

subject to overwhelming conservative consensus in 2014 (the importance of speaking English, the value of US citizenship, having lived in the United States for life) saw no ideological differences in 1996. This pattern is consistent with the notion that, for the American public, the symbolic resonance of specific stories is a reflection of the most recent election, not the long-term accumulation of philosophical messaging.

Theories of the American party system also provide competing explanations for Ricci's pattern of messaging. Matt Grossman and David A. Hopkins ("Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats," *Perspectives on Politics*, 13 (1), 2015) argue that it is a mistake to regard the two major political parties as organizational mirror images or, most commonly, as two coalitions of politically motivated elites. Instead, they argue that the Republican Party is (for largely sociological and demographic reasons) motivated by advancing ideological purity, disciplined by purists in think tanks and conservative media. The Democratic Party, in contrast, comprises an ad hoc alliance between distinct social groups—racial minorities, labor unions, climate change activists, and so on. According to this account, Democratic elites might be incapable of adopting Ricci's prescription, because they lack the institutional resources to achieve ideological discipline.

Theories of public opinion also complicate the Ricci account. Christopher Ellis and James A. Stimson (*Ideology in America*, 2012) find a fundamental ideological asymmetry among the US public. When Americans are asked to appraise a specific policy proposal, there is a persistent appetite for expanded government intervention and liberal policy answers. When asked an abstract question about the proper scope of government, without recourse to a specific policy, conservative symbols are favored. This aggregate paradox—that the US public prefers specific liberal policies and general conservative principles—is also apparent on an individual level (almost one-third of the US public has this bundle of preferences). This finding might reframe Ricci's paradox as a rational response by elites to the strategic contours of US politics: liberals emphasize specific policies, and conservatives abstract symbols, because those are the strongest cards they have. Similarly, others find psychological differences along the ideological spectrum: conservatives are more inclined to symbolic enchantment, whereas liberals are more equipped for rationalism (J. Eric Oliver and Thomas Julian Wood, *Enchanted America: How Intuition and Reason Divide Our Politics*, 2018), or that incompatible values among liberals and conservatives preclude interchangeable political appeals (Mark Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler, *Prius or Pickup? How the Answers to Four Simple Questions Explain America's Great Divide*, 2018).

Finally, a voluminous literature has abstracted away the details of specific political campaigns and instead posited that US presidential elections respond powerfully to

prevailing economic circumstance. To the extent that Ricci intends to resolve the liberal predicament to improve their political prospects, this literature would suggest that styles of ideological appeal operate on the electoral margins, yielding only a modest difference on voters after the powerful effect of economics has been felt.

Ricci's carefully researched and elegantly argued book provides a valuable contribution to students of US politics and to those interested in the electoral implications of philosophical debates. In an area dominated by those who use quantitative methods on survey data, Ricci's focus on the intellectual style of competing philosophical schools is a vital and distinct contribution. It will surely prove an influential claim among those seeking to understand the sources of ideological differences in the US public.

The Politics of Losing: Trump, the Klan, and the Mainstreaming of Resentment. By Rory McVeigh and Kevin Estep. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019. 320p. \$32.00 cloth, \$22.00 paper.

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As the outlines of President Trump's reelection campaign become clearer, it seems likely that stoking racial division will again be a central feature. According to *The Politics of Losing: Trump, the Klan, and the Mainstreaming of Resentment* by Rory McVeigh and Kevin Estep, this should come as no surprise. Drawing parallels to periods of heightened Ku Klux Klan activity throughout American history, the authors show how Trump succeeded in 2016 by appealing to white nationalist sentiment.

McVeigh and Estep contribute to an expanding literature on contemporary backlash politics. From Kathy Cramer's (2016) *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness and the Rise of Scott Walker* to Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan Hajnal's (2015) *White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics* and Ashley Jardina's (2019) *White Identity Politics*, a raft of recent scholarship documents the ways in which white Americans' fears and resentments have been nurtured, consolidated, and channeled to the political benefit of right-wing politicians and the Republican Party. Along with a broader scholarship on the persistence and political activation of racism, work in this area often makes arguments using experimental or fieldwork research and behavioral and opinion data. McVeigh and Estep's innovation is to use a historical case study approach, comparing episodes of heightened KKK activity in the 1860s, 1920s, and 1950–60s to Trump's 2016 strategies and bases of electoral support. The authors argue that Trump, like earlier KKK leaders, has taken opportunistic advantage of white Americans' sense of loss, focusing their resentment on others perceived as unfairly benefiting at their expense. The result is episodic white

nationalist resurgence during periods of marked change: Reconstruction, the Progressive and civil rights eras, and today.

