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THE MISSING TURKISH REVOLUTION: COMPARING VILLAGE-LEVEL CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN REPUBLICAN TURKEY AND SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA, 1920–50

Abstract

The Kemalist leadership of early Republican Turkey attempted to transform the country's Muslim populace with a heavy emphasis on secularism, scientific rationalism, and nationalism. Several studies have examined the effects of this effort, or the “Turkish Revolution,” at the central and more recently provincial levels. This article uses first-hand accounts and statistical data to carry the analysis to the village level. It argues that the Kemalist reforms failed to reach rural Turkey, where more than 80 percent of the population lived. A comparison with sedentary Soviet Central Asia's rural transformation in the same period reveals ideology and the availability of resources as the underlying causes of this failure. Informed by a Marxist–Leninist emphasis on the necessity of transforming the “substructure” for revolutionary change, the Soviet state undermined existing authority structures in Central Asia's villages to facilitate the introduction of communist ideals among their Muslim inhabitants. Turkey's Kemalist leadership, on the other hand, preserved existing authority structures in villages and attempted to change culture first. However, they lacked and could not create the resources to implement this change.

Keywords: Central Asia; development; rural studies; Soviet Union; Turkish revolution

Between 1924 and 1950, Mustafa Kemal and his followers in the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) attempted to remake Turkey's populace in the example of Europe, as they perceived Europe, with a heavy emphasis on secularism, scientific rationalism, and nationalism.¹ The self-celebratory rhetoric of the Kemalist elite and the journalistic accounts of contemporaneous Western observers presented these attempts as a revolutionary process of social and cultural transformation. “We have accomplished many great tasks in a short period of time,” Mustafa Kemal declared in 1933, at the tenth anniversary of the republic.² To find out if such a transformation took place, this article turns to the early republic's villages. In 1927, 83.7 percent of Turkey's 13.5 million citizens lived in villages, and by 1950, when the population increased to 20.8 million, 82.5 percent continued to do so.³ The success or even the existence of the “Kemalist revolution” would have necessitated significant transformations at the village level, but

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multiple first-hand accounts and statistical data suggest that change in Turkey's villages was limited to an insignificant minimum in this period.

A comparison with the transformations of sedentary Soviet Central Asia in the same period, an area that roughly corresponds to today's Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, further highlights this point.⁴ As Adeeb Khalid has suggested, this comparison is warranted for multiple reasons. The Soviet Union and the Turkish Republic both originated from the collapse of "the European imperial order" at the end of World War I. They were both "activist, interventionist, [and] mobilizational" modern states that sought to "sculpt [their] citizenry in an ideal image." Their leaderships each "pursued shock modernization programs that involved . . . radical interventions in the realms of society and culture, featuring state-led campaigns for the 'emancipation' of women, spreading literacy, the elaboration of new literary languages, and secularization." The Turkish political elite were inheritors of the Ottoman Empire's Westernist intellectual movements, to which the political elite of the Soviet Union's Muslim-inhabited territories was also deeply connected.⁵ Moreover, the Soviet and Kemalist leaderships carefully observed and learned from one another.⁶

The demographic and economic circumstances of Turkey and sedentary Soviet Central Asia were relatively similar as well. Decades of violence and resulting migrations in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Anatolia had concentrated an almost entirely Muslim, though ethnically diverse, population in the territory that became the Turkish Republic in 1923, whereas sedentary Central Asia had long hosted a predominantly Muslim and ethnically diverse population. Civil war in Central Asia and the War of Liberation in Turkey prolonged the devastation of World War I and left behind ravaged populations in both regions. Industry was nearly absent, infrastructure was in tatters, and agriculture required serious recovery in both regions under observation, although some areas such as the Aegean or Cilician plains in Turkey and the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia offered better prospects for recovery. Compared to Turkey's over 80 percent rural population until 1950, sedentary Central Asia remained about 75 percent rural between 1913 and 1940, after which that figure slowly decreased, reaching 66.2 percent by 1960.⁷

Despite these similarities in regimes, regime ideals, and postwar circumstances, the following analysis reveals that by the mid-20th century the Soviet state was able to penetrate rural society and transform it, while the Turkish state was not. Comparisons with other mobilizational states, such as Iran,⁸ or colonial territories, such as Iraq and Syria, may highlight the Turkish experience in the second quarter of the 20th century as a success story. Yet, the Soviet comparison offers a different conclusion. The effectiveness of the Soviet regime was partly due to its disregard for human costs, and therefore, the present evaluation of its effectiveness should not be taken as a moral estimation of superiority. However, when measured against each regime's avowed goals of transforming a predominantly peasant population into a modern nation of well-educated and secularly minded citizens, the achievements of the Turkish state lagged far behind that of the Soviet Union at least until the 1950s.

Similar to Senem Aslan, who examines the Turkish state's failure to transform its Kurdish citizens, I highlight ideology and resources to explain the discrepancy in the effectiveness of the Soviet and Kemalist transformation projects. However, while Aslan considers the Kemalist regime to have been "ideologically rigid" due to its

uncompromising policies of linguistic assimilation,⁹ I conceive of ideology as more than an inflexibly pursued political objective and define it as a comprehensive vision of social and political reality that informs utopian ideals as well as strategies to achieve them. In my examination of resources, on the other hand, besides assessing their availability, I question each regime's ability to mobilize what was available to it.

Informed by a Marxist understanding of social change, the Soviet state attacked existing authority structures in society (again, and importantly, at great human cost), replaced them with new ones linked to the Communist Party, and mobilized those new authority structures to induce large-scale social and cultural transformation. Turkey's Kemalist leadership, in contrast, was informed by an eclectic mix of positivist and populist ideals that did not amount to a systematic ideology. In other words, what this article offers is not a juxtaposition of capitalism and Soviet socialism as two rival ideologies. Both capitalism and Soviet socialism entailed the development of a more or less integrated market at the national level even as they differed on whether supply and demand mechanisms or the state's planning institutions should regulate that market. The effects of this integration then extended to the economies of culture and politics. The interventions of the early Turkish state failed to produce such an integration. Otherwise, the effects of the integration of dispossessed and pauperized Algerian peasants into a *capitalist* economy in colonized Algeria in the 19th century could offer an equally enlightening contrast to the experience of Turkish peasants a century later.¹⁰ In the absence of a coherent ideology, the Kemalist elite adopted a piecemeal and unsystematic path to change. They targeted culture first and primarily through education and modeling. Yet, they lacked the necessary personnel, funds, and infrastructure for top-down intervention that the realization of this ambitious aspiration would require. Moreover, because they neither attempted nor were able to dislodge existing authority structures at the village level, the introduction of revolutionary transformations through bottom-up mobilization also remained beyond their reach. Consequently, the social and cultural impact of their policies upon the country's peasant majority remained minimal. If a revolution took place in the early Turkish Republic, it missed the villages.¹¹

NOTES ON TURKISH HISTORIOGRAPHY

Historiography of the Turkish Republic has come a long way from the "modernization" paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s, which assumed that the Kemalist leadership's legal and administrative reforms amounted to or would eventually translate into large-scale social and cultural transformation.¹² This assumption about a continuum from elite interventions to societal transformation still pervades official Turkish historiography, but scholarly literature has challenged it in multiple ways especially in the past two decades. In 1997, for instance, Joel Migdal suggested looking at the "physical and social spaces where" the elites and "the poor or marginal groups of society" intersected to test if the Kemalist reforms had actually changed the society.¹³ Since Migdal's suggestion, several excellent studies have located and explored those sites of interaction in the archives and periodical collections of Turkey's small towns. Their findings at this provincial level have revealed that Turkish citizens did not simply receive the Kemalist leadership's state-induced transformation projects but negotiated, modified, and sometimes even thwarted them.¹⁴

Yet, if we take the contributions of this growing literature one step further to question the Kemalist reforms' social and cultural ramifications beyond small towns at the village level, we are still in relatively uncharted territory. Undeniably, the fate of Turkish villages and villagers has concerned many studies since at least the 1930s. As the sociologist Mediha Esnel observed in 1941, earlier examples of these studies were quite amateurish.¹⁵ Among the later works, most are highly descriptive. Some are worth noting for the authoritative information they provide,¹⁶ and others are helpful as sources of raw data.¹⁷ A few studies published in the 1960s, though primarily based on research from the late-1940s, are analytically rich but tend to subscribe to the modernization paradigm of the post-World War II period.¹⁸ As microlevel case studies, all of these reports reflect the regional peculiarities of the villages they feature, and many of them need to be evaluated carefully for possible prejudices and research deficiencies. However, cross-evaluating their findings and further verifying the emerging picture against the broader suggestions of macrolevel statistical surveys, as I do in this article, offers a reliable view of the overall state of Turkish villages before the 1950s in the republican period.

