this unity. This relation between legal unity and political plurality is the central theme in contemporary scholarship on border politics that complements Kotef's reflections on movement and border security.

The politics of movement also predominantly figures in Waldinger's *The Cross-Border Connection*. Whereas most academic literature views migrants either as *immigrants*, focusing on their integration in the receiving state, or as *emigrants*, focusing on the ties and relation with the country left behind, this book seeks to do both. On the understanding that "every immigrant is an emigrant, every alien a citizen, every foreigner a national" (p. 37), Waldinger targets the social, economic, and political relations that migrants have or do not have with the country of origin and host state.

Although the book lacks a general introduction that properly explains which questions will be asked, how they will be answered, and why this is important, the second chapter raises a promising research question: How does the selection and exclusion at the borders of the host state impact upon cross-border connections? Waldinger claims that border control by states impedes the potential to maintain contacts with the home country, and that this is particularly true for irregular immigrants (p. 27). However, this claim is refuted in Chapter 7, where the strong ties between Mexico and its émigrés are demonstrated by discussing the efforts of Mexico to provide its nationals who irregularly stay abroad with identification papers. From a European perspective, it is fascinating to read how Mexican consuls within the United States relentlessly negotiated with banks, city officials, police, and lawyers to accept and recognize the Mexican consular identification cards. Practical considerations relating to the everyday lives of both irregular immigrants and U.S. citizens (e.g., the identification of victims and the acceptance of illegal immigrants in the banking system, to the benefit of both the immigrants and the economy) demonstrated the use and value of the Mexican consular identification card.

Yet Waldinger clearly sketches the clash between those practical considerations with the claimed right of every state to select and exclude foreigners in its own interest. This clash between the interests of irregular immigrants and the sovereign state refers us back to Kotef's book, which illuminates why the movement of some people is to be obstructed and stonewalled in order to let the movement of others flourish.

Hume and the Politics of Enlightenment. By Thomas W. Merrill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 199p. $99.00
doi:10.1017/S1537592716002206

— Robert Lamb, *University of Exeter*

In historical studies of political thought, there is often an intimate connection between the choice of textual subject matter for investigation and the interpretive approach deployed by the scholar. This connection is explicit in Thomas W. Merrill's rich and insightful study, *Hume and the Politics of Enlightenment*, which aims to glean an account of politics and morality—as well as an account of the appropriate philosophical *approach* to questions of politics and morality—from the writings of David Hume. Part of the charm of the book is the apparent seamlessness between subject and author: It is never clear exactly where Hume ends and Merrill begins, with the latter offering an interpretive reconstruction of the former's theory that is consistently sympathetic, and yet expressed in a gentle, reflective, and never over-bearing, manner. As with the Humean position being outlined, Merrill's interpretation is appropriately free of any philosophical or methodological zealotry.

Merrill begins with the worry that the contemporary status of philosophy—understood as "radical questioning"—is politically troubling, since it appears to have given rise either to disastrous forms of anti-liberalism (attributed to the legacies of Martin Heidegger and Karl Marx), or to the alleged defeatism of Richard Rorty's relativism (pp. 1–4). His thought is that that Hume's philosophy has something to say to profitably address this impasse. Even if Merrill does not expect it to yield any absolute normative conclusion, his study is "by no means merely antiquarian in intention" (p. 7). Indeed, the hope is that an interpretive conversation with Hume could liberate us from dominant ways of framing our moral/political problems, such that we might "come to see our situation with new eyes" (p. 8, 191). This refreshingly open-minded attitude to the philosophical value of scholarship in the history of political thought is attractive, and puts less pressure on the concern about the (totalitarian or defeatist) culs-de-sac that radical questioning has allegedly led us down so far, an idea that remains too undeveloped to do much work.

As with many modern scholars—but famously unlike Hume's contemporaries—Merrill here gives priority to the *A Treatise of Human Nature*, rather than either of the *Enquiries* or the major writings on history or religion. The scope of the study is limited in that sense, and also insofar as it "in no way attempts to replace the variety of interpretations of Hume that exist" (p. 11). It is nevertheless notably ambitious in two respects: First, in its attempt to read the *Treatise* as offering a profound answer to the perennial question about the capacity of philosophy to contribute to politics and morality; and, second, in its claim that a proper understanding of Hume's answer to this question requires attention to an oft-overlooked allusion to Socrates in the *Treatise*, where the need to "call philosophy down from the heavens. . .and compel it to inquire into life and mores and good and evil things" is expressed (p. 7).

