

Public Opinion and International Policy Choices: Global Commitments for Japan and Its Peers?

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ABSTRACT

To understand the prospects for global order and progress in the coming years, we explore the joint implications of three premises: (1) states advantaged by the current international order have stakes in its regularity and predictability, and thus in moving to counter or prevent threats to those stakes; (2) along impure public and club goods lines, they are more likely to make efforts to do so when some private or club benefits result; and (3) public opinion provides a bounded policy acceptance envelope offering incentives and disincentives to national political elites to act as envisioned by the first two premises. We present a mosaic of public opinion in major OECD countries (the US, Japan, and major EU members) on three policy areas – foreign aid, UN peace-keeping operations, and environmental quality – that contain international public goods elements. Actual contribution tendencies in those areas found in our previous work largely conform to the public opinion patterns reported here. Within the limits of available data, domestic political incentives as represented by public opinion warrant neither extreme optimism nor pessimism about the prospects for continuing contributions by OECD states to sustaining orderly functioning of the current world system.

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A perspective

States in the contemporary global system generally desire some element of predictability, progress and regularity in the relationships they cultivate. This is not to say that all states desire stable or status quo relationships and interactions at all times, but rather that unpredictable relationships generally work against the overall strategic policy goals of the states most centrally involved in global systemic management. Thus, we begin our analysis from the assumption that the dominant states in the global system desire some modicum of predictability and stability in their global interactions, even if maintaining the status quo is not part of the overall goal. Put another way, we assume that states desire smooth and predictable progress toward their political, economic, and military goals rather than progress that occurs in fits and starts and also rather than preserving the status quo or more chaotic types of relationships. We recognize that this is a rather large assumption about the way the contemporary world works, but we also feel it is a valid one given the core of values internalized by the dominant states in the system today.

Our general concern in this article lies with the prospects for global order and progress as they relate to limiting the disasters of conflict and war, to improve economic well-being and avoid crises, and to enhance environmental quality. While that agenda is far from being in the sole control of the industrialized states, it will in large measure be affected by the extent and nature of their contributions to these goals. In previous work, we have used public goods theory and its many variants to structure our analysis of contributions in the policy areas of foreign aid, United Nations peace-keeping operations (UNPKO), environmental quality, and debt relief (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1998a, 1998b, 1999; Boyer, 2000).¹ Based in the overarching conceptual structure, this article examines one domestic policy base for such contributions: public opinion in the OECD countries.

Given the current and rising importance of Asia in all aspects of international affairs, special attention will be paid to Japan. Japan is of course no more representative of all of the Asia-Pacific than OECD members are of the world. But no other Asian nation yet rivals it in the capacity to make the types of contributions of interest to us, or provides the rich public opinion data which allow temporal and comparative analysis with other OECD publics.

In our larger research project, we have found that international cooperative activities of the non-US OECD states have not decreased and in some cases have actually increased in recent years. And although US cooperative activities have

¹ We do not subscribe to either pessimistic or optimistic extremes with regard to the prospects for contributions to the provision of international public goods. We do not share self-styled realist views about the essential, irreplaceable nature of positively disproportionate contributions by a hegemon. Neither do we subscribe solely to various schools of generalized optimism about cooperation – be they of the absolute gains, institutionalized cooperation, liberal/democratic normative consensus and regime similarity, material globalization, or ideational common identity variants.

declined in several respects (but not all), that decline falls far short of total withdrawal and suggests a continued commitment to international activism, though also a need to be more careful in choosing opportunities for involvement (Bobrow and Boyer, 1998a). Similarly, data for the broader group of industrialized states (be it with regard to foreign aid, contributions to environmental quality, United Nations peace keeping, or international debt management) do not show simple, uniform patterns within or across issue areas or countries in terms of policies supporting or opposing cooperation. Accordingly, we take a position of muted optimism about the prospects for international cooperation and the maintenance of contributions and expect them to differ across particular issues, cases, and country policies even if generally moving in a progressive direction.

Since international cooperation varies, an impure public goods formulation suggests looking into domestically prevailing views of the private and public benefits associated with cooperation. Pessimists emphasize that cooperation provides public benefits, if at all, at the expense of private ones; for pessimists, private goods should and will be the dominant policy focus. Optimists contend that public benefits are produced without concern about negative (at least in opportunity cost terms) private benefit implications. That might be because parochial distinctions have been eliminated, because of normative convictions, or because of satiation of desires and needs for private benefits. In our world of muted optimism, we expect public goods contributions to be more substantial when linked to private goods for the contributor, burden-sharing or matching contribution arrangements, and limits on contributions. If club membership is established, 'club goods' offer a payoff which excludes some others, as a sort of semi-private matter. Goods – be they private, public, or club – are not only direct material benefits, they can also include intangible rewards associated with conforming to held values and self-images about the international role.²

Before moving on to public opinion, it is worth making several brief points about the conceptual basis of public goods, public bads, and their provision upon which we build our mutedly optimistic argument. First, we recognize that cooperation by international actors in the pursuit of public goods results from a number of factors aside from the joint provision of private goods discussed above. Our focus in

² Pure public goods are defined as joint and non-excludable. Jointness means that consumption of a public good by one individual does not diminish the amount of the good available for consumption by another individual. Non-excludability refers to the inability of producers of a public good to exclude those not paying for the production of the public good from consuming it. Once it is provided for one member of a collective, it is provided for all members, regardless of payment or lack thereof. National defense is often pointed to as the consummate example of a pure public good. Impurities to public goods can occur on both dimensions of a public good. If on the non-excludability dimension, thus allowing exclusive consumption, the goods are referred to as 'club goods'. If on the jointness dimension, the good is variously termed a 'congested good', an 'impure public good', or a 'good that produces joint products' or both publicly and privately consumable benefits. For more lengthy discussion of these concepts, see Sandler (1997).

this article is primarily on the private benefits that accrue to states from their cooperative efforts and how that may translate into public support for policy choices. That does not involve denying that several other factors may well tend to increase public good provision beyond what was hypothesized in the original public goods constructs public forth by Olson (1965) and others. They include: the iterative nature of most international interactions and the role such processes play in prompting greater longer-term cooperation; the degree to which actors operate in a multi-issue environment that produces opportunities for policy trade-offs across issues, and actors that enhance public good provision; and the degree to which some globally relevant values are held across actors in the system and increase the likelihood that states can find common policy goals to pursue collectively.

Second, we deliberately encompass contributions involving provision of collectively and individually desired goods through cooperative action and ones which involve reduction in 'public bads' through cooperative action. As a result, we include for particular policy areas both increases in public goods and reductions in negative externalities (or public bads).

With foreign aid, it is relatively easy to identify the public goods that are produced by spending and policies in this area: enhanced political and economic development prospects in developing countries, stability in commercial and financial relationships across the developed and developing worlds, and political affinities between donors and recipients. These public outputs also produce substantial private products (such as contracts for donor country firms or military basing rights) that can be consumed primarily by an individual donor country.

With peace keeping, the primary public good produced is political-military stability in a conflict-prone region. But in this case, there is also the clear reduction of the public bads of human suffering, violence, and war. In this sense, contributions toward order and progress constitute both the production of public goods now and in the future and the reduction of public bads that currently exist or seem imminent.

With environmental affairs, the link between policy inputs and public output is even more skewed toward the reduction of public bads as the primary goal for collective action. That is at least partly because the nature of global economic development over the past 200 years has centered on industrial development and its extensive reliance on fossil fuel consumption and the production of commodities that have only recently been found toxic to the world environment. As a result, although public goods are produced in this issue area (such as signing on to environmental protection regimes that promote environmental quality in many areas of life), a large part of collective and individual policy decisions necessarily center on the reduction of public bads, such as reducing carbon dioxide and PCB emissions and cleaning up toxic waste sites.