Remarkably, hardly any historical analyses have utilized these village studies systematically to assess the effectiveness of state-induced social and cultural transformation projects in the early Turkish Republic. Nancy Margaret Alderman's 1975 dissertation constitutes a noteworthy exception in this regard. Although she too writes within the modernization paradigm, her language would probably be dismissed as Orientalist by today's readers, and her research on Turkey's religious movements is rather superficial, she nevertheless provides an historical analysis that aptly concludes that "Kemal's secularist reforms . . . did not affect the countryside immediately."¹⁹ However, this unpublished dissertation seems to have remained virtually unnoticed in the field. Writing more recently, Gavin D. Brockett and Hakan Yavuz both assert, without citing Alderman, that the Kemalist reforms failed to transform rural society in Turkey. However, Yavuz's research concentrates mainly on fieldwork among Turkish Islamic groups in the 1990s and, although he studies an earlier period, Brockett explores active "resistance" in contexts much more visible than the mundane routines of ordinary village life. Therefore, while both authors make insightful comments about the early republic, neither seeks to demonstrate how and why the Kemalist reforms failed to transform villages and villagers in this period.²⁰ Thus, Erik Jan Zürcher writes in 2010 that "there is still a great need for studies on the impact of the Kemalist regime on the population outside the major towns,"²¹ to which I would add, not only in the small towns, as highlighted in the most recent literature, but also in the villages, where the overwhelming majority of Turkish citizens lived.

BRINGING CULTURAL PROGRESS TO THE VILLAGES IN TURKEY

World War I and the subsequent War of Liberation (1919–22) prepared the grounds for the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Mustafa Kemal, who emerged from the War of Liberation as the new republic's leader, was a genius in organization and strategy. He consolidated military and administrative power in Ankara, eliminated all political opposition within a few years,²² and introduced a plethora of Westernizing reforms through administrative fiat, from the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924 to

the adoption of a Latin-based alphabet in 1928.²³ He also used the republican state's punitive forces to pacify all popular resistance.²⁴ It is true that open resistance to this seemingly grandiose transformation project was limited, but not necessarily because Turkish society was weak and acquiescent, as has been suggested,²⁵ nor solely because the government's intrusions in everyday life could be mitigated through everyday forms of resistance.²⁶ If we recognize that the country's society included the villagers and not just urban dwellers, it becomes apparent that the early republican state's ability to, aspirations for, and attempts at transforming that populace were too limited to evoke sustained confrontation.

This is not to say that the Turkish state paid no attention to the villages. Mustafa Kemal and his followers wanted to create a "modern" and "civilized" nation, and this could not be achieved without the peasants. Thus, from the very beginning, they espoused a populist desire to "civilize" peasants and integrate them into the emerging nation.²⁷ The Turkish parliament passed a "Village Law" in 1924 and successive republican governments supplemented it with several regulations and directives. If implemented, this legislation would have turned the country's villages into idyllic communities of peace and productivity.²⁸ But while the Kemalist elite's positivist world outlook, which at times blurred into more radical views of scientism and materialism, offered "blueprints for a future society" in Şükrü Hanioglu's words,²⁹ it did not provide an executive strategy for the implementation of a large-scale social reconstruction project. Socialists in the Soviet Union and Kemalists in Turkey both improvised as they worked toward actualizing their blueprints, but as Stephen Kotkin has convincingly suggested, the socialist blueprint was grounded in transforming societal relations and offered a tangible strategy, primarily through the elimination of private property.³⁰

Changing culture, as opposed to the substructure that social engineering projects informed by Marxism targeted, was key to the Kemalist elite's endeavor to build a nation.³¹ Mustafa Kemal and his followers believed in the ultimate magnetism and triumph of the "civilized" and "national" way of life that they were creating in the cities and expected villagers to work toward that urban model on their own over time. According to one proponent of Kemalism in 1941, being attracted to the amenities of city life was "human nature."³² Yet, the early republican state did not (or could not) allocate substantial resources from the central budget to carry these amenities, such as electricity or running water, to the villages. Moreover, it was the peasants who financed the creation of the Kemalist elite's urban models with their taxes, further contributing to rural poverty.³³ In the end, the improvements that the republican elite expected to take place in the villages—from the delineation of field borders to the elimination of quack healers—did not have enough urgency or relevance for Turkey's villagers to spare their time and paltry resources. Therefore, they typically disregarded legislative guidance. And, as we shall see, unlike their Soviet counterparts Turkey's Kemalist leadership was not interested in forcing the peasants into a promised life through an upheaval of existing social structures and the concomitant violence.

In fact, the Kemalist leadership's one sustained effort that approximated a strategy for rural transformation, the "peasantist movement" (*köycülük hareketi*) of the 1930s, considered villages as *bastions* of social and political stability. The proponents of this movement targeted national development through the distribution of industry to villages in small-scale manufacturing enterprises. Coming in the wake of the Great

Depression, peasantism was an international response to the high risk involved in the potential failure of nationally integrated economies or the destabilizing—that is, socialist revolutionary—effects of concentrating the proletariat in the cities through urban industrialization.³⁴ A prominent proponent of this movement, Nusret Köymen, posited in 1934 that villages were not susceptible to socioeconomic fluctuations because they could feed themselves and therefore be self-sufficient. According to him, the Soviet Union and the United States were both suffering from the concentration of agriculture in grand-scale enterprises. And peasantism, he explained, would aim for creating economically independent, agriculturally self-sufficient, industrially productive, and culturally progressive village households.³⁵

However, the economic aspect of this development plan failed as the republican state lacked the resources to stimulate such diffused development. As Aslan also points out, qualified civilian personnel were in short supply.³⁶ The few existing civil servants heavily concentrated in major towns and in the ministries that were charged with collecting taxes or preserving order—not with transforming society. As opposed to the 9,294 employees of the Ministry of Finance or the 7,924 employees of the Ministry of Justice, for instance, the Ministry of Education employed just 3,397 personnel in 1931.³⁷ If the state wanted to launch transformative projects, it had to collect taxes to finance them, but after years of devastating war, the republic was dirt poor. War had consumed the male population in villages, severely disrupting agricultural production. Moreover, the majority of the wealthier and more entrepreneurial non-Muslim minorities had been removed from the social fabric through deportations and extermination. There was not much tax to be collected in the country and whatever was collected had to be spent first and foremost on keeping the state running. The Ministry of Education's share in the general budget remained at less than 5 percent until 1944, then slowly climbed to 9.3 percent by 1950, while the share of the Ministry of Defense ranged between 20.9 percent in 1933 and well over 40 percent during World War II, then gradually declining to 24.3 percent by 1950.³⁸

The introduction of horse-carts instead of ox-driven tumbrels (*kağrı*) and carts, iron ploughs instead of wooden ploughs, and slightly more productive seed and stud varieties marked the limits of technological improvement in the Turkish villages until the late 1940s.³⁹ In 1949, over 34,000 villages in Turkey owned 3,195 tractors, about 3.15 million draft oxen, and 384,065 draft horses. About 4.4 million hectares of wheat were sown and about 4.73 million hectares of land were left fallow. The country's level of wheat production in 1950 still remained close to that of 1912. Tractors as well as some other mechanical tools, such as seed sowers, started to appear after World War II but only in specific areas where relatively more fertile soil actually enabled capital investment.⁴⁰

Inspired by state planners from the Soviet Union, the early Turkish Republic invested in railway construction, boosting the length of its lines from 2,333 miles in 1923 to near 4,766 miles in 1950.⁴¹ But without an extensive network of highways and village roads, or trucks to haul produce, this would have little impact on life in the villages. The republic also built roads and almost tripled the length of its highways from 11,393 miles in 1923 to 29,254 miles in 1950.⁴² This, however, was hardly enough to stimulate national development by linking the economies of various regions in the country, let alone to integrate villages into the national economy. According to 1938 numbers, the high

cost of transportation increased the price of wheat from three kurushs in Urfa, where it was produced, to ten kurushs in Hakkari, less than one hundred miles away. The price of garlic increased from two kurushs in Konya, in central Anatolia, to forty kurushs by the time it arrived in Zonguldak, in the western Black Sea region. Until after World War II perishable vegetables were available only where they were grown.⁴³ Strategically located industrial investment, such as a textile mill built by Soviet engineers in Kayseri,⁴⁴ created pockets of development and affected the few villages in their vicinity but did not result in enough national development for large-scale rural integration.

