

# The defeat of heartbreak: problems and solutions for Stump's view of the problem of evil concerning desires of the heart

LINDSAY K. CLEVELAND

*Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, Waco, TX, 76710, USA*  
*e-mail: lindsay\_cleveland@baylor.edu*

W. SCOTT CLEVELAND

*The Philosophy and Theology of Intellectual Humility Project, Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, MO, 63108, USA*  
*e-mail: wcleve@slu.edu*

**Abstract:** Eleonore Stump insightfully develops Aquinas's theodicy to account for a significant source of human suffering, namely the undermining of *desires of the heart*. Stump argues that what justifies God in allowing such suffering is benefits made available to the sufferer through her suffering that can defeat the suffering by contributing to the fulfilment of her heart's desires. We summarize Stump's arguments for why such suffering requires defeat and how it is defeated. We identify three problems with Stump's account of how such suffering is defeated and offer solutions to each. We defend and strengthen Stump's response to the hardest cases for her view, and explain what her view demands of God.

In *Wandering in Darkness* Eleonore Stump insightfully develops Aquinas's theodicy into a defence against the argument from evil against theism to account for what she regards as a significant source of human suffering, namely the undermining of core desires that she calls *desires of the heart*.<sup>1</sup> Stump argues that the goods that justify God's allowing such suffering are benefits made available to the sufferer through her suffering that can defeat the suffering by contributing to the fulfilment of the sufferer's heart's desires. We summarize Stump's arguments for why such suffering requires defeat and how it is defeated. We identify three problems with Stump's account of how the suffering due to the undermining of heart's desires is defeated. The first is her ambiguous use of the term 'refolded' to refer to a particular form of a heart's desire the satisfaction of which, she argues,

is both necessary and sufficient for a benefit to satisfy one of the necessary conditions she gives for a benefit to defeat suffering. The second problem is that given either sense of the term 'refolded', it is implausible in a set of her cases that the satisfaction of a refolded form of the undermined heart's desire is sufficient to satisfy one of the necessary conditions she gives for a benefit to defeat suffering. The third problem is that her response to an objection to her view fails to meet the particularity requirement that she claims is necessary for the refolding of a heart's desire.

We offer solutions to each of these problems in order to support the plausibility of Stump's view. We disambiguate two meanings of 'refolded' and then apply our disambiguation to Stump's response to the hardest cases for her view in order to defend and strengthen her response. We develop Stump's account to make it plausible in the relevant set of cases that the satisfaction of a refolded form of the undermined heart's desire is sufficient to satisfy the relevant condition she gives for a benefit to defeat suffering. Finally, we offer what we take to be the best response that meets the particularity requirement for the relevant objection and, given her view, explain what this solution demands of God.

### **A summary of Stump's response to the problem of suffering**

The particular aspect of the problem of evil that is Stump's focus is the involuntary, undeserved suffering of mentally fully functional adult human beings. Such suffering, she thinks, results from the undermining, in part or in whole, of the satisfaction of a person's central cares. Stump distinguishes two types of central cares: objective and subjective. Objective cares concern those things that are essential to any human person's flourishing just in virtue of being human. The significant value of these cares is objective, deriving from the intrinsic value of their objects.<sup>2</sup> Since the objects of such cares are the same for all humans, whether or not they are conscious of or correct about them, these objects can be characterized in terms of universals, e.g. health, freedom, and love.<sup>3</sup>

Subjective cares concern those things that need not be essential to human flourishing as such, but which have significant value to a person in virtue of her deep commitment to them.<sup>4</sup> Since these cares arise when a person sets her heart on something, Stump calls them *desires of the heart* or *heart's desires*.<sup>5</sup> While the objects of these cares may or may not have significant intrinsic value, the great value they have for a person derives from that person's valuing the object of care. Stump thinks the objects of proper subjective cares are persons or non-trivial projects.

Stump takes the undermining of those heart's desires for persons or projects that are compatible with the sufferer's flourishing to be a significant enough contravention of a person's will to demand justification for God's allowing such undermining.<sup>6</sup> This is because Stump thinks that having heart's desires (for things

compatible with flourishing) is necessary for flourishing and that heart's desires lie at the core of a person's volitional structure. Stump thinks that having heart's desires is necessary for flourishing because it is natural for humans to form such desires and the objects of such desires are goods desired for their own sakes.<sup>7</sup> Given this, it follows that it is necessary to a person's flourishing that she have heart's desires. Stump thinks that the fact that most humans form heart's desires by setting their hearts on particular persons or projects is strong reason to think that forming such desires is an activity natural to and characteristic of humans. Further, Stump thinks that the heartbreak resulting from the undermining of heart's desires reveals that heart's desires themselves lie at the core of a person's volitional structure. This is evidenced by the fact that when one is heartbroken the ordinary good things of life lose their attractiveness to a person.<sup>8</sup>

So, on Stump's view, the relevant suffering is the involuntary, undeserved undermining of a person's objective flourishing or the satisfaction of her heart's desires. The problems with Stump's view that we discuss all concern the defeat of the suffering due to the undermining of a heart's desire. We'll call such suffering *heartbreak*.

Stump follows Aquinas in maintaining that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good God is morally justified in allowing the suffering resulting from the undermining of a person's flourishing if and only if that suffering makes available a benefit that can defeat the suffering. On Aquinas's view, a benefit (or conjunction of benefits) can defeat suffering if and only if the benefit (or conjunction of benefits):

- (1) goes primarily to the sufferer,
- (2) can outweigh the good of avoiding the suffering, and
- (3) given the circumstances, is best attained by means of the suffering.<sup>9</sup>

A benefit that can defeat suffering fails to defeat suffering if and only if the sufferer refuses the benefit.<sup>10</sup> Stump's focus and ours is on the second condition, which we'll explain in more detail below. For now we'll say this: Aquinas thinks that the benefit of gaining a possible means to ultimate flourishing is sufficient to outweigh the good of avoiding the suffering of the undermining of non-ultimate flourishing. Stump assumes Aquinas is correct to this point but thinks his view requires development to account for heartbreak. For, she denies that the benefit of gaining a possible means to ultimate flourishing is sufficient to outweigh the good of avoiding heartbreak. We explain why after first giving the scales of value that Stump uses to determine whether a benefit outweighs suffering.

Stump distinguishes an objective scale of value and a subjective scale of value corresponding with the objective and subjective cares of a person, i.e. her flourishing and her heart's desires. Stump follows what she takes to be Aquinas's view of the objective scale of value, which ranges from the highest to the lowest degree of human flourishing. The highest degree of flourishing, which we'll call ultimate

flourishing, is the experience of everlasting shared union in love with God, while the lowest degree is a state of permanent psychic disintegration resulting in alienation from oneself and others, including God.<sup>11</sup>

Stump follows Aquinas in maintaining that the suffering resulting from the undermining of earthly flourishing is defeated by being a possible means to ultimate flourishing, which outweighs in objective value the good of avoiding the suffering.<sup>12</sup> A benefit contributes to ultimate flourishing if and only if it (i) justifies the sufferer in relation to God, i.e. it establishes a relationship of mutual love between the sufferer and God and so wards off the greater harm of the permanent absence of union with God; or (ii) sanctifies the sufferer in relation to God, i.e. it deepens the relationship of mutual love between the sufferer and God and so contributes to the greater good of an increased degree of everlasting shared union with God.<sup>13</sup> While the greater good of ultimate flourishing outweighs in objective value the good of avoiding the suffering due to the loss of earthly flourishing, Stump denies that it is sufficient to outweigh in subjective value the good of avoiding the suffering due to the loss of a heart's desire. We explain why she denies this below.

