

Reviews

Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time – Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, Princeton University Press, \$55.00 hbk, ISBN: 0-691-11511-7; \$18.95 pbk, ISBN: 0-691-11512-5
doi:10.1017/S1468109905211799

In recent years young scholars have begun to examine the variation between war and peace from new and creative angles. This new scholarship has generated new insights and breathed a much-needed breath of fresh air into Security Studies. Professor Fortna's book *Peace Time – Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* deserves a prominent place in this new scholarship on war. The book is an outstanding example of creativity, scholarly attention to a normatively important question, hard-headed integrity – which gives potential counter-explanations equal chance and weight – as well as of the creative employment of multiple methods.

The book seeks to explain whether, why, and when states who have fought one war will fight another. Specifically, Fortna focuses on the *duration* of peace; her main explanatory focus is on the nature of the cease-fire. The analytical approach in the book therefore falls squarely within the institutional tradition in International Relations. In what is a signature strength of the book, potential competing explanations are given full attention, and are evaluated in a systematic and systematically honest fashion. The basic arguments can be summarized by Figure 1.




Figure 1 Summary of the Argument

Situational factors such as the decisiveness and costs of war, prior history of conflict, and relative capabilities affect the baseline prospects for peace. In turn, when the baseline prospects for an enduring peace are poor, the author argues, states will craft strong cease-fire agreements, all to maximize the duration of peace.

From its very outset, the book takes seriously the Realist critique about the efficacy of cease-fire agreements: the claim that cease-fire agreements are merely epiphenomenal. In other words, cease-fire agreements will be signed and are strong in the easy cases, where peace is most likely to endure for *other* reasons. In contrast, the book argues along functionalist lines that cease-fires are most likely, and strongest when *ex ante* prospects for enduring peace are the most dim. To examine the plausibility of the Realist critique, Fortna first estimates the overall baseline prospects for the duration of peace with situational factors, using sophisticated hazard rate estimation.¹ The next chapter shows in a very ingenious and insightful analysis that agreement strength goes up when the baseline difficulty of maintaining peace increases. (The United States are shown (Figure 4.2) to prefer systematically stronger agreements. This should serve to bolster Fortna's claims, since if any country enjoyed a favorable balance of power with its enemies, and therefore would be least likely according to Realist logic to require a strong agreement, it should be the US.)

Detailed case studies of the Israeli–Syrian and Indian–Pakistani conflicts allow Fortna to argue forcefully and persuasively that cease-fires agreements are most likely when the baselines prospects for enduring peace are *poor*.

The next two chapters then examine whether and how cease-fire agreements affect the durability of peace. As throughout the book, both detailed case studies and statistical analysis are brought to bear on the questions at hand. Fortna persuasively argues that agreements do increase the prospects for an enduring peace. Loosely speaking, the risk of renewed conflict in case of a moderately strong agreement is about one-third the risk of a renewed conflict after a weak agreement. Strong agreements produce about one-seventh the risk of failure of a weak agreement. The components of cease-fire agreements that are particularly effective in promoting the durability of peace are found to be withdrawal beyond the status quo ante, demilitarized zones, explicit third-party guarantees, peacekeeping, joint commissions for dispute resolution, and a clear and precise specification of the cease-fire terms (p. 210).

This book thus has many strengths, both academic and for policy-makers. It is unfailingly clear and careful, it successfully marries quantitative and qualitative research, and openly discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each. In particular, Fortna is very careful to expose some important sources of bias in the statistical tests, concluding that the statistical tests are biased *against* the functionalist hypotheses. However, some important sources of bias do not receive the attention they deserve.

Fortna lays out the conceptual schema of the book (p. 36), apparently considering only uni-directional effects of situational factors and agreement strength on the duration of peace. However, as explicitly argued throughout the book and as required by the author's functionalist logic, and as shown in some explicit examples in the book, expectations about the duration of peace also affect agreement strength. In other words, a *reciprocal* relation exists between

¹ A problem in this first set of regressions is that 'Agreement strength' – the fundamental variable of interest – is excluded from these regressions on the duration of peace. By the theoretical argument of the book, this must introduce omitted variable bias.

agreement strength and the duration of peace. (In Figure 1, B should point both ways.) Fortna recognizes this reciprocal relationship in the case studies, arguing, for example ‘the follow-up agreement reached in 1976 in the Football War [between El Salvador and Honduras, HG] was a response to serious clashes and skirmishes that leaders feared would escalate to war’ (p. 122, fn 8). Similarly, India and Pakistan apparently managed to agree on several confidence building measures in the 1980s and 1990s, ‘directly [as a result of] moments of particularly risky conflict in 1986–87 and 1990’ (p. 137). Failing to model such endogeneity obviously introduces bias. Since the Cease-Fires data set (1946–98) contains 48 original cease-fire agreements and 15 follow-up agreements, there would seem to be ample room for a two-stage equation to estimate the reciprocal relationship between agreement strength and the duration of peace.