The early Turkish Republic's villages were not worlds apart, as global price fluctuations had started to affect their consumption patterns even in the early 19th century.⁴⁵ Yet many of them constituted a world unto themselves, limiting their procurement from the outside world to a bare minimum. Peddlers came to villages to exchange haberdashery for agricultural produce, and itinerant craftsmen provided specialized services, such as tin-coating copper kitchenware or circumcising boys. Cash money was rare and rarely used outside of the occasional trips of village men to nearby towns where they would purchase basic clothing, shoes for the winter, or perhaps agricultural tools. The purchase of oxen as draft animals was also a substantial drain on the villagers' meager cash assets.⁴⁶ In his village notes, Mahmut Makal, a village school teacher in central Anatolia in the late-1940s, offers an illustrative example of the insulation of villages. One day, upon reading a sentence about honey in the school primer, he asked his students if they had ever seen honey. All but one of his fifty-six pupils answered negatively. The one exceptional student had seen it during a visit to another village.⁴⁷

Thus, the Kemalist leadership was able to invest in the rural economy and infrastructure only meagerly, but they were enthusiastic and significantly more proactive in introducing cultural progress to villages. In 1930, an aborted challenge to the otherwise uncontested power of the Republican People's Party (RPP) served as a catalyst in this regard by highlighting the importance of popular support.⁴⁸ In 1931, the RPP introduced "republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, statism, and reformism" in its program as the "principles of Kemalism" and embarked on a campaign to indoctrinate these principles in the Turkish people.⁴⁹ In 1932, it created cultural centers called "people's houses" in fourteen cities with contributions from nearly 2,100 volunteers. By 1940, the number of these volunteers had reached 154,000, and by 1950, the RPP's last year in power, 478 people's houses were in operation.⁵⁰ This was still an urban project, but with thousands of volunteers, the people's houses in the cities and towns could potentially serve as launching pads to organize campaigns for improving the conditions of villages.

The magazine *Ülkü* (Ideal), which was published by the Ankara People's House between 1933 and 1950 but served as an instrument of communication for all people's houses in the country, promoted and advertised such efforts to reach out to the villages in its pages.⁵¹ For instance, the Ankara People's House supplied 15,176 pieces of reading material to village, city, and prison schools together in 1939.⁵² In 1941, the volunteers of the Çanakkale People's House traveled to villages and provided medicine and various other needed items and services. A volunteer at the Fethiye People's House, who was a physician, traveled to the villages of his district in southwest Anatolia and treated hundreds of patients.⁵³ Earlier, in 1938, when the roads opened in March, about one hundred volunteers from the Ankara People's House organized a trip to a village in the outskirts of the city. The villagers were informed in advance and had prepared to

host their guests. Together, the villagers and the people's house volunteers had a picnic and organized wrestling, horse riding, and javelin-throwing competitions. Then, the volunteers planted 1,500 trees to celebrate "earth day" and staged a play inspired by traditional Turkish theater (*ortaoyunu*) before returning to Ankara.⁵⁴

These efforts and their news generated awareness about village conditions among the urban elite, but they were too sporadic, disorganized, and limited to change village conditions.⁵⁵ In 1939, the RPP decided to expand the activities of the people's houses beyond cities and towns in a more systematic way by opening "people's rooms" (*halk odalari*) in villages. The number of these rooms would reach a total of 4,261 by 1948. The more affluent villagers in many Turkish villages already opened and operated "village rooms" (*köy odalari*) where village men would gather for conversation and guests from outside the village would be accommodated. The people's rooms, however, would belong to the RPP. They spurred some level of cultural activism in villages with strong support for the RPP, but otherwise, most villages failed to sponsor their activities and left them idle.⁵⁶

The early republican state's most serious effort to bring cultural progress to the villages was predictably in the fields of elementary and informal education. Many studies have investigated the ideological foundations of the Turkish state's educational initiatives.⁵⁷ Ascertaining the actual impact of those initiatives on the larger populace, however, is an ongoing project.⁵⁸ Literacy is one barometer of how effective these initiatives were. In 1928, the literacy rate in Turkey dropped to almost nil with the introduction of a Latin-based alphabet. Thanks to a campaign of adult education alongside regular schools, it rapidly increased to 20.4 percent by 1935, then slowly climbed to 32.4 percent in 1950 and 39.5 percent in 1960.⁵⁹ Another important aspect of the Turkish state's push for large-scale transformation through education was the opening of village schools. This was a slow process in the beginning: only 9,203 of the country's over 34,000 villages had schools in 1940, and underqualified teachers, appointed after a few months of crash training (*eğitmens*), taught in most of them. But the introduction of a new type of special teacher school, the "village institutes," changed the picture in the 1940s. These institutes admitted only peasant children and offered practical education—including farming techniques—that would help the students serve and survive in the villages as teachers after graduation.⁶⁰ In this fashion, the Ministry of Education hired a remarkable number of 15,807 new village teachers and increased the number of village elementary schools to 15,800 by 1950 (3,860 with *eğitmens*).⁶¹ Finally, some people's rooms in villages maintained small libraries (448 of them in 1935),⁶² radios started to enter villages in the 1940s, especially in the latter part of the decade,⁶³ theater troops organized by the people's houses staged some of their plays in the villages,⁶⁴ and some nationally distributed magazines, especially the ones with large pictures and simple, humorous content, occasionally made their way into villages.⁶⁵

It is true that these developments indicate tangible progress, but we should keep in mind that more than half of Turkey's villages still lacked schools in 1950. It was mostly the urban population (25 percent in 1960) that boosted the country's modest literacy rates.⁶⁶ Female literacy remained at less than half of male literacy until the 1970s.⁶⁷ And importantly, the ability of some Turkish peasants to read or the presence of teachers in some villages did not necessarily mean that the peasants actually read anything culturally transformative or that the teachers actually transformed them.

Anecdotal information from many studies of individual villages as well as broader surveys such as İlhan Başgöz's work on the geographic distribution of personal names suggest that the most significant catalyst of social and cultural transformation in the early republic's villages was exposure to towns and cities thanks to proximity or better transportation opportunities.⁶⁸ One village to the northeast of Ankara, Hasanoğlan, was fairly advantaged in this regard. It was on a railway line, although without a train stop, and since the early 20th century it had a functioning school. When the Ministry of Education opened a village institute in Hasanoğlan in 1941, the village also acquired a train station, a post office, a telephone line, a people's room, a practice school for institute students to practice teaching, about 1,500 new residents (teachers, students, and personnel), and a significant amount of cash inflow. This was a village where one could expect transformation to take place.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, when the institute's sociology teacher İbrahim Yasa conducted a detailed study of Hasanoğlan in 1947, the literacy rate for the Latin alphabet was only 33.7 percent. Almost every household had someone literate, but in 70.6 percent of those households, no one had read anything in the past year. Those who did read were mostly elementary school students studying textbooks. Other than this, the villagers were mostly interested in books with a religious content, including the Qur'an in Arabic and popular Sufi literature. Some read newspapers and other periodicals, typically with large fonts and copious amounts of pictures indicating the elementary level of their readership. Almost all women read nothing but the Qur'an in Arabic.⁷⁰ Nobody attended the people's room.⁷¹ And the villagers rarely interacted with people at the institute or with the school teachers who taught their children.⁷²

The three things that significantly transformed the attitudes of Hasanoğlan's villagers were a radio in one of its two coffeehouses, which increased interest in national and world affairs, the inflow of cash, which increased consumption and the variety of items purchased from outside the village, and the train station, which made day trips to nearby towns and to Ankara possible. All of these factors, as well as increased educational opportunities, would have meaningful long-term effects in Hasanoğlan, as Yasa showed in a follow-up study in 1966.⁷³ Yet, as the preceding observations have made clear, radios started to appear in most Turkish villages only at the end of the 1940s, the majority of those villages did not receive sudden cash inflow or even an elementary school until the 1950s, and Hasanoğlan's train station was simply a fortunate exception.

The persistence of Islam and Islamic institutions, such as marriage and inheritance practices, religious instruction by imams, and to some extent Sufism, in Turkish villages beyond the state's purview, are other indicators of the early republican state's inability to transform rural Turkey. Peasants in various parts of Anatolia and Thrace practiced Islam with variations that reflected their local and historical circumstances.⁷⁴ Some of their practices even diverted from the rulings of Sunni jurisprudence that the overwhelming majority of Turkish peasants followed. However, the question here is not whether the Turkish peasants' religious practices complied with the textual tradition of Islam from a normative point of view. Regardless of the nature of that compliance, Turkish peasants considered Islam to be an authoritative point of reference in determining their life choices. As Talal Asad explains, although local "Islamic traditions are not homogeneous, they aspire to coherence, in the way that all discursive traditions do."⁷⁵ Ideally, the early republic's Kemalist elite wanted to replace the authority of Islam with what

they considered to be “contemporary” (*muasır*) values brokered by the state, such as positive science, rational thinking, and national interest. But after they concluded that complete secularization in this way was not possible, they opted to monopolize religious authority in the hands of the state and to create a more positivist and prostate version of Islam.⁷⁶ The co-optation of the Ottoman high ulama by the republican state⁷⁷ as well as the creation of a Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), which appears to have pervasive if not uncontested religious authority in contemporary Turkey, may suggest achievements in this direction.⁷⁸ But this co-optation was mostly an urban phenomenon and the Directorate of Religious Affairs consolidated its power over rural imams long after the 1950s. The Kemalist elite’s aspirations to secularize the Turkish populace or transform Islam did not reach the village level in the period under consideration.