It is not surprising, then, that public support for the production of public 'goods' and for internationally cooperative policies sometimes focuses on producing 'new' public goods (such as stable economic relations with the developing world)

while at other times it focuses on reducing or eliminating something that has negative implications for the club of developed states. Thus throughout our discussion, we use the term ‘public good’ to indicate both the production of ‘goods’ and the reduction of ‘bads.’ As one explanation of the focus and quantity of state contributions to cooperative policies, we begin with the premise that the behavior of governments is affected by aggregate citizen preferences on international policy issues. We hold that premise to apply whether or not public support or opposition to particular global policy choices seems stable and coherent. The Almond-Lippmann assertion of incoherence and fluctuation in public opinion has been effectively disputed with regard to international affairs for the US (Wittkopf, 1986, 1990; Holsti and Rosenau, 1984, 1990; Murray, 1996; and Chanley, 1999) and Japanese publics (Bobrow, 1989).

We do not contend that foreign policy decision makers mimic public pluralities and majorities, but rather that public sentiments have at least a boundary-making impact on foreign policy processes and their outcomes (Eichenberg, 1998; Powlick and Katz, 1998). Public opinion can magnify or attenuate the political implications of growing supra-national identities, normatively rooted notions of international responsibility, and judgments that multilateralism relative to its alternatives provides greater private benefits than unilateralism. Moreover, with the end of the overarching Cold War threat as a unifying structure particularly in the United States, the need for attentiveness to public opinion mounts (Holsti, 1992: 191, 455). That need gains additional force for politicians with the weakening of party loyalties and the prevalence of contested elections or splits in party dominance of national institutions, with all the competition for an edge these imply.³ Whatever the accuracy of political elite perceptions of public opinion (Kull and Destler, 1999), there is a demonstrated tendency to eliminate from consideration policy options thought to confront widespread opposition in the public and the political system more generally (Powlick and Katz, 1998: 44).

In light of these positions about the divergent goods desired by states and the impact of public opinion on policy choices, subsequent sections discuss the extent to which public opinion in Japan and other OECD countries favors international contributions in foreign aid, UNPKO, and environmental policy realms. From the start of this analysis, we recognize the difficulties of deriving anything more than an impressionistic image of public opinion because of limits on cross-national and over-time comparisons in the data.⁴ Nevertheless, we can discern differences and similarities toward contributions in terms of: (1) support for contributions and cost-bearing; (2) attributed importance and priority of an issue area; (3) relationships to

³ For example, in the US, the capacity of public opinion to curb excessive swings toward unilateralism was evident in the 1980s on Reagan administration arms control policies, and in the late 1990s on the most extreme tendencies of the Republican Congressional majority.

⁴ Limitations on available poll data prevent us from examining a broader range of national publics. Also, sufficient poll data are available for only three of our main issue areas – foreign aid, peace keeping, and environmental quality.

national and club self-images and values; and (4) the salience and relative magnitudes of related benefits and costs. A final section summarizes contribution data we have analyzed elsewhere in relation to the public opinion material.⁵

Foreign aid

The first policy area we examine is foreign aid. While foreign aid has become a focus of heated debate in the US Congress in recent years, the publics of other OECD countries have had clearly varying views.

Spending

Public opinion on changing the level of appropriate foreign aid spending appears in Table 1. US negativism stands out (1986 through 1998). Until the 1998 poll, large public majorities were for reductions in government foreign aid with only about one-fourth of the respondents in favor of continuing it at its current level or increasing it. In 1998 and 2000, however, the public was more evenly divided. The greater tendency of American elites to support increases rather than cuts in levels of foreign aid bounced back to its historical preponderance from the negative preponderance of 1994. Pluralities in 1998 did not support cutting current levels to Africa, Egypt, Israel, Poland, and Russia. Polls in the 1990s repeatedly showed a public evenly divided on the provision of foreign aid in general, and overwhelming elite support for continuing use of that policy instrument. These data suggest little prospect of substantial increases or reductions in US foreign aid levels (Development Cooperation, 2000).

Japanese public opinion has been strikingly different with about four-fifths for increasing or maintaining foreign aid allocations throughout the 1990s. To a declining extent, more have favored increases than cuts in aid. Based on these and other data to follow, we expect Japan at least to maintain recent and current levels which have established it as the world's largest foreign aid donor (Development Cooperation, 2000).

West Europeans have been polled both for national government allocations and those of the European Union (EU) and its predecessors.⁶ Data for 1996 are illustrative. For their countries, only Germany and Austria (with a near tie) did not provide more support for increases than cuts. Increase majorities (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, and the UK) were accompanied by increase pluralities (Belgium, Denmark, France, and Sweden). For

⁵ Public opinion data used for the analysis in the following sections were taken from: European Commission (various years); Gallup On-Line; Hastings and Hastings (various years); the International Social Survey Programme (1995, 1993); the Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL); Levin (1999); Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA); Public Agenda On-Line; Reilly (various years); and Richman (1994a, 1994b).

⁶ We use EU throughout rather than using a temporally more accurate but potentially confusing earlier EC (European Community) and more recently EU (European Union) distinction.

Table 1. *Support for foreign aid spending (per cent)*

| Country | Increase | Decrease | Net | Increase | Decrease | Net |
|----------|----------|----------|-----|----------|----------|-----|
| US | 27 | 49 | -22 | Japan: | | |
| 2000 | | | | | | |
| 1998 | 13 | 48 | -35 | 28 | 23 | 5 |
| 1996 | 4 | 68 | -64 | 33 | 15 | 18 |
| 1994 | 4 | 72 | -68 | 33 | 15 | 18 |
| 1991 | 4 | 72 | -68 | 41 | 9 | 32 |
| 1986 | 6 | 70 | -64 | 39 | 9 | 30 |
| EU | | National | | | EU | |
| 1996 | | spending | | | spending | |
| Belgium | 41 | 40 | 1 | 45 | 32 | 13 |
| Denmark | 44 | 38 | 6 | 47 | 20 | 37 |
| Germany | 40 | 43 | -3 | 57 | 20 | 37 |
| Greece | 71 | 8 | 62 | 81 | 1 | 80 |
| Spain | 79 | 8 | 72 | 80 | 3 | 77 |
| France | 47 | 38 | 9 | 60 | 20 | 40 |
| Ireland | 68 | 10 | 58 | 72 | 3 | 69 |
| Italy | 64 | 14 | 50 | 71 | 6 | 65 |
| Lux. | 66 | 14 | 52 | 67 | 12 | 55 |
| Neth. | 56 | 32 | 24 | 63 | 13 | 50 |
| Austria | 35 | 35 | 0 | 42 | 23 | 19 |
| Portugal | 72 | 19 | 53 | 79 | 3 | 76 |
| Finland | 65 | 24 | 41 | 66 | 11 | 55 |
| Sweden | 45 | 39 | 6 | 52 | 12 | 40 |
| UK | 60 | 21 | 39 | 61 | 12 | 49 |
| EU 15 | 55 | 27 | 28 | 63 | 13 | 59 |

Notes: Neth. = Netherlands; Lux. = Luxembourg.

Sources: For the US Gallup On Line, Hastings and Hastings (various years); for Japan Prime Minister's Information Office Surveys from Japan Public Opinion Location Library; for the EU, European Commission 1996 (Eurobarometer #46).

EU contributions, increases had majority support (up slightly from the Cold War level of 1983), with that preference for European Commission (EC) policy receiving majority support in all member states except for pluralities in Belgium and Austria. We expect no substantial changes for Germany and Austria, increases for the majority grouping and the EC, and increases or maintenance for the plurality states.

Importance and priority

General spending inclinations should be put in the perspective of the priority and importance attached to assistance to the developing world. Particularly rich data on EU-country views on priority have only trace percentages, seeing foreign aid as the most important problem for the regional grouping (1998, 1993, and 1974). When ranked relative to other identified issues or problems (1998, 1983), foreign aid came

below most of them. A less-demanding indicator is the percentage which consider assistance to the developing world to be very important or important (1996, 1991, and 1989). Those results in general favor foreign aid. All of the earlier EU member publics attach greater importance to aid spending in 1996 than at the end of the Cold War. That, however, is mostly because of upward movement from 1989 to 1991. Further, the countries break into three groups: (1) continuing increasers (Denmark, Greece, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands); (2) stable at a raised plateau (Ireland, Italy, and Portugal); and (3) recent decliners (Belgium, Germany, Spain, and the UK). At a minimum and in aggregate terms, these views favor the maintenance of aid allocations and the generosity of terms.

