

The Political Consequences of Indigenous Resentment

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Abstract: Understanding the legacy of settler colonialism requires understanding the nature and scope of anti-Indigenous attitudes. But what, exactly, are the political consequences of anti-Indigenous attitudes? Answering this question requires recognizing that attitudes toward Indigenous peoples are distinct from White racial attitudes toward other disempowered groups. In this paper, I introduce a novel measure of *Indigenous resentment*. I then show that Indigenous resentment is an important predictor of policy attitudes using data collected from an original survey of White settlers. I estimate the effect of both Indigenous resentment and negative affect on policy attitudes—opposition to welfare and support for pipeline developments—to make the case that Indigenous resentment is a better measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes than affective prejudice, and that Indigenous resentment is an important omitted variable in the study of public opinion in settler societies.

Keywords: settler-colonialism, symbolic racism, racial and ethnic politics, prejudice, anti-Indigenous attitudes.

INTRODUCTION

Most quantitative research related to the legacy of White settler racism focuses on “perceived Aboriginal deficits” (Walter and Andersen 2013, 26). For instance, on gaps between Indigenous peoples and settlers on social and economic outcomes such as employment, income, and incarceration rates. It is an important omission that very little quantitative research considers the legacy of White settler racism in terms of ongoing *anti-Indigenous attitudes*. Overt racism toward Indigenous¹

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peoples—the belief in the intrinsic, biological inferiority of Indigenous peoples—helped motivate and justify the mass dispossession of Indigenous lands and attempted genocide of Indigenous peoples. Today, democratic norms prevent most settlers from openly endorsing the idea that Indigenous peoples are intrinsically inferior and should be eliminated. Democratic norms even prevent most settlers from openly admitting they dislike Indigenous peoples more than settlers. But how should subtler anti-Indigenous attitudes be measured? And what are the ongoing political consequences of anti-Indigenous attitudes?

In this article, I use original survey data and a novel scale measuring *Indigenous resentment*. The goals of this article are to introduce a theoretically-informed, quantitative measure of Indigenous resentment to the political science canon and to offer an empirical look at the political consequences of Indigenous resentment in settler-colonial states. The present work focuses on White settler attitudes in Western democracies such as United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. However, the concept of Indigenous resentment likely has applications in other settler-colonial contexts. *Settler-colonialism* is a specific type of colonialism—political domination over a territory—that involves replacing colonized, Indigenous peoples with settlers from the dominating polity (Wolfe 2006). *Indigenous peoples* refer to peoples who, “having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them” (Martínez Cobo 1987).

In the “Theory and Literature” section, I draw on Indigenous political thought and settler-colonial theories to make the case that anti-Indigenous attitudes are distinct from Whites’ other racial attitudes. I argue that mapping the psychological contours of hierarchical social relations in settler-colonial contexts requires recognizing the relationship between White racism and *place* (Coulthard 2014; Razack 2002; Simpson 2011; Wildcat et al. 2014). Because “territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element” (Wolfe 2006, 388), any valid measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes should tap into struggles over land. I also consider existing efforts to quantitatively study anti-Indigenous attitudes. Drawing on my theoretical discussion, I outline the limitations of existing approaches. Although existing measures offer a useful starting point, they are insufficient insofar as they either tap into overtly hostile measures of anti-Indigenous attitudes (such as “old fashioned racism” or the affective component of prejudice), or they merely use measures of anti-Black attitudes—for instance, switching the word “Black” for “Native American”

(Neblo 2009)—and thus fail to tap into distinct features characterizing Indigeneity and Indigenous-settler relations.

In this section, I explain that there are good reasons to suspect anti-Indigenous attitudes impact important policy outcomes. Just as anti-Black attitudes motivate White opposition to welfare (DeSante 2013; Gilens 1995; 1996), there is evidence that affective prejudice toward Indigenous peoples also motivates opposition to welfare (Harell, Soroka, and Ladner 2014). Furthermore, given Indigenous peoples' relations to land, conflicts between Indigenous peoples and settlers often emerge in the context of settler efforts to expropriate and exploit natural resources on Indigenous territories. It also may be the case that White settlers' attitudes toward Indigenous peoples impact their attitudes toward resource extraction.

In the "Methods" section, I introduce the novel measure of Indigenous resentment. The concept of Indigenous resentment draws on the symbolic racism literature, particularly the literature on racial resentment (Enders and Scott 2019; Kinder, Sanders, and Sanders 1996). However, the Indigenous resentment scale is unique in that it also taps into settlers' attitudes toward Indigenous land-claims, languages, and the belief that Indigenous peoples have unfair tax benefits; attitudes not normally associated with Black peoples in Anglo-settler colonies such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In this section, I also outline my methodology, which involves estimating two important policy outcomes: attitudes toward redistribution (opposition to welfare) and attitudes toward resource extraction (building pipelines).

In the "Results" section, I offer an original analysis of the political consequences of Indigenous resentment. My analysis accomplishes two tasks: first, I show that Indigenous resentment predicts opposition to welfare and support for building pipelines. Second, I show that Indigenous resentment is a better predictor of support for these policies than a measure of explicit dislike that taps into the affective component of prejudice. Without controlling for Indigenous resentment, affective prejudice toward Indigenous peoples has a significant but small impact on opposition to welfare and does not significantly predict support for pipeline developments. Controlling for Indigenous resentment, affective prejudice does not significantly explain welfare attitudes or impact attitudes toward pipeline developments in the predicted direction.