The poor reception of a new, secular civil code adapted from the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 provides an illustrative example in this regard. The new code introduced many provisions that contradicted existing customs and norms that Turkish peasants associated with Islam. It banned imams from officiating marriages, for instance, and required all new marriages to be registered by civil officials. However, most Turkish Muslims considered a marriage that was not officiated by an imam as lacking sanctity and therefore illegitimate. Moreover, registering a marriage involved many bureaucratic procedures that required traveling to urban centers, obtaining documents, and paying fees. Most Turkish peasants were simply not up to this. One scholar estimated in 1950 that twenty-four years after the introduction of the Swiss Civil Code in Turkey, still less than half of the marriages in the country each year were being registered officially. This resulted in so many childbirths out of official wedlock that the Turkish parliament repeatedly had to pass laws to legitimize unregistered children.⁷⁹ The new code banned polygyny, but it was allowed in Islamic jurisprudence. Turkish men in the late Ottoman Empire’s villages rarely married second or sometimes more wives, often to secure extra labor in the household or, in cases of infertility, to have a child, and they continued to do so in the republican period at least until the 1950s.⁸⁰ The new code required the equal division of inheritance between sons and daughters, contradicting Islamic legal stipulations. And daughters tended to override it by relinquishing their legal rights to their brothers in order to comply with what Paul Stirling calls the “informal system of social control” operative in their communities. This system was so strong that village communities typically settled conflicts among their members internally, without escalating their cases to the attention of state authorities.⁸¹

Such discrepancies between state laws reflecting republican ideals and actual practices associated with Islam existed in other fields as well. In 1924, a law gave the Ministry of Education monopoly over all educational activities in the country, closed religious seminaries (*madrastas*), and banned imams from teaching the children of their congregations basic Islamic knowledge, including recitation of the Qur’an in Arabic. Following the alphabet reform in 1928, the teaching of the Arabic alphabet was banned altogether. Yet imams continued to teach secretly in the villages.⁸² Another law outlawing Sufi orders in 1925 and requiring the closure of their lodges was more successful.⁸³ However, one could still find exceptions. Makal, for instance, writes that in 1947 a Sufi master had at least fifty disciples in each of the thirty-one villages close to where he taught.⁸⁴ Or take the example of Kaşıkçı Ali Rıza Efendi, a Naqshbandi Sufi master and

Islamic scholar in a village of Konya. He moved to Medina in 1934, but thanks to his lasting influence, most villagers in his former village were still unwilling to send their children to the village school in the 1940s. Perhaps out of frustration, the school teacher would in turn raid houses to catch children studying Qur'an recitation.⁸⁵

SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN SEDENTARY SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the extent to which the Kemalist reforms had missed Turkey's villages before the 1950s. An account of what happened in sedentary Soviet Central Asia in the same period provides a useful comparative perspective highlighting the causes that prevented the Turkish state from transforming its rural population. Marxism-Leninism, as interpreted and continuously reinterpreted in the Soviet Union, provided both the blueprint for a future society and an executive strategy to construct it.⁸⁶ According to Karl Marx, true change in society, or revolution, necessitated the transformation of the relations of production, or the society's "substructure." Changes in the substructure would then transform culture, or more broadly the "superstructure." He expected the next grand transformation in human history to take place in industrialized Europe as a transition from capitalism to socialism through the revolutionary agency of the proletariat. That, however, did not happen. Thus, the Bolsheviks, who seized power in the violent turmoil of World War I, decided to *build* socialism through the agency of the Communist Party. They proclaimed the party to represent the proletariat, sometimes even in the absence of a proletariat as was the case in Central Asia.⁸⁷

The travails of post-tsarist power struggles, which included large-scale grain requisitions and famine, had already weakened Central Asia's Muslim communities when the Bolsheviks consolidated their power in the region in the early 1920s. As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, they initially prioritized winning the loyalty of the local population over transforming it.⁸⁸ They did not hesitate to attack religious institutions when the opportunity arose, but only in a limited way, reflecting both the "thinness of Soviet rule" in this early period and the Bolsheviks' assumption that religion as a factor of the superstructure was doomed to disappear anyway as socialism transformed the relations of production.⁸⁹ Then, around 1926, the Soviet government dropped this assumption and started to encourage anti-Islamic propaganda more openly.⁹⁰ A conspicuous aspect of the Soviet propaganda effort was an "assault" on Muslim women's face veil, which Bolshevik agents and progressive Muslim intellectuals (*Jadidists*) both perceived as a symbol of the oppression of women in a society governed by traditional Islam.⁹¹

All of these interventions in the realm of culture had analogs in Republican Turkey, but unlike the Kemalist leadership, the Bolsheviks persistently targeted existing authority structures in society by isolating and dispossessing "the upper strata in the countryside" and destroying the social, religious, and economic institutions that sustained them.⁹² This destruction went far beyond the republican Turkish government's focus on closing madrasas and Sufi lodges. During the Soviet Union's First Five-Year Plan of 1928–32, Moscow launched a "proletarian cultural revolution" to parallel rapid economic development.⁹³ This translated into more concerted and direct attacks on the clergy and Islamic institutions in Central Asia. Besides the propaganda effort of local

enthusiasts, it was the Soviet Union's notorious secret police organization that directly answered to Moscow (Joint State Political Administration, or OGPU) and the higher party personnel who carried out such attacks. The result was the final abolishment of qadi courts, the closure of Muslim schools, even if they had reformed and introduced secular subjects, the banning of religious instruction in all schools, and the purge of Islamic scholars.⁹⁴ By 1929, the majority of Islamic scholars had been killed, imprisoned, or exiled,⁹⁵ and many had escaped to distant villages where they could still make a living.⁹⁶ Furthermore, as a new generation of local Bolsheviks trained in Soviet educational institutions moved into positions of authority, the Communist Party also purged progressive Muslim intellectuals, whose services and mediation it had initially used, thereby ridding itself of all vestiges of the past regime.⁹⁷

Whereas many institutions and practices of the old order had an afterlife, such as officially closed mosques that continued to function secretly or women who unveiled at party meetings only to reveal "to walk back home,"⁹⁸ changes at the turn of the 1930s in the form of the collectivization of land and the expansion of cotton monoculture decisively broke authority structures and communal solidarities in sedentary Central Asia. Although party enthusiasts had already been encouraging peasants to join collective farms for some time, in 1929 Stalin launched a Union-wide campaign for collectivization. The campaign involved persistent propaganda, large-scale mobilization of party cadres, many incentives to join the collective farms voluntarily, and if need be, coercion in various forms, including induced famine in Kazakhstan and Ukraine⁹⁹ and the use of the Red Army and paramilitary OGPU units.¹⁰⁰ In October 1929, only 3.4 percent of Uzbekistan's peasant households had joined collective farms. With the new campaign in effect, this number reached 37.7 percent in 1931 and 76.4 percent in 1933.¹⁰¹ By the end of the decade, 96.9 percent of the peasant households and 99.9 percent of the agricultural land was collectivized in the Soviet Union, and Central Asia was no exception.¹⁰²

For Uzbek villagers, who constituted about 75 percent of the population in Uzbekistan until after World War II, collectivization meant transitioning from growing one's own produce and consuming or selling it to working for a state-owned farm enterprise as a wage worker, hence becoming dependent on the state for income and, importantly, for the supply of basic needs.¹⁰³ Moreover, in the process of collectivization, security forces had removed the wealthier and more authoritative members of rural communities as "enemies of socialism" (a process often referred to as *dekulakization*), thereby crushing the autonomous authority structures of village communities. The rural society in sedentary Central Asia could no longer dodge or ignore party interventions after the 1930s.¹⁰⁴

