The following are also sources of difficulty:—

1. Some cases of paralytic dementia following cerebral hæmorrhage, tumour of the brain, or chronic encephalitis.
2. Cases of lead poisoning with mental symptoms.
3. Cases of progressive muscular atrophy, spinal meningitis, with delirium.
4. Paralytic pellagra.
5. Paralysis from phosphoric or arsenical poisoning, accompanied by intellectual disturbances.

This makes a formidable list; but it shows how shadowy are our notions even on such a common disease, that so many uncertainties or differences of opinion should be possible.

PART II.—REVIEWS.

The Theory of Practice, An Ethical Enquiry. In Two Books. By Shadworth H. Hodgson. Longman and Co.

This is far from being an ordinary book. It is replete with deep thought and metaphysical lore. Mr. Hodgson is a metaphysician of the first order. He traces every branch of knowledge to its root in the mind. He shows that every department of physical science has its metaphysical aspect, and must, in ultimate analysis, be tracked to its home in consciousness; or, in other words, must be subjective as well as objective. The highest generalization arrived at by the men of physical science is that which regards matter as ultimately reducible into atoms pervaded by force. Among these enquirers it is usual to consider that when they have arrived at atoms they stand face to face with the knowable least. Mr. Hodgson contests this opinion, and maintains that they have not analysed their object so far as it is possible to do so, but that even atoms and force have also a subjective side which is inseparable from their objective one. This leads us to the idealism of the author.

It must be understood that Mr. Hodgson is an idealist of the Hume-Mill School. While holding idealistic views every bit as rigid as those of Ferrier, he differs from Ferrier in being given more to induction, analysis, verification, and less

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to deduction. While Ferrier starts from one datum, and from that deduces the contents of the "Institutes," Mr. Hodgson brings forward all the prominent facts of mental science, analyses them after his exhaustive fashion, and then points out how they relate to human actions. Having analysed the theory of practice, he afterwards indicates how the theory is to be applied. The theme, as you may imagine, is an extensive one, and Mr. Hodgson devotes to it no less than 1,067 pages. We question the expediency, on the part of a metaphysician, of embarking so much of his capital in one bottom, that is, of course, on the supposition that one who soars so much into the regions *in excelsis* of metaphysic takes into account such ordinary calculations as whether a book will sell and afterwards be read. To our mind the perfection of metaphysical writing is Hume's, and he wrote under the conviction that "in all abstract reasonings, there is one point of view which if we can happily hit, we shall go farther towards illustrating the subject than by all the eloquence and copious expression in the world." Now we cannot help thinking that our author has erred on the side of copious expression, and that he would have produced a more acceptable book had he given us his views in a more condensed shape. The author aims at taking the most general view of his subject, but he seeks to combine with this such an amount of detail that the effect upon the reader is bewildering. Not content with occupying the position of a commander in chief, from which he can, especially with his metaphysical telescope, command an adequate view, for his purpose, of the whole army, he seems to be his own aide-de-camp as well, and to be continually rushing away from his proper post to direct the movements of this brigade and that regiment. The consequence is that the all commanding view is being continually lost in that descent into particulars which, we are disposed to think, could be advantageously spared.

From principle we hold that if a subject is contemplated from a certain level, it is best, for the sake of clearness and efficiency of treatment, to keep to that level as much as possible, and thoroughly explore it. To mix up observations taken at the top of the mountain of knowledge with those taken at the middle and the bottom, more than is absolutely necessary, disturbs that unity which a treatise, like a well-constructed drama, or a well-painted picture, ought to possess. There is a way of using particulars to illustrate ultimate principles without going into an elaborate examination of

such particulars. While we cannot but admit then that Mr. Hodgson is a powerful thinker, and possesses a thorough acquaintance with his subject, we certainly have an impression that he does not excel in the art of book-making. His style is too cumbrous. It wearies one as much as that of Butler's Analogy. We perceive that he possesses a mind of the best order, a deeply analytical one, but the effect of this on his style is to overweight it. There is too much of the particularity of an Act of Parliament about his sentences, and consequently the reader feels wearied much sooner than he would in reading the works of authors quite as profound and quite as original—for instance, those of J. S. Mill, Hamilton, and the very metaphysical Ferrier, whose style indeed is about the clearest and the most precise of any with which we are acquainted.

