

developing countries. Tecker examines the difficulty of this new approach through a case study of a joint East German-Bulgarian investment project to establish a cement industry in Syria. This was a mutually advantageous relationship for all parties involved. Syria would get a cement industry that would allow more national self-sufficiency and the German and Bulgarian imports of necessary goods. However, the project was a nightmare because of the difficulty of coordinating between the mutually hermitized East German and Bulgarian economies. Yet, despite many failures, CMEA members did construct a plant in Syria and established a native concrete industry.

The book proceeds to chronicle the “golden age” of CMEA-south cooperation that occurred in the mid 1970s to early 1980s. This period coincided with high energy prices that both restricted the credit that western firms could offer due to high input prices and allowed many developing countries to suddenly have access to credit. In this context, CMEA improved its practices by adapting formal trade agreements with governments in the Global South. The two chapters that make up this section try to examine the interests of both CMEA countries and their counterparts in developing long-term economic relationships. It is clear that for the Soviets and their CMEA allies, the key drive to engage in economic relations with the developing world was shifting from the political idealism of the Khrushchev era to the need to diversify sources of commodities away from the Soviet Union.

Tecker concludes with a discussion of CMEA’s transformation in the late-1980s. These chapters document the effect on CMEA trade strategy of the radical reforms in the socialist bloc with the pressures of a global financial contraction in the wake of the sharp rise in interest rates and collapse of energy prices. As CMEA integration and interaction with the Global South continued, Socialist countries became interested in gaining profits in hard currency from their ventures. This was especially true for less developed CMEA countries who needed markets for exports to sustain their own borrowing in global capital markets. When the decades’ developing world debt binge turned into a sovereign debt crisis, CMEA creditors were last in line to have their loans repaid. This narrative animates a case study of CMEA projects in the Indian steel industry led by the USSR in conjunction with Czechoslovakia and East Germany. While initially maintaining a political priority to support India’s industrialization and its pro-Soviet stance, these projects began to slowly become explicitly tied to the need for hard currency.

*Red Money for the Global South* breaks ground by documenting intertwining east-east and east-south relations. Tecker covers a vast amount of material, which is challenging enough. However, at times the book makes many diversions into theoretical corners that are tangential to the main narrative. Also, a deeper engagement with recent literature on Cold War development policies could have made the book’s extremely valuable contribution more obvious. These small issues aside, *Red Money for the Global South* is an achievement and worth reading for anyone interested in the history of the Cold War.

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***Napred, u prošlost: Studije o politici istorije u Poljskoj, Ukrajini i Rusiji.*** By Milan Subotić. Belgrade: Edicija REČ Fabrika knjiga, 2019. Notes. Bibliography. Glossary. Index. Illustrations. Tables. Maps. RSD 1780, paper.  
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This is a timely book that provides a new analysis of the role that history and memory play in the processes of national identity formation in contemporary Poland,

Ukraine, and Russia, three countries with interconnected and deeply contested histories. Milan Subotić, who is affiliated with the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade, introduces the concept of the *politics of history*, which he defines as the “(mis)use of history as an instrument for staying in office or gaining political power, for legitimizing rule, as well as for mobilizing the population” (12). This becomes evident, Subotić writes, when history is used for resolving “crises of communities’ self-understanding” by “formulating and imposing the essentialist understanding of collective (most frequently, national) identity” (13). What distinguishes this concept from the narrower term of the “politicization of history” is the scope of the policies that include, among other examples, legislation proscribing the interpretation of particular historical events, curriculum and educational program reforms, and commemorative practices. While this is a new term, the concept itself is not, as the author also shows when he connects it to Eric Hobsbawm’s concept of “invented tradition” and other related scholarship in the interdisciplinary field of nationalism studies. Perhaps, it could also be linked with Timothy Snyder’s concept of the “politics of eternity” in *The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America* (New York, 2018), which may be read in tandem as both concepts encompass the memory of victimhood in national identity development.

In the first part of the book, Subotić reviews the life and work of the sociologist and historian Jan Tomasz Gross in the context of Holocaust memory and contemporary political divisions in Poland. The political parties on the right were highly critical of Gross’s work, especially the book *Neighbors: The Destruction of Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton University Press, 2001) that challenged the narrative of national victimization during the WWII by highlighting the responsibility of the Polish residents in this act of violence. At the same time, political leaders on the left welcomed the book as an opportunity to mobilize their supporters who embraced a different kind of understanding of history that acknowledged and included minorities in their formulation of contemporary Polish national identity.