Further and more conclusive attacks on communal and religious institutions accompanied this push for collectivization. In Shoshana Keller's estimation, roughly 69 percent of the mosques in Uzbekistan were closed by 1935 and more than 14,000 Islamic scholars, about 70 percent of the estimated total, were purged or otherwise disappeared from records by World War II.¹⁰⁵ The Soviet state's campaign against Islam was at times hampered by concerns over security or by the inefficiency of government structures, but all in all, the regime was able to displace Islam "from the public arena," relegating it to "fragmentary and fading memories of prayers, texts, and rituals" for the generations to follow. Islam continued to mark identity but ceased to dictate devotional commitment

or practice at a significant level. Perhaps Islam was not totally eradicated as a religion in this early period and even acquired official recognition once again after World War II, but it was marginalized and damaged enough to eliminate popular resistance to further destruction, such as when Khrushchev closed many more thousands of mosques in the 1960s.¹⁰⁶

Nevertheless, as Kotkin emphasizes, the Soviet experience was not only one of destruction.¹⁰⁷ Purges, *dekulakization*, and collectivization were traumatic, inflicting pain, undermining customs and religion, and destroying existing authority structures. But this destruction also opened opportunities for the *construction* of a new life that the remaining villagers—now collective farm members—could hope to be better. Power was not distributed between sedentary Central Asia’s Muslim villagers and the Communist Party in a zero sum game, nor did it travel on a one way alley from Moscow to local party bosses and on to the villagers. Those villagers who were willing and capable of working with the party found themselves empowered in the emerging “socialist” Soviet Union, and in turn, they put their energies into the creation of that imagined better future under the guidance of the party.¹⁰⁸

The Soviet future featured tractors, hospitals, and schools.¹⁰⁹ In 1914–15, 17,300 students attended public schools in what would later become the territories of Uzbekistan. By 1940–41, their number exceeded 1.3 million, comprising almost the entire school-age population in the republic.¹¹⁰ Uzbekistan’s literacy rate climbed from 11.6 percent for ages nine through forty-nine in 1926 to 78.7 percent in 1939 and 98.1 percent in 1959 despite two alphabet changes, first from the Arabic script to Latin in the 1920s and then, with directives from Moscow, to Cyrillic in the 1930s. While the statistics for ages over forty-nine are not available, the rapid growth of literacy among this younger cohort indicates the effectiveness of Soviet elementary education. Moreover, by 1959, 45 percent of the urban and 30 percent of the rural population in Uzbekistan had also received secondary or higher education.¹¹¹ In 1940, 1,278 libraries operated in rural Uzbekistan, corresponding to one library per 3,869 individuals. By 1960, the number of libraries reached 2,600, corresponding to one library per 2,137 individuals.¹¹² During that same year, six movie tickets were sold for each rural Uzbek citizen and sixteen tickets for each urban citizen.¹¹³ While each of these numbers can be challenged to some extent, together they reinforce the above-told story of social and cultural reconstruction, as also confirmed by the most recent literature on the subject.¹¹⁴

COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Nermin Erdentuğ’s depiction of polygyny in her study of the Hal village underscores the power of informal social control mechanisms in villages. All but one of the marriages in Hal were monogamous, although elderly villagers told Erdentuğ that the village population used to be one-third polygynous. The villagers related the near disappearance of polygyny to the new laws, economic circumstances, and the unwillingness of village women to face competition. However, Erdentuğ reported a different picture upon closer scrutiny. Because the Hal village barely owned any agricultural land, 80 to 90 percent of its male population traveled to various cities to earn money as seasonal workers. There, in the cities, many of them acquired second wives in religiously officiated marriages that were considered illegal by the state. To wit, the men of Hal were monogamous *inside*

the village but polygynous *outside* of it. Their “parents, neighbors, and relatives” condoned the existence of second wives but did not want them in the village, and therefore, the wives from the cities never set foot in it.¹¹⁵ In urban settings, the Hal men evaded or tacitly defied state laws prohibiting polygyny, but back at home, the village community was too close to evade and its control mechanisms were too strong to defy.

Considering class struggle as the foundation of social transformation, agents of the Soviet state devised strategies to undermine mechanisms of control and structures of authority in society. As Jan Gross describes in great detail in the example of Soviet-occupied Poland during World War II, this was not necessarily a top-down process. In most cases, socialist transformation involved the agitation and exploitation of existing inequalities and private grievances by making state powers, including violence, available to individuals to rectify what they thought or felt was wrong in their communities. The Soviet state did not have the capacity to infiltrate and transmute each and every community; no state does, for that matter, as James Scott highlights.¹¹⁶ However, with targeted and sustained agitation backed as needed by security services, state powers, which in the Soviet Union often merged with the Communist Party, were able to incite enough strife and chaos at the communal level to induce social fragmentation, thereby introducing the party-state as the fountainhead for new authority structures and control mechanisms. This transformation rendered society susceptible to the proselytization of new normative values and cultural forms.¹¹⁷

In sedentary Central Asia, The Soviet regime attacked villages and village notables, including Islamic scholars, through collectivization and accompanying purges, though without leading to immediate urbanization. The technological, military, and administrative advantages that the Bolsheviks inherited from the tsarist empire in European Russia and made available to Central Asia’s local party enthusiasts contributed significantly to the effectiveness of this attack on society. As a result, the Communist Party with its Moscow-bound nomenklatura and local enthusiasts was able, in Khalid’s words, to disestablish Islam “as the major font of moral and ethical values for society” in sedentary Central Asia.¹¹⁸

Turkey’s Kemalist leadership, on the other hand, was moved by a mix of positivist and populist convictions, without the Marxist insistence on transforming the relations of production. Continuing in the tradition of the 19th-century modernizing states, the country’s ruling elite attempted to improve society through a gradual process of education, modeling, and forced reform, without directly or vigorously targeting existing authority structures and control mechanisms, especially in the villages.¹¹⁹ They attacked the image of Islamic scholars¹²⁰ but did not attempt to eradicate Islamic scholars as a class. The Turkish state incorporated Islamic scholars into its executive machinery through the creation of a Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı),¹²¹ but this did not mean establishing pervasive control over rural ulema, at least in the short run.

Furthermore, the Turkish state tried to preserve villages and village communities as sources of political stability. The 1924 Village Law required each village to elect a village headman (*muhtar*) and a council of elders for local governance. In the absence of a significant challenge to existing authority structures, villagers elected rich notables, such as the big landowners, to these positions or sometimes conceived of the village headman as merely a scribal functionary subordinate to the influence of those notables.¹²² While imams had to receive certification from and be appointed by the

Directorate of Religious Affairs, once appointed they were free to engage their congregations relatively unrestricted by state interventions. The state was distant and, importantly, it was the villagers who paid the imams, not the state. If the villagers wanted imams to teach their children how to recite the Qur'an, the imams would do so despite state interdictions.¹²³

Such examples of evading the law do not mean that Turkish villagers completely disregarded the state. They tried to avoid it as much as possible, but they fearfully obeyed its representatives when an encounter was inevitable. Yet, agents of the state, aside from the gendarmes, remained all too distant to affect the villagers' daily lives. The gendarmes could be used in enforcing certain reforms such as sartorial stipulations,¹²⁴ but even this was sporadic as the gendarmerie remained an "intensely disliked" punitive force that was feared and obeyed when present but that did not have constant presence in the villages to promote social and cultural transformation.¹²⁵ Teachers, as proselytizers of the Kemalist reforms, constituted an exception in this regard, but more than half of Turkish villages still lacked schools by 1950. Where there were schools, teachers typically arrived in tight-knit village communities as suspicious outsiders. Ultimately, their survival in the village depended on their ability to maintain peace with existing authority structures. If they challenged village notables or the villagers' existing norms and values, especially in religious matters, they were likely to face responses ranging from indifference to derision and even violence.¹²⁶

In conclusion, the regime ideals of the Soviet state and the general circumstances of sedentary Central Asia in the wake of World War I approximated those of the Turkish Republic, and both areas remained predominantly rural until after the 1950s. Yet, in the second quarter of the 20th century, the Soviet state was significantly more effective in transforming the rural society of sedentary Central Asia than was the Turkish state in transforming that of Anatolia and Thrace. This divergence in effectiveness emanated from differences in the two regimes' ideological foundations and related choices and capacities for mobilizing resources. Motivated by Marxism-Leninism's emphasis on the necessity of substructural transformation to build socialism, the Soviet state attacked and undermined existing authority structures and communal solidarities in sedentary Central Asia. In contrast, the positivist inclinations of the Kemalist leadership did not provide a similar strategy of action in Turkey. Partly under the influence of the peasantist movement and partly because they lacked the resources to confront village communities, the republican regime preserved existing authority structures in the villages.