Stump identifies a subjective scale of value for heart's desires ranging from the deepest to the most superficial desire of the heart. Stump assumes that those things one ought to take as heart's desires have a sufficient degree of intrinsic value such that (i) not every desire counts as a heart's desire, and (ii) the more superficial heart's desires are not superficial in themselves but only in comparison to the deeper heart's desires. Since the greatest good for human beings consists in the personal relationships constitutive of shared union with God, Stump maintains that particular persons ought to be the object of the deepest desires of the heart, with God being the deepest.<sup>14</sup> A desire for God is implicit in the innate desire for one's own flourishing and so is had by all persons whether or not they are conscious of it. However, humans also ought to have a conscious desire for God wherein God is understood not only as that in which one's good consists but also as a person with whom one ought to be united in a relation of mutual love. This conscious desire for God is not innate.<sup>15</sup> Rather, it is gained and deepened in the course of life, including through one's experience of suffering.<sup>16</sup> Since the highest good constitutive of general human flourishing is shared union with God, there is a convergence of objective and subjective cares on God and shared union with God.<sup>17</sup>

Stump holds that in a case of heartbreak the sufferer's reception of a benefit that is of greater objective value than the object lost is insufficient on its own to outweigh the good of avoiding the heartbreak. She thinks the satisfaction of some form of the undermined heart's desire is also necessary. For without the satisfaction of some form of the undermined heart's desire the sufferer would be internally disintegrated in her will. Stump takes internal integration in the will to be the integration of hierarchically ordered desires and volitions, which involves

having higher-order desires in harmony with one's first-order desires (i.e. one must desire to desire the things she desires).<sup>18</sup> The sufferer who receives a benefit that contributes to her ultimate flourishing but that does not satisfy a form of her undermined heart's desire will have a conflict of desires. On the one hand, she will desire the heartbreak since it served as a means to her ultimate flourishing. On the other hand, she will desire the object of her heart's desire that was undermined. But such a conflict of desires that are central to a person is a state of internal disintegration.

Stump gives the example of Mary of Bethany, who had a heart's desires for her brother Lazarus. Her desire for Lazarus was undermined when Jesus did not prevent Lazarus' death by healing him. Supposing, counter to the facts of the story, that when Jesus later arrived he brought comfort to Mary and reassured her of his love for her but did not restore Lazarus' life. If Mary received the benefit of increased closeness to Jesus, whom we'll assume she identified as God, which was made available to her through her suffering the loss of Lazarus, she would then be torn regarding her care for Lazarus.<sup>19</sup> On the one hand, she would desire the heartbreak that resulted from his loss since it was a means to her closer relation to Jesus. But, on the other hand, she would still care for Lazarus and be heartbroken over her loss of him. In this state she would not be integrated in her desires.<sup>20</sup>

Stump identifies two ways to resolve the internal disintegration resulting from heartbreak. Either the person must give up her heart's desire or another form of the heart's desire must be satisfied. The view that a person must give up her heart's desire is what Stump calls the stern-minded view. The stern-minded view is the view that one should only have deep, central desires for things that are necessary for one's ultimate flourishing.<sup>21</sup> Given this, the stern-minded maintain that if a person suffers heartbreak, then she should give up the relevant desire of her heart. When the relevant desire is given up, then the sufferer can embrace the benefit that contributes to her ultimate flourishing without suffering internal disintegration. Stump rejects this view as inhuman and incompatible with God's perfect love. She thinks it is inhuman because it rejects as disordered the natural human tendency to have deep desires for significant things, including persons and meaningful projects. She thinks it is incompatible with God's perfect love because she thinks that in a proper relationship of love, the lover seeks to fulfil so far as he can all of the beloved's deep desires that are compatible with her flourishing. Further, Stump finds in the stories of the four biblical characters she discusses evidence that in the face of heartbreak, God not only makes available to the sufferer a benefit that contributes to her ultimate flourishing but also a benefit that satisfies some form of the undermined heart's desire, indeed a more subjectively valuable form of the undermined heart's desire.<sup>22</sup> So, assuming that the object of an undermined heart's desire is compatible with flourishing, Stump thinks the sufferer should maintain the heart's desire and trust that a perfectly loving God would seek to fulfil some more subjectively valuable form of it.<sup>23</sup>

In summary, assuming internal integration is necessary for flourishing and that undermined heart's desires compatible with flourishing should not be given up but maintained in some form, Stump concludes that the benefit made available through suffering must satisfy some more subjectively valuable form of the undermined heart's desire. When these two conditions are satisfied, we'll say that the benefit outweighs the good of avoiding the suffering in subjective value. Thus, Stump maintains that the good of avoiding heartbreak must be outweighed by the benefit in both objective and subjective value. Here is a restatement of the second condition for a benefit to defeat suffering that expresses Stump's development of Aquinas's view regarding the defeat of heartbreak:

A benefit (or conjunction of benefits) can defeat the suffering of heartbreak if and only if the benefit (or conjunction of benefits):

- (2\*) can outweigh the good of avoiding the suffering in both objective and subjective value, where
- (2a) a benefit outweighs the good of avoiding the suffering in objective value if and only if it justifies or sanctifies the sufferer (thereby contributing to her ultimate human flourishing), and
- (2b) a benefit outweighs the good of avoiding the suffering in subjective value if and only if it satisfies a form of the undermined heart's desire that is more subjectively valuable than the undermined heart's desire.

The kind of benefit that satisfies 2b is what Stump calls a *refolded* form of the undermined heart's desire.

### **The first problem: the ambiguity of 'refolded'**

The first problem with Stump's view is her ambiguous use of the term 'refolded'. In this section, we disambiguate the two senses of 'refolded' that we find in Stump's discussion.

Stump initially characterizes the *refolding* of a heart's desire as a reshaping without the loss of identity of that desire. She says, 'if a person takes God as her deepest heart's desire, all her other heart's desires... can refold, can reshape without losing their identity, by being woven into that deepest desire'.<sup>24</sup> Stump offers no analysis of refolding but instead provides an analogy to the reconfiguration of a protein to explain what she has in mind. Just as a protein can change from one configuration to another without losing its identity, so a heart's desire can change from one configuration to another without losing its identity. This change involving reconfiguration without the loss of identity she calls 'refolding'. Stump distinguishes two configurations of heart's desires, which we characterize as two modes of presentation of the same desire: (i) the desire for something *x* as desirable in itself, and (ii) the desire for something *x* as desirable in itself *and* as a gift to be received from and given back to God.<sup>25</sup> Stump characterizes the refolded heart's desire as a desire in the second configuration, wherein the heart's desire is

integrated with the deepest heart's desire for God.<sup>26</sup> We call this configuration of a heart's desire the *gift configuration*.

