

ticular attention is paid to the revolution in Transylvania and to the Romanian-Hungarian relationship.

Missing from Jianu's work is an explanation of the complexity of the Romanians' identity, history, and culture: for example, the definition of the Romanian concepts of liberalism, patriotism, and nation, would have enabled a more nuanced understanding of the genesis and evolution of Romania. Together with a discussion of the political events, this would have helped clarify both similarities and differences between the French and the Romanian social-intellectual courses. Such a focus would also have made clear that not only did French influences play a role in the Romanians' Europeanization, but also the German influences did as well, when they penetrated Transylvania, Banat, and Bukovina during the period of Habsburg rule.

This volume extensively evaluates the correspondence, the memoirs, and the press of the time to highlight, often from a new perspective, the process of emancipation, the emerging pro-European orientation of the top Romanian revolutionaries, the integration of the so-called Oriental quest and of the Romanian issue into the larger framework of Europe, the unification of Moldavia with Walachia, and the formation and international recognition of Romania. The detailed contextualization refers to the political landscape in both central southeastern and western Europe.

Jianu paints a graceful historical picture, renarrating the political facts through the biographies of the main Romanian actors during the decades of revolution and exile that preceded the union of the two principalities. Intended for an academic audience, this work would also be accessible to a public eager to learn more about the history of Romania.

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***Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800–1912.*** By Isa Blumi. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. xxii, 250 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. Maps. \$85.00, hard bound.

There is an established custom in historical studies of southeastern Europe to use the nation as the frame for narrating the past. In some cases the nation may be a useful unit of analysis for the post-Ottoman period, but Isa Blumi argues in this book that reliance upon the ethnic nation as the main social or political category in the late Ottoman era misreads the reality of the nineteenth century. He illustrates the argument by providing new interpretations of key events in the last century of the empire's existence in Europe, focusing upon what he terms the western Balkans (areas historically with significant Albanian populations, covering today's Albania, Kosovo, western Macedonia, southern Serbia, northwestern Greece, and southern/eastern Montenegro). Blumi's "alternative" view of the modern period presents a serious challenge to Balkan historiography that must be considered by anyone working in this field or indeed in the wider history of the late Ottoman empire.

Blumi arranges his study in five chapters that follow a rough chronological sequence, in each of which he points out misinterpretations that have arisen from standard national-minded accounts. The key to each revision lies in considering the individuals involved and their motivations, rather than treating them simply as "Albanians," "Greeks," and other ethnic groups. Chapter 1 discusses the dynamic of relations between provincial society and the Ottoman imperial regime to the 1830s, and the effect of growing western European influence in the empire. Through reference to figures such as Ali Pasha, governor of Ioannina, Blumi shows that local leaders usually portrayed as resisters of Ottoman domination were anything but rebels. The Ottoman-provincial relationship was fluid, allowing Ali the opportunity to act according to interests unrelated to his usual two-dimensional identification as either an Ottoman official or the founder of a proto-Albanian state. Chapter 2 discusses the tightening of the relationship(s) between province and imperial center but argues that many natives of the western Balkans, especially Tosks, staffed the

expanding Ottoman bureaucracy and manipulated that relationship to serve their own local-regional, rather than ethnic, interests. Blumi analyzes writers such as Pashko Vasa and Sami Frashëri in light of their local ties and their roles in the modernizing state, arguing that their concepts of “Albania” fit their provincial and Ottoman milieux rather than denoted ethnic separatism. This theme continues in the third chapter, which covers the turmoil of 1875–78, when much of Ottoman Europe gained independence. Again, movements interpreted as nationalist, including the League of Prizren, were driven by local chaos engendered by European powers’ imposition of “ethnic” borders where none had existed or were justified. Chapter 4 discusses the ways in which local societies blurred the ethnonational separations that the new borders were supposed to define and indeed were able to exploit Ottoman fears about “the frontier” to gain status and resources from the center. Chapter 5 discusses a theme, education, rather than events, but the focus remains upon how Ottoman schools were made to serve local interests rather than the “loyalty-building” agenda usually attributed to Istanbul.

Blumi’s argument is certainly sound, and he offers intriguing glimpses of local society and local politics that are rarely seen elsewhere. One of the important points made in arguing against the ethnic nation as a useful category of analysis is the mistrust and misunderstanding separating Tosks and Ghegs, the two largest groups of “Albanians.” That said, the book does have some features that could rob it of some of its potential impact. Most important is the audience that it addresses, which in effect is advanced specialists in both Albanian and late Ottoman history. Individuals and events are too rarely identified with their significance explained properly, and the language of the text has too much opaque “academese” to be easy and clear. For readers with the level of knowledge assumed, numerous statements or interpretations mentioned in the text, especially in the first two chapters, demand more explanation. Perhaps the most unsettling are recurring references to private capital or banks as the dismantlers of the Ottoman empire, from the overthrow of Ali Pasha to the gutting of Ottoman Europe in 1877–78. Such assertions may be meant to be provocative, but they are difficult to accept without careful explanation. It would be regrettable, were Blumi’s provocativeness to lead the specialists whom he addresses to discount his important overarching argument against reading the nation back through history.

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*Wissenschaft als nationaler Beruf: Die Serbische Akademie der Wissenschaften 1944–1992. Tradierung und Modifizierung nationaler Ideologie.* By Nenad Stefanov. *Balkanologische Veröffentlichungen Geschichte—Gesellschaft—Kultur*, no. 52. Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2011. 388 pp. Notes. Bibliography. €98.00, hard bound.

Many accounts of the surge of nationalism in Serbia/Yugoslavia in 1980s used to begin with the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences’ (SANU) Memorandum of 1986. This conspiratorial approach to history, which always seeks a “document” and the important “men” behind it, is misleading and erroneous in ways too numerous to cover here. Its two key flaws are that it does not explain how the ideas evoked in the Memorandum appeared so suddenly and, consequently, how they could, in the span of only a couple of years, attract and mobilize so many. How so many came to be mobilized under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević has since been addressed in a number of monographs ranging from the structural deficiencies of Yugoslav federation, to the economic slump, to political mobilization. With Nenad Stefanov, we have a long-awaited volume that deals with the former. His book traces the tragic delusions of a significant group of Serbian academicians whose views were expressed in the Memorandum, followed by the venomous responses they devised and shared with a significant portion of the Serbian intellectual elites, ruling party, and, eventually with the help of the media, the masses. A number of works have already dealt with the Memorandum, its authors, and agency (Audrey Budding, *Serb Intellectuals and the National Question*, 1998; Olivera Milosavljević, “The Abuse of the Authority of Sci-