argument with out-of-sample tests. But these are minor quibbles. This is an outstanding piece of scholarship, presenting a sophisticated theoretical framework and impressive field research that breaks new ground in an underexplored critical subject in Latin America.

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Eduardo Moncada, *Cities, Business, and the Politics of Urban Violence in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016. Bibliography, index, 248 pp.; hardcover $65, ebook.

The stubbornly high crime rate afflicting Latin America—where the homicide rate has been more than three times the global average since 2000, with over 40 percent of the world's annual murders—has been met with an equally frustrating inability to curb it. Assessing the range of actors and policies responsible for this failure in Colombia's three main cities, Eduardo Moncada's book zeroes in on the relationship between local government and business, creating an explanatory framework that is both clearly formulated and historically grounded.

Colombia is, of course, an exceptional case, both for its prolonged political violence and for the turnaround of security in its cities. But exploring how its local officials and businesses deal with a host of challenges and with each other helps disentangle the complex interactions that have obstructed efforts to curb crime throughout Latin America.

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The book's central premise is that collaboration between local government and business limits the corrosive influence on policy of other actors, while conflict or disengagement between them opens up opportunity for those actors. To be open to such collaboration, though, government officials must free themselves from the grip of clientelism, and business from the myopia of short-term concerns. Breaking out of the longstanding focus of policy studies on contrasting Latin America's iron fist and community-based approaches, this analytical premise also provides a much-needed context for those approaches by showing how political clientelism and business controls can hollow out any type of reform, giving citizens the image without the substance of actual change or participation.

The book also reasserts the centrality of spatiality. Much criminality is rooted in neighborhood dynamics, as criminological studies show, and this book's exploration of neighborhood-level conditions widens rather than narrows security studies. As seen in cities throughout Latin America, efforts to address those conditions, such as block-by-block community meetings, special prosecutors examining unsolved crimes, and mapping out gang controls, are effective because security is not just about armed violence or drug trafficking. It is also about the full range of local issues, from uncertainties of property ownership and public housing to the location of sports fields and factories. As Moncada shows vividly in Colombia's cities, for example, regulations for public vendors became a reflection and a lightning rod for the overlapping issues of political power, public image, and crime.

Brute violence, though, "has and continues to be strategically used" as a primary channel of local power. As Moncada shows, the mutually reinforcing patterns of violence in Colombia stem from a city-level intersection among political parties, clientelist networks, and local militias—themselves supported by regional caudillos and national elites—producing the country's longstanding exclusion based on the ability to deliver votes and resources, which themselves are attained through constant and organized criminal violence. Underscoring the breadth of this pattern are the ongoing battles for control over urban neighborhoods throughout Latin America. In addition to urban zones in Colombia like Medellín's Comuna 13 neighborhood, similar controls inflame violence in areas such as the routes between the United States and the Mexican city of Nogales, the big cities of Central America's Northern Triangle, and the roads leading into the working-class zones of Brazil's megalopolises.

Along with violence, the book captures the impact of decentralization, perhaps the most significant change in Latin American governance of the current democratic era. Transferring authority to provinces and cities makes sense, of course, since they break up long-centralized controls while they more ably respond to local concerns and acquire the citizen knowledge and trust needed to prosecute crime. But on security, regional and local governments throughout Latin America have lacked the funding, expertise, and coherence to implement effective action.

In Colombia, when a new constitution transferred policy control to municipalities, each of the three big cities, Medellín, Cali, and Bogotá, took up the mantle by forging ambitious participatory security reform to tackle extensive violence. In

Medellín, the government worked in the 1980s with civil society to develop projects based on broad participation, judicial reform, and institutional accountability. Similarly, Cali's Desepaz (Development, Security, and Peace) program "combined violence control and prevention efforts with initiatives to integrate citizen participation into security policy-making" (90) with a focus on small police stations, violence mapping, and youth resocialization. Bogotá, most famously and ambitiously, directly addressed ingrained civil habits—from alcohol sales to jaywalking—that contributed to daily insecurity. Citizens from the city's different areas were actively recruited and results regularly documented through an Observatory for Security, which has since become a common security reform throughout the region.