For the US (1994, 1987, and 1983), less than 5 per cent of the public viewed the developing world as a major foreign policy problem, substantially less than in proximate years for France, the UK, and Japan. Japan stood out in this small set for the seriousness it attached to developing world problems, but still only for a small minority. Especially noteworthy was the small proportion of Japanese (1997, 1991) giving priority to spending on domestic problems over aid to developing countries.

Values and national self-conceptions

Poll results also illuminate some pertinent features of identities and values. The American self-conception clashes in key respects with prevailing opposition to foreign aid spending. Majorities responded positively that the US should help relieve world hunger and starvation (1998, 1995, 1994, 1990, 1986, and 1982). As to whether the US should help raise standards of living in less-developed countries (1998, 1995, 1994, 1990, 1986, and 1982), support tended downward from a majority to only 22 per cent in 1995 only to increase modestly to 29 per cent in 1998. When asked explicitly about moral responsibility (1995, 1999), more than two-thirds responded affirmatively. A strong majority thought that the US should match contributions (as a share of GNP) by other advanced industrialized countries, while only small minorities thought it should contribute less or more (1995).

For Japan, when two international role preference choices were allowed, aid to developing countries was chosen only by declining minorities in the 1990s (from a high of 29 per cent in 1990 to 18 per cent in 1998). As for Japan's role in the United Nations, it was chosen only by a stable and larger minority even though respondents could choose all desirable roles. As shown in Table 2, only about 40 per cent of those favoring increasing or maintaining foreign aid levels cited human obligation as the reason (1998–1995). This suggests that US aid will be more responsive to humanitarian appeals (a public good) than that for Japan.

Benefits and costs

The implications of American and Japanese public opinion may be clarified by the perceived private and public benefits and costs associated with such spending. Substantial US majorities (1990, 1986, and 1974) viewed aid as providing economic

Table 2. *Japanese rationales for increasing or maintaining foreign aid*

| Year | 1998 | 1997 | 1996 | 1995 | 1993 | 1992 | 1991 | 1990 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Human obligation of developed countries | 39 | 39 | 37 | 37 | 36 | 40 | 38 | 34 |
| Stabilizing developing countries contributes to world peace | 47 | 43 | 48 | 43 | 45 | 46 | 44 | 50 |
| Large trade surplus countries like Japan are obligated to help countries with trade deficits | 16 | 15 | 18 | 19 | 22 | 23 | 25 | 20 |
| Economic Cooperation is an important part of Japan's diplomacy | 27 | 21 | 28 | 23 | 21 | 23 | 19 | 22 |
| Political stability, economic growth in developing countries essential for further development of Japan's economy | 25 | 16 | 23 | 18 | 18 | 22 | 17 | 20 |
| Will improve access to energy sources | 17 | 16 | 18 | 15 | 16 | 21 | 14 | 15 |
| Japan will be isolated in the international community if it does not | 17 | 19 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 21 | 15 | 12 |
| Japanese technology and experience will help prevent environmental pollution in developing countries | 34 | 30 | 30 | 27 | 29 | 32 | Na | Na |

Note: Multiple responses were permitted.

Sources: Prime Minister's Information Office surveys from the Japan Public Opinion Location Library.

gains to recipients and helping their general population – private goods for others. Equally substantial majorities saw costs to the US in economic and foreign entanglement terms, and gains as political (strengthening friendly foreign governments) or military (aid as a substitute for US troops). This fits with the direction of US aid to countries of strategic importance (e.g., Egypt and Israel), and periodic 'hot spots' like El Salvador in the 1980s and Bosnia in the 1990s.

For Japan, even larger majorities in 1986 and 1996 believed that aid helped recipients. Perceived private benefits to Japan are suggested by Japanese polling in other Asian countries (1994–7, 1991). Other Asians have indicated that aid would improve relations between them and Japan, and that its absence or decline would have negative consequences for relations. Asia has been consistently singled out for economic cooperation (1990–8) and related to nearby security and territorial issues. Throughout the 1990s the Japanese public majority in support of increasing or maintaining foreign aid cited reasons with a private benefit element (Table 2), while those for cuts relied on the domestic economic opportunity cost of aid. Throughout the 1990s, the public substantially favored making the private benefit of Russian concessions on the Northern islands a precondition for substantial economic assistance. For other countries, Japanese majorities or pluralities supported aid, conditionality linking it to restraint in recipient military spending (1991) and nuclear weapons programs (1998, 1995), and achievements in democratization and marketization (1991). In large measure, aid for the Japanese public has been an instrument to

be used to advance a national agenda which fitted with their conceptual framework, emphasizing the private benefits obtained from this impure public goods expenditure.

Similar questions were not asked of Europeans, but other evidence suggests a tendency to see aid as a club good. Sustained majorities in EU members (1993–8) supported joint national and European as opposed to purely national foreign aid policy. The club-based orientation is compatible with the direction of European aid, favoring former colonies and the ACP/home countries generally (Development Co-operation, 2000). The private (Japan) and club (European) emphases suggest higher relative spending for them than for the US

Peacekeeping

Given the recurrence of conflict hot spots throughout the world, peace keeping is another policy venue that increasingly relies on international cooperation, contributions, and support among industrialized countries. That is particularly the case with a shift toward peace making and peace enforcement from post-ceasefire monitoring and interposition. As the following suggests and parallel to our findings for foreign aid, public opinion in this is varied cross-nationally and also dependent on the urgency of the conflicts at hand.

Participation in and cost-bearing for UNPKO

In the post-Cold War world, support for participation in UNPKO reached majority levels in a number of OECD countries by the mid 1990s (the US, Canada, Japan, the UK, Germany, France, South Korea, and New Zealand). American support, however, was far more selective. From 1995 through 1997, persistent majorities opposed placing US troops in Bosnia as was also true (1999) for East Timor. Even if opinion for dispatching troops to international peace keeping develops a majority, it takes time for that to occur and it may well erode – especially for a hot conflict. The implications are that US participation in such operations will not be anticipatory and will be controversial at home.

For Japan, after fluctuations in the early 1990s, stable majorities were achieved for the rest of the decade. Those were composed, however, far more of respondents who urge maintenance rather than increasing levels of participation. In contrast to the US, support for participation has not been linked to the particular locale for UNPKO, underscoring the notion that US public support buys into the strategic interest rationale for UNPKO. Constraints on Japanese participation have been, as we shall see, more about the types of participation activities and how they influence potential costs and Japan's world role.

At the most general level, Japan, the UK, Germany, France, and the US all seem to accept paying for UNPKO in principle. Only very small minorities have seen that responsibility as one that rests with those countries proximate to the conflict. National publics have differed about the extent to which the burden should be born by a small club (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council

plus Germany and Japan), or by all members of the UN in relation to their population and economic size. The US and especially Japan have been more disposed towards a broadly distributed burden; while the UK and France support a more narrowly distributed one. Perhaps the American and Japanese respondents perceived a larger public good element compared to the UK and especially France. US public opinion in general has permitted continued funding, but with controversy about amount and share. Supportively, only 18 per cent in a 1994 poll believed it inappropriate to spend as much as 1 per cent of the US defense budget on PKO. A year later, a majority thought US expenditure was excessive on this item. In the more recent budget surplus climate of 2000, a plurality of the public favored maintaining spending levels for the United Nations and UNPKO, and a larger minority favored increasing it than cutting it.

