

revolutionary detour” of the Mao era (p. 230). Gerth now asserts that the Party not only failed to build socialism; it chose early on “to reproduce private capitalism rather than abolish it” (p. 41). He argues that “building socialism” during the Mao era “primarily meant facilitating the expansion of industrial production *rather* than doing so while concurrently transforming the social relations of production” (p. 42, emphasis added). Gerth in fact capitalizes “Socialist Transformation” throughout the book in order to “flag it as the ubiquitous CCP term for a policy [that the author] would otherwise call ‘state capitalist expropriation’” (p. 51). In so saying, he “calls into question the utility of continuing to think of China during this period as socialist” at all (p. 231).

This is not merely a cynical reading of the Mao era: the claim that the Party’s commitment to building socialism amounted to little more than a mantle of rhetorical claims resting lightly upon a set of policies leading the country in a rather different direction is grim to say the least. As Mao himself famously acknowledged on more than one occasion during the Cultural Revolution, his efforts to realize a radical break with the pre-revolutionary past would probably result in defeat, because “revisionism” would likely win in the end. But Gerth’s conclusion is even more pointed: the state’s persistent tinkering with market mechanisms did not merely undermine, but “continually *negated* the central goals of the revolution itself” (p. 4, emphasis added). Mao-era Party elites may have debated “whether or to what extent a ‘socialist’ country should use markets and materialism to aid accumulation”; Gerth notes that even Mao himself expressed his doubts, although he spends little time on these (p. 231). Notwithstanding such theoretical infelicities, the Party nevertheless continued to shift the country back and forth along the “state-to-private spectrum of industrial capitalism” to aid its relentless programme of capital accumulation, negating the revolution that brought it to power.

There is a great deal of theoretical and conceptual slippage in this book. The title, for example, claims that it was consumerism – and, in particular, state consumerism – that negated China’s revolution. However, as his analysis proceeds, we see Gerth arguing that it was actually the relentless process of state accumulation that drove state consumerism, thereby undermining socialist revolutionary transformation. At points he seems to read consumption and the desire to consume itself as consumerism, which he also describes as both self-expanding *and* compulsory, raising the question of why the Mao-era state needed to mediate it. At close examination, all that seems solid about the analytical framework melts into air. But Gerth is at his best interweaving the breadth of the empirical detail of the range of materials he amassed for this study: read as an engaging history detailing consumer demand for products during the Mao era, instead of as a ringing indictment of the state’s failures to deliver on its promises of revolutionary transformation, it shines.

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Borderland Infrastructures: Trade, Development, and Control in Western China

ALESSANDRO RIPPA

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In *Borderland Infrastructures*, Alessandro Rippa examines how the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), touted by the Chinese government as lifting poor areas out of

poverty into modernity and “investing in its border regions, fostering cross-border exchanges” (p. 38), in fact erases local cross-border histories, marginalizes and impoverishes minority traders, and in the case of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, incarcerates and effectively “disappears” them.

Rippa used what he calls “itinerant ethnography” to follow itinerant local traders to discover their histories, relations and networks. He focusses on border nodes along the China/Burma border and on the China/Pakistan border, sites that reveal the coherence of Chinese state strategies as well as differences related to local histories, products, networks and the degree of perceived national security concerns.

The book is divided into three parts: proximity, curation and corridor. Rippa defines traders’ proximity as “‘informal’ practices [that] are embedded in institutional and infrastructural landscapes that they contribute to re-making and legitimizing through specific encounters with state authorities” (p. 64). These practices are enacted through historical links, kinship and local and regional geographies, and are reconfigured by changing connections, bad weather, new goods, appearing and disappearing markets and other markers of the practical world. As an example, Rippa describes Ali, a Shia from Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan, who shuttles between Kashgar (China), Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi in Pakistan. Ali is constantly on WeChat to assess the changing “players, commodities, regulations, and technologies” (p. 69) in various sites and at border crossings.