Yet the Soviet state did more than undermine authority structures. Through propaganda and mobilization, boosted at times by European Russia's superior military and administrative capacities, it created new authority structures subordinate to the Communist Party and filled them with new cadres who identified with the Soviet developmental ideals. The support from European Russia did not have an analog in the Turkish case until Turkey started to receive financial and military support from the United States in the 1950s. The Kemalist leadership attempted to introduce its secularist and nationalist ideals in Turkey's villages through education and urban modeling, but it lacked the means to accomplish its goals. Moreover, Turkey's villages preserved a substantial degree of autonomy and largely escaped the state's manipulative influences at least until after World War II. Consequently, if there was a Kemalist revolution in early Republican Turkey, it missed the villages, where more than 80 percent of the population lived.

NOTES

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¹On the late Ottoman intellectual and ideological context from which Mustafa Kemal and his followers emerged, see M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011). On how this legacy carried over into the Republican era, see Umur Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State* (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2010).

²Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, ed., *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 1997), 2:318. For this self-celebratory rhetoric, see Irfan Orga, *Phoenix Ascendant: The Rise of Modern Turkey* (London: R. Hale, 1958). Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976) largely reproduces the same position. For examples of Western observers, see Henry Elisha Allen, *The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935); and "Turkey: The Land a Dictator Turned into a Democracy," *Time*, 12 October 1953. On Kemalism, see Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültenginil, eds., *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Kemalizm* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2001).

³Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişiminin 50 Yılı* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1973), 78. The calculation of the rural population ratio is a complicated task because many villages and small towns that functioned as administrative centers were given urban status. The numbers cited here categorize them as rural. For anecdotal data on the recognition of villages as urban administrative centers, see Muhtar Körükçü, *Köyden Haber* (Istanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1950), 14.

⁴Tajikistan separated from Uzbekistan in 1929.

⁵Adeeb Khalid, "Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective," *Slavic Review* 65 (2006): 234–35. For a detailed analysis of the shared world of Russian and Ottoman Muslim intellectuals, see James H. Meyer, *Turks across Empires: Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian–Ottoman Borderlands, 1856–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

⁶On early Soviet–Turkish interaction, see Samuel J. Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet–Turkish Convergence in the 1930s," *Slavic Review* 72 (2013): 32–53; and Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, "Kemalism and Communism: From Cooperation to Complication," *Turkish Studies* 16 (2015): 510–26.

⁷G. I. Zaiko, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Uzbekskoi SSSR v 1971 g.* (Tashkent: Izd. Uzbekistan, 1972), 8; and Iu. A. Poliakov, ed., *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1939 goda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), 22.

⁸Such comparisons are offered in Touraj Atabaki and Erik Jan Zürcher, eds., *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah* (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004); and Touraj Atabaki, ed., *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran* (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2007).

⁹Senem Aslan, "Everyday Forms of State Power and the Kurds in the Early Turkish Republic," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43 (2011): 75–93.

¹⁰Mahfoud Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830–1987: Colonial Upheavals and Post-Independence Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1–88.

¹¹Joseph S. Szyliowicz posits a similar argument in his 1966 ethnographic study of two Turkish villages. Szyliowicz, *Political Change in Rural Turkey: Erdemli* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1966), 58.

¹²Representative of this paradigm are Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); and Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964).

¹³Joel S. Migdal, "Finding the Meeting Ground of Fact and Fiction: Some Reflections on Turkish Modernization," in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, ed. Reşat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdoğan (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1997), 252–60.

¹⁴See, for instance, Michael Meeker, *A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002); and Erik Jan Zürcher, "Two Young Ottomanists Discover Kemalist Turkey: The Travel Diaries of Robert Anhegger and Andreas Tietze," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 26 (2002): 359–69. See also Yiğit Akın, "Reconsidering State, Party, and Society in Early Republican Turkey: Politics of Petitioning," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39 (2007): 435–57; Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2010), 259–70; Aslan, "Everyday Forms"; Gavin D. Brockett, *How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk: Provincial Newspapers and the Negotiation of a Muslim National Identity* (Austin, Tex.: University of

Texas Press, 2011); Hale Yılmaz, *Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey, 1923–1945* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2013), 220; Murat Metinsoy, “Everyday Resistance and Selective Adaptation to the Hat Reform in Early Republican Turkey,” *International Journal of Turkologica* 8 (2013): 7–47; Sevgi Adak, “Anti-Veiling Campaigns and Local Elites in Turkey of the Nineteen Thirties: A View from the Periphery,” in *Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, Modernism and the Politics of Dress*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (New York: Routledge, 2014), 59–85; Murat Metinsoy, “Everyday Resistance to Unveiling, and Flexible Secularism in Early Republican Turkey,” in *Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, Modernism and the Politics of Dress*, 86–117; and Alexandros Lamprou, *Nation-Building in Modern Turkey: The ‘People’s Houses,’ the State and the Citizen* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2015).

¹⁵Mediha Esenel, *Geç Kalmış Kitap* (Istanbul: Sistem Yayıncılık, 1999), 85–112. Several short entries in the periodicals *Ülkü* and *Halk Bilgisi Haberleri* provide examples of these amateurish observations.

¹⁶See, for instance, İbrahim Yasa, *Hasanoğlan Köyü’nün İçtimâî-İktisadî Yapısı* (Ankara: Doğuş Ltd. Matbaası, 1955); Yasa, *Yirmibeş Yıl Sonra Hasanoğlan Köyü* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1969); Nermin Erdentuğ, *Hal Köyü’nün Etnolojik Tetkiki* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1956); and Nermin Erdentuğ, *Sün Köyü’nün Etnolojik Tetkiki* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1959). Erdentuğ’s studies are particularly interesting in that one portrays a Sunni and the other an Alawi village in the same area.

¹⁷An early example of these village studies is Sadri Aran, *Evedik Köyü: Bir Köy Monografisi* (Ankara: Yüksek Ziraat Enstitüsü, 1939). See also the several articles published in the 1950s and the 1960s in the journal *Sosyoloji Dergisi* of Istanbul University and the semiliterary village memoirs, Mahmut Makal, *Bizim Köy* (Istanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1950); M. Enver Beşe, *Bu da Bizim Köy* (Bursa: n.p., 1950); Mahmut Makal, *Köyümden: Köy Öğretmeninin Notları II* (Istanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1952); Körukçü, *Köyden*; and Ali Kemal Saran, *Omuzumda Hemençe: Cumhuriyet Devrinde Bir Medrese Talebesinin Hatıraları* (Ankara: Kurtuba, 2010), 11–174.

¹⁸See, for instance, Szyliowicz, *Political Change*; and Paul Stirling, *Turkish Village* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), esp. his conclusion on p. 293.

¹⁹Nancy Margaret Alderman, “Secularization in the First Turkish Republic, 1924–1960” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1975), esp. 6–8, 13–19, 150–75. The academic community has similarly failed to acknowledge the Soviet scholarship that followed Stalin’s lead from the 1930s on to declare the revolutionary claims of Kemalism abortive. See Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, “Turkish Transformation and the Soviet Union: Navigating through the Soviet Historiography on Kemalism,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 2 (2016): 281–96.

²⁰Gavin D. Brockett, “Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923–38,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 4 (1998): 45, 58; M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 56.

²¹Zürcher, *The Young Turk*, 212.

²²See Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926* (Leiden: Brill, 1984).

²³Although written by a devoted Kemalist and therefore highly biased, Sinan Meydan, *Akl-ı Kemal: Atatürk’ün Akıllı Projeleri*, 4 vols. (Istanbul: İnkılâp, 2013) provides a fairly large catalog of Mustafa Kemal’s reforms and projects. For a more scholarly analysis, see Bora and Gültekinçil, *Kemalizm*.

²⁴Gavin D. Brockett, “Revisiting the Turkish Revolution, 1923–1938: Secular Reform and Religious ‘Reaction,’” *History Compass* 6 (2006): 1060–72.

²⁵Birol Başkan, “What Made Atatürk’s Reforms Possible?,” *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 2 (2010): 143–56.

²⁶Hale Yılmaz, “Reform, Social Change and State–Society Encounters in Early Republican Turkey” (PhD diss., University of Utah, 2006) repeatedly points to “everyday forms of resistance” in her evaluation of the reception of republican reforms. Akin, “Reconsidering State” provides a similar approach by focusing on petitions as instruments of communication between the state and society. See also Metinsoy, “Everyday Resistance and Selective Adaptation”; and Metinsoy, “Everyday Resistance to Unveiling”.

²⁷See Asım Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta: Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Köycü Söylem* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2006).

²⁸For a collection of the laws and regulations through 1938, see A. Şükrü Alptekin, *Köyün Kitabı* (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938).