Casualties are another possible cost of UNPKO, one particularly associated with dispatch to hot conflicts. In 1994, majorities accepted taking such risks in the US, Germany, the UK, and France (especially the latter two), but not in Japan. Yet US public support has been far stronger for air strikes, with very limited potential for American casualties than for more risky ground operations. Japanese public opinion support for UNPKO participation throughout the 1990s was predominantly for types which either avoided hot conflicts altogether or for primarily unarmed roles rather than armed and coercive peace making. Majorities have continued to oppose participation in those riskier situations and roles. The publics of the two largest OECD political economies have been very concerned with resultant casualties, a distinctly private goods element of participation in such ventures.

Importance and priority

We now turn to opinions about the importance of relevant types of conflicts, the UN as an institution for dealing with them, and UNPKO as a priority mission for national military establishments. When all are high, contributions to UNPKO should be especially large. Relevant types of conflicts (1994, 1993, and 1987) are held to be serious or important by substantial British, French, and German minorities, with an upward trend clear for only the last. For the US public, there also is a trend – downward. Further, when asked (1993–8) about prominent conflicts of the time (e.g., Somalia or those in the Former Yugoslavia), only 1 per cent or less of Americans saw them as the first or second most important policy problems for the US government. In 1998, only about a third of the public and a fourth of American leaders saw regional ethnic conflicts as a critical threat to US interests. While foreign affairs in general were clearly more important for Japan and the Europeans, no EU country (1994) saw even 20 per cent for such efforts. This result occurred even though Bosnia was viewed by these respondents as the principal EU problem. Only 4 per cent of the Japanese public (1997) saw regional conflicts as the most important national problem. The private goods element for UNPKO contributions seems less than compelling in these cases.

In 1991, majorities in the US, Japan, the UK agreed that the UN should do more to deal with regional conflicts. In contrast, by 1994 similar sentiments were only found in Japan. Perhaps that was related to the generally positive Japanese evaluation of UN contributions to peace (1997, 1993) – compared to erratic American verdicts, and more skeptical British, German, and French views. Yet Japanese public pluralities have opposed stronger and more pro-active UNPKO forces (in 1993, 1994), and UN contributions have been preferred as a priority for Japan's military by only modest to trivial minorities. These data suggest support for a PKO approach that minimally take resources away from other matters, in other words a 'do something' syndrome. This translates into support for the United Nations, but in a less than wholehearted fashion.

Values and national self-conceptions

Values and national self-conceptions (appropriate national role) may underlie the previous opinions on UNPKO. The Japanese and US publics stand in sharp contrast about the use of force being justified to advance the public goods of international order and justice. For example, in 1991, only 26 per cent of the Japanese public accepted that justification, while 70 per cent rejected it. The US response was almost the reverse.

Japanese sentiment has endorsed the importance of contributing to world peace in general (1991–8), and large majorities have recommended a national priority to contribute to the United Nations for that purpose (1991–8). As the century ended, so did predominant opposition to participation in UNPKOs, with a switch from majority opposition to majority support for revising the Constitution to enable tightly constrained UNPKO participation (1994–8). Support for permanent UN Security Council membership came to receive substantial majority support (1993–8) as a way to contribute to world peace. Japanese preferences for national contributions to world peace, however, feature non-military rather than military contributions (1992–5). Massive majorities (1990–7) have held Japan's 'pacific nature' to be a major positive national feature. While contributing to the resolution of international disputes became a widely acknowledged 'international responsibility' or 'obligation' (1992, 1994, and 1997), less than a majority viewed UNPKO as the primary means of contribution. These views are harmonized with participation by the limitations on the situations and roles for Japanese UNPKO involvement.

Use of American forces other than in defense of immediate US targets seems to have a largely normative justification (Table 3). Note the large majorities in cases of mass misery and the majorities and pluralities in cases of barbarism and persecution of civilians in contrast to weaker support for political-military rationales. These values make otherwise attractive air strikes a problematic instrument as shown by US responses to polls in 1999 and 1998. While atrocities justify them, as against Serbia over Kosovo, general support for them falls roughly to an even split if they are associated with substantial civilian casualties in the target entity (e.g., Serbia or Iraq).

Table 3. *Justifications for the use of US military forces (per cent)*

| YEAR | Aggression | | Hum. relief, starvation | | Atrocities, persecution | | Restore democracy | | Moral obligation | |
|----------|------------|----|-------------------------|----|-------------------------|----|-------------------|----|------------------|----|
| | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO |
| 1992 | 33 | 57 | 71 | 23 | 56 | 36 | | | | |
| 1993 | | | 67 | 27 | 57 | 35 | 47 | 41 | | |
| 1994 | 41 | 35 | 65 | 20 | | | | | | |
| 1994 | | | 79 | 17 | 67 | 24 | 37 | 53 | | |
| 1995 | | | | | 66 | 24 | | | 53 | 40 |
| 1998* | | | | | 36 | 47 | | | | |
| 1999 | | | | | 77 | 29 | | | 64 | 32 |
| 1999* | | | | | | | | | 58 | 37 |
| 1999** | | | | | 58 | | | | 58 | |
| 1999*** | | | | | 58 | | | | 58 | |
| 1999**** | | | | | 60 | | | | 60 | |

Notes: * = Kosovo; ** = Africa; *** = Asia; **** = Europe.

Sources: Gallup On Line, Program on International Policy Attitudes, Kull and Destler (1999), Richman (1994a).

The acceptability of damage inflicted in response to malefactors poses serious policy constraints.

Benefits and costs

Moving beyond opinion on national responsibilities for PKO brings us to an examination of the perceived gains from international peace keeping. We expect support to be greater for multilateral rather than unilateral steps against hostilities if the private goods element is not positive and dominant. The American public (1991–8) strongly supported the multilateral option; the Japanese public in effect was not even asked to consider unilateral interventions.

Opinion data on the results of specific missions suggest differences in other respects about PKO benefits and costs. American public judgments about the results of peace-keeping interventions have been more negative than those of the Japanese public. That may be because US expectations for peace restoration and perceived private element costs were higher for the particular cases for which surveys were taken.⁷ It may also result from two possible causal explanations on the Japanese side. The first is based in the notion that excessive non-participation by Japan might result in international criticism (a majority in 1992). This was a particularly sensitive issue among a public with only a minority satisfied with the international respect accorded to Japan (1990, 1995–7). The second explanation is based in a minority view that excessive participation could stress relations with other Asians (1992, 1994). A

⁷ The cases were Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia for American respondents and Cambodia and the Golan Heights for Japanese respondents. Moreover, in the mid 1990s, more than two-thirds of the American public felt that the US was providing an unfairly large share of troops.

particular peace-keeping operation may then warrant a positive verdict if it avoids these two adverse consequences for Japan as well as more narrowly the military costs and risks – even with no resolution of the regional conflict.

The environment

Not surprisingly given the daily impact of environmental issues, public opinion data on environmental matters is much richer than that available on foreign aid and UNPKO. This is particularly true in terms of the existence of more consistent surveys cross-nationally and over time.⁸

Spending and regulation

Governments can allocate resources to the environment in several ways – explicit budgetary expenditures for that purpose or by the use of various legal and regulatory instruments. We first consider views on national government efforts in general and then those on international governmental organizations.

On national government spending, American polls (1986–6) persistently show majorities in favor of increasing it, a decline to a plurality in 1997 and a return to 50 per cent support in 2000. When spending was for environmentally focused payments to developing countries, a larger minority supported such increases than did for foreign aid in general (1995). By 1998, majorities favored it with or without a link to lessening environmental protection costs to Americans. UK polls about government spending (1986–3) fluctuated between a majority and a plurality for increases, with only small minorities for cuts to environmental spending. Cross-nationally, majorities (usually massive ones) supported their government doing more in general for environmental protection in the UK (1997, 1992, and 1989); Canada (1989, 1990); India (1992); and the US (1999, 1993, 1991, 1991, and 1988). Yet the American majority was substantially smaller at the end of the period than earlier.