We should say that both the example of Bacon, and of Comte, who, it would seem, aimed at being a second Bacon, and hit the mark, ought to deter philosophers from applying their principles with too little restraint. Who does not now perceive that the time spent by Bacon in applying his inductive method would have been more profitably spent on the more minute elaboration of his principles? For while his aphorisms are still in deserved repute, his application of them to practice is rather amusing than anything else. Again, who will think much of Comte for anything beyond the method which he so ably developed, a method which admits of being perfectly expounded, illustrations to boot, in a moderate sized volume? When Comte attempted to give the world not simply a scale of the sciences, but the sciences in scale, he degenerated into a book-maker, and subjected himself to the depreciation consequent on being deemed shallow and inaccurate by the specialists in each of those branches of science which he undertook to reduce to method. For instance, the mathematicians, judging from his endeavours in their department, inferred that he could not be very profound; and judging from his physiology, Prof. Huxley has warned us that he must not be too implicitly followed. Most readers know what was said of the late Prof. Whewell—science was his forte but omniscience his weakness. It is not uncommonly a characteristic of men who excel in one department to feel also that they can do so in any other, and thus many a great man has, before now, been laughed at for attempting to do that of which, for want of acquired proficiency, he could make but a bungling job.

The present work is a sequel to a former one entitled, "Time and Space: a Metaphysical Essay." Mr. Hodgson follows Kant so far as to hold that Time and Space are the formal elements of phenomena. Unlike Kant, however, he maintains that a perceived phenomenon is not partly subjective and partly objective, say blue mixed with yellow, known to us solely as green; but that the phenomenon is wholly subjective, and, at the same time, wholly objective. Let us hear his own words on this important point. Alluding to his former essay, he remarks:—"In that work it was maintained that phenomena, the whole world of phenomena in the widest sense of the term, and every portion of it however minute, had a double aspect, subjective and objective, was at once a mode of consciousness and an existing thing; but that these opposite aspects of a phenomenon applied to the whole of it, and were not elements constituting it by their combination. It was farther maintained that every phenomenon had, besides this, at least two such constitutive elements metaphysical, and logically discernible in it, but not empirically separable from each other; the inseparable union of which constituted an empirical or complete phenomenon; which phenomenon then had, as a whole, the two aspects just mentioned, so that the same two kinds of constitutive, metaphysical, elements, could be discerned alike in either aspect. These elements were of two kinds, Time and Space, the formal, and Feeling, the material, element; time, or time and space together, entering into all phenomena whatever, along with some mode or modes of feeling; which latter were, however, indefinitely numerous, so that the formal element being of two kinds only, served as the common link or bond between them all." The present work deals with the feelings, which term is here used as embracing all the material elements of a phenomenon, the whole of a phenomenon, that is, with the exception of time and space, its formal elements. Taking, in the first place, after the manner of Comte, a statical view of the Feelings, the author divides them into Presentations or Sensations, and Representations or Emotions, which latter are again divided into Direct and Reflective. In the next place, the Feelings as leading to movement are examined, and Physiology comes under notice. This combination of metaphysics with physiology is called psychology, which we imagine is rather a novel use of the word. This is the dynamical view of the feelings. In the second volume, we have the systematic or synthetical portion of the author's enquiry, as in the first volume we

have the analytic, constituting the preparation for the second part. This volume gives us, in the first place, the Logic of Practice. This is then applied, in successive chapters, to Ethic, Politic, and the Practical Sciences. This exhausts the contents of a most abstruse and elaborate work, full of deep thought, subtle analysis, and extensive knowledge, but most formidable to the ordinary reader; a work, indeed, which we seriously believe no one, except he belongs to the workers of the studious world, would dare to tackle.