Since the desire for God is the deepest heart's desire, the gift configuration of a heart's desire makes that heart's desire deeper and so more valuable than the original desire without the gift configuration. Given Stump's characterization of refolding as an addition to the original heart's desire of a desire to receive the object of the heart's desire as a gift from God, we classify the change of refolding under this description as a *qualitative* change. For the refolded heart's desire takes the same object as the original heart's desire but with the additional value of that object being desired as a gift from God.

Although Stump does not individuate heart's desires in the book (and says she does not know how to), we think her initial characterization of refolding yields a way to individuate specific heart's desires that is quite intuitive, namely by their object alone without their mode of presentation.<sup>27</sup> Take, for example, a desire to have a child and a desire to have a child as a gift from God. The object of these desires, i.e. having a child, is the same while the mode of presentation is different. Stump is clear that a change in the configuration of a heart's desire, which we have characterized as a change in its mode of presentation, does not result in a different desire but the same desire with a different shape or, as we suggest, a different quality.<sup>28</sup>

Our proposal for individuating specific heart's desires by their object without their mode of presentation is consistent with Stump's discussion in her 'Wandering in darkness: further reflections', where she rejects the idea that heart's desires be individuated by what we may call the *intentional object* of a desire, which is the object of desire plus its mode of presentation.<sup>29</sup> Stump argues, using an illustration, that such a view would require its proponent to deny, when it is implausible to do so, that something received by a person satisfies her original, undermined heart's desire. To illustrate, Stump gives the story from O. Henry's *The Gifts of the Magi* of a couple who each sought to fulfil one of the other's heart's desires at Christmas: the wife had her heart set on a pair of combs for her beautiful hair, and the husband had his heart set on a silver chain for his heirloom pocket watch.<sup>30</sup> In order to buy the silver chain for her husband, the wife cut her beautiful hair, and in order to buy the pair of combs for his wife, the husband sold his heirloom pocket watch. If we individuated desires on the basis of their intentional objects, then, Stump says,

with regard to the O. Henry story, we would have to say that at Christmas the wife did not have the desire of her heart fulfilled, and neither did the husband. Rather, each of them failed to get his heart's desire. They may have received something else good, but they did not receive what had been their original heart's desires.<sup>31</sup>

For their original heart's desires were, respectively, for a pair of hair combs as desirable in itself and for a silver chain as desirable in itself. But what they received were hair combs or a silver chain as expressions of sacrificial love.

Stump maintains, instead, that ‘the whole point of the O. Henry story is that a person can get her heart’s desire in a way that is much deeper and better than she could ever have imagined’. Such is the case, she thinks, for the husband and wife in the story. Our proposal that heart’s desires be individuated by their object without their mode of presentation coheres well with Stump’s interpretation of the O. Henry story. For, given our proposal, the husband’s and wife’s respective original and subsequent desires were the same desire in different configurations. The object of the husband’s desires was a silver chain, first desired as desirable in itself and subsequently desired as an expression of sacrificial love, while the object of the wife’s desires was a pair of hair combs, first desired as desirable in itself and subsequently desired as an expression of sacrificial love.

Another of Stump’s examples that fits her characterization of refolding that we’ve articulated is her interpretation of Stacey O’Brien’s chronicle of her life with Wesley, the owl she deeply loved. Stump recounts that during the period when O’Brien first began caring for the owl, O’Brien describes herself as ‘an ordinary, secular, scientifically inclined young woman, working in a university lab. But her years of caring for the owl changed her’.<sup>32</sup> After nineteen years of gazing into Wesley’s eyes almost daily, O’Brien began to suffer from a debilitating and painful illness. Stump explains:

she considered killing herself and also her owl, so that it would not suffer because she was no longer there to care for it. But she found that she could not do it . . . She explains her rejection of that double death in this way: ‘It’s the Way of the Owl. You commit for life, you finish what you start, you give your unconditional love, and that is enough. I looked into the eyes of the owl, found the way of God there, and decided to live.’ And so what O’Brien began by thinking of as the way of the owl became for her one part of what she came to see as the way of God. Somehow, then, because of her love for this one particular owl, O’Brien came to set her heart on God and union with God; and the two loves, for God and for the owl, came into harmony for her. When they did, her heart’s desire for the owl altered by being woven into an even deeper desire for God and union with God.<sup>33</sup>

As Stump describes it, the alteration of O’Brien’s heart’s desire for her owl consisted in the reconfiguration we characterize as a qualitative change. O’Brien’s heart’s desire for her owl was reconfigured into the gift configuration such that she desired the owl as a gift received from God.<sup>34</sup>

Some of Stump’s other examples which she characterizes as involving a refolded heart’s desire do not fit her characterization of a refolded heart’s desire for at least one of two reasons: (i) the object of the supposedly refolded heart’s desire is *not* identical to the object of the original, undermined heart’s desire, or (ii) the object of the original, undermined heart’s desire already seems to be in the gift configuration, which is the supposedly refolded configuration. Consider the cases of John Milton and Victor Klemperer. On Stump’s interpretation Milton’s undermined desire to serve in the Puritan government refolded into a desire to write poetry expressing the Puritan spirit. Klemperer’s undermined desire to complete a study



of eighteenth-century French literature refolded into a desire to record his experience under the Nazi regime. In both of these cases the object of the heart's desire that is undermined is given up and replaced with a different though related object of desire. This kind of change we call *substantial*. Unlike qualitative change, when a heart's desire undergoes substantial change, the original desire and the resulting desire are different heart's desires since the object of desire is different and, as we have suggested, the object of desire is what individuates heart's desires.<sup>35</sup> Given all of this, Stump's characterization of these examples as involving a refolded heart's desire assumes a meaning of the term 'refolded' other than her initial characterization of a refolded heart's desire as a heart's desire that is reconfigured without the loss of identity.

Further, in at least the case of Milton, it is plausible that the object of the undermined heart's desire was already desired as a gift to be received from God.<sup>36</sup> Regardless of whether this was in fact the case for Milton, it seems possible that there be such cases. But if a heart's desire is already a desire in the gift configuration then it seems there could be no refolding of that desire, given Stump's characterization of refolding as a reconfiguration of a heart's desire *into* the gift configuration. For when a heart's desire in the gift configuration is undermined, it is already in the configuration Stump characterizes as the refolded form of a heart's desire.

The two ways Stump's examples depart from her initial characterization of 'refolded' yield four possible senses of the term 'refolded'. For economy's sake we disambiguate what we take to be the two main senses, based on the first departure (i.e. the loss of identity), and define them in such a way that they are neutral with respect to the second departure (i.e. the undermined heart's desire is already in the gift configuration). In the next section we discuss the problem raised by the second departure and offer a solution.

The two main senses of 'refolded' that we find in Stump's discussion differ with respect to whether the object of the refolded desire is identical to that of the undermined desire. When it is, as her initial characterization assumes, the change of refolding is merely a qualitative change of a heart's desire. When the object of the refolded desire is not identical to the undermined desire, the change of refolding involves (at least) a substantial change of a heart's desire. In order to distinguish in a particular case between a qualitative and a substantial change of a heart's desire we must further specify what the object of a heart's desire consists in.