Majorities in 1990s have also supported increased governmental regulatory activity in Germany, the UK, Canada, India, and the US.⁹ The only marked shift was in Germany from previous minority to majority support by 1997. Very robust majorities in the each of 20 countries in the 1993–4 ISPP poll supported the governmental imposition of restrictions on individual behavior, and near unanimity prevailed for government environmental restrictions on the behavior of businesses. Strong support for both types of regulation was found in developed and developing, European and Asia-Pacific, capitalist and transitional economy countries.

A remarkably positive disposition appears for financial outlays to support

⁸ Of particular value is the International Social Survey Programme polling of 1993–4 conducted in Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany (east and West), Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, and the US

⁹ An exception for the US is the protection of endangered species, and only narrow support for regulation versus free market incentives to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (1997).

international environmental agencies. A 24-country poll (1992) found supportive majorities in each, except for a plurality in India. Majorities exceeded two-thirds in Canada, Korea, Finland, West Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, the UK, Russia, and Nigeria. Results fell below that level in Mexico, the US, Japan, Denmark, Norway, Turkey, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, the Philippines, and India. Majorities for empowering an international environmental agency tended to be even larger than for providing it with funds. Support from less than two-thirds only occurred among respondents in Brazil, India, and Uruguay. A few years later (1995), a 23-country poll found majorities in every country (in most of 70 per cent or more) for an international organization having enforcement powers. That opinion marked the countries included from West and East Europe, North America, and those from the Western side of the Pacific (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan). Recent American majorities have supported the Kyoto Accord (1998, 1997) – with only modest minorities finding its emissions cuts excessive – and payments to the UN if they were a domestically cost saving road to environmental protection.

Importance and priority

A demanding check on importance and priority to environmental policy arises in survey questions asking what is the ‘currently most important problem facing your nation’. The level of importance and priority that is required for environmental protection to loom large in public responses unsurprisingly declines as more than one response are permitted. With few exceptions, only very small minorities named environmental protection even when two responses were permitted.¹⁰ Such a judgment about environmental matters in isolation from other issues receives a far larger response in Japan (1989–6), the UK (1989–96), Germany (1989–94), and the EU (1989–92).

In polling on most serious threats to the future of the nation, the environment received much higher mentions. Multiple responses were usually permitted and are shown in the first two Columns of Table 4. The UK and Germany presented

¹⁰ For the US (seventeen polls from 1987 through 1998), the 5 per cent level was achieved only in 1990. In Japan a low double digit response was reached only in 1993 and 1994, only then to return to below 5 per cent. Canadians sharply exceed that level from 1988 through 1990, but then also returned to below 5 per cent. Importance was greater in the UK (about 10 per cent in 1989, 1991, 1994, 1995, and 1998) intermittently and only when two responses were allowed. Otherwise the 5 per cent level was not achieved. The 1 per cent level was not reached (1995) in urban India, France, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and, a year earlier, in New Zealand. Surveys (1998, 1993, 1974) European Union national publics did show more substantial minorities in some of them in the latter years (especially in Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and the UK) but those declined from 1993 to 1998 for Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. And in 1998 no EU public placed environmental quality as one of their five most important current problems.

Table 4. *Most serious problem: environment (per centS)*

| | National | | World/International | |
|---------|----------|----------|---------------------|--------|
| | Future | | Now | Future |
| | 1995 | 1997 | 1994 | 1993 |
| US | 40 | 11 | 2 | 31 |
| Japan | 41 | 35 to 43 | 10 | 57 |
| UK | 59 | NA | 12 | 35 |
| Germany | 65 | NA | 11 | 52 |
| France | 48 | NA | NA | 39 |

Sources: Hastings and Hastings (1992–93, 1994–95, 1995–96, 1996–97).

majorities in 1995 for that view; the US, France, and Japan very substantial minorities, with a substantial reduction in the US two years later.

Concern about the future world environment (the second two Columns of Table 4) is greater than the low levels for the present. The three Europeans again exceed the US. And Japan exceeds all of them in future concern. That importance is consonant with the Japanese public tending to give first place to environmental problems as a focus for collective international action, be it at G-7 summits (1993, 1990) or at the regional APEC level (1993). The data are also compatible with the Japanese public especially seeing a major public good element in contributions to improve the international environmental future and perhaps an indirect private element as well.

When the choice posed to respondents is less demanding – whether the environment per se warrants attention (a priority, urgent, immediate action, critical, serious, among the most important problems) – we find very robust majorities rather than modest to tiny minorities. That is most clearly demonstrated for the West Europeans with reference to the EU (1986, 1992, and 1998) with a tendency for increases in more recent years. Narrow national problem questions about the environment tended to produce similar results in the UK (1986, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1995), Japan (1983, 1993), Canada (1987, 1989, and 1990), India (1992), and 17 Latin American countries (1996). In the US, only minorities supported the urgency of action now on global warming, but majorities were present when those minorities are combined with those favoring gradual steps starting now (1997–9). Responses to a similar type of question about priorities for the UN (1994) in the US, Japan, the UK, Germany, and France produced larger minorities selecting the environment (around 30 per cent) than did the ‘most important international problem’ question.

Direct questions about air pollution and global warming being a very serious world problem, asked in 24 countries (early 1990s), found national publics in three groups. More than two-thirds of the respondents in Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Russia viewed air pollution as a very serious problem. Smaller majorities appeared in Canada, the US, Korea, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, the UK, and India. And only

minorities held that view in Japan, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Nigeria. As for global warming, the first group held West Germany, Norway, Portugal, Brazil, and Uruguay. The second group contained Canada, Mexico, Denmark, Ireland, Poland, Switzerland, the UK, Brazil, and Chile. The minority group consisted of the US, Japan, Korea, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Turkey, the Philippines, India, the Russian Federation, and Nigeria. We expect those in the first group for a particular problem to be more prone to making contributions to its amelioration, those in the third group to be least so, and those in the second to favor contributions to an intermediate extent.

In sum, national publics overwhelmingly tend to believe it appropriate to pursue environmental protection, but only minorities are willing to give it automatic standing over other issues. There is a stronger disposition to position for dealing with national and international environmental problems looming ahead. The first conclusion is strengthened by public views of general and specific trade-offs with economic concerns.

Preferences between environmental protection and economic growth provide an appropriate starting point. In the 20-country 1993–4 ISPP polls, majorities or substantial pluralities denied the trade-off, instead viewing economic growth as a prerequisite for environmental protection except in the Netherlands and New Zealand. In the same surveys, however, the impacts of economic growth were viewed as not inherently negative by majorities and pluralities in fewer of those countries (Australia, the UK, the US, Ireland, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Norway, New Zealand, Canada, and Israel). More recently (1999), very large US majorities saw growth and environmental protection in general to be compatible, as they did for measures to counter global warming (1998, 1997). An inherent tension between growth and environmental protection was accepted by majorities and pluralities only in Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, the Philippines, Japan, and Spain. Yet majorities or pluralities in half of those felt economic issues were being short-changed relative to environmental concerns (East Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia, Poland, and the Philippines).

When a trade-off in priority was explicitly posed, support for environmental quality over economic growth has been widespread. Among the advanced industrialized countries, that was true by a substantial and relatively stable majority in 1984 and in polls from 1990 through 1999 – especially so in Japan (1997, 1996, 1995, and 1991, except for a near tie in 1994). Seventy per cent of the US public held that view in 2000. In Western Europe all 12 EU members provide majorities or pluralities preferring environmentally centered policies (1986). That position was particularly strong in Denmark, (West) Germany, France, Italy, and Luxembourg, and particularly weak in Belgium, Ireland, and Portugal. Near majorities were present in Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK (a majority by 1992). Available data showed only majorities or pluralities for other countries as well: India (1993); nine Latin American countries, Australia, urban China (Beijing and Shanghai), and urban Thailand

(Bangkok) (1995); and South Korea (1996). In a sense, the first preference for respondents is to deny a growth–environment trade-off, but when faced with it, they tolerate favoring the latter. The political incentives implied are in the first instance for politicians to at least seem to pursue both.