We shall not here attempt to enter into any of the details of the author's system, but content ourselves with a few remarks on the general principles of the work. J. S. Mill it is well known is an idealist; but it was not until his examination of Sir W. Hamilton's doctrines that his proclivities in this way were otherwise than incidentally made known; he left room for another. His views in this respect may be described as *a posteriori* idealism. He belongs to a school which, denying that there are any truths independent of experience, also denies that we bear such a relation to the external world as to justify us in philosophically believing that we know it *per se*. Of this school J. S. Mill is *par excellence* the logician, Lewes the historian, Mr. Hodgson the metaphysician.

Mr. Hodgson, in common with Mill and Lewes, expresses great admiration for Comte, but maintains that Comte was wholly in error in denouncing metaphysic. Being an idealist, and holding that phenomena are wholly subjective as well as objective, Mr. Hodgson could not do otherwise than insist that objective observation is never by itself exhaustive. But Mr. Hodgson, while he is an out-and-out stickler for metaphysic, will have nothing to do with ontology; yet he must accept an ontology which is co-extensive with metaphysic, as Ferrier did, else his system will be completely defective, one of Knowing without Being, the Subject without an Object. We admire what our author urges in defence of metaphysic as a method of subjective observation, and perceive that he has fallen under the wholesome influence of what Berkeley teaches in regard to the limits of abstraction. Metaphysic deals only with percepts and that which conclusively follows from them. It avoids making entities of abstractions; such abstractions, for instance, as those for which the phrenologists sought so astutely to find an organ in the brain. Metaphysic deals always with the things containing abstractions, "analyses the phenomena in which they are combined, using

the terms, time, space, and matter, solely to fix and connote the features which are actually perceived in the phenomena. The ontological philosophers, on the other hand, not having drawn the distinction in question, always use such abstract and descriptive terms, words of second intention, as connoting independent things, and in this way make entities of abstractions." Abstract terms "are reasoned upon as if they were phenomena, instead of being descriptions of phenomena; and thus the description becomes an entity, and the philosophy an ontology," we might add, and, in part, a phrenology.

That there is a field of subjective observation, or introspection, is very evident. How, for instance, do I know what another man's feelings are, but by likening them to my own? I am absolutely restricted to my own thought and emotion, and can only by imagination multiply instances of these, and impute them to the beings who bear the same shape as myself, make the same movements, and utter the same sounds as I myself am wont to do. Of the thought of other people I cannot possibly possess any presentative knowledge; I can only know it at second hand. Either, then, all that concerns knowing and feeling is quite incapable of being scientifically dealt with; or, if it be not so, subjective observation is a valid and essential operation of science. So far we perfectly agree with the author. There is a legitimate use of introspection, and an indispensable one; but in exploring the world of mind, care must be taken that facts, percepts, and their valid consequents alone are accepted, and not abstractions arbitrarily set up as facts.

We cannot, however, coincide in opinion with the author when he endeavours to explain, in opposition to Comte's objection, how the facts of consciousness are to be observed. He allows that present states of consciousness cannot be observed. "Past states of consciousness are all that can be observed, and all that need be observed by the applier of the method; and this is done in memory or redintegration, spontaneous and voluntary. Past states of consciousness recalled in memory are objective—that is, are objects to the reflecting consciousness, to the applier of the method of subjective observation. And all past states of consciousness, when recalled in memory, are equally objective." We feel constrained to question the truth of this view of the case. It does not seem to us to get over the difficulty, for a past state of consciousness, as it is called, must, if summoned up out of latency, become a present state. We conclude,

however, that it is better to postpone the further discussion of this point till after we have indicated how the supposed impregnable fortress of idealism is to be taken.