In addition to its topical appeal, *The Politics of Losing* is eminently readable. The authors explain social science tools and concepts (e.g., regression analysis, social movement theory) and significant history (e.g., the Black Codes, Republican Party issue shifts) in a way that is especially useful in the undergraduate classroom. Their central argument is premised on what they call the “occurrence of power devaluation” (p. 19), which they explain as what happens when a powerful group feels threatened by a loss of power across multiple dimensions. Separate chapters on economics, politics, and social status detail how leaders exploited changes in each of these spheres to direct white Americans’ anger toward support for white nationalism. The authors describe both general historical and current trends in demographic change, economic fluctuation, and political and party alignments (also useful in the classroom), showing exactly how opportunistic leaders framed these developments for susceptible audiences. A chapter on the media shows the similar ways that Klan leaders and the Trump administration managed their images and controlled narratives to their advantage. Although much of the argument is made through qualitative comparisons, the authors rely on quantitative data and simple statistical analyses, especially to demonstrate who was most responsive to Trump’s candidacy.

With *The Politics of Losing*, McVeigh and Estep have waded into the class versus race debate over why Trump won in 2016. By showing which white Americans were made receptive to Trump’s racist, demagogic appeals—and how—the authors reveal that race and class are made to serve one another by ambitious elites. One of their central claims is that education, more than income level, drove Trump’s support, arguing that whites in communities bypassed by globalization—typically with lower education levels—were especially vulnerable to his white nationalist messages. Focusing on primary voters who elevated Trump above more conventional Republican candidates, the authors argue that Trump appealed to lesser-educated whites because his populist rhetoric spoke not only to their economic loss but also to their perceived loss of social status and political power in a country with changing racial, ethnic, and religious demographics. This type of argument is not new; Richard Hofstadter and others writing in the mid-twentieth century used the concept of status anxiety to explain popular support for right-wing politics. Although more recent scholars of modern conservatism have dismissed this claim as too simplistic (e.g., Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right*, 2002), McVeigh and Estep have reinvigorated the argument, updating it with the concept of a trifold loss and highlighting how Trump, by yoking economic nationalism to religious and racial

conservatism, offered a message very different from that of traditional Republican elites.

Historicizing the pattern helps answer the question of how virulent racism is kept alive in a country that has nonetheless made progress toward liberal goals: what leaders do matters. But Trump was put into office by Republican voters in general. Contemporary party polarization, as well as efforts by generations of Republican leaders to rhetorically discredit the federal government and expertise in general, undoubtedly aided Trump in his populist, scapegoating efforts. Although the authors recognize some of this in their discussion of the modern Republican Party, more could probably be said about how these larger party trends accommodate the sustenance of white nationalism and its effects.

The authors’ decision to compare a case of, in essence, intraparty factionalism (Trump Republicanism) to an external social movement (the KKK) also minimizes the role of institutions. Although Donald Trump had no public service history, his electoral success capitalized on long-standing Republican currents of social conservatism and coded racial and anti-immigrant mobilization. And, notably, despite the hiccup of the “Never Trump” movement, the Republican Party establishment has largely tolerated and occasionally endorsed Trump’s base-rallying appeals. Bringing white nationalism into contemporary party politics is presumably what the authors mean by “mainstreaming” resentment. But why not compare Trump’s success to McCarthyism, the Dixiecrats, or even the Know-Nothings/American Party? This sort of comparison, by showing how established parties have negotiated—absorbing *and* repudiating—popular antiliberal movements over time, might give additional leverage on addressing the question of how white nationalism was mainstreamed in 2016. The authors have done us a big service in pointing to the conditions under which white nationalism flourishes, but perhaps the biggest story here is how a national political party, theoretically and often empirically a moderating institution of democracy, has become a facilitating vehicle for ideological extremism.

A related question about the authors’ comparative endeavor is what role in the analysis should be accorded to changing norms and laws. The earlier episodes of KKK activity took place after the Civil War and during Jim Crow—when illiberal racial norms were pervasive and had state legitimation. That white nationalism has resurged is not surprising to any student of US history, but that it has been mainstreamed, as the authors suggest, in the context of a legal regime with additional liberal protections and greater norms of equality, requires more discussion. It may make the parallels the authors draw between now and then all the more ominous.