We suggest that, on Stump's view, the object of all heart's desires is a particular person (or persons) with a certain property or conjunction of properties.<sup>37</sup> That is, every heart's desire is directed at a particular person (or persons) that she have a certain property (or properties).<sup>38</sup> Stump distinguishes two types of heart's desires: desires directed at other persons, which we call *relational desires*, and desires directed at one's own accomplishment of a project, which we call *self-actualizing desires*. A relational desire is directed both at oneself and at another

person that each have the property of being related to the other in some specified way. A self-actualizing desire is a desire directed at oneself that one have the property of accomplishing a specified project.

Assuming that the first sense of 'refolded' results from only a qualitative change consisting in the addition of the gift configuration to the original object of the heart's desire, we suggest that the refolded heart's desire in this sense is such that both the particular person (or persons) and the primary property (or properties) that constitute the object of the desire must be the same as in the undermined heart's desire. In contrast, we suggest that when the person or primary property at which the original desire is directed changes, there is a substantial change such that the original and subsequent desires are two substantially different desires.<sup>39</sup> In the case of a relational desire, the primary property is the specific relationship desired. In the case of a self-actualizing desire, the primary property is the specific project whose fulfilment is desired. There may be innumerable other properties concerning, for example, time, place, or other circumstances, by which one may hope to characterize the satisfaction of her heart's desire. We suggest these non-primary properties need not remain the same for a heart's desire to be a refolded heart's desire in the first sense of 'refolded'.

Consider, for example, a relational heart's desire directed at another person that she have the property of being in a union of love with the desirer, whom we'll call the lover. Both the beloved and the property of being in a union of love with the lover must remain the object of desire if the satisfied desire is to remain substantially identical to the lost heart's desire. Consider a self-actualizing heart's desire directed at oneself that one have the property of fulfilling the role of Parliamentarian, or the task of completing a study of eighteenth-century French literature, to use Stump's examples. The specific mode of self-actualization through fulfilling the role of Parliamentarian or the task of completing a study of eighteenth-century French literature is the property that must remain if the satisfied desire is to remain substantially identical to the lost heart's desire.

Given this clarification, we offer the following definition for the first sense of a refolded heart's desire:

A refolded<sub>1</sub> heart's desire is a heart's desire (i) in the gift configuration (i.e. the object of the desire is desired as a gift to be received from and given back to God), and (ii) is such that the particular person and the primary property that constitute its object are the same as those that constitute the object of an undermined heart's desire.

We have noted that Stump's second sense of 'refolded' involves the substantial change of a heart's desire. In order to clarify the other necessary conditions for a 'refolded' heart's desire in the second sense, we identify three common characteristics in the examples that Stump characterizes as involving a refolded heart's desire but wherein the benefit gained by the sufferer satisfies a substantially different heart's desire from the desire undermined: (1) the satisfied desire and the

undermined desire can be reasonably construed by the sufferer as distinct specifications of a more general desire, (2) at least the satisfied desire is in the gift configuration, and (3) the undermined heart's desire is (very probably) *permanently* undermined due to external circumstances.

To illustrate the first common characteristic, Milton's undermined desire that he serve in the Puritan government and his satisfied desire that he write poetry expressing the Puritan spirit could be reasonably construed by Milton as two different specifications of a more general desire that he promote the Puritan cause.<sup>40</sup> Klemperer's undermined desire that he complete a study of eighteenth-century French literature and his satisfied desire that he record his experience under the Nazi regime could be reasonably construed by Klemperer as two different specifications of a more general desire that he write an influential book. The notion of reasonable construal here is vague, but we think some vagueness is unavoidable (though acceptable) at this point given Stump's view. We offer one necessary condition, based on a claim Stump makes, that a construal of re-specification must satisfy to count as reasonable. Without further clarification, Stump claims that when a person's heart's desires are undermined she ought to trust that God will give her 'the desires of her heart, in one form or another, but recognizable still in their particularity'.<sup>41</sup> Given this, we suggest that a construal of re-specification is reasonable only if the relevant general desire retains some of the particularity of the initial heart's desire. Without the preservation of some particularity, any heart's desire could be construed as a re-specification of any other heart's desire just by ascending to a sufficiently high level of generality. Such ascent would threaten the significance of the refolding relation. Given the specification of the objects of heart's desires that we gave above, we suggest that for relational heart's desires, the relevant general desire must preserve the particularity of the person or relation involved in the undermined heart's desire. For self-actualizing heart's desires, the relevant general desire must preserve the particularity of the goals of the project involved in the undermined heart's desire (e.g. promotion of the Puritan cause in the case of Milton).

In addition to the satisfied desire being an alternative specification of a more general desire, it is also the case, Stump holds, that the refolded desire's fulfilment more deeply satisfies the general desire than the fulfilment of the undermined desire would have.<sup>42</sup> For example, Stump claims that Milton's poetry expressing the Puritan spirit not only enabled him to promote the Puritan cause in a greater way than he would have as a minor official in the Puritan government, but enabled him to flourish and flourish abundantly.<sup>43</sup>

The second common characteristic in Stump's examples of refolding is, again, that at least the satisfied desire is in the gift configuration. Stump identifies the poetry that Milton wrote in the midst of his impoverished and imperilled state due to the collapse of the Puritan political regime as Milton's greatest poetry, which both promoted the Puritan cause and reflects Milton's own growth closer to

God.<sup>44</sup> Stump identifies in Klemperer's diary, written during the time that he was denied access to books and forced by the Nazis to do servile labour, the loosening of the grip of atheism on Klemperer, a love of the good that enabled him to resist the evil that oppressed him, and growth towards God.<sup>45</sup> Recall that on Stump's view, the gift configuration of a heart's desire extends not only to cases wherein the sufferer has a conscious desire for God and to receive the object of a heart's desire as a gift from God (like Milton) but also to cases where the sufferer may have these desires only implicitly (like Klemperer).

Though Stump doesn't state this explicitly, the third common characteristic in her examples is that the undermined heart's desire is (very likely) *permanently* undermined due to external circumstances. In Milton's case, the collapse of the Puritan political regime made it very likely that he would never become a Parliamentarian in service of the Puritan cause. Similarly, Klemperer's virtual enslavement by the Nazis made it very likely that he would never complete a study of eighteenth-century French literature.

Given these three common characteristics and Stump's view, we offer the following definition for the second sense of a refolded heart's desire:

A refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire is a heart's desire (i) in the gift configuration, (ii) is such that it and the (very likely) permanently undermined heart's desire can be reasonably construed by the sufferer as distinct specifications of a more general desire, and (iii) whose fulfilment more deeply satisfies the general desire than would have the fulfilment of the undermined desire.