²⁹M. Şükrü Haniöğlu, “Blueprints for a Future Society: Late Ottoman Materialists on Science, Religion, and Art,” in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (London:

Routledge, 2005), 28–116. Hanioglu profiles mainly late Ottoman intellectuals, but the continuity in cadres from the Ottoman Empire into Republican Turkey is a well-established phenomenon. See Eric Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Legacy of the Kemalist Republic,” in *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society, and the State in Turkey and Iran*, ed. Touraj Atabaki (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007), 95–110; and Hanioglu, *Atatürk*.

³⁰Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1997), 152–53.

³¹Şerif Mardin, “Religion in Modern Turkey,” *International Social Science Journal* 2 (1977): 279–97.

³²Nahid Sırrı, “Bir Kastamonu Seyahatnâmesi,” *Ülkü: Halkevleri ve Halkodaları Dergisi* 102 (1941): 532–33.

³³Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 56.

³⁴Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada*.

³⁵Nusret Kemal Köymen, *Köycülük Esasları* (Ankara: Tark Edip Kütüphanesi, 1934).

³⁶Aslan, “Everyday Forms” 84–90.

³⁷1931 Memurlar İstatistiği (İstanbul: İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1932), 5.

³⁸Saide Ayvaz and Mustafa Şahin, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi Eğitim, Bütçeleri,” *Çağdaş Türkiye Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1 (2014): 304–16.

³⁹Aran, *Evedik*, 51; Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, 42, 98; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, 268.

⁴⁰1949 Köy Sayımı Hülâsa Sonuçları (Ankara: İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1953), 4–8; Çavdar, *Türkiye’de Toplumsal*, 78–83.

⁴¹Çavdar, *Türkiye’de Toplumsal*, 407.

⁴²Çavdar, *Türkiye’de Toplumsal*, 412. See *Küçük İstatistik Yıllığı* (Ankara: İstatistik Genel Müdürlüğü, 1951), 325 for the number of motor vehicles in 1950.

⁴³George Helling and Barbara Helling, *Sosyolojik ve İstatistikî Bakımdan Türkiyede Köy* (Ankara: İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1956), 14.

⁴⁴The villages that Paul Stirling studied at the turn of the 1950s were located close to this mill; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, 67.

⁴⁵See Halil İnalçık, “When and How British Cotton Goods Invaded the Levant Markets,” in *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 374–83.

⁴⁶Aran, *Evedik*, 86, 125–29; Mahmut Makal, *Bizim Köy: Bir Köy Öğretmeninin Notları*, 5th ed. (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1952), 36–40; Turhan Yörükan and Turgut Cebe, “Çatak Köyü Araştırması,” *Sosyoloji Dergisi* 10–11 (1955): 8–9; Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, 166–68; Cavit Orhan Tütengil, “Keçiller Köyü İncelemesi,” *Sosyoloji Dergisi* 10–11 (1955): 40; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, 29, 67, 74–76; Esenel, *Geç Kalmış*, 127. See also Helling and Helling, *Sosyolojik*, 86–87; and Çavdar, *Türkiye’de Toplumsal*, 25.

⁴⁷Makal, *Bizim Köy*, 11–12.

⁴⁸Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada*, 48.

⁴⁹Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), 68.

⁵⁰Esra Dicle Başbuğ, *Resmî İdeoloji Sahnede: Kemalist İdeolojinin İnşasında Halkevleri Dönemi Tiyatro Oyunlarının Etkisi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), 44; Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada*, 61. For a detailed analysis of the entire people’s house experiment, see Lamprou, *Nation-Building*.

⁵¹On this magazine, see M. Bülent Varlık, “Ülkü: Halkevleri Mecmuası,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce: Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 268–71.

⁵²Behçet Kemal Çağlar, “Halkevleri Haberleri,” *Ülkü: Halkevleri Dergisi* 72 (1939): 548–52.

⁵³“Halkevleri Postası,” *Ülkü: Halkevleri ve Halkodaları Dergisi* 95 (1941): 465–68.

⁵⁴“Halkevleri Haberleri,” *Ülkü: Halkevleri Dergisi* 62 (1938): 175–80.

⁵⁵Sefa Şimşek, *Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi: Halkevleri 1932–1951* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayinevi, 2002), 127–39; Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada*, 64; Lamprou, *Nation-Building*, 185–215.

⁵⁶Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, 189; Şimşek, *Bir İdeolojik*, 139–43, 250.

⁵⁷Among many other studies, see Ahmet Eskicumali, “Ideology and Education: Reconstructing the Turkish Curriculum for Social and Cultural Change, 1923–1946” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1994); Faith James Childress, “Republican Lessons: Education and the Making of Modern Turkey” (PhD diss., University of Utah, 2001); Sefika Akile Zorlu-Durukan, “The Ideological Pillars of Turkish Education: Emergent

Kemalism and the Zenith of Single-Party Rule” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2006); and Başbuğ, *Resmî İdeoloji*.

⁵⁸Yılmaz, “Reform, Social Change” 139–78 provides important insights on the subject.

⁵⁹*Millî Eğitim Hareketleri 1927–1966* (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1967), 11, 85; Çavdar, *Türkiye’de Toplumsal*, 79.

⁶⁰Fay Kirby-Berkes, “The Village Institute Movement of Turkey: An Educational Mobilization for Social Change” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1960).

⁶¹*Maarif İstatistikleri İlk Öğretim 1952–1953* (Ankara: İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1953), v–vii, xi; Çavdar, *Türkiye’de Toplumsal*, 455.

⁶²*Kültür İstatistikleri 1934–1935* (Ankara: İstatistik Genel Direktörlüğü, 1935), 403.

⁶³*Küçük İstatistik*, 348–50; Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, 47; Cahit Tanyol, “Elifoğlu Köyü,” *Sosyoloji Dergisi*, 17–18 (1962–63): 203, 209; Yörükan and Cebe, “Çatak,” 17; Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada*, 113. On the wider use of radio in the 1960s, see Yasa, *Yirmibeş Yıl Sonra*, 233–36.

⁶⁴Başbuğ, *Resmî İdeoloji*, 213–58.

⁶⁵For instance, see Cavit Orhan Tütengil, “İhsaniye Köyü İncelemesi,” *Sosyoloji Dergisi* 9 (1954): 54.

⁶⁶See the urban–rural distribution of elementary school students in *Maarif İstatistikleri*, xi.

⁶⁷Çavdar, *Türkiye’de Toplumsal*, 78–79. See also Yılmaz, “Reform, Social Change” 279–80.

⁶⁸İlhan Başgöz, “The Meaning and Dimension of Change of Personal Names in Turkey,” in *Turkish Folklore and Oral Literature*, ed. Kemal Sılay (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998), 201–15. Senel, *Geç Kalmış*, 85, 119–20, 139–40, 148, 208 is a good example of a village study that emphasizes this point.

⁶⁹Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, 38–48, 82–87, 166, 172–76.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 179, 185–87, 192.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 189.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 190.

⁷³Yasa, *Yirmibeş Yıl Sonra*.

⁷⁴See the contrasts in religious practice in the following accounts: Tütengil, “İhsaniye,” 37–58; Körükçü, *Köyden*; Cahit Tanyol, “Peşke Binamlısı Köyü,” *Sosyoloji Dergisi* 16 (1961): 17–58; Erdentuğ, *Hal*; Erdentuğ, *Sün*; and Nedim Göknil, “Garbi Anadolu Köy Monografileri Bilecik ve Edremit Bölgeleri,” *Sosyoloji Dergisi* 2 (1943): 312–57.

⁷⁵Talal Asad, *The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1986).

⁷⁶Hanioğlu, *Atatürk*, 51–57, 128–56.

⁷⁷Amit Bein, *Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Republic: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011).

⁷⁸For an insightful analysis of the role of the contemporary Directorate of Religious Affairs, see Mona Hassan, “Women Preaching for the Secular State: Official Female Preachers (*Bayan Vaizler*) in Contemporary Turkey,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (2011): 451–73.

⁷⁹H. Timur, “Civil Marriage in Turkey: Difficulties, Causes and Remedies,” *International Social Science Bulletin* 1 (1950): 34–37; Paul Stirling, “Land, Marriage, and the Law in Turkish Villages,” *International Social Science Bulletin* 1 (1950): 30–31.

⁸⁰F. L. Fındıkoğlu, “A Turkish Sociologist’s View,” *International Social Science Bulletin* 1 (1957): 17–19; Körükçü, *Köyden*, 92; Yörükan and Cebe, “Çatak,” 14; Erdentuğ, *Hal*, 33–35; Erdentuğ, *Sün*, 26; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, 197; Szyliowicz, *Political Change*, 51; and Nicole van Os, “Polygamy before and after the Introduction of the Swiss Civil Code in Turkey,” in *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran*, ed. Touraj Atabaki (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2007), 179–98.

