

and rhetoric in electoral campaigning and public statements. The persistence of Republican negative racial symbolism is still disturbing, underscoring African American resistance to GOP efforts to change its image, absent substantive policy adjustments, as Philpot demonstrates.

Fauntroy's historiography yields three major conclusions: the overestimation by Republicans of early GOP support for black Americans' political and social equality; the ironic misunderstanding *even by African American Republicans* of the ideological bases of mass black support for Democrats and opposition to Republicans; and the GOP's electoral paradox of apparently *wanting* to increase its minority vote shares while *having* to increase its share of white votes due to the nation's changing demographics and its own failure to solidify minority support.

One of the more important conclusions I drew from both books is the basic inability of Republican strategists to simply understand the black community, and their resulting inability to formulate policies and messages to earn credibility, let alone votes. The fundamental societal problem here encompasses the differences between white and black perspectives on American politics and the political system (see, e.g., Howard Schuman et al., *Racial Attitudes in America*, 1997); the GOP's (often self-created and self-perpetuating) problems thus reflect broader inter-racial misunderstanding and distrust. Republicans are right to take the initiative in building bridges across the racial and ethnic divides but cannot build the right bridges with mere rhetoric; they must engage in more transparent efforts to increase trust, including the politically risky—but morally correct—strategy of proactively repudiating politically expedient negative racial symbolism. The strategic context is problematic, of course, because Democrats benefit from the race-party status quo and Republican successes will threaten them, giving Jefferson's party the incentive to undermine even genuine GOP overtures. Still, perhaps black Americans will consider Fauntroy's suggestion that “[f]inally, now may be the time for African American voters to rethink their resistance to the GOP” (p. 3).

In this context, both books usefully contribute to our understanding of parties' political incentives to change their images and coalitions, of the conditions under which voters will respond to such efforts, and of the awkward historical dance between African Americans and the party of Lincoln.

The New Environmental Regulation. By Daniel J. Fiorino.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006. 290p. \$23.00.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707072428

— Robert V. Bartlett, *University of Vermont*

The subject matter of this book is not exactly what its title suggests. The author's attention is limited to industrial pollution regulatory policy in the United States, rather than focusing on environmental regulation more broadly.

And the “new” regulation it touts is not really all that new. Daniel Fiorino does not describe and analyze something that has been invented recently, say, in the last five to 10 years, nor does he propose something wholly original or novel that has never before been tried or imagined. Many of the regulatory tools that he lumps together under the label of “new” can be traced back decades, some to even before the modern federal pollution regulatory era began in 1970, and so many of them are as old as or older than much of his “old” pollution regulation. Fiorino uses the adjective “new” because it is an inherently appealing, future-oriented label whether one is selling soap, politicians, or ideas. Although “old” hints at something worn out, no longer desirable, and perhaps near death, he does not want to bury the old regulation: “Designing and implementing a new regulation does not mean that we should do away with the old one” (p. 190). By using “old” as his label of convenience, he at least sidesteps an ideological minefield by avoiding the also-loaded label “command and control,” which is often used by political critics of adversarial, directive regulation in the public interest.

What Fiorino summarizes and contrasts in this book are two strategies for regulating industrial pollution. The first is a strategy (old regulation) of establishing and enforcing a complex set of directives aimed at specific inputs or outputs of production processes. The second is a strategy (new regulation) that, while retaining several elements of the old regulation—namely, demanding normative standards, legal authority and enforcement capability, information availability, and independent advocacy—differentiates among regulated firms on the basis of past and expected future performance, incorporates mechanisms and incentives that promote continuous performance improvements, builds policy learning capacity, measures performance at all levels, and creates mechanisms and relationships that build trust.

Because this new regulation is not all that new, there are hundreds of policy reforms and initiatives in the United States and abroad, many of them well studied, that provide an empirical foundation for understanding the potential, limitations, and design prerequisites for a pollution regulation system that would be more flexible, less adversarial, less directive, and more performance based. The value of *The New Environmental Regulation* is that it brings together a wide range of this research (particularly the U.S. based portion of it) and, because of the author's extensive personal experience with several flexible regulatory initiatives at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, distills key lessons for the design of the U.S. industrial pollution regulatory system of the future. Such systemic regulatory reform is badly needed, Fiorino argues, not only for cost and efficiency reasons but for environmental reasons as well. Instead of a regulatory system with a reach limited to the inputs and outputs of production processes, a more flexible performance-based system can achieve dramatic improvements in environmental outcomes by

influencing other activities in a product value chain, such as research and development, raw materials sourcing, customer service, marketing, and end-of-life disposal.