Our disambiguation of the two senses of a 'refolded' heart's desire focused on distinguishing whether the object of the refolded desire is identical to that of the undermined desire. Although in cases of refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desires it is not the case that the object of the refolded desire is identical to that of the undermined desire, there is still a sense, though different from that of the refolded<sub>1</sub> desire, in which the relevant refolding is a reconfiguration without the loss of identity. For if we think of the desire that is being refolded as the more general desire, of which the original and refolded<sub>2</sub> desires are specifications, then it is true that the more general desire is reconfigured without the loss of identity. Here 'reconfigured' means re-specified from one specification of the general desire to another specification the fulfilment of which constitutes a deeper fulfilment of the more general desire. As we explain in the penultimate section, it may or may not be the case that in addition to this re-specification, there is also the addition or deepening of the gift configuration. In contrast, in refolded<sub>1</sub> cases there need not be a more general desire of which the original and refolded<sub>1</sub> desires are specifications, and, according to Stump's initial characterization of 'refolding', the desire that is refolded or 'reconfigured' is the original, specific desire.<sup>46</sup> Here 'reconfigured' means the original desire gains the gift configuration that was lacking in the original desire. Since refolded<sub>1</sub> and refolded<sub>2</sub> desires are both in the gift configuration, cases involving either desire

are united by what Stump calls a single strategy where ‘suffering stemming from the loss of heart’s desires is redeemed by the satisfaction of heart’s desires only when those desires have been reconfigured into an expression of the deepest heart’s desire, which is for God’.<sup>47</sup> For even though the refolded<sub>1</sub> desire need not be an expression of a more general desire, because it is in the gift configuration, it is still an expression of the deepest heart’s desire for God.

### **Refolding in the hardest cases for Stump’s view**

We now apply the two senses of refolded we’ve just defined to Stump’s response to the hardest cases for her view in order to strengthen her response. Stump identifies as the hardest cases for her view those in which a person’s love is permanently rejected by another person, such that no form of union in love, not even the love of friendship, is possible. Stump’s response to the hardest cases is that, in order to be fulfilled, the desire for the reciprocal union of love with a person who rejects one’s love has to refold from a desire for union with the beloved to a desire for giving compassion to the beloved.

Given our two senses of refolded, we identify the refolded heart’s desire in Stump’s response to the hardest cases as a refolded<sub>2</sub> heart’s desire. Since Stump assumes that all refolded heart’s desires are desires in the gift configuration, we can assume that the refolded heart’s desire to give compassion to the beloved is in the gift configuration. Since the suffering in the hardest cases results from the beloved’s permanent rejection of the lover’s love, it is plausible that the undermined heart’s desire for union is (very likely) permanently undermined. Since the primary property of the object of the refolded heart’s desire, namely the property of giving compassion to the beloved, is different from the primary property of the object of the undermined heart’s desire (i.e. the property of being in a reciprocal union of love with the beloved), the refolded heart’s desire cannot be a refolded<sub>1</sub> heart’s desire. We argue that the desire for union with the beloved and the desire to give compassion to the beloved can be reasonably construed by the sufferer as distinct specifications of a more general desire to love the beloved.

The plausibility that giving compassion is a re-specification of union depends on what union and compassion are thought to consist in. Stump doesn’t explain what she takes compassion to consist in. We offer a plausible way to understand compassion that coheres with Stump’s view and according to which it is plausible that giving compassion is a re-specification of loving union. Following Aquinas, Stump maintains that all forms of love involve two desires, which are both necessary for genuine love for another person: (i) a desire for the good of the beloved and (ii) a desire for union with the beloved. Stump specifies that the undermined desire for union with the beloved in the hardest cases is the desire for real union with the beloved.<sup>48</sup> Though Stump does not define the term in this context, it is plausible, given her discussion of this desire, that she assumes something

similar to Aquinas's notion of real union. Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of union characteristic of love: *affective* and *real*.<sup>49</sup> Affective union is the union of the lover and the beloved in intellect and in will. Alexander Pruss explains that in affective union the lover strives to 'enter' the intellect of the beloved in order to understand the beloved from the beloved's point of view. Such understanding leads to the union of will wherein the lover shares in the beloved's joys and sorrows and wills her good. Real union is an additional union that lovers achieve through shared activity. The appropriate form of shared activity depends upon the form of love, e.g. the love of friends, spouses, etc. Since such shared activity involves cooperative interaction between the lovers, real union, unlike affective union, requires reciprocity.<sup>50</sup> Whereas the desire for union with the beloved is a desire for real union with the beloved, the desire to give compassion to the beloved can only be a desire for affective union with the beloved. For in so far as the lover has been rejected by the beloved, the kind of reciprocal cooperation characteristic of real union is not a practical possibility. It is plausible that giving compassion to the beloved is a form of affective union with the beloved, since compassion involves a kind of empathetic understanding of another person's suffering and will for her good but does not require real union with her. Assuming that giving compassion to the beloved is a form of affective union with the beloved, which is a kind of union characteristic of love, the desire for real union with the beloved and the desire to give compassion to the beloved who refuses one's love can be reasonably construed by the lover as distinct specifications of the general desire to love the beloved.

Recall Stump's claim that a benefit outweighs the suffering due to the undermining of a heart's desire in subjective value if and only if it satisfies a refolded form of the undermined heart's desire. Given this claim, Stump is committed to the view that the satisfied desire for giving compassion to the beloved outweighs in subjective value the good of avoiding the suffering due to the undermining of the desire for union with the beloved. We now motivate the plausibility of this view. Given Stump's other views, in cases in which the undermined heart's desire is not already in the gift configuration, what makes the benefit satisfying a refolded heart's desire outweigh the good of avoiding suffering in subjective value is that the object of the refolded heart's desire has the additional subjective value of being desired as a gift from God. This is plausible even in cases where the object of a refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire is on its own of less subjective value than the object of the undermined heart's desire. For given Stump's assumption that the deepest heart's desire is the desire for God, it is plausible that the subjective value added to the object of the refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire by being in the gift configuration is sufficient to compensate for any diminishment in subjective value from the object of the undermined heart's desire taken on its own to the object of the refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire taken on its own. In the hardest cases, it is plausible that union with the beloved is on its own of more subjective value to

the lover than is giving compassion to the beloved on its own. For what the lover really wanted was union with the beloved; compassion for the beloved is a kind of consolation prize. But if the suffering due to the undermining of the desire for union with the beloved led to the lover desiring to give compassion to the beloved *as a gift to be received from God* and if the lover's desire for union with the beloved was not desired as a gift to be received from God, then it is plausible that the latter would be of greater subjective value to the lover. In other words, assuming with Stump that God is the object of every person's deepest heart's desire, it is plausible that the lover would regard giving compassion to the beloved with God, so to speak, as more valuable than being reciprocally united to the beloved without God.

So far so good, but what about when the undermined desire for union with the beloved was already in the gift configuration? In that case it seems implausible that the sufferer would regard giving compassion to the beloved (with God) as more valuable than being reciprocally united to the beloved (with God). We address this kind of case in the next section. Let us now explain the significance of what we've done in this section. Our identification and defence of the refolded heart's desire in Stump's response to the hardest cases as a refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire that outweighs in subjective value the good of avoiding the relevant suffering strengthens Stump's response by both defending it from hasty dismissal and increasing its plausibility. For given the first sense of 'refolded' it is implausible that the refolded heart's desire to give compassion to the beloved is a refolded form of the undermined heart's desire for the (reciprocal) union of love with the beloved. So, without the distinction of the two senses, one might, assuming the first sense of 'refolded' to be the only sense, dismiss Stump's response as a failure to meet her own criteria for the defeat of suffering in so far as it is implausible that the benefit she proposes to defeat the suffering in this case fails to be a refolded form of the undermined heart's desire. Further, by offering a plausible explanation of the two desires involved in her response to the hardest cases and an account of how the latter could outweigh the former in subjective value, we've increased the plausibility that the desire to give compassion is a refolded<sub>2</sub> form of the undermined heart's desire for union with the beloved and so its satisfaction could, on Stump's view, defeat the suffering due to the undermining of the initial heart's desire.