It seems to us that idealism is nothing better than semi-scepticism. It first of all tampers with the facts of consciousness, and having thus distorted them, proceeds to demonstrate that the clear testimony of consciousness is not to be trusted, because it is in conflict with the facts; but in conflict forsooth with what facts? Not the real ones, but the assumed facts of the idealist. Let us suppose the facts of consciousness to be a person in a witness-box giving testimony. Now the existence of such a witness, and the fact that the testimony which he affords is of such and such a nature is beyond the reach of question; but whether his testimony is true or otherwise is quite a different matter. The facts of consciousness, namely, the existence of a mental revelation and its purport, are severally to be likened to the witness and what the witness testifies; but the credibility of what consciousness testifies is to be likened to the credibility of the witness, which is not incapable of being found at fault. Now what the idealists contend for is, that the facts of consciousness are beyond the reach of scepticism. They are, considered as revelations of their own existence, self-verifying, because revelation and thing revealed are identical; and to doubt their existence is impossible, for such doubt would be suicidal by self-contradiction, it being nothing else but a mode of operation of the very instrument which doubts, so the result would be that the doubting instrument would be trying to doubt whether it doubted.

The facts of consciousness then exist beyond all question. But now, when we come to examine the credibility of what the facts declare, doubt is not rendered impossible by self-contradiction. My consciousness, in an act of sensible perception, informs me that there is felt to be as non-identical with the knowing an object externally in relation with my organism. The existence and the purport of this deliverance cannot be questioned. It is thought to be otherwise, however, with its trustworthiness. If we attempt to doubt the truth of this deliverance we are not deterred from doing so, because the revelation and thing revealed are non-identical, and therefore the former is not self-verifying; and because the doubt, since in this case it does not question the existence of the doubting instrument, is not suicidal. Still, although the facts of consciousness are unassailable, while the testimony

of consciousness is said not to be, it would, nevertheless, be unbecoming for reasonable men to distrust the testimony simply because such distrust is not impossible, or not so well guarded against doubt as the facts, especially when it is considered that, in practice as opposed to speculation, no man can by any amount of effort reverse his perceptive convictions—those convictions which are common to all the race, and are doubtless shared also by the more intelligent brute animals. But in justice to the idealists, it must be admitted that their scepticism has never been gratuitous. It has always had the appearance, to them at least, of being based on facts, even the indubitable facts of consciousness. Comparing the evidence of knowing with the facts of knowing as understood by them, a contradiction has been observed between the two; but since the facts are unassailable, while the testimony is not, they have no option but to reject the latter as in theory not to be trusted, and to frame their system accordingly. But are the facts and the testimony in conflict? Why does idealism, if true, go so roughly against the grain of human nature when unsophisticated by philosophy? Is the "root of our nature a lie?" What we maintain is that really they are not in conflict with each other; that the conflict is only apparent, owing to the distortion on the part indeed of almost all metaphysicians of the facts of consciousness.

We all know how ardently and persistently Reid combated the idealism of Berkeley; how he believed that it was the "ideal hypothesis" alone which afforded a basis for a doctrine so violently opposed to the spontaneous convictions of mankind; and how he believed that by exploding the ideal hypothesis he did not leave idealism a leg to stand upon. Subsequent investigation has not, however, established the supposed victory of the champion of common sense. No man laboured more earnestly, powerfully, and intelligently, to win the battle so bravely fought by Reid, than Hamilton. Combining with great speculative talent a marvellous capacity for the acquirement of knowledge, he undertook, as a work of love, to carry on the task which Reid had so earnestly commenced. That the world is deeply indebted to Hamilton for his profound researches is unquestionable, but after all his strenuous endeavours to establish natural realism on a secure basis, it must have been mortifying to him to behold such a star as Ferrier appearing in the firmament, and that too the firmament of Scottish metaphysic. Now, the very fact that Ferrier, who