Support for environmental contributions shrinks in many, but not all countries, when posed with an explicit and personal economic penalty. When that price is unemployment, sentiment was strikingly opposed in the US (1997, 1990) and India (1991), erratic in Canada (two 1990 polls) and accepting only in the UK. The ISPP (1993–4) asked about willingness to incur a cut in living standards, pay much higher taxes, and pay much higher prices. The results are summarized in Table 5. Public majorities for all three occurred only in West Germany and Italy; majorities or pluralities for all three only in Australia, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Japan, and Spain. And more publics were accepting of higher prices than taxes or a reduced standard of living. More recently (1997), a majority of the Japanese public accepted higher prices but not taxes as did American majorities (1998, 1997). Supportive majorities or pluralities, often with the specification that any increase be small, appeared in Australia (1995), Spain (1996), Canada (1990), Thailand (1994), and India (1991). When the taxes were aimed at private vehicles and fuel consumption, as for EU countries (1996), supportive majorities appeared only in Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Majorities were opposed in Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, and pluralities in Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg. When higher gas prices were linked to environmental protection efforts, resistance was less pronounced in the US, with predominantly accepting majorities or pluralities (1997, 1994, 1993, and 1989).

Whatever mandate for environmental contributions is indicated by these survey results, it is a significantly limited one. The message is closer to ‘do more’ and masks directly associated economic costs. Even the higher price tolerance is constrained by standard of living considerations and commodity exceptions. As with spending and regulation, national governments have a mandate for action, but definitely not a blank check. This obviously leaves a large zone for interpretation and judgment about contributing to environmental protection without going beyond public support.

Values and self-image

When national values and self-image focus policy attention on support for pursuing environmental quality more than they accept economic and other burdens, we expect countries to be active in supporting environmental betterment in non-monetary ways. One such approach involves signing on to good behavior codes, which are more expressions of sentiment and support for environmental principles than a submission to penalties for non-compliance. A turn to multilateral forums and organizations may also provide a way to skirt or offset constraining domestic preferences by scape-goating the organizations for unpopular policy choices.

Table 5. *Acceptance of economic penalties for environmental protection*

| Country | Much higher taxes | Cuts standard of living | Much higher prices |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| US | –P | –P | +M |
| Japan | +P | Equal | +M |
| Australia | +P | +P | +M |
| Bulgaria | –P | –M | +P |
| Canada | –P | +P | +M |
| China (Beijing, Shanghai) | na | –M | +M |
| Czech Republic | –M | –M | –P |
| Germany (East) | +P | +P | –P |
| Germany (West) | +M | +M | +M |
| Hungary | –M | –M | Equal |
| Ireland | –M | –M | +P |
| Israel | +P | –P | +M |
| Italy | +M | +M | +M |
| Netherlands | +P | +P | +M |
| New Zealand | –P | Equal | +P |
| Norway | –P | +M | +P |
| Philippines | –M | –P | –P |
| Poland | –P | –M | +P |
| Russia | +P | –P | +P |
| Slovenia | +P | +P | +P |
| Spain | +P | +P | +M |
| UK | –P | –P | +P |

Notes: M signifies a majority and P a plurality percentage of responses. Plus signs indicate acceptance of the economic penalty in order to protect the environment; minus signs, unwillingness to pay that penalty to protect the environment.

Sources: All except China from International Social Survey Program (1995); China data from polls in 1994 are from Hastings and Hastings (1997–98).

Public dissatisfaction with current levels of environmental quality can also indicate unfulfilled values. For instance, surveys displayed in Table 6, Column A from the early 1990s examining national environmental quality found the following: (1) more than two-thirds dissatisfied with national quality in Korea, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Chile, and the Russian Federation; (2) smaller majorities in Mexico, Japan, the Philippines, and India; (3) more than one-third in the US, West Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, the UK, Brazil, Uruguay, and Nigeria; and (4) less than one-third in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, and Switzerland. We reason that the private bad-reducing element of environmental efforts decreases as the opinion summarized declines. Japan then stands out among the industrialized countries in terms of perceived magnitude of the private element. Recent data for the US (1997 and 1999) show an increase to about two-thirds in those satisfied with the quality of the American environment, suggesting a decline in the private element associated with contributions. Put simply, as perceptions of national environmental

Table 6. *Environmental quality and environmental responsibility (per cent)*

| | A Bad National Quality | B Bad World Quality | C National Less World | D Industrialized Countries | E Equal with Developing | F AICs Less Equal |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| US | 45 | 66 | -21 | 29 | 61 | -32 |
| Japan | 52 | 73 | -21 | 41 | 28 | +3 |
| Brazil | 49 | 64 | -15 | 32 | 56 | -24 |
| Canada | 26 | 79 | -53 | 37 | 57 | -20 |
| Chile | 68 | 88 | -20 | 37 | 50 | -13 |
| Denmark | 18 | 92 | -76 | 64 | 27 | +37 |
| Finland | 13 | 73 | -60 | 58 | 33 | +25 |
| Germany (West) | 42 | 86 | -44 | 54 | 37 | +17 |
| Hungary | 72 | 71 | +1 | 28 | 56 | -28 |
| India | 52 | 42 | +10 | 31 | 46 | -15 |
| Ireland | 14 | 73 | -51 | 40 | 46 | -6 |
| Korea | 74 | 66 | +8 | 33 | 23 | +10 |
| Mexico | 56 | 70 | -14 | 37 | 50 | -13 |
| Neth. | 45 | 84 | -29 | 53 | 40 | +13 |
| Nigeria | 38 | 24 | +14 | 32 | 37 | -5 |
| Norway | 12 | 88 | -76 | 65 | 26 | +39 |
| Phil. | 52 | 58 | -6 | 30 | 54 | -24 |
| Poland | 88 | 73 | +15 | 45 | 39 | +6 |
| Port. | 39 | 75 | -36 | 37 | 52 | -15 |
| Russia | 88 | 66 | +22 | 30 | 57 | -27 |
| Switz | 27 | 86 | -58 | 46 | 46 | 0 |
| Turkey | 92 | 45 | +47 | 40 | 39 | +1 |
| UK | 36 | 76 | -40 | 37 | 50 | -13 |
| Uruguay | 37 | 74 | -37 | 38 | 49 | -11 |

Notes: AICs refers to Advanced Industrialized Countries; Neth., to the Netherlands; Phil. to the Philippines; Port., to Portugal; and Switz. to Switzerland. Column C contains results from subtracting the entries in Column B from those in Column A.

Sources: For Columns A and B, Dunlap (1994); for Columns D, E, and F, Hastings and Hastings (1992-93).

quality increase, private benefits from international cooperation on environmental betterment decrease. Cooperation in this sense becomes more of an international public good.

Strong dissatisfaction with world environmental quality (Table 6, Column B) characterized almost every country except Turkey, India, and Nigeria. That suggests associating a high public goods element with contributions to environmental quality. We reason that the potential public element relative to the private element of benefits achieved or costs avoided will be greater as world environmental quality is thought to be worse than that of one's own nation (a minus sign in Table 6, Column C), and the

opposite as world quality is held to be better (a plus sign in Column C). A preponderant anticipated public element is, then, especially the case for Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, and Switzerland. A preponderant anticipated private element would be present for Korea, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, India, the Russian Federation, and Nigeria. The others are in a middle range with a larger anticipated public than private element, more so for the UK and West Germany than for Japan and the US.

Value concerns can also reflect views of national environmental quality trends with optimistic or pessimistic implications for the future, with the former implying a less substantial private element increment from increased contributions. The US stands out for its majority optimism (1999, 1995, 1993, and 1991) in contrast to Japanese pessimism (1990–1997). Germany (1997) and Great Britain (1990 and 1993) were in a middle position, but with only optimistic minorities. As for actions to affect the future, Japan would, according to our reasoning, see the largest private element, and the US the smallest, with the British and Germans closer to the Japanese position.