### **The second problem: the insufficiency of the satisfaction of some refolded heart's desires**

It is possible on Stump's view, and plausible in the case of Milton as we noted above, that some undermined heart's desires are already in the gift configuration.<sup>51</sup> But this raises a problem. While the gift configuration of the satisfied desire is sufficient to make the satisfied desire outweigh the good of avoiding



the suffering in cases involving an undermined heart's desire that is not already in the gift configuration, it is not necessarily sufficient in cases involving an undermined heart's desire that is already in the gift configuration. For if the undermined heart's desire is already in the gift configuration, then it is not the case that a refolded<sub>1</sub> or refolded<sub>2</sub> desire has any additional subjective value just in virtue of being in the gift configuration. Further, it is possible and indeed sometimes plausible that the object of the refolded<sub>2</sub> desire is itself of less subjective value than the object of the undermined desire. For the object of the undermined desire is what the subject initially set her heart on, while the object of the refolded<sub>2</sub> desire is in many cases desired by the subject only after losing hope of gaining the object of the undermined desire. Returning to the hardest cases for Stump's view, if we assume that both desires are in the gift configuration, such that the relevant relation with the beloved is desired as a gift to be received from God, then it is implausible without further information that the satisfaction of the refolded<sub>2</sub> desire for compassion is of greater subjective value than the good of avoiding the suffering due to the thwarting of the undermined desire for union.

Our solution to this problem in part builds on the fact that even when the undermined heart's desire is already in the gift configuration it is possible that there be a kind of alteration like reconfiguration from the undermined heart's desire in the gift configuration to a refolded<sub>1</sub> or refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire. Given this, and to avoid multiplying senses of 'refolded' beyond necessity, the definitions we've given for the two senses of 'refolded' are neutral with respect to whether the undermined heart's desire is already in the gift configuration. The kind of alteration we have in mind is the deepening of the gift configuration of the undermined heart's desire, which we will explain below. We argue that in cases in which the undermined heart's desire is already in the gift configuration what is required for a benefit to outweigh the good of avoiding suffering in subjective value is that (i) the refolded desire be in a *deeper* gift configuration than the undermined heart's desire or, (ii) in cases involving a refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire, the object of that refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire itself be of greater subjective value than the object of the undermined heart's desire.

Regarding (ii), just as it is sometimes plausible that the object of the refolded<sub>2</sub> desire is itself of less subjective value than the object of the undermined desire, so it is sometimes plausible that the object of the refolded<sub>2</sub> desire is itself of greater subjective value than the object of the undermined desire. It is plausible that such is the case for Mary of Bethany, whose heart's desire for Lazarus to be well is undermined when Jesus fails to prevent his death but is later satisfied when Jesus restores his life. 'At the end of the story of Mary of Bethany', Stump explains, 'the great love Jesus has for her is made powerfully evident to her, and Lazarus is restored to her in a more meaningful way than she could have imagined beforehand, through Jesus' miracle of the resurrection of Lazarus.'<sup>52</sup> Here Stump suggests that for Mary to receive Lazarus from Jesus through Jesus' miracle that



restores Lazarus' life is of greater subjective value than it would have been for Mary to receive Lazarus from Jesus through Jesus' healing Lazarus and preventing his death. Assuming this, it is plausible that Mary's receiving Lazarus from Jesus through that miracle more deeply satisfied Mary's general desire that Lazarus be well than would have the fulfilment of her undermined desire that Jesus prevent Lazarus' death.

We suggest that for a refolded desire to be in a deeper gift configuration is for its object to be more deeply desired by the subject as a gift from God than was the object of the undermined desire. This could result from the subject gaining a deeper desire for the object as such (when that object was already desired as a gift from God) or a deeper desire to receive the object from God or both. It is plausible on Stump's Thomistic view that each could result from the sufferer embracing the good of sanctification made available by her suffering. For on this view, sanctification involves becoming more internally integrated around what is good, where God is the highest good.<sup>53</sup> Assuming that the sufferer embraces this sanctification and that the object of her heart's desires is a genuine good, it is plausible that such sanctification would make her more integrated in her desire for that good that is the object of her heart's desire. It is also plausible that the more integrated the person is in her desire for this good, the more the desire will be integrated with her deepest desire for God and so the more she will desire to receive this good from God.<sup>54</sup>

Returning to the hardest cases, if we assume that through sanctification the sufferer becomes more integrated in her desire to give compassion to the beloved or the desire to give compassion to the beloved is more deeply integrated with the sufferer's desire for God than was the sufferer's undermined desire for union with the beloved, it is plausible that a consequence of this greater or deeper integration is that the sufferer has a greater love for the beloved than the sufferer would have had had she not suffered the beloved's refusal of her love. For, greater integration around a good enables greater love of that good and greater love of God enables greater love of others. On Stump's scale of subjective value, an unreciprocated love for the beloved that is greater or more deeply integrated with the desire for God is more worth having than a reciprocated love for the beloved that is lesser or less deeply integrated with the desire for God. Given this, it is plausible that the satisfied desire to give compassion to the beloved in the deeper gift configuration would outweigh in subjective value the good of avoiding the undermining of the desire for real union with the beloved. It is also plausible that the fulfilment of the lover's desire to give compassion to the beloved would, given its greater or deeper integration, more deeply satisfy the lover's general desire to love the beloved than would the fulfilment of the desire for real union with the beloved.

In this section we have argued that, since the gift configuration of the satisfied desire is not necessarily sufficient to make the satisfied desire outweigh the

good of avoiding the suffering in cases in which the undermined heart's desire is already in the gift configuration, what is required is that the refolded desire be in a *deeper* gift configuration than the undermined heart's desire or, in cases involving a refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire, the object of that refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire itself be of greater subjective value than the object of the undermined heart's desire.

### **The third problem: the failure of Stump's response to an objection**

The final problem with Stump's view that we address is that the object of the supposedly refolded heart's desire that she proposes in response to an objection to her view fails to preserve the particularity of the undermined heart's desire, which she claims is necessary for the refolding of a heart's desire. Given this, her response fails to meet the condition for the defeat of heartbreak that a benefit of heartbreak satisfy a refolded form of the undermined heart's desire. Recall that we clarified Stump's particularity requirement by arguing above that in cases of refolding (involving a refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire), the re-specification of a heart's desire must somehow preserve the particularity of the person or relation in a relational heart's desire and the particularity of the goals of the project in a self-actualizing heart's desire. We now argue that Stump fails to preserve such particularity in her response to an objection. We then offer what we take to be the best solution for Stump and, finally, we explain what it demands of God.