The authors’ concluding observation is that white nationalism thrives on segregation and that integration—geographic and social—is key to defeating it. And as

they note, the United States today remains remarkably segregated. But what should be underscored is that today's Republican Party, with its record of resisting equality-promoting legislation and its active minority governance strategy of gerrymandering, immigration restriction, and racialized voter disenfranchisement, has helped drive inequality. Complicit in its rise and sustained by its cultivation, the Republican Party of 2020 may see little benefit in resisting white nationalism. And this institutional capitulation—in the context of twenty-first-century liberalism—might be one of the biggest differences from the past.

The Collision of Political and Legal Time: Foreign Affairs and the Supreme Court's Transformation of Executive Authority. By Kimberley L. Fletcher. Philadelphia:

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In *The Collision of Political and Legal Time: Foreign Affairs and the Supreme Court's Transformation of Executive Authority*, Kimberley L. Fletcher sets out to explain how the Supreme Court, over the last century, has decided key cases concerning executive authority in foreign affairs. Moving beyond a singular focus on one of the three canonical models of judicial decision making—the legal, attitudinal, and strategic models—Fletcher contends that justices must weigh both internal factors like established legal norms and external factors—such as social forces, the political landscape, and national security threats—when deciding whether to expand or contract presidents' foreign policy powers at critical moments.

In analyzing the Supreme Court's decision making in these cases, Fletcher highlights its ability to create a “new constitutional order” (p. 11) for interpreting the president's proper legal and constitutional role in foreign affairs. In other words, the outcomes of such cases can usher in a new regime that shapes how future courts and other political actors define the limits of executive power. Such precedent, however, is not irreversible. Instead, she argues that exogenous shocks can lead to the emergence of new transformative cases that can once again create opportunities to redefine the boundaries of executive authority in particular areas.

To provide evidence for her claims, Fletcher conducts cases studies on a handful of the most important Supreme Court decisions involving executive authority in foreign policy throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. These cases consider challenges to a wide range of presidential actions, such as foreign trade embargos (*United States v. Curtiss-Wright*, 1936), Japanese internment (*Hirabayashi v. United States*, 1943; *Korematsu v. United States*, 1944), the seizure of steel mills (*Youngstown*

Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, 1952), freezing Iranian assets (*Dames & Moore v. Regan*, 1981), restricting travel to Cuba (*Regan v. Wald*, 1984), and the detaining of enemy combatants (*Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 2004; *Boumediene v. Bush*, 2008). In analyzing these cases, she provides an impressive array of rich detail surrounding the impetus for the initial challenges; the social, legal, and political context at the time the cases were decided; the most relevant factors in the justices' deliberation; and their long-term consequences.

Fletcher indeed finds that the Supreme Court's decisions in these pivotal cases were based, at least partially, on external conditions and also created new precedents that dictated the parameters of executive authority in foreign policy. In the midst of war between Bolivia and Paraguay, for instance, the Court relied on the “sole organ” doctrine in *United States v. Curtiss-Wright* (1936), which consequently ushered in a newly expansive interpretation of the president's independent role in conducting foreign affairs. Executive power was further bolstered following the decisions in *Hirabayashi v. United States* (1943) and *Korematsu v. United States* (1944), when the Supreme Court upheld President Franklin D. Roosevelt's executive order leading to the internment of Japanese Americans in World War II. In those rulings, the Court claimed that such orders were justified in that particular context for the sake of protecting the national interest during national emergencies.

Although the outcomes of these cases were crucial for shaping future opinions regarding executive authority, they were not immutable and certainly did not lead to a blanket increase in executive power over time. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Court subsequently decided key cases that produced serious limitations on presidential foreign policy powers at critical moments. In the immediate post-9/11 era, for instance, the Supreme Court determined in a series of cases that national security interests did not warrant many of George W. Bush's actions regarding detainees, which it found violated individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Across all of the cases she examines, Fletcher finds that the Court relied heavily on its evaluation of pressing external conditions, often in contradiction to the justices' own ideological preferences, to determine whether executive power should be expanded or restricted. In doing so, she contributes to—and challenges—a political science literature largely focused on the partisan or ideological alignment of institutional actors when analyzing judicial outcomes. She demonstrates that there is a constellation of germane factors that affect judicial decision making in foreign policy, an area where presidents have the greatest potential to exercise their most expansive and consequential powers.

Notwithstanding these contributions, the book would have been further enriched had Fletcher incorporated much of the existing separation-of-powers literature into