The Ukrainian analysis, beginning with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, shows how the contested views of the memories of Holodomor, also referred to as the Great Famine in 1932–33, and Stepan Bandera, the controversial leader of the radical faction of the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists, were represented along with national liberation symbols, such as greetings and flags, in political campaigns and protests. In the case of Holodomor, the author discusses different interpretations ranging from the view that it was an act of genocide against the Ukrainian population to the view that it was a tragedy that occurred as a result of the harsh Soviet economic development program (121–28). In a similar way, the naming of Stepan Bandera as a “hero of Ukraine” by Viktor Yushchenko in 2010, after losing the elections, illustrated how the divisive effects of the “politics of history” extended beyond the national level to the international sphere when this act was criticized not only by Russia, Poland, and Israel, but also by the European Parliament (149).

In the last part, Subotić shows how the Russian commemoration of the October Revolution gradually lost the national prominence and was eventually replaced by the “new tradition” of the Unity Day under the regime of Vladimir Putin. The last chapter is dedicated to an analysis of the symbolism of the Georgian Ribbon and the Immortal Regiment commemorating WWII veterans on the Victory Day, and includes an analysis of the simultaneous commemoration in Serbia.

This book will be of interest to historians and social scientists who read Serbian, Croatian, or Bosnian. If translated, it would attract the attention of scholars beyond the region interested in the use of the “politics of history” to strengthen and legitimize political power by promoting national unity. Subotić provides a new perspective that also includes comparisons with similar trends in Serbia, especially in the last

chapter, in addition to updating the existing literature with examples from Poland, Ukraine, and Russia.

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***Interwar East Central Europe, 1918–1941: The Failure of Democracy-building, the Fate of Minorities.*** Ed. Sabrina P. Ramet. Routledge Studies in Modern European History. London: Routledge, 2020. xx, 360 pp. Notes. Index. Illustrations. Tables. \$128.00, hard bound.

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“Why now? Why present yet another book about interwar East Central Europe?” Sabrina Ramet introduces the book with this question—and she gives a thoughtful and convincing answer. As she points out, this is the first multi-authored book with each chapter written by experts in the field. The eleven authors come from universities in seven different countries; all are fluent in the language of the country they study. The last book on eastern Europe before World War II was published nearly two decades ago, by Ivan. T. Berend; so a work which now explores diverse interpretations and perspectives is more than appropriate. More importantly, Ramet suggests that in this time of global challenges, examining the factors which led to the failure of democratization in east central Europe might provide some valuable lessons.

The opening chapter by Ramet provides an overview and a framework for the more detailed analysis by individual scholars focusing on individual countries. These chapters appear to be organized geographical, based on border proximity. Thus the countries covered, in order, are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians (Yugoslavia), and finally Albania. An interesting omission is Austria. Ramet suggests that Austria does not share the general patterns of state failures. One could, however, argue that Austria shared border issues, challenges of linguistic minorities, and the failure of democracy, all factors found in the other seven states. Chapter 9 covers peasantries and peasant parties; these parties/movements were especially relevant and important for understanding interwar east central Europe. Finally, there is a summative afterword by Stefano Bianchini that attempts to synthesize the period.

In this first chapter, Ramet focuses on a number of commonalities and patterns, chief among which was the fact that not a single one of these states had the same boundaries in 1919 as in 1875; there were territorial winners and losers, which contributed to conflict. Furthermore, the borders were contested for several years after the war ended, so that implementing new governance structures was negatively affected. Compounding border issues were other problems that made political stability problematic, above all the position of minorities in the nation-building process. Tables found in this chapter and throughout the book provide valuable data on such factors, including a table on prominent political figures assassinated in the region between 1919 and 1940! The formation of these new or re-configured states was based as much on economic needs, geography, and history as on national identity. Thus as Ramet points out, the goal of the new states was to form governments that would reflect the role and vision of the state-forming nation—ethnic diversity was a problem to be solved, not embraced as a necessary component of the new borders. By 1929, Ramet identifies Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Poland, and Yugoslavia as failed states; with Romania added (1930) and finally Czechoslovakia in 1938. This is examined in much greater detail in the chapters on the individual countries.