

both sides of the border. Han uses the terms “*chao khao*” or “hill tribes” without recognizing that these are pejorative terms in Thailand for upland groups, whom he describes as roaming in the hills practising slash and burn agriculture (p. 86), a disparaging lowland stereotype that doesn’t reflect reality. Han mentions the Royal Projects and highland development projects as positive efforts, ignoring that these have been controversial attempts at state and nation building.

Among the book’s many accomplishments, chapter three provides a history of state formation in upland Southeast Asia, including colonial history, necessary for understanding the entrenched stereotypes of ethnic minorities and the misbegotten efforts to include them in nations. In Burma, this history explains why ethnic minorities in the north and northeast continue to resist inclusion in Myanmar to this day. Chapter four details how the KMT army presence “has had tremendous implications for the processes of state building along the borders of these three countries” (p. 56), including border solidification in China, borderland fragmentation in Burma, and the formation of an irregular armed group in northern Thailand.

Chapter five covers the manoeuvring of communist groups in borderlands, including excessive PLA violence in Yunnan in the 1950s; the development of a Communist Party in Burma, with Chinese support until the late 1970s; and the formation of the Communist Party of Thailand that was violently suppressed in 1976. Han argues that, “[h]aving escaped colonial domination, Thailand’s political and social structures had more continuity and durability compared with other formerly colonized countries in Southeast Asia” (p. 86). However, Siam was all but colonized by the British, who established the Royal Forestry Department to allow Britain to govern northern Thailand and extract its teak forests. British officials mapped Siam and rebuffed French forces on Siam’s eastern border. As Thongchai Winichakul argues in *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation* (University of Hawai’i Press, 1994), many elites in Bangkok welcomed British control and protection.

Chapter six on transboundary economic flows covers the uneven history in trade, including recent rapacious timber harvesting in northern Myanmar by China and Thailand, extractions that have wrought ecological and social devastation. The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) enabled much of this resource extraction. The Conclusion describes new regional organizations to control resource extraction and trade along the GMS-sponsored Asian Highway and the Mekong River. Region-making, now driven by China, has joined state building as an important dynamic to keep an eye on.

*Asymmetrical Neighbors* brings together detailed histories recounted nowhere else. Viewed as a historical study of the borderlands linking China, Myanmar and Thailand, the book is a major contribution.

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*BRI and International Cooperation in Industrial Capacity: Industrial Layout Study*

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This is an important book, but not because it is readable, timely or prescient. Its importance is as a policy snapshot of senior policymakers in Beijing planning the

geo-economic architecture of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). International Capacity Cooperation (ICC) was China's international trade, industry and finance geo-policy blueprint. The policy had huge implications for the global economy as well as for the regional economies of Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East and East Africa. This book is a translation of the 2017 publication by China Machine Press ("*Yi dai yi lu*" *yu guoji channeng hezuo: guobie hezuo zhinan*), now marketed in English as *The Countries' Cooperation Guide of the Belt and Road Initiative and International Capacity Cooperation*. ICC was launched in 2014 as the practical economic architecture underpinning Xi Jinping's BRI. It had built on Jiang-era "Going out" and "Bringing in," which together had become colloquially known in English as "Going global." In 2020 though, the ICC foreign geo-industrial policy has at least temporarily been wound down and folded back in to "Going global."

The study is important not for the attempts at global command economy planning, but for who has written it. The book is an exercise in collective authorship by senior National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) officials, and it is best read as a codification of policy which had been incubated, developed and deployed to Belt and Road economies. Xu Shaoshi was director of the NDRC at the time of the book's Chinese release. Co-editors of the book are He Lifeng who has been NDRC director since 2017, Ning Jizhe, National Bureau of Statistics director and Wang Xiaotao, China International Development Cooperation Agency director. The younger ranked authors of the book – Guo Jianmin, Zheng Qi, Liu Shen and Chen Chao – will also maintain policy relevance into the 20th Party Congress and beyond. This is highest-level policy making, and the coordination between "aid," trade and industry here is indicative of coordinated state industrial policy. This higher-level policy-making is made clear when we see a whole chapter on the Middle East "1+2+3 Cooperation Pattern," which had previously been released by Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the "Middle East White Paper." This book makes clear who is really making China's foreign, trade, industrial and finance policy. What is missing from the study though is any genuine policy prescription, analysis or integration of the policy banks' role in this global geo-policy.