The book proceeds straightforwardly, beginning with a history of the old regulation and an evaluation and critique of it. Middle chapters analyze various influences that promote the greening of portions of the business community and the many, mostly nonstatutory, initiatives of the federal and state governments that experiment piecemeal with flexible performance-based approaches. Fiorino also considers some conceptual issues relevant to the politics of regulation, putting his arguments for a new regulation in the context of developments in reflexive law, civil governance, policy learning, and civic environmentalism. The final chapter presents his design principles for a new regulation, discusses the kinds of changes in laws and agencies that a transition will require, and identifies the near-term steps that need to be taken to facilitate longer-term fundamental change when the political conditions for that become more propitious.

Aside from an eight-page analysis of Dutch regulation, *The New Environmental Regulation* does not look much to other countries for comparative insights into regulatory policies generally or industrial pollution regulatory systems in particular. Fiorino acknowledges, for example, that the design and evolution of environmental regulation in the United States has been influenced by both a constitutional system that fragments power and a cultural belief in a limited state, but he does not explore the significance of federalism and a constitutionally limited state as compared with other countries, notably constitutionally limited federal ones.

Thus, the book's strengths are also its main weaknesses. It is a book of limited scope, and so it may be of limited interest for many political scientists. It has no pretensions of theoretical profundity. As mentioned earlier, it makes no effort to compare industrial pollution regulation with other areas of environmental regulation, nor does it draw much from, or speak to, the political science literature on regulation generally. But it is a significant, integrative work that addresses a crucially important matter of practical policy reform, and so it is worthy of attention. The analysis it offers is thoughtful, cogent, and insightful. Fiorino's writing is accessible, and he discusses many real-world examples, making the book an excellent resource for politicians, practitioners, scholars, and students interested in improving industrial pollution control regulatory policy specifically.

Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency. By Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 282p. \$28.00. DOI: 10.1017/S153759270707243X

— Brian J. Cook, *Clark University*

One of the cornerstones of Woodrow Wilson's policy agenda, even before he formally sought the presidency,

was transparency. To neutralize corporate misbehavior, for instance, he called for "turn[ing] the light" on corporations: "They don't like light. Turn it on so strong they can't stand it. Exposure is one of the best ways to whip them into line." Although the authors of this superb work do not acknowledge Wilson's part in the evolutionary line of transparency policy, they do show by means of thorough and enlightening description and analysis the fruit finally borne of ideas like those Wilson espoused. Indeed, the authors tell a story of policy design that demonstrates the continuing value of careful legislative craftsmanship and policy refinement over time, based on feedback from administration and enforcement. It is a tale of effective *legislative* governance, particularly at the national level, that far too many American citizens, and even political leaders, believe is impossible or at least unlikely anymore.

The focus of this study is "targeted transparency policy," a form of regulation that, the authors argue, is readily distinguishable from, and complementary to, both standards-based and general market-based policy instruments. The distinctions are rooted in the nature of the public problems for which different policy approaches are best suited, as well as in the obvious differences in central design elements. Standards-based regulation aims to address problems in which "uniform performance across all regulated parties" (p. 175) is essential. Market-based programs are best aimed at problems in which costs of compliance vary considerably across regulated entities *and* variations in levels of achievement by those entities is tolerable. Targeted transparency policies, in contrast, aim to reduce information asymmetries, empowering consumers with information by mandating "public disclosure" by publicly or privately regulated parties of "standardized, comparable, and disaggregated information" that concerns "specific products or practices" so as to "further a defined public purpose" (p. 6).

The authors begin with an introductory chapter that sets the context of the study by stressing the social, economic, and political transformations linked to advances in information technology and the general failure of the scholarly community to keep pace with the policy responses that have emerged. They then look at the history of what they consider the politically unlikely emergence of transparency policies as an innovation that at least sometimes has actually worked. They move on from there to the core of their study by examining in successive chapters the logic behind, and the common design elements of, targeted transparency policies, the critical question of what makes for successful transparency policy, and the equally vital matter of how such policies can be made "sustainable." The authors shift briefly from what is primarily a U.S. domestic policy focus to examine the special challenges of targeted transparency policy at the international level. They also consider the next stage of innovation in targeted transparency policy, as the continued advances in