In Yunnan, Rippa focuses on three trading sites, including Tengchong, formerly famous for trade in Burmese jade and amber. As China’s relations with Burma fluctuated from support for the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) to support for the government in Yangon, trade in jade, timber and narcotics waxed and waned through practices of proximity. In 1992 the Chinese government made Tengchong a provincial level port as part of the Tengchong–Myitkyina Road to “open up” trade to Southeast Asia. Following the 1998 Yangtze River flood and restrictions on logging in China, an explosion of timber imports flowed in from Burma, a lucrative trade that lasted for ten years until forests in Burma were nearly exhausted. As Rippa explains, the timber trade *made* the border, complete with border markers, customs houses and immigration services. Local middlemen continued to make the trade possible, but state plans for roads and regulations marginalized long-time minority traders while Han investors in timber became rich.

To exemplify his notion of curation, Rippa focusses on the Drung in the Dulong Valley of Yunnan. The Drung used to rely on shifting cultivation and timber for their livelihoods but following state prohibitions on these activities, the state engaged in projects to lift the Drung out of poverty and into modernity. By curation, Rippa means the effort to describe the Drung as “primitive and the Dulong Valley as a wasteland” (p. 113). The people and their landscape need to be curated to heal the disease of backwardness, a political project to impose state control in the guise of the state “as a giving entity” (p. 134), providing new “Drung-style” houses, welfare, education, subsidized TVs and smart phones. As Rippa notes, these provisions made the Drung more dependent on the state without improving their livelihoods. Instead, the Dulong Valley became a tourist spectacle, erasing Drung culture even while promoting Drung “heritage.”

Similarly, the state remade Kashgar into a tourist site by reconstructing Kashgar’s old town, promoting “cultural prosperity” through imitation Islamic architecture while eliminating Islam (p. 145). The purpose was “to redefine Uyghur-ness [as] integral to the reconstruction of Kashgar’s old town and lay bare the material and ideological foundations for producing new Uyghur subjects” (p. 145). In the process, many Uyghurs had to move to the outskirts as marginalized and impoverished

residents (p. 146). Again, as in the Drung case, “processes of heritage-making, development, and control are closely intertwined” (p. 153).

The theme of corridor is illustrated by the role of the BRI in Xinjiang and into Pakistan. The alleged purpose of the BRI was “to foster cross-border ties and generate economic opportunities for local ethnic minorities” (p. 146). In practice, the road is an instrument of control, allowing certain people and goods to pass and others to be impeded or disallowed. With China’s wars on terror beginning in November 2001, Uyghurs were designated as terrorists and in ensuing years Kashgar has been transformed by surveillance. At the same time as the New Old Town was being constructed and Xinjiang designated as a “hub” in the BRI, surveillance cameras, check points, police stations at major intersections, and barbed wire were being erected around public buildings. Prison camps were set up in Xinjiang that by 2018 were reputed to hold over one million Uyghurs.

The book’s conclusion links the concepts of proximity, curation and corridor, showing how as proximity was erased, practices of curation and the development of corridors involved surveillance, control and the reconfiguration of minority peoples, spaces and livelihoods. Borderland minorities in all cases have been marginalized, impoverished and held in place as China promotes its development projects and the BRI as linking China and Pakistan as well as China and Burma in grand economic corridors producing unending wealth for all.

The book is elegantly organized and well written. My quibbles are that the Press failed to catch non-sentences and unnecessary words and that the title fails to capture the originality of this work.

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Mobilizing for Development: The Modernization of Rural East Asia

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The economic success of East Asia has motivated a vast and ever-expanding literature on the role of the state in development. However, this literature focuses mainly on the urban and industrial sectors, leaving the countryside much less systematically explored. In *Mobilizing for Development*, Kristen Looney fills in this gap with a comparative study of Taiwan, South Korea and mainland China, highlighting the pivotal role the state plays in rural development. Focusing on state-orchestrated campaigns, the author seeks to explain both the achievements in the region and variations across individual countries.

The book conceptualizes the common approach adopted by the East Asian states in rural development as campaigns, defined as “policies that aim to transform the countryside through the intensive use of bureaucratic and popular mobilization” (p. 5). As an ideal-type concept, campaigns rely on bureaucratic and popular mobilization and are distinct from institutions. While institutions represent routinized, rational and stable governance, campaigns are more uncertain, more radical and more volatile, and yet are more effective in generating rapid and transformative changes (pp. 31–32). The book further proposes that rural development campaigns