approach would suggest, and I was often uneasy about how (as in the example above) he pressed concepts in an excerpted translation in the interests of getting his argument to the next stage.

University of Glasgow MATTHEW FOX
matthew.fox@glasgow.ac.uk
doi:10.1017/S0075435815000532

P. VESPERINI, *LA PHILOSOPHIA ET SES PRATIQUES D'ENNIUS À CICÉRON* (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome 348). Rome: École Française de Rome, 2012. Pp. 615. ISBN 9782728309382. €50.00.

To be clear from the outset: this is a very strange book. The author has an axe to grind, and his primary target appears to be philosophy as 'a way of life', a notion developed primarily by Pierre Hadot. Vesperini leaves *philosophia* untranslated to avoid connotations that, from his point of view, would be anachronistic. In a Roman context, he argues throughout the book, *philosophia* covers an encyclopedic range of many Greek forms of knowledge. As *ornamentum, philosophia* has a primarily esthetic function, as can be seen too in the decorations and libraries of Roman villas, and it is meant both to provide high-level entertainment (*delectatio*) and to enhance the cultural status as well as the socio-political capital (*gloria-virtus*) of its bearers.

V.'s study treats Ennius' *Annals* in connection with the temple of the Muses erected by M. Fulvius Nobilior; the so-called books of Numa; the embassy to Rome of the Athenian philosophers; the relation between philosophers such as Blossius and Panaetius and their patrons; Roman Epicureans, and especially the relation between Piso and Philodemus; and, finally, the authors of the Roman Republic who could be seen as philosophers themselves, namely Lucretius and Cicero. The range of material covered is impressive. As such, the study serves as a powerful testimony to the socio-cultural aspects of *philosophia* in Rome. If the author had stopped there, the work would have been a valuable contribution. Unfortunately, V. is also intent on proving that the impact of the philosophical ideas themselves on the outlook and life of these famous Romans was negligible.

A first considerable problem for this thesis arises with the sources. We have very limited evidence dating back to the actual cultural context of the earliest manifestations of *philosophia* in Rome. It is striking, for instance, how much V. relies on accounts such as Plutarch's *Lives*, written in Greek, early in the second century A.D. At the very least, one should take into account Plutarch's own socio-cultural context, and his own emphases in the treatment of his material. Similarly, one of V.'s main sources for Scipio Aemilianus' interest in *philosophia* primarily as an elegant pastime is none other than Cicero (208ff.). And by V.'s own admission, Cicero is writing a very distinct 'history' of *philosophia* in Rome in order to underscore the significance of his own contributions. Only in Cicero's case, then, do we have the kind of evidence, in his correspondence, that allows us to see, parallel to his other writings, how he construed his position in Roman society.

The more 'philosophical' V.'s material becomes, the more his method leads his readers astray. Thus one is rather surprised to learn that the debates and controversies around the embassy in 155 B.C. to Rome of the three Athenian philosophers Carneades (Academic), Diogenes (Stoic) and Critolaus (Peripatetic) had little to do with philosophical ideas, but rather with styles of oratory (143). But as Cicero, one of the main sources on this embassy with his own distinct interest in oratory, makes abundantly clear, there is a direct correlation between the *style* of speech adopted by the representatives of the different philosophical schools and the philosophical *content*.

Matters do not improve when readers are told that Lucretius' *De rerum natura* was really not meant to convey philosophical ideas. V. has shown how the bravura aspects of the work would have been received. But when he tries to argue away the philosophical aspects of the poem, his argument derails. It is not true that Epicurus is not mentioned by name (see 3.1042). But even if that were the case, the Prefaces of Books 3, 5 and 6 leave no doubt in the audience's minds who is meant. Whereas the poem does not pay much explicit attention to the key Epicurean theme of friendship (but there is the rôle Lucretius assumes *vis-à-vis* Memmius, grafted onto the traditional patron-client relationship), other therapeutic Epicurean aims do pervade the text, namely to rid human beings of the suffering that results from fear of the gods, fear of death and the passions. On the standard Epicurean account, absence of pain is the highest type of pleasure.