This relatively minor quibble aside, Fortna has produced an important book. Policy makers can glean powerful lessons on how to craft agreements that foster peace; academics can learn new insights on the study of war and peace. The book should feature prominently on graduate syllabi, because of the importance of the questions it addresses, for its original and powerful insights, as well as for the exemplary use of multiple methods.

H.E. Goemans
Department of Political Science
University of Rochester

David Kennedy, *The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, \$29.95, ISBN: 0-691-11686-5
doi:10.1017/S1468109905221795

This is an interesting and important book, written in the style almost of personal reflections in elaborating a thesis that is not altogether unfamiliar. The author in effect engages his readers in a conversation in a style of writing that is always sparse and often elegant. But there is also a tendency to repeat the same arguments, or restate them with different examples. And sometimes, although fortunately not very often, it is difficult to follow the thread of reasoning.

As Kennedy notes, war has always been with us, and so has humanitarianism, ‘an endless struggle to contain war in the name of civilization’ (p. 323). The central argument – that the best and the brightest ideas of humanitarians can sometimes have bad consequences – will hardly be a surprise. But what Kennedy does do well is to argue that the humanitarian community has by and large failed to confront the reality of bad consequences flowing from good intentions, preferring to retreat into denial, or intensifying efforts to do good, or pointing the finger of accountability at others.

The reason for much of the first part of Kennedy’s argument lies in the growing influence and power of humanitarian actors as a result of which they have effectively entered the realm of policy making, at the same time as their emancipatory vocabulary has been captured by governments and other power brokers. The globalization of humanitarianism has been accompanied by ‘the globalization of policy making’ (p. 111). International humanitarians are participants in global governance as advocates, activists, and as policy makers. Their critiques and policy prescriptions have demonstrable consequences in the governmental and intergovernmental allocation of resources and the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

With influence over policy should come responsibility for the consequences of policy. When things go wrong, or do not happen according to plan, then the humanitarians share the responsibility for the suboptimal outcomes. The explanation for the second part of the argument – the denial of responsibility – is the refusal to acknowledge that they have crossed over from the world of ideas and ideals into the realm of power and policy making. If the humanitarian project is to be renewed, Kennedy argues, then humanitarian practices must embody two ideas: ‘realism about power and clarity about commitment’ (p. 328).

Human rights has become the universal vocabulary of political legitimacy, and humanitarian law of military legitimacy. But rather than necessarily constraining the pursuit of national interests in the international arena by military means, human rights and humanitarian law provide the discourse of justification for the familiar traditional means of statecraft. Much as humanitarians might want to believe that they still hold up the virtue of truth to the vice of power, the truth is that the vocabulary of virtue has been appropriated in the service of power. The fault line between activists and policy makers is no longer as sharp as it used to be.

Moreover, both the military strategist and the humanitarian activist retreat into abstract principles at the very point where the application of rules (humanitarian law) and standards (human rights) become conceptually and operationally interesting. For instance, if an Iraqi insurgent is hiding among the civilian populace in Fallujah, how many civilians may a US soldier kill without violating the principles of distinction between soldiers and non-combatants? And how many Iraqi civilians may legitimately be killed in order to save one American soldier without violating the principle of proportionality? This is contemporaneous restatement of the dilemma familiar from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945: were they justified on the twin principles of distinction and proportionality?

Rather than answer these difficult questions with any degree of clarity, both the humanitarian and the strategist retreat into restatements of abstract rules and standards, or the vocabulary of absolute normative commitment: the use of force must always be proportional; civilians may never be targeted; we will do our utmost to protect our soldiers; etc.

The subject of international intervention to protect the victims of humanitarian atrocities is a particular manifestation of the more general paradox. For the central objective of traditional humanitarian policy making has been to reduce the frequency and violence of war. Now many humanitarians demand the use of violence and war in order to advance the humanitarian agenda. But how can one ‘intervene’ in Kosovo and East Timor and pretend to be detached from and responsible for the distributional consequences with respect to wealth, resources, power, status, and authority? This dilemma is inherent in the structure of interventions, has nothing to do with the false dichotomy between multilateral interventions in one context and unilateral in another. ‘The effort to intervene . . . without affecting the background distribution of power and wealth betrays this bizarre belief in the possibility of an international governance which does not govern’ (p. 130).

