

The sequence of events was significant here. The Cosgrave government had been, by a distance, the strongest of the dominions in assailing the Privy Council's jurisdiction. But it had giped at uprooting the court from the Irish legal system because it feared that doing so would be condemned as unilateral action. However, this Government was replaced by Fianna Fáil in early 1932 which in the following year took the bull by the horns and removed the Privy Council, without British consent. Two years later came the *Moore* ruling that the I.F.S. was empowered to uproot the appeal, on its own. What if this decision had come in time for the outgoing Government to capitalise on it and remove the appeal? Would this have affected the outcome of the fateful election of 1932?

One brief sequel is not mentioned in this book: Article 34.1 of the 1937 Constitution states 'justice shall be administered in courts ... by judges appointed in the manner provided by this Constitution'. In other words, Ireland is placed beyond the reach of the Privy Council.

The subject of this book is at an intersection and so the book casts light in a number of directions. Most important of all the Privy Council's early removal in the case of Ireland is a major strand in the peaceful development of the Commonwealth. This is probably one of the few examples we have yet had of the break-up of an empire being put to a constructive, if limited, use. As regards the legal system, one should emphasise this book is principally about the interrelationship between the two countries. So there is only a little on such practicalities as the relationship with the court system, lawyers (Irish and British? representing the parties), attempts to enforce the judgments in Ireland. But there is plenty of material relating to the question of whether, given good luck, including the absence of a Caveman, the court might have worked. Dr Mohr seems to be of the opinion that the political background was just too hostile and I respectfully agree.

In summary, this is an excellent book about an aspect of Irish–British relations in the 1920s, which has not to my knowledge, been comprehensively explored before. It is balanced, comprehensive, meticulous and accessibly written.

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NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR: POLITICS, ECONOMIC MOBILISATION AND SOCIETY, 1939–45. By Philip Ollerenshaw. Pp 272. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 2013. £75.

The Second World War was exceptionally important in defining the second generation of unionist rule in Northern Ireland. It was the usual practice for any aspiring unionist politician to style themselves by their given military ranks: in 1963 Captain Terence O'Neill became prime minister and he was succeeded in 1969 by Major James Chichester-Clark. Both times Brian Faulkner, though recognised as ambitious and highly capable, was overlooked. His reputation suffered because he had remained in Northern Ireland during the war years to run his father's textile factory. It was important to have had a 'good war'.

Philip Ollerenshaw's excellent book shows clearly that, domestically, unionist Northern Ireland did not have such a good war. It entered the conflict fully committed to defence of empire. (Imperialism seems to have been a stronger identity than Britishness; Viscount Bledisloe, president of the Empire Day Movement, wrote to Prime Minister Craig in May 1939 to say that 'I always regard you as the Prince of Imperialists.') But conscription was not applied to Northern Ireland for fear of the

likely nationalist reaction and embarrassment that unionists were disproportionately immune by being overrepresented in 'reserved occupations'. Economic mobilisation was also unimpressive. Ulster's peripheral position in the United Kingdom economy had been exacerbated by nearly twenty years of devolution, and the province found it difficult to pull its weight in U.K.-wide economic mobilisation. No Royal Ordinance factories were located in the province and full employment was never achieved.

Ollerenshaw cites a memorandum penned at the time by a British socialist, G. D. H. Cole, pointing out that smaller firms were often more efficient and more agreeable for workers than industrial giants. Ollerenshaw's regional study of the province bears this out. The engineering firm of Mackies stepped up impressively, but Harland and Wolff shipyard failed to control costs while Shorts Brothers, wracked by poor industrial relations, had to be nationalised in 1943. Linen production struggled as continental suppliers of flax were cut off. Specialising in luxury goods, Ulster's linen industry was ill-suited to war time priorities or, indeed, emerging markets: 'Linen is the aristocrat of textiles, but these are democratic days', as a representative sadly noted. Agriculture, based on typically quite small farms, did rather better than industry.

The reputation of the unionist government suffered due to their apparent inability to step up to the challenge of war. Lord Craigavon died in post in November 1940 but his replacement, John Andrews, failed to renew the 'old guard' cabinet or generally take a grip. Unionists seemed locked into narrow local concerns. Repression of Irish republicanism was justifiable on grounds of security, but Ollerenshaw believes that it went further than the war emergency required. In contrast, Belfast was poorly protected from air attack, which wreaked heavy casualties in 1941. The ruling party began to suffer reversals to labour and independent unionist candidates in by-elections, and rumblings of dissent grew in the Unionist Party itself. Andrews was ousted in 1943 and replaced by Sir Basil Brooke who was widely seen as much more proactive. By now victory was in sight, and Northern Ireland after all could not fail to be at least partly stimulated by war production towards some convergence with the British economy. In 1938, per capita income in the province was only fifty five per cent of the British level, but by 1945 it stood at sixty seven per cent. The Beveridge Report caused political consternation, amongst unionists for its perceived socialism, amongst nationalists for further separating the north from southern Ireland's voluntarist model of welfare. Still, it undoubtedly helped to concentrate minds on Northern Ireland's dismal health and social service provision. After the war, with the British government grateful for the province's war service, at least in contrast to Irish neutrality, Treasury funds flowed to support the welfare state. The cherry on the cake was the 1949 Ireland Act, a British response to Ireland becoming a republic which granted Stormont a veto on the ending of partition. This, unfortunately, only made uninterrupted unionist control of Northern Ireland's parliament all the more important, perpetuating one-party majoritarianism that was to provoke the rebellion of 1968.

Ollerenshaw's book is based upon close study of a great a mass of rather dry official documentation on social and economic issues. This would daunt most researchers. He has distilled from this a tightly organised, dryly funny and genuinely eye-opening panorama liberally sprinkled with gasp-out-loud vignettes illustrating the statelet's peculiar political culture. It contributes substantially to the wider project of recalibrating study of the war to a regional scale.

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