The methodological tone struck by Merrill throughout the book is also admirably undogmatic, though notably

he does lean on some well-established Straussian interpretive strategies. For example, some of his claims do not exactly depend on, but are assisted by, assumptions about the "structure of the *Treatise*" as a key to its meaning, such as the precise positioning of the Socratic allusion (p. 17, 35) in the conclusion to Book I, or the textual ordering of Hume's *Essays* (p. 186). There are also claims about authorial intentions that are somewhat overplayed in a manner invited by some of Strauss's methodological writings. Merrill thus refers to "the fact that Hume had to downplay, disguise, or downright lie about his heterodox views" about religion (p. 10), and yet—whatever the status of Christian orthodoxy in Britain at his time of writing—it is certainly not a *fact* that Hume *had* to do any such thing. Nevertheless, on the whole, the book actually emerges as a fine exemplar of just how fruitful some Straussian tropes can be when treated as useful heuristics rather than as hard rules for interpretation.

Merrill argues provocatively that Hume's Socratic allusion holds the key to understanding the entire intellectual project of the *Treatise*: It expresses the view that philosophers must enter "into an alliance with ordinary citizens" (p. 26), rather than seek any other-worldly detachment in their reasoning, and should conceive of enlightenment as the self-awareness that emerges through a questioning activity that takes popular opinion seriously instead of attempting to stand above it. Although it might seem far-fetched to place such interpretive weight on a single remark, through an impressively dogged and detailed analysis, Merrill shows how his reading makes sense, and how it inspires Hume's conception of enlightenment as an ultimately *personal* project of self-understanding that is nevertheless bound up with a distinct political vision.

Each chapter offers textually scrupulous, penetrating analyses of Hume's idea of enlightenment and its consequences for the relationship between philosophy and politics. Following a detailed discussion of the Socratic allusion, the second chapter skilfully explains both the grounds of his "seeking" rather than "destructive" scepticism in the *Treatise* (p. 58) and his turn towards "human nature in all its manifestations" as the gateway to proper philosophizing (p. 60). The third and fourth chapters cover the best-known aspects of Books II and III of the *Treatise*, such as Hume's view of moral psychology and motivations, and his ideas about justice, rights, and the status of the virtues. Throughout these discussions, Merrill displays a thorough command of Hume scholarship, and is carefully attuned to various interpretive debates over the identity of his moral thought, though most of the direct critical engagement with other commentators is confined to the footnotes.

After guiding us carefully through the *Treatise*, Merrill then spends the final two chapters connecting its concerns with those of Hume's *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*. These are perhaps the most original and compelling sections of the book, where we see the normative political payoff of Hume's idea of enlightenment. Merrill explores the philosophical roots of Hume's critique of religion, which is ultimately really only a "symptom" caused by an erroneous commitment to philosophical truth, one that views "the Platonic philosopher-king [as] the appropriate model for political society" (p. 146).

The normative vision that then emerges is of political liberalism and philosophical pragmatism. Within Hume's thought, the securing of individual liberty takes priority. For him, the fact that wise laws and political institutions are the best way to protect individual freedom implies the rightness of republican government (pp. 137–138), because it secures the rule of law that is, in turn, necessary to enable commerce (p. 147). In order for the liberal commercial republic envisioned to flourish, it needs also to be cherished by the very middle-class individuals whose creation it assures (pp. 169–171). And, crucially, as Merrill emphasises, these are the very "honest gentlemen" whose opinions Hume thinks must be the starting point for meaningful philosophical reflection, and consequent self-knowledge, in the first place. The unpacking of a coherent theory across the *Treatise* and the *Essays* is another virtue of this valuable addition to Hume scholarship, which illustrates just how philosophically illuminating the historical analysis of political thought can be.

The Biopolitics of Gender. By Jemima Repo. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 218p. $49.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592716002218

— Jennifer Denbow, *California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo*

This is a groundbreaking work. Jemima Repo has written a genealogy of gender that upends common approaches to gender in feminism. Her main argument is that gender is an apparatus of power that is wielded to regulate life and govern bodies and populations. The book starts with a critique of Judith Butler and ends with a positive appraisal of radical feminist Valerie Solanas's *SCUM Manifesto*. Throughout, Repo's arguments are scholarly and provocative, and they left this reader unable to think about gender in the way I had before reading the book.

The most dense and theoretical part of *The Biopolitics of Gender* is the introduction, which situates the book in a wide-ranging field of literature. Repo's engagement with and challenge to Butlerian thought is perhaps the most theoretically significant. She argues that Butler dehistoricizes gender and deploys Foucaultian thought without attention to biopower. Repo's aim is to restore biopower to understandings of sex and gender through a genealogy of gender akin to Foucault's genealogy of sexuality.

In Chapter 1, the author begins by looking to the site in which gender was first "deployed into the sexual order" (p. 24): postwar psychological research on hermaphroditism.