A key piece of spatial planning rhetoric that the English reader should internalize is the macro-layout of BRI through ICC as a "main axis" through Eurasia, a "West wing" comprised of the Middle East and extending into East Africa, and an "East wing" of Latin America. This is the hierarchy of priorities for Belt and Road through ICC: Central Asia, Russia and Eastern Europe, followed by Middle East and East Africa, with an auxiliary of Latin America. Part five is probably of most use to contemporary researchers, focusing on high-technology transfers in high-speed rail, nuclear power, and equipment. This section would have reached a much larger audience as a standalone booklet. Section 39 on forming overseas industrial clusters is also useful, demonstrating the structure behind the deployment of overseas Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to mimic the domestic SEZs which had been the backbone of China's capital import model. These overseas SEZs are being deployed as the institutional architecture for a distributed overseas production base model. The acute focus of this policy is explored in China–France third-party market cooperation, which leveraged China's mid-tier and France's high-tier technology into a techno-industrial policy of joint development and capacity cooperation in Belt and Road economies for export to the global economy.

Ultimately this book, like the policy, is a shadow of what could have been. The goals expressed here were to develop a China-led global industrial value chain. Unfortunately for the NDRC, China has only the industry, and neither the value nor the global access to create an effective chain. This does not come across as

cutting-edge 21st-century techno-industrial policy, but more like a continuation of the GOELRO to GOSPLAN to NDRC institutional development and feels like 1920s policy being repackaged for 2020. What was prescribed here will not eventuate, but neither will it be completely abandoned. This is a codification of policy wreckage, and it joins the Soviet industrial institutions which already litter the Eurasian landscape.

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*China in Ethiopia: The Long-Term Perspective*

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In *China in Ethiopia*, Aaron Tesfaye lays out the historical and contemporary relations between China and Ethiopia and discusses the long-term interests and implications of their evolving relationships on the economic, political and strategic fronts. The book opens up with a critique of China–Africa studies for primarily putting China in the driver’s seat, thus overlooking the agency of African actors. The diverse forms of political and economic arrangements among African countries and the uneven ability of African state actors to negotiate with their Chinese counterparts, the author argues, necessitate scholarly research into bilateral relations between China and specific African countries. The focus on China–Ethiopia relations is then justified by the latter’s geopolitical and geostrategic importance.

Chapter one traces the history of China–Ethiopia relations. It details Ethiopian leaders’ shifting perspectives towards China as being shaped by their strategic consideration of the domestic, regional and international politics at the specific time period. For example, Emperor Haile Selassie, in alliance with the US, was cautious of developing close relations with the socialist government of China. Later, during the Derg’s rule (1974–90), Chinese support of the “oppositional sides” – such as the Eritrean Liberation Front, the Western Somali Liberation Front in the Ogaden region, as well as the national government of Sudan – in order to combat the influences of the Soviet Union and the US in the Horn of Africa, further strained its relationships with Ethiopian leaders.

Chapter two continues to examine contemporary China–Ethiopia relations under the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia since 1991. The government, led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and faced with domestic and international challenges to the one-party system, heavily invested in economic development to legitimize its rule. Partnership with China, according to the author, was a strategic choice of the Ethiopian leaders to obtain much-needed foreign capital and technological know-how to push forward modernization. Chapter three then specifically focuses on the economic dimension of the bilateral relation. The author reviews Chinese investment in megaprojects such as railways and dams as well as small projects in agriculture, road construction and manufacturing. He argues that Ethiopia’s cooperation with China has been carefully managed and coordinated by the federal government through national Growth and Transformation Plans (GTPs). Therefore, despite the country’s dependence on foreign assistance, it is capable of crafting a national framework to direct the flows of aid and investment.