Kennedy’s solution is to engage in a rigorous calculation of the costs as well as benefits, of the areas illuminated by the shining light of idealism, but also the darker sides of virtue, of alternative strategies, and policy options. That is, he argues passionately for the overriding virtue of pragmatism. Instead of a priori ‘enchanted’ multilateral processes and institutions, weigh them and their long-term project against immediate and long-term humanitarian outcomes. This requires a shift from a purely instrumental to a more skeptical process of reasoning.

Because the darker sides can sometimes swamp the benefits of humanitarian work, Kennedy proposes a posture or sensibility of pragmatism. Is it worth bombing Belgrade or Baghdad to save Kosovo or Iraq? Maybe, maybe not. The answer requires a rigorous empirical assessment, and cannot be derived from a priori norms. In all such policy choice frameworks, there are winners and losers, virtuous outcomes and horrendous costs. To be sure, humanitarianism provides us with a vocabulary and institutional machinery of emancipation. But it must be judged also against the pragmatism of intentions and consequences. Kennedy guides us along a journey of intellectual discovery that focuses the searchlight of critical reasoning on the noble goals and aspirations of humanitarianism. For example, 'Far from being a defense of the individual against the state, human rights has become a standard part of the justification for the external use of force by the state against other states and individuals' (p. 25).

We can and will quibble with some of the particular examples chosen by Kennedy, contest some of his reasoning, and dispute many of his conclusions. This is especially true with respect to some of his observations on the Iraq war, perhaps because that event was too close to the time of writing to permit a perspective of distance and detachment. But we should be grateful for such an engaging and reflective conversation on one of the nobler instincts of our times.

Ramesh Thakur
United Nations University

Miranda A. Schreurs, *Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 261 pp, £47.50, \$65.00 hbk, ISBN: 0 521 81912 1; £17.95, \$23.99 hbk, ISBN: 0 521 52537 3
doi:10.1017/S1468109905231791

Politics and international relations are now forced to deal with various criteria in explaining global peace and stability, other than narrowly focusing on the security and development of a country. Issues related to human rights and the environment, have thus been gaining the attention of scholars, decision-makers, and the public in many parts of the world. In particular, as the rapid growth of the world economy and the economic development of individual states have also been the cause of various environmental problems, issues related to the environment no longer remain as mere ecological issues, but have had important political, social, and humanitarian implications for the state, as well as for the international community. At the national level, the negative impacts of rapid economic growth and urbanization are not only manifested by ecological threats such as pollution and the scarcity of resources, but also by human security concerns involving population, health, food, and energy concerns. At the inter-state level, the environmental degradation of one country could easily affect the environments of neighboring states. In this context, the study on the environmental politics of individual countries is increasingly important in understating not only domestic situations of a country but also inter-state relations, both at the regional and global levels.

Japan, Germany, and the United States, all leading countries in the world economy, have played a pioneering role in initiating and supporting various projects in promoting environmental protection. As the title suggests, Miranda Schreurs' book deals with the environmental politics

of these three leading countries. Throughout the book, Schreurs successfully portrays slight yet distinct differences in the environmental policies of the three countries by utilizing a comparative case study methodology and empirical data from in-country research. There are three big questions that she seeks to answer: (i) why environmental movements have become institutionalized in such very different ways in Japan, Germany, and the United States; (ii) how these countries have developed their own respective environmental strategies in the process of establishing environmental communities and their relationship to political and economic actors, and how their differences have affected the environmental policy approach of states; and (iii) how changing perceptions of environmental protection and participation in the international environmental policy-making process have modified the strategies and goals of domestic political actors.

The book first starts out by illustrating the relationship between the economy and environment in Japan, Germany, and the United States. By showing the budgetary environmental expenditures of the three countries in relation to their economic size, Schreurs provides a general view of the environmental policies and action strategies of each respective country. According to the book, Germany has spent the most in implementing its environmental policy (30% of its budget), with Japan and the United States following (25% and 10.5% of their respective budgets). The book then goes into deeper discussion in order to provide more insightful answers to the three questions. In general, Schreurs begins each chapter with a brief explanation of the chapter topic, which is then followed by a thorough analysis in which the arguments for each country are logically developed under their respective subheadings. This method provides the reader with a clearer understanding of the diverse environmental approaches of the three countries.