Views of health effects relate to what is for most people of fundamental value for themselves, their family, and their children – an important private element. General questions about posing a current health danger elicited only majorities when asked in the UK, Germany, Japan (all in 1996), and in urban China, Thailand, and India (1994, 1994, and 1992 respectively). When it was asked, 75 per cent or more perceived dangers to future generations. Negative current health effects attributed to specific environmental dangers were widely recognized. ISSP polls (1993–4) found overwhelming majorities in all 20 countries, seeing automobile and industrial air pollution, nuclear power stations, agricultural pesticides and chemicals, water pollution, and global warming as dangerous for themselves and their families. An exception to this general view was in the US for global warming and the greenhouse effect. US public acknowledgment of negative current health effects fell from a 1993 high of 74 per cent to a 1997 minority of 25 per cent, but the threat was placed in the future (65 per cent) rather than eliminated.

We now turn to other motivations for contributions to environmental protection – attributed responsibility, and by implication warranted burden sharing for remediation, and preferred national roles. Returning to poll results (1991) in Table 6 (Columns D, E, and F), majorities attributed primary responsibility to the industrialized countries only in Denmark, Finland, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. Only pluralities did so in Japan, Korea, Poland, and Turkey. The developing nations having equal responsibility was the view of majorities in Canada, Mexico, the US, Hungary, Portugal, the UK, Brazil, Chile, the Philippines, and the Russian Federation. The first two sets, we reason, are more motivated to contribute to environmental quality whatever the developing countries do. Positive signs in Column F suggest a public more prone to view their country or club as bearing the primary burden more as a warranted form of injury compensation than an acceptance of improper free-riding; minus signs, the opposite. More recently (1997),

85 per cent of the Japanese public accepted substantial responsibility. American majorities have opposed emissions rights trading, as allowing rich countries to sidestep emissions reduction (1998, 1997). Yet American majorities favor equal restraints on developing as well as on rich countries (1997) and reject placing primary responsibility on the advanced countries (1998, 1997). Yet, in those same years, majorities favored cuts in US emissions whatever others would do. This partial acceptance of free-riding as a sort of second-best is what impure public goods theory leads to expect if a private elements is also at work.

Another comparative perspective on responsibility focuses on the causes of the environmental problems of the developing countries (Table 7). The relationship between developed world environmental standards and responsibilities relative to those of the developing world has also become a significant international political flash point as the Kyoto negotiations and the World Trade Organization protests have demonstrated. Respondents were asked about advanced industrialized country resource consumption, the operations of multinational corporations, and developing country overpopulation. The first two involve 'Northern' behavior, the last that of the 'South'. We reason that publics placing responsibility on their own 'club' are more likely to feel a contribution obligation on its part (if not necessarily from their own nation directly). Those with the opposite distributions of opinion are likely to seek compensatory behavior from members of the other club. AICs' resource consumption is allotted responsibility by majorities only in Germany, Norway, Turkey, and Mexico; multinational corporations, by majorities only in Germany, Norway, Mexico, and Uruguay. Developing country overpopulation receives majorities in a far larger set of countries: the US, Germany, the UK, Canada, Finland, Norway, India, the Philippines, Turkey, and Mexico. Across the rows in this table, larger minorities chose advanced-country responsibilities than developing country ones in Japan, Chile, Poland, Brazil, Russia, and Korea. The Japanese position, with respect to its own excessive resource consumption, was near the 90 per cent level a year later (1993), as was acceptance of great responsibility for world environmental quality and a professed willingness by 79 per cent to drastically change Japan's economic and social activities to protect the global environment (1997).

Acceptance of responsibility seems a useful condition for environmental protection contributions especially when accompanied by activist preferences for one's nation's current and future international role. Self-images of current international activity (1993) had Americans most prone to see their country as active, substantially more so than the British, Germans, French, and massively more so than Japanese. For the future (1995), Germany and the UK stood out for activist preferences. The US alone declined compared to perceived current behavior; Japan showed the greatest increase over it. The US and Japanese publics may be on different paths. From 1990 to 1998, environmental protection as an important US foreign policy goal fell dramatically for elites (72 per cent to 46 per cent) and to a thin majority of the public. In contrast, the Japanese public (1990–8) saw environmental protection as an

Table 7. *Responsibility for developing country environmental problems, 1992 (per cent)*

| | Advanced industrialized resource consumption | Countries MNCs' operations | Developing countries' overpopulation |
|-------------|---|-------------------------------|---|
| US | 41 | 35 | 50 |
| Japan | 38 | 25 | 22 |
| Brazil | 46 | 45 | 37 |
| Canada | 43 | 44 | 50 |
| Chile | 43 | 37 | 37 |
| Denmark | 34 | 35 | 42 |
| Finland | 49 | 42 | 57 |
| Germany | 60 | 55 | 62 |
| Hungary | 14 | 13 | 19 |
| India | 36 | 30 | 61 |
| Ireland | 43 | 43 | 46 |
| Korea | 42 | 41 | 29 |
| Mexico | 55 | 51 | 54 |
| Netherlands | 12 | 16 | 32 |
| Norway | 57 | 53 | 60 |
| Philippines | 44 | 41 | 52 |
| Poland | 26 | 21 | 17 |
| Russia | 28 | 28 | 18 |
| Turkey | 64 | 39 | 52 |
| UK | 45 | 43 | 54 |
| Uruguay | 48 | 50 | 43 |

Notes: The second data Column refers to the operations of Advanced Industrialized Countries Multi-National Corporations.

Source: Hastings and Hastings (1992–3).

especially attractive form of international contribution, and marked it for increase. It received persistent majorities (1991–9) surpassed only by world peace as an area for contributions to the United Nations. The mosaic of opinions suggests that: (1) Japan will increasingly rival or surpass the US in international environmental contributions; (2) the US will not end its provision; and (3) some West Europeans may well outdo both of them.

Benefits and costs

Contributions to environmental protection involve private and public goods elements based in an understanding of national and world environmental problems. They also can entail reductions in private and public elements of what can be termed 'bads', in this case pollutants and other negative externalities. Once again, Japanese-sponsored polls have tried to ascertain how contributions to environmental betterment could be positively influenced by other countries important in Japanese foreign policy. In other words, the stronger the desire of other countries that Japan make environmental contributions, the greater the private benefit element Japan might

gain in making those contributions. In the mid 1990s substantial minorities in China, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, and Malaysia encouraged Japanese contributions. A 1992 poll found substantial minority support in the US, UK, Germany, and France for Japanese international environmental contributions, and much fewer in 1995 perceiving Japan to be activist in that regard. As a result, there may be reason to believe that Japanese environmental contributions will be greater than suggested by direct examination of domestic public opinion on environmental issues.

We found a globally widespread view that environmental deterioration imposes costs that publics would prefer to avoid. For general publics, that conviction wanes when protection measures are directly linked to private economic losses, thus opinion favors regulatory measures and more so ones which impact directly on industry rather than individuals. This adjustment preference at a literal, question wording level seems to apply to international collective as well as national action. This all suggests that support for environmental policies depends upon the circumstances of the policy trade-offs.

Majorities tend to be aware of environmental degradation costs now and in the future, but only small minorities favor policies based solely on environmental consequences. Several European countries stand out for the magnitude of perceived private costs compared to the US and Japan. Yet those most aware of costs (bads) are not always the same from environmental issue to issue. That suggests evolving and continually realigning coalitions of initiative takers, relatively compliant followers, and reluctant others for a continually changing set of issues and problems. For example, in very few countries does public opinion suggest a consistent initiative or reluctant position across air pollution (possessing more of a private goods element) and global warming (more a public goods element).