must have possessed a most intimate knowledge of Hamilton's doctrine, grew nevertheless into a full fledged idealist, proves to our mind, more cogently than J. S. Mill's examination, that Hamilton failed to establish his point. The way in which we account for his failure is this—we do not believe that he set forth the facts of consciousness in their true light, but left them still obscured by that obfuscation which gives them a false appearance, and renders them a basis for idealism. Indeed we are now fully convinced that few, if any, have really entered into the full significance of Reid's theory of immediate perception. Hamilton believed that he clearly understood Reid. That may be, but then he thought Reid in error on a certain vital point, and that, as it seems to us, is the point on the determination of which the result of the contest depends. "Suppose," says Reid, "that once, and only once, I smelled a tuberose in a certain room where it grew in a pot, and gave a very grateful perfume. Next day I relate what I saw and smelled. When I attend as carefully as I can to what passes in my mind in this case, it appears evident that the very thing I saw yesterday and the fragrance I smelled, are now the immediate objects of my mind when I remember it." Reid's critics, and even his admirer—Hamilton —feel assured that he has here committed a gross mistake, for the immediate object, they one and all insist, is not the tuberose he saw yesterday, but the thought representing it in the mind. The question involved in this dispute is whether, in order to be conscious of an object, either that object must be present or its representation—itself if perceived, its representation by the mind if remembered. Reid manifestly held that perceptive knowledge did not involve the presence of an object, nor memory the presence of a representative object. Speaking of Reid's peculiarity in this respect Hamilton remarks that "he has, at least in words, abolished the distinction of presentative and representative cognition. 1°, he asserts, in general, that every object of thought must be an immediate object; 2°, he affirms in particular, not only of the faculties whose objects are, but of those whose objects are not, actually present to the mind—that they are all and each of them immediate knowledges. Thus he frequently defines memory (in the sense of recollective imagination) an immediate knowledge of things past; he speaks of an immediate knowledge of things future; and maintains that the immediate object in our own conception (imagination) of a distant reality is that reality itself." Reid, in the question here at issue, seems

to us to be quite right, and his critics wrong; although we are far from holding that Reid has not often laid himself open to criticism and misconception in the exposition of his doctrine. It is only lately, after pondering over this abstruse question at various intervals during the course of above twenty years, that this view of it has burst suddenly upon our mind. We now see Reid's doctrine of immediate perception in a light in which we never saw it before. By immediate knowledge we cannot conceive that Reid meant anything more than knowing a thing without any medium, at first hand, truthfully, or as it is to be known; and that it could thus be known, even though the nerves which convey the stimulus to the brain, for they convey nothing more, were as long as the Atlantic Telegraph Cable. That the knowing should be present *there where* the object is declared to be, would yield no advantage. Knowing is simply a revelation, and if the revelation be at first hand, and not through a medium, that is all that is really essential to constitute it an immediate knowledge. Bringing a perceptive organ into the immediate presence of the foot would cause no difference in regard to what it revealed concerning the foot, the revelation would be nothing more than a revelation, of course it would not be the foot as well, an object clearly declared to be non-identical with the cognition of it. Knowing, it is very important to bear in mind, is absolutely simple in nature; it is nothing more than knowing. It is not a synthesis of subject and object, as Ferrier tried to make out. It is not a fact in which there is logically discernible a subjective and an objective aspect as Mr. Hodgson wishes to prove. All such descriptions of knowing are erroneons, the remains of that ideal hypothesis which Reid so manfully struggled to explode. When he thought of the tuberose, he felt that he had present in his mind absolutely nothing but the knowing of it, and that this knowing was not compounded of knowing and thing known, but was manifestly simple knowing only. He felt positive that it was the tuberose he was thinking about, and not the representation of it in the mind. He felt assured that he was not even thinking of the tuberose by means of a representation as a medium. What he felt was that between his thinking and the real tuberose there was no medium whatever, and that it was a great mistake ever to think that such a medium was necessary even in memory, much less in perception.