The chapter titled 'The Birth of Environmental Movements and Programs' historically overviews the emergence of environmental programs in Japan, Germany, and the United States. Schreurs states that modern environmental movements are related with the foundation of environmental administrations and the national pollution control legislation of the 1960s and 1970s. She argues that until the 1960s, pollution control had only remained at the local level. Yet, because local governments failed to effectively control pollution and prevent environmental destruction, numerous coalitions and laws aiming to protect the environment have been developed at all levels of government since the 1970s. The three countries tend to share this process though sharp differences exist in the role, approach, and the decision-making process of the respective governments of the three countries.

The next chapter focuses on the 1970s, which was called 'the period for the institutionalization of environmental movements', particularly in the United States. Numerous acts and laws were legislated, including the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, the Marine Mammals Protection Act of 1972, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, the Expansion of the Clean Air and Water Laws of 1980, etc. Although Japan and Germany have also made some amendments to their laws and institutions during this period, Schreurs argues that the mid-1970s was 'the period of environmental policy stagnation' for these two countries, which was mainly due to the oil shock. Still, environmental groups started to emerge in Japan, while the Green Party became stronger in Germany during this period.

The chapter titled 'Acid Rain: Signs of Policy Divergence' deals with the newly emerging environmental issue of acid rain during the 1980s. The environmental policies of Japan, Germany, and the United States began to diverge during this period. In Germany, the Greens became a political force in which the electoral campaigns and its effort to win international recognition on environmental problems have been phenomenal. Accordingly, Germany rapidly emerged as a

European and international leader in promoting international regulations on acid rain-producing substances. Through its efforts, there has been an increase of environmental legislation in Europe. As for Japan, acid rain was not on the political agenda until the end of the 1980s. In the United States, the political influence of environmental NGOs continued to increase though there was little interest in addressing acid rain issues at the policy level. Similarly, the next chapter discusses stratospheric ozone depletion.

Perhaps the most important chapters of this book are the last four chapters, which deal with global climate change, the Kyoto Protocol, global communities, and the domestic politics of the three countries. The issue of climate change both has enormous economic and ecological implications for states. Accordingly, the three countries have adopted their own respective positions on climate change. Consequently, Germany and the United States show sharp contrasts in their policies on climate change with Japan uneasily positioning itself in between. Thus, these last four chapters address the distinct differences of the three countries on such issues.

On the whole, Germany adopts a 'green social welfare' state approach to environmental protection, guided by a 'precautionary principle'. Also it is inevitable for Germany to reflect the influence of the European Union (EU) in environmental policy-making. It attracts the attention of many environmental scholars because of its Green Party. Moreover, there are strong local, federal, and international environmental groups such as Greenpeace and the BUND based in the country. In contrast, the United States increasingly leans away from the use of environmental regulations. Instead, it is heading towards the use of market-based mechanisms and cost-benefit analysis in determining when environmental protection should precede over the economy. This is the outcome of a neo-liberal economic paradigm in US trade policy, which is starting to influence US environmental policies. However, the United States is similar to Germany in that it has strong environmental groups and think tanks. As mentioned above, Japan sits between these two distinct approaches. Schreurs points out that Japan is different from the two other countries, as it does not have any strong think tanks to make environmental policies. Also, Japan lacks big, organized foundations or groups to increase social and political awareness on environmental issues. Such differences have widened with the change of administrations in the United States. For instance, President George W. Bush announced that his administration was 'unequivocally' opposed to the Kyoto Protocol. Japan, Germany, and the EU made a failed attempt to convince the US to reconsider this decision. Nevertheless, the EU and Japan have agreed to move forward with the Kyoto Protocol without the US.

Despite these differences and difficulties, it is important for Japan, Germany, and the United States to continue their efforts to pursue policies for environmental protection. Many developing countries have attempted to follow the Japanese, German, and US models to promote their economic and social development. Consequently, if their own socio-economic models are 'greened', other countries will likely follow suit, making the environmental outcome phenomenal at the global level.

In summary, Schreurs succeeds in depicting why different environmental policy approaches have developed and what their implications are for Japan, Germany, and the United States by analyzing the different ideas, actors, and institutions of each country in dealing with environmental issues.

Shin-wha Lee

Department of Political Science and International Relations
Korea University