There is much less agreement on the locus of responsibility for world environmental problems. Judgments suggest differing degrees of concern about free riding and the private element associated with contributions. Those most inclined to accept responsibility are often not those most concerned with the private element of environmental quality, as witnessed in a number of the European countries with particularly large environmental activist minorities. The club modality which the European Union offers bridges the gap leading to particularly pronounced support for environmental protection. Fragmentary trend data suggest an increase in many West European nations in the motives which would support contributions for private, club, and public goods element reasons. The US, if anything, shows a decline in recent years after an increase earlier in the last decade. And the Japanese position is mixed.

Relating public support to international policy contributions: some concluding thoughts

Having explored the impressionistic mosaic of public preferences, we now turn to relationships between public opinion and contributions actually made to foreign

aid, UNPKO, and environmental quality. Do they support our muted optimism perspective?

Table 8 provides a ‘broad-brush-strokes’ summary of the findings of separate analyses previously undertaken on foreign aid (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997a), UNPKO (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997b), and cooperation on environmental quality (Bobrow and Boyer, 1998b). Contribution measures are discussed at length in each of these separate papers and will not be discussed here. Data for each substantive area were updated from the earlier analyses using the most current available. The entries show in an impressionistic way the compatibility between domestic public opinion and actual international contributions. We are able to draw a number of preliminary conclusions about international contributions in the coming years, based on the past and present. In particular, our conclusion focus on: (1) the role of US as a hegemonic provider of contributions; (2) the degree to which other states have been and continue to be important contributors; and (3) the degree to which some form of cross-national division of labor occurs among the most important contributors.

Table 8 summarizes contributions made to each of the three substantive issue areas. For each issue area, names of each country for which public opinion data were available are placed in the blocks that best describe that state’s role as a contributor, with special attention to those countries that have been playing a major role in a particular area. Boldface type for a state’s name indicates that public support corresponds with the type of contribution for that state; the absence of boldface, a lack of fit between public opinion and contributions. A lack of fit suggests that recent contribution policies are fragile as they lack public support. Our understanding of the impact of public opinion on foreign policy tells us that such a ‘counter-publicly supported’ policy might be sustainable in the short run, but that over the long term, change is likely in electoral, constituent-serving political systems. In any event, the ambiguity and incompleteness of our data urge caution in offering conclusions.

Table 8 locates the states demonstrating the highest contributions relative to national capabilities in the top row labeled ‘Comprehensive Super-Contributors’.¹¹ The US does not show up as a dominant relative provider of contributions in any issue area, nor does Japan. We do see evidence of a high degree of contributions by other OECD members (such as France, the UK, Italy, and Canada to UNPKO and the environment), and significant contributions by the Nordic states to every issue area. This is hardly a picture, historically or currently, that suggests retrenchment of contributions by others in the wake of a decline in US propensity to contribute. Rather, it fits well with muted optimism regarding the prospects for international contributions.

¹¹ In our analyses of actual contributions a variety of methods and indicators were used. In many cases the standard GDP to expenditure relationship was used, but others measures were also necessary to accurately gauge policy contributions in diverse policy areas. Please see the article cited in the previous paragraph for more detail on our methodology for assessing contributions.

Table 8. *International contributions*

| <i>Type of contribution</i> | <i>UN peace-keeping operations (PKO)</i> | <i>Official development assistance (ODA)</i> | <i>Environment</i> |
|--|--|--|---|
| <i>Comprehensive super-contributors</i> | Canada, France, UK | Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden | Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, UK |
| <i>Reliable comprehensive contributors</i> | Germany, New Zealand | Belgium, Finland, France | US, Germany |
| <i>Specialized Contributors</i> | Personnel: US | US for food aid and emergency relief; Japan on economic infrastructure | <i>Contributions to IOs (MLF, GEF):</i> US, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, UK |
| | <i>Financial:</i> Japan | <i>Financially Steady but not Spectacular (ODA/GDP):</i> Japan, Austria, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, UK | <i>Financial:</i> US |
| <i>Drop-Outs</i> | <i>Personnel:</i> Japan <i>Finance:</i> US | US (ODA/GDP) | <i>Financial:</i> Japan |
| <i>Other Considerations</i> | | Japan , with low ODA/GDP, ratio emerges as largest volume donor | <i>Production of Public Bads:</i> US high for all pollutants, but mid-range when control for GDP size; Japan, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK , also large producers. |

Notes: **Boldface** indicates public support or permissiveness for the indicated role in contribution; other entries indicate a contribution role different from prevailing public opinion.

The second row – ‘Reliable Comprehensive Contributors’ – provides additional compatible evidence. A number of OECD states loom large as reliable suppliers of publicly consumable provision to each area. Continuing contributions by these states is likely given the inertial aspects of many policy outputs in advanced industrialized states, where dramatic policy changes are less likely than incremental ones. A less forthcoming stance on contributions in general can be accompanied by willingness to provide specialized ones (the third row in Table 8), thus also buttressing muted optimism. Here we find many countries including Japan and the US, and many non-OECD states.

Hegemonic leadership does not seem to be a necessary condition for others to contribute and division of labor seems to be present. For UNPKO, the US shows

specialized contributions in personnel, but has become a financial drop-out. Although the US arrears situation for its UN contributions is improving somewhat, it still lags behind relative to others. Some recognition should go to multilateral PKO outside of UN operations such as US leadership in Bosnia and Kosovo. In the foreign aid area, we see the greatest evidence that relative contributions can be maintained without US leadership. Traditionally at the low end of the ODA to GDP ratio, the US ratio has dropped even lower in recent years (0.1 per cent in 1998) firmly claiming last place among members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Since the early 1990s, the US has abdicated its historic role as the largest volume aid donor, with Japan replacing it (\$14.5 billion for Japan and \$7.4 billion for the US in 1995; \$10.6 for Japan and \$8.8 billion for the US in 1998).¹²

As for environmental protection, the US role has been at most mixed. It has made clear contributions to the production of public goods outputs and the reduction of public bads (i.e. pollution), but also remains the largest producer of public bads. Other OECD states have provided leadership in environmental contributions. Our findings about contribution levels in Table 8 are substantially compatible with those from the World Economic Forum's (2000) pilot environmental sustainability index.¹³ The US ranked sixteenth in the world behind (in order) Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Iceland, Finland, New Zealand, Ireland, Canada, Australia, Denmark, France, Austria, Netherlands, the UK, and Germany. As this suggests, provision of environmental public and private goods proceeds without US leadership as a central factor. One might even go so far as to assert that recent US approaches at Kyoto and other environmentally relevant forums show the US as at best a follower of others.

At this point, then, neither the extreme pessimism of hegemonic stability theory or the extreme optimism of socio-economic globalist and shared identity schools seems warranted. We do see reason to be guardedly more optimistic than pessimistic, however, in light of the continuing relative contributions in spite of America's ambivalent and limited provision, the diversity of contributing states, and the appearance of division of labor. Our publics may not support, and the record surely does not show, a contribution cornucopia – but they do support and the record does show support for some provision. Further, in the important cases of Japan and the

¹² We have argued elsewhere (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997c) for the strong relationship between debt relief and official development assistance. Here, US leadership has been both reluctant and necessary, others have taken initiatives to spur the US to be more forthcoming.

¹³ The index is a composite of: environmental systems (extent to which environmental systems are maintained at healthy levels – usually associated with low population density, high wealth, or abundant natural resources); environmental stress (impact of human activities and their byproducts on ecosystems and human health); human vulnerability (extent to which people and social systems are vulnerable to environmental disturbances); social and institutional capacity (extent to which political institutions and social patterns foster effective responses to environmental challenges); global stewardship (extent to which a country cooperates with other countries to manage common environmental problems).

US, publics are in some respects more supportive of contributions than have been their governments. Hence, withholding contributions may be as fragile a stance as making them is often alleged to be.

If past is prologue, then there is reason for muted optimism regarding international contributions, even if tempered by awareness of the variety of unknown and changeable domestic and international forces in the years ahead. That conclusion will not appeal to seekers of parsimony, but it is no more complex and messy than the actual world around us. Nonetheless, it reflects the reality of international policy decisions and the often non-linear way in which cooperation develops and progress is pursued.

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