⁸¹Erdentuğ, *Hal*, 81–82; Stirling, “Land,” 21–29; Szyliowicz, *Political Change*, 47.

⁸²See, for instance, Yasa, *Yirmibeş Yıl Sonra*, 202; and Saran, *Omuzumda*, 99–174. Emin Saraç, interview with the author, Istanbul, 25 August 2009; Muhammed Kulu, interview with the author, Konya, 24 August 2015.

⁸³For an account that reflects the Kemalist logic behind the closure of Sufi lodges, see Baki Öz, *Çağdaşlaşma Açısından Tarikat ve Tekkelerin Kapatılma Olayı* (Istanbul: Can Yayınları, 2004).

⁸⁴For other anecdotal data, see Tanyol, “Elifoğlu,” 204.

⁸⁵Kulu, interview with the author. Muhammed Kulu is the husband of one of Rıza Efendi’s granddaughters and himself a retired preacher of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs.

⁸⁶Kotkin, *Magnetic* remains to be the most influential interpretation of the foundation of a Soviet “civilization” on ideological grounds. On the continuing (re)interpretation of ideology in the Soviet Union, see Anna Krylova, “Soviet Modernity: Stephen Kotkin and the Bolshevik Predicament,” *Contemporary European History* 2 (2014): 167–92.

⁸⁷See Gregory J. Massell, *The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974).

⁸⁸Shoshana Keller, *To Moscow, Not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign against Islam in Central Asia, 1917–1941* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 32–39, 58–63; Adeb Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2015), 161, 232.

⁸⁹Keller, *To Moscow*, 39–42, 58–63, 67, 85–95, 150–51; Adeb Khalid, *Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2007), 54; Beatrice Penati, “The Reconquest of East Bukhara: The Struggle against the Basmachi as a Prelude to Sovietization,” *Central Asian Survey* 4 (2007): 521–38; Penati, “On the Local Origins of the Soviet Attack on ‘Religious’ Waqf in the Uzbek SSR (1927),” *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 36 (2015): 39–72; and Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan*, 164–69, 196, 240.

⁹⁰Keller, *To Moscow*, 98–101; Khalid, *Islam after Communism*, 62–63.

⁹¹Massell, *The Surrogate Proletariat*; Marianne Kamp, *The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 2006), esp. 150–85; Douglas Taylor Northrop, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004); Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan*, 360–62. On progressive Muslim intellectuals in sedentary Central Asia, see Adeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1998).

⁹²Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan*, 162–63.

⁹³See Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1978).

⁹⁴Keller, *To Moscow*, 124–39, 166, 169–74, 192; Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan*, 240, 318.

⁹⁵Keller, *To Moscow*, 167, 202; Khalid, *Islam after Communism*, 71–73.

⁹⁶Marianne Kamp, “Where Did the Mullahs Go? Oral Histories from Rural Uzbekistan,” *Die Welt des Islams* 3 (2010): 503–31.

⁹⁷Khalid, *Islam after Communism*, 318–28; Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan*, 363–89. For an analysis of this change in cadres more broadly in the Soviet Union, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

⁹⁸Keller, *To Moscow*, 250; Kamp, *New Women*, 215–28.

⁹⁹See Niccol Pianciola, “The Collectivization Famine in Kazakhstan, 1931–1933,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3/4 (2001): 237–51; and the essays in Halyna Hryn, ed., *Hunger by Design: The Great Ukrainian Famine and Its Soviet Context* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008).

¹⁰⁰For a general analysis of collectivization in the Soviet Union, see Lynne Viola, V. P. Danilov, N. A. Ivitskii, and Denis Kozlov, eds., *The War against the Peasantry, 1927–1930* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005). For an analysis focused on Uzbekistan, see Rustambek Shamsutdinov, *Qishloq foizheasi: zhamaalashtirish, quloqlashtirish, surgun* (Tashkent: Aktsiadorlik kompaniiasi, 2003), 8–163.

¹⁰¹R. Kh. Aminova, ed., *Sploshnaia kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva Uzbekistana (1930–1932 gg.) - Sbornik dokumentov* (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1980), 9–12.

¹⁰²Kh. A. Shaikhova, *Formirovanie novykh npravstvennykh otmoshenii u kolkhoznogo krest'ianstva Uzbekistana* (Tashkent: Fan, 1982), 99.

¹⁰³Aminova, *Sploshnaia*, 12.

¹⁰⁴On this process, see Shamsutdinov, *Qishloq foizheasi*, 54–124.

¹⁰⁵Keller, *To Moscow*, 224, 241.

¹⁰⁶Keller, *To Moscow*, 254–55; Khalid, *Islam after Communism*, 98–104. See also Eren Taşar, “Soviet and Muslim: The Institutionalization Islam in Central Asia, 1943–1991” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2010) for the period after World War II.

¹⁰⁷Kotkin, *Magnetic*.

¹⁰⁸Sergei Nikolaevich Abashin, *Sovetskii kishlak: mezhdru kolonializmom i modernizatsiei* (Moskva: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2015), 240–311 illustrates the dynamics of this process well. See also Paolo Sartori, “Towards a History of the Muslims’ Soviet Union: A View from Central Asia,” *Die Welt des Islams* 3 (2010): 315–34. For examples of Soviet construction from Turkmen and Kyrgyz contexts, which neighbored sedentary Central Asia but reflected similar Soviet practices, see Adrienne Lynn Edgar, *Tribal Nation: The making of*

Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Ali F. İğmen, *Speaking Soviet with an Accent: Culture and Power in Kyrgyzstan* (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012).

¹⁰⁹On the mechanization of agriculture in Uzbekistan and improvements in the health sector by the 1960s, see Zaiko, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, 144–53 and 317–28 respectively.

¹¹⁰Shaikhova, *Formirovanie novykh*, 226; Poliakov, *Vsesoiuznaia perepis*, 36.

¹¹¹Zaiko, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, 11–13. For a brief account of the changes in alphabet, see Thomas G. Winner, “Problems of Alphabetic Reform among the Turkic Peoples of Soviet Central Asia, 1920–41,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 31 (1952): 133–47.

¹¹²Zaiko, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, 305.

¹¹³Zaiko, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, 311.

¹¹⁴See, for instance, Khalid, *Islam after Communism*; and Abashin, *Sovetskii kishlak*.

¹¹⁵Erdentuğ, *Hal*, 35.

¹¹⁶James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).

¹¹⁷See Jan Tomasz Gross, “Social Control under Totalitarianism,” in *Toward a General Theory of Social Control: Selected Problems*, ed. Donald Black (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1984), 2:59–77; and Jan Tomasz Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). See also Wendy Z. Goldman, *Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin: The Social Dynamics of Repression* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) for a detailed depiction of how the interplay of state policies and local initiatives induced social fragmentation in the case of the Stalinist terror.

¹¹⁸Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan*, 254 and elsewhere; Keller, *To Moscow*. On the role of local enthusiasts, see Kamp, *New Women*, 186–228; and Penati, “The Reconquest.”

¹¹⁹The purge of tribal and religious notables in the wake of a rebellion by Southeast Anatolia’s Kurds in 1925 is probably the one major exception to this. See Martin van Bruinessen, *Aga, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books, 1992).

¹²⁰For examples of such attacks, see Başbuğ, *Resmî İdeoloji*, esp. 68–77.

¹²¹See Gotthard Jashke, *Yeni Türkiye’de İslamlık*, trans. Hayrullah Örs (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1972); and Mehmet Temel, *Atatürk Dönemi Din Hizmetleri* (Ankara: Akçağ, 2010), 13–84.

¹²²Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, 193–98, 207; Erdentuğ, *Hal*, 78–79; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, 254–59; Szyliowicz, *Political Change*, 47–48; and W. Frederick Frey and Leslie L. Roos, *Social Structure and Community Development in Rural Turkey: Village and Elite Leadership Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies MIT, 1967), esp. 3–26.

¹²³On the payment of imams, see Aran, *Evedik*, 29; Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, 111; and Esenel, *Geç Kalmış*, 134. Alptekin, *Köyün*, 34 provides the laws regulating the selection and payment of imams. For a discussion of the limitations of turning locally funded village imams into central state functionaries in a different context, that of late tsarist Russia, see Mustafa Tuna, *Imperial Russia’s Muslims: Islam, Empire and European Modernity, 1788–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 52–54.

¹²⁴Yılmaz, *Becoming Turkish*, 73–74, 124–37.

¹²⁵Szyliowicz, *Political Change*, 48–49.

¹²⁶See Makal, *Köyünden*, 120–24.