Of the hundred or so pages the author devotes to Cicero, only a handful, right at the end, treat his philosophical writings. In this section, Cicero's works on oratory, together with his correspondence, dominate. Perhaps this is a welcome change of perspective, given that most of the philosophical works were written, after all, in a couple of years towards the end of Cicero's life. Yet even V., though he chooses not to dwell on it, has to admit that a radical change does happen in this last phase of Cicero's activity, and that philosophy as *ars vitae* starts to assert itself.

That the study overreaches is, to this reader at least, nowhere clearer than when V. states (based on Plutarch's rendering of Cato's suicide, see comment above) that the Romans had no interest in interiority, but were entirely concerned with outward appearance (497–8), and that, in fact, one has to wait until the Christian Augustine to find this turn inwards attested. If this were true, one could hardly make sense, to make just one counter-argument, of Cicero's treatment of the Stoic theory of passions in his *Tusculan Disputations*, which requires that one assess closely one's value judgements. One would also miss one of Cicero's most distinctive contributions to the debate about the best life for human beings, as an innovative combination of the active life and the pursuits of reason. And the later Seneca — with his repeated injunctions that one turn to or withdraw into oneself — would find himself in a complete cultural and philosophical vacuum.

University of Notre Dame GRETCHEN REYDAMS-SCHILS
reydams-schils.1@nd.edu
doi:10.1017/S0075435815000283

A. M. SEIDER, *MEMORY IN VERGIL'S* AENEID*: CREATING THE PAST*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. x + 229. ISBN 9781107031807. £55.00/US $95.00.

This book is based on the author's doctoral thesis, written at the University of Chicago, and revised in communion with the Bochum-Texas *Memoria Romana* project. It confirms memory in the *Aeneid* as a fertile transverse topic which implicates narratology, characterization, rhetoric and the emotions, as well as historical and ideological matters. Poetic memory is glanced at, but regrettably only in passing (e.g. 6 n. 21). I found the book substantially convincing in its main argument that 'memory in the *Aeneid* acts as a social and narrative mechanism for integrating a traumatic past with an uncertain future' (4): memory *acts*, sometimes with unstoppable momentum, while characters remember, often with tendentious selectivity. Sometimes Aeneas can direct memory, but sometimes it impels *him* (see e.g. 184–93 on the death of Turnus). The five main chapters concern: (ch. 1) turning to Rome; (ch. 2) dealing with memories of Troy; (ch. 3) Aeneas' and Dido's relationship; (ch. 4) apostrophes to the dead and dying by the narrator and his characters; and (ch. 5) memory in *Aeneid* 12, culminating in a reading of the epic's closing scene. Concepts drawn from more or less recent studies of memory are used to analyse passages from the *Aeneid* in which characters or the narrator himself either remember the past or look forward to how they imagine the present will be remembered. The main memory concepts are individual and social memory (and the interdependence between these two), and the creation of an oikotype, a standardized version of a community's past on which its members agree. Memory is malleable, rhetorically manipulated for the needs of the moment, and when these needs change or conflict with others' needs, then the memory may change, or there is disagreement about what the authoritative version should be.

Thus, it is argued, Aeneas' auspicious replacement of Celaeno with Anchises as the author of the table-eating prophecy is an unconscious distortion, if not a plain fabrication (28–31, 40–6); Aeneas privileges a pro-Trojan interpretation of the pictures on Dido's temple because he needs to (82–6); for similar reasons Aeneas seduces Dido with pitiable memories (101–7); Dido initially fosters memories that establish warm relations between herself and Aeneas, only to end up competing bitterly with him about how their affair will be remembered (111–21); a series of different characters (and also the narrator) voice diverging visions of how Nisus and Euryalus, Pallas and Lausus will be remembered, depending on the speaker's emotional standpoint at the time (140–54).

Seider proposes to advance on previous scholarship on his subject, most notably Quint, who 'sets too strict an opposition between remembering and forgetting' (2). Sure enough, it emerges that memory in the *Aeneid* involves a calculated blend of remembering, refashioning, overwriting and forgetting, rather than any outright choice between preservation and oblivion. Arguably this does reformulate Quint's 'repetition with a difference', but the emphasis is on the act of memory and