But then politics descended. Medellín's business community, fearing that change would entrench armed radical movements in key areas of the city, "used its research capacities, financial capital, and other resources to advance its own interests, and in the process, undermined key elements of the participatory project" (160). The mayor, for his part, stalwartly rebuffed demands by civil society. Many of those demands came from the city's myriad movements, many sustained by crime, which reflected a lack of coordination in the marginalized areas that the reform was targeting.

Cali's peripheral neighborhoods similarly resembled "quilts of diverse and powerful armed actors, each of which exerted territorial control and whose individual leaders actively competed to obtain greater territory and share of various illicit markets" (97). Police-supported social cleansing groups began killing the young men who relinquished their weapons as part of the county's resocialization plan, and the recruitment of Cali's youth gangs as "proxies" by narcotraffickers—along with the skeletal police budget and lack of trust in elected officials—made security even less amenable to policy.

In contrast, "collaborative local government-business relations together with the atomized nature of territorial control" sustained the participatory project in 1990s Bogotá. Mayor Antanas Mockus fended off city council clientelism with a combination of foreign support, citizen participation, and steadily improving conditions. As the book describes in detail, officials were able to navigate crosscurrents that capsized projects in most cities, as well as the officials themselves.

One of the most understudied obstacles to security reform in Latin America, in fact, is the legislative obstruction and disorganization that either prevents enactment of coherent reform or allows reckless executive action to go unchecked. This book shows that to be as true on the local level as on the national. In addition, the continuation of both dense public–private sector linkages and atomized territorial control led Bogotá's businesses to continue backing reform under Mockus's successor, Luis Eduardo Garzón. Such continuity underscores its own importance for reform throughout Latin America, where so many executives at all levels dismantle their predecessors' security policies—and cycle through so many security ministers and police chiefs during their own terms—that no policy gets much traction. From Mexico to Argentina, many of Latin America's most significant security reforms have hinged on their prospects for survival through successive governments.

Along with the pressures of time, though, come the limits of space. While this book skillfully describes territorial controls within cities, it does not include the controls and politics in the larger metropolitan areas of which they are a part. The sprawling urban areas of Latin America share the same security challenges but are fragmented by competing governments unable to muster the coordination needed to meet them. As seen in nearly every large and medium-sized city—such as the Federal District of Caracas, where dozens of municipal police work and clash with each other and with federal forces—the structure of municipal governments in Latin America could not be more ill suited to curb the criminality that flows across the administrative and political lines that splinter them.

While the geography of territorial control is a pillar of the book's theoretical framework, more centrally, it does not neatly square with the case studies in this book or with other Latin American cases. Moncada shows that increased government-business collaboration "reduces the scope of the politics of urban violence by generating a more united local ruling class able to fend off mobilization by opposing interests" from below and above (156). But as also seen in the cities of Colombia and other countries, such collaboration stems from a civil society unable to unite due to a violent fragmentation that also obstructs any policy that emerges from such collaboration.

The solid recommendations that are proposed in the book's final chapters, though, address such limitations. Moncada's practical suggestions to incorporate business, focus on local order, and take other proven steps all provide focus without losing sight of security's underlying complexity. This book, deeply historical and clearly presented, demonstrates the utility of understanding the full trajectory of reform to know how it might fare in other cities. Only by clearing away illusions of security's promise can it be pared down to its most robust elements.

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Teri L. Caraway, María Lorena Cook, and Stephen Crowley, eds., *Working Through the Past: Labor and Authoritarian Legacies in Comparative Perspective*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. Photographs, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index, 296 pp.; hardcover $79.95, paperback $27.95.

Organized labor occupies a prominent role in research on the origins and development of welfare states in advanced democracies. The "power resources" approach puts a strong emphasis on the organizational power of the working class to pursue its interests. Much of this literature focuses on the postwar era, a period when industrialized Western countries already enjoyed uninterrupted democracy. Thus, regime type is not a central factor for explaining the strength of labor and its capacity for influencing the development of the welfare state. In contrast, the rapidly growing research agenda on the welfare state in less-developed countries gives regime type a central place in the study of social policy development. However, with some notable