The relevant objection to Stump's view is the objection that external circumstances may 'prevent [a person] from ever succeeding at a project on which he had set his heart'.<sup>55</sup> Call this *the thwarted project objection*. In response, Stump says that in such circumstances, 'a heart's desire for first-personal self-actualization in a certain way, through a certain project, can transform into a desire for second-personal closeness, for receiving one's life as a gift from God and giving it again as gift to God'.<sup>56</sup> She continues: 'anything one can do in one's circumstances, however constrained they are, can be a way of giving everything back as gift and flourishing in doing so'.<sup>57</sup> It is reasonable to interpret Stump's response as the claim that the undermining of a heart's desire for some particular project could be defeated by being a means to the satisfaction of a refolded heart's desire to receive one's life as a gift from God and give it back to God through whatever (good) action one can perform in one's circumstances. But Stump says nothing here about her requirement for refolding that the satisfied heart's desire retain something of the particularity of the undermined heart's desire.<sup>58</sup> Given our clarification of that requirement above, in this case the sufferer's particular goals for the project must be part of the satisfaction of her refolded heart's desire. But giving one's life back to God through whatever action one can perform in one's circumstances need not involve the goals of the project that was the object of the

undermined heart's desire. Without those goals, Stump's response fails to meet the particularity requirement that she claims is necessary for refolding. Given this, what she proposes is not a refolded form of the undermined heart's desire and so its satisfaction does not defeat the suffering.

Given her view, the best solution for Stump is, we suggest, that the benefit in this case must involve one's receiving of and offering back to God one's goals for fulfilling the project. To give one's goals back to God includes trusting that God will bring about those goals in some way.<sup>59</sup> For example, if the goal is the promotion of some cause or achievement of some good, then the person will trust God to bring about that goal in some other way without the sufferer's contribution (since the objection assumes external circumstances make it impossible for the sufferer to contribute).<sup>60</sup> Since the desire includes the trust that God will bring the goals about, the desire is only satisfied if God brings them about. So, God must bring about those goals in some way in order for the more subjectively valuable refolded form of the heart's desire to be satisfied. Some might think this demands too much of God but Stump has given reason to think this is just what we should expect of God. For, God's perfect love is such that He would want to satisfy heart's desires and God's omniscience and omnipotence are such that He *can* satisfy them.

In conclusion, we have explained Stump's development of Aquinas's theodicy to account for the suffering of heartbreak, identified three problems with her view, and offered some friendly solutions. In response to the problem of ambiguity in her use of the term 'refolded' we disambiguated two meanings of 'refolded' based on whether the change of the specific heart's desire is merely a qualitative change or involves a substantial change. We applied our disambiguation to Stump's response to the hardest cases for her view in order to defend and strengthen her response that the lover's desire to give compassion to her beloved who refuses her love is a refolded<sub>2</sub> form of the undermined heart's desire for union with the beloved. In response to the problem that the gift configuration of a refolded heart's desire is not necessarily sufficient to make the satisfied desire outweigh the good of avoiding the suffering in cases involving an undermined heart's desire that is already in the gift configuration, we argued that what is required is that the refolded desire be in a *deeper* gift configuration than the undermined heart's desire or, in cases involving a refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire, the object of that refolded<sub>2</sub> heart's desire itself be of greater subjective value than the object of the undermined heart's desire. In response to the problem that Stump's response to the thwarted project objection fails to preserve the particular goals of the project that was the object of the undermined heart's desire, we suggested that to satisfy a refolded form of the undermined heart's desire the benefit must involve one's receiving of and offering back to God one's goals for fulfilling the project. Since such giving of one's goals to God includes trusting that God will bring about those goals, God must bring about those goals in some way in order for the more

subjectively valuable refolded form of the heart's desire to be satisfied, and so for the heartbreak to be defeated.<sup>61</sup>

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## Notes

1. Whereas a theodicy proposes God's actual reason (or reasons) for allowing evil, a defence proposes a plausible reason (or reasons) God may have for allowing evil.
2. Stump (2010), 5–10.
3. *Ibid.*, 438.
4. However, as we discuss below, it is essential to each person's particular flourishing that she have subjective cares compatible with her flourishing.
5. We discuss this concept in more detail below. The referent of this term is ambiguous between the desires themselves and the object of the desires. In this article, we include the word 'object' when the object is the referent.
6. *Ibid.*, 7.
7. *Ibid.*, 431. Later she says, 'The particular focus of a particular heart's desire on something accidental to flourishing, even flourishing in union with God, is natural to human beings and so also essential to their flourishing' (*ibid.*, 443).
8. *Ibid.*, 8.
9. Stump quotes Aquinas's *Commentary on Romans*, 8.6:
 

whatever happens with regard to the noblest parts is ordered only to the good of those parts themselves, because care is taken of them for their own sake, and for their sake care is taken of other things . . . But among the best of all the parts of the world are God's saints . . . He takes care of them in such a way that he doesn't allow any evil for them which he doesn't turn into their good. (Stump (2010), 384)
10. Stump (2010), 386.
11. *Ibid.*, 386–388.
12. Stump accepts Aquinas's solution to the paradox in which the undermining of flourishing is a means to the good of flourishing by relativizing flourishing to the two portions of a human life.
13. *Ibid.*, 392–402.
14. Stump clarifies that the force of the 'ought' here 'indicates a normativity about the world and not a duty on the part of the person' (*ibid.*, 9–10; see also 630 n. 53). In other words, it is what would be the case in an optimal world.
15. One can become conscious of the innate desire for God as that in which one's ultimate good consists. This conscious desire is distinct from the conscious desire for God as a person with whom one ought to be united in a relation of mutual love. Whereas the former is often referred to as a 'natural desire for God', the latter is often referred to as a 'supernatural desire for God' and is typically thought to be the result of and to require the subject's cooperation with God's grace. This distinction is not uncontroversial. See Feingold (2010) for a thorough overview of this debate.
16. We explain this further below when we discuss the benefit that defeats suffering.
17. Stump (2010), 436–442. Stump maintains that this does not reduce the subjective value to the objective, for the subjective value of the deepest heart's desire is still derivative from having set one's heart