The result of making knowing a compound, subject *plus*

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object, is to make it appear that the testimony of consciousness is not to be trusted. For, argues the idealist, basing his reasoning on the above misconception, the immediate and only object really known is the mental one, which is but another aspect of the knowing. Cognition and thing cognised, quoth he, are one and the same fact viewed in two different relations. Whereas then intelligence, as a Catholic revelation, declares that, in sensible perception, the object known is not identical with the knowing of it; the idealist, wiser than his own nature, declares the contrary. But what is this object which, in contradiction to our fundamental intelligence, is pronounced, with such unblushing effrontery, to be one and the same with the consciousness of it? Simply a hypothesis, a misconception, a blunder.

Let us imagine that we are gazing upon two stones, and let the problem be, how stone A is to be made to exist to stone B. The only reply which offers itself is, that B must be endowed with an intelligence which will enable it to become cognizant of A. But when B becomes aware of the existence of A, B is put into possession of positively nothing more than the consciousness of A's existence. The knowing is nothing more than knowing, it cannot be the known as well. It is only figurative language then—and very vicious, misleading language too—this practice among metaphysicians of describing knowing as consisting of two elements, when it is indeed a pure simple, a beginning, too, which cannot be explained for the very evident reason that there is nothing beyond the beginning wherewith to explain.

We are now going to be more idealistic than the idealists, to out-Herod Herod. We assert that we possess in consciousness no objects whatever We possess revelations concerning objects, but the objects themselves are to us, and, indeed, to any other kind of intelligence, as far as we can see, never possessed. But what more can we conceive possible? How can knowing be understood to be anything but itself? And what is knowing? That which reveals to us the existence and nature of objects. As an intelligence, there is, to me, no space, but simply the knowing of space; no body, not even my own body, but simply the knowing of body. We may ask, in amazement, how can these things be? But we must learn to understand that when we have come to the beginning, and knowing is a beginning, we cannot launch out beyond. We cannot explain that which underlies all explanation; we can neither prove nor dis-

prove the veracity of an intelligence which underlies all proof and disproof.

The idealists may think that this is a doctrine identical with their own, but it is not, for whereas they give the lie to what knowing reveals, and in an incomprehensible fashion attempt to improve its morals, we reverently place confidence in its veracity, and by a speculative voyage right ahead of theirs, discover that we have arrived at the very point from which we started, namely, natural or practical confidence in the trustworthy character of the fundamental convictions of mankind. Of course, in this brief space, we could do no more than indicate how natural realism is to be established in opposition to idealism, and point out the rock on which Hamilton's doctrine has been wrecked, namely, failing to see that Reid is right when he insists that knowing does not involve the presence, the mental possession, the proprietorship of any object, and that even were such an object granted, it is quite impossible, in ultimate analysis, to comprehend what it can be; for if it is *not* knowing, we possess only the knowing of it; if it *is* knowing, then it is no object, for knowing is simple, nothing but knowing. This leads us to the question which, a few pages above, was postponed till after this inquiry had taken place. That question is, how is subjective observation possible? We now answer that since knowing is absolutely a simple, and never has a mental object, face to face with itself, as an essential of its existence, subjective observation can only consist of an act of knowing being self-conscious, it knows itself. Indeed, we cannot conceive how, if it did not know itself, it could have any existence. Knowing is simply a revelation, and must, of necessity, reveal itself as the condition of revealing that which is not itself. At the same time, it is not in the operation of the faculties on some other question that knowing admits of being examined, but when knowing itself becomes the theme. The introspective element of knowing is then called into fuller operation than when knowing is concerned with something other than itself. But, indeed, in considering this momentous point it is well to realize the fact that all our intercourse, as intelligent beings, is with knowing alone. Facts, things, objects, events, are never possessed by us, we are entirely restricted to the knowing of them, and all that we need be anxious about is that we know, as it is right we should know.

W. G. D.

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