- on God and loving union with God, and not merely from God's objective value as the highest good (*ibid.*, 441).
18. *Ibid.*, 125.
  19. *Ibid.*, 433.
  20. It is important to note that the problem here is not that the centre of a person's web of desire has been destroyed by heartbreak. For we are to assume that the sufferer has embraced the benefit that contributes to her ultimate flourishing such that God is her deepest heart's desire and she is in a relationship of love with God. Regarding such a heartbroken person, Stump says, 'The suffering stemming from the loss of what he desires as gift in relation of love with God is still suffering, but it does not destroy either the center of the web of desire for him or his hope to have the other desires of his heart' (*ibid.*, 446).
  21. Stump writes: 'The stern-minded attitude is, at best, unwilling to accord any value to the desires of the heart and, at worst, eager to extirpate the desires themselves' (*ibid.*, 423).
  22. Stump devotes a chapter to the story of each of Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary of Bethany in the third part of Stump (2010). She also makes reference to these stories in the course of explaining and defending her view in the final part of her book.
  23. As will be clear later when we discuss what makes a form of a heart's desire more subjectively valuable than another, it is the object of desire that must be more subjectively valuable rather than simply the desire itself.
  24. *Ibid.*, 445.
  25. Stump says, 'When the deepest heart's desire is for God, then other desires of the heart become desired as gifts in the second-personal connection to God' (*ibid.*, 449).
  26. Stump (*ibid.*, 449) clarifies that the gift configuration of a heart's desire extends not only to cases wherein the sufferer has a conscious desire for God and to receive the object of a heart's desire as a gift from God but also to cases where the sufferer may have these desires only implicitly. On Stump's Thomistic view, the strong connection between God and goodness entails that a person can know, love, and desire God in virtue of her knowledge, love of, and desire for what is good without accepting any theological truths about God. Stump explains: 'to know *that* one's life, even in its suffering, is a gift and to know *that* it is a gift of love is already to know (with the Franciscan knowledge of persons) the giver, even if in an unacknowledged way and to a very limited extent' (*ibid.*, 471). Stump distinguishes what she calls 'Franciscan knowledge' from 'Dominican knowledge'. Dominican knowledge is knowledge that is reducible to the knowledge of propositions, whereas Franciscan knowledge is knowledge that is *not* reducible to the knowledge of propositions, such as the knowledge of persons. Her discussion of this distinction is found on pp. 45–60.
  27. Stump says: 'I have no idea how to individuate heart's desires; but, intuitively, it seems clear that it is possible for a heart's desire even for a project to be radically reconfigured and still remain the heart's desire it was' (*ibid.*, 445). It seems plausible that the reason Stump does not individuate heart's desires is because she assumes two senses of 'refolding' according to which, as we shall explain later, there are two senses in which two heart's desires may be the same desire despite having some differences. However, we suggest that individuating particular heart's desires by their objects without their modes of presentation is compatible with both of Stump's senses of 'refolding' and indeed illuminates the distinction between the two.
  28. Again, she says, 'if a person takes God as her deepest heart's desire, all her other heart's desires . . . can refold, can reshape without losing their identity, by being woven into that deepest desire' (*ibid.*).
  29. Stump (2012). Here Stump follows her interlocutor in using the term 'object' to refer to what we have called the intentional object. We thank Eleonore Stump and an anonymous reviewer for directing us to this resource.
  30. *Ibid.*, 202–203. As will become clear, strictly speaking, hair combs and a silver chain aren't proper objects of heart's desires on Stump's view, but that is irrelevant to the point Stump is making here.
  31. *Ibid.*, 203.
  32. Stump (2010), 442.
  33. *Ibid.*
  34. While Stump believes that humans can set their hearts on any object, they ought to set their deepest heart's desires only on persons. So, O'Brien's desire for her owl should not be one of her deepest heart's desires (*ibid.*, 439).

35. Given the relation between the two desires in Stump's examples, we will further specify this kind of change as 're-specification'. Later we defend the claim that these desires are substantially different.
36. Milton's undermined desire to be a Parliamentarian was plausibly in the gift configuration in so far as he desired the position in order to serve God by promoting the Puritan cause.
37. While Stump's view assumes that the relevant properties that characterize the objects of heart's desires are non-trivial, her view does not yield a principled way of distinguishing which desirable properties are sufficient to constitute the object of heart's desires from those that qualitatively change them.
38. While all heart's desires are directed at a particular object that it have a certain property, a person may not be conscious of what she has set her heart on, due to lack of self-understanding. Furthermore, a person may not recognize when her heart's desire is undermined or fulfilled, owing to the possible opacity of such undermining and fulfilment. See Stump (2010), 11–13.
39. We are grateful to Jonathan Kvanvig for suggestions regarding individuating heart's desires.
40. Indeed Stump's discussion of Milton's case assumes Milton's desires are related by a desire to promote the Puritan cause (*ibid.*, 468–469). She says that Milton had a heart's desire to promote the Puritan cause and that 'the particular way in which that heart's desire took form in him' was in a desire to serve in the Puritan government (*ibid.*, 468).
41. *Ibid.*, 450.
42. This is the apparent point of the O. Henry story that Stump uses in Stump (2012).
43. In the case of Milton, Stump thinks that the original, undermined desire was actually contrary to Milton's flourishing since she thinks writing poetry was essential to Milton's flourishing and serving in Parliament was incompatible with Milton's writing poetry.
44. Stump (2010), 468–469.
45. *Ibid.*, 472.
46. So, Stump's (2012, 202) claim that 'the form of any particular desire can be reshaped by the deeper desires of which it is an expression without losing its character as the desire it was' applies to refolded<sub>2</sub> cases but need not (and seems not to) apply to refolded<sub>1</sub> cases.
47. *Ibid.*, 203.
48. Stump (2010), 475.
49. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I–II, q. 28, a. 1.
50. Pruss (2013), 31–33. Pruss uses the term 'formal union' instead of the more literal translation 'affective union', which we use. Stump's (2010) claim that the union of love appropriate to friendship requires personal presence and mutual closeness coheres with the view that real union requires mutuality. She explains and defends her claim on pp. 110–128.
51. Stump reveals this assumption in a remark concerning a person for whom God is the object of his deepest heart's desire. She says: 'The suffering stemming from the loss of what he desires as gift in relation of love with God is still suffering, but it does not destroy either the center of the web of desire for him or his hope to have the other desires of his heart' (*ibid.*, 446).
52. *Ibid.*, 434.
53. Stump (*ibid.*, 124–150) offers an insightful analysis of psychological integration and disintegration and its effects on personal relationships.
54. Since it is very plausible in some cases that a person will not know the specific object a refolded<sub>2</sub> desire will take until the desire is satisfied, perhaps a more general desire of which the undermined desire was a specification is deepened. In addition, or instead, even when a heart's desire is construed as (very probably) permanently undermined, that heart's desire still may be more deeply integrated with the sufferer's desire for God. For one's recognition that a desire will probably go unsatisfied does not necessarily eliminate the desire.
55. *Ibid.*, 471.
56. *Ibid.*, 473.
57. *Ibid.*, 472.
58. Stump says: 'To harmonize the heart's desires with flourishing is not to stamp out the heart's desires. The subjective character, the particularity, of the heart's desires, is preserved' (*ibid.*, 448). And later, 'What defeats the loss of the desires of a heart for a person is his gaining of the desires of his heart in another mode' (*ibid.*, 449).

59. Perhaps, in addition, when a person is prevented from directly contributing to the project on which she set her heart, she can offer her suffering in union with Christ's with the particular intention that that suffering be used for the accomplishment of the project. This is possible even if what prevents the person from fulfilling the project is her death, assuming she goes to purgatory or heaven and those in purgatory or heaven can pray.
60. Perhaps if the goal of a project is to exercise one's talents, then the person will trust God to provide the opportunity to exercise those talents in some way, whether in this life or the next.
61. We are grateful to Trent Dougherty, Jonathan Kvanvig, Alexander Pruss, Eleonore Stump, and participants of the Baylor Philosophy Department Graduate Student Colloquium for suggestions or conversations helpful to the development of this article.