My analysis demonstrates the usefulness of using a measure of Indigenous resentment—a more subtle and valid measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes—in political science research. I discuss the implications of my findings in the "Discussion" section, and conclude by outlining an agenda for

future studies. I point to the potential for comparative work on anti-Indigenous attitudes both across Anglo-settler states and the global south, the intersection of anti-Indigenous and anti-immigrant attitudes, and to the potential contribution that studying settler-colonialism can make to our understanding of White in-group attitudes (*c.f.* Jardina 2019).

THEORY AND LITERATURE

Belief Systems in Settler Colonies

Indigeneity is defined by peoples' distinctive ties to specific territories that pre-date later colonization and settlement. In my present work, I focus on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the Anglo-settler colonies of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but my work likely has applications to other settler-colonial contexts. Settler colonization is the processes by which an imperial state takes over sovereignty by sending settlers to establish political control over territories and the populations inhabiting those territories (Veracini 2010; Wolfe 2006). In Anglo-settler states, the belief systems of *White racism* and *liberal colonialism* played a central role in motivating and justifying processes of settler colonization.

White racism (which I also refer to as racism) refers to belief systems justifying White supremacy, or “the system of domination by which White people have historically ruled over and, in certain important ways, continue to rule over non-White people” (Mills 2014, 1–2). White racism refers to the “common conceptual denominator” that ultimately signifies “global statuses of superiority and inferiority, privilege and subordination” (Mills 2014, 21). As Mills (2014, 21) points out, these statuses have taken different forms—distinctions based on geography (European/non-European), religion (Christian/heathen), or level of cultural development (civilized/wild or savage)—but these distinctions all eventually coalesce “in the basic opposition of White versus non-White.”

Racism worked in conjunction with *liberal colonialism* to justify processes of colonization in Anglo-settler states. Liberal colonialism is an ideological framework characterized by commitment to private property, capitalism, and industry (Arneil 2017, 30). Liberal colonialism “constitutes citizens and civil society in explicit opposition to the idle, irrational, custom-bound ‘Indian’ who may be transformed into a citizen but only if he/she gives up his/her ‘customs’ or ‘ways’ and instead becomes industrious and rational” (Arneil 2012, 492). White racism and liberal colonialism

were linked in that Indigenous peoples' purported wildness and inability to engage in "productive" activities—such as exploiting natural resources—were used to distinguish Indigenous peoples as inferior (non-White). Indigenous peoples' categorization as non-White thus excluded them from the basic moral obligations—treating others as ends in themselves (Kant 2013)—that White people in democracies normally extend to one another.

During the initial settlement of Anglo-settler states, leading officials and writers were not shy about describing Indigenous peoples as unproductive and irrational savages and thus the expropriation of Indigenous land and elimination of Indigenous life as justified. U.S. President William Henry Harrison, when he was Governor of the Indiana Territory, clearly articulated the opposition of White versus not-White when, with respect to displacing Indigenous peoples, he rhetorically asked:

“Is one of the fairest portions of the globe to remain in a state of nature, the haunt of a few wretched savages, when it seems destined, by the Creator, to give support to a large population, and to be the seat of civilization, of science, and true religion?” (cited in Esarey 1915, 449)

In addition to displacement, assimilation was used as a tool to try and eliminate Indigenous peoples. A policy of “aggressive civilization” was developed during Ulysses S. Grant's post-Civil War administration, which included “industrial schools” to teach Indigenous children Christianity and prepare them for menial work (Smith 2001). Inspired by American industrial schools, Canadian policy-makers dramatically expanded an already existing Indian residential school system, which involved incarcerating Indigenous children at boarding schools, often against the will of the children and their families. P. G. Anderson, Canada's Indian Affairs Superintendent, clearly articulated the motivating ideologies of liberal colonialism and White racism when he explained to the General Council of Indian Chiefs and Principle Men why their children would be removed from their families and sent to residential schools:

“You would not give up your idle roving habits, to enable your children to receive instruction. Therefore you remain poor, ignorant and miserable. It is found you cannot govern yourselves . . . It has therefore been determined, that your children shall be sent to schools, where they will forget their Indian habits and be instructed in all the necessary arts of civilized life, and become one with your White brethren” (quoted in Baldwin 1846, 7).

In response to a report detailing the high morbidity rate of Indigenous children incarcerated in state institutions, Duncan Campbell Scott, the

Superintendent of Canada's Indian Affairs, explicitly stated that the "policy of this Department . . . is geared towards a final solution of our Indian problem" (quoted in Talaga 2018). Canada's Indian residential school system resulted in the recorded deaths of 3,200 children, although actual numbers are likely higher (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2015).

Today, democratic norms prevent most people from endorsing the idea that Indigenous peoples—or any peoples—are explicitly inferior and should be exterminated. But does the legacy of these belief systems manifest in subtler anti-Indigenous attitudes today? And what are the political consequences of anti-Indigenous attitudes?

Existing Research on Anti-Indigenous Attitudes

Measuring Anti-Indigenous Attitudes

Only a few researchers have tried to quantitatively study settler attitudes toward Indigenous peoples, and most have focused on *overtly hostile measures* of anti-Indigenous attitudes. For instance, scholars have adapted measures of "old fashioned racism" (or Jim Crow racism), which were originally developed to tap into the explicit belief in the inferiority of Black Americans and support for segregation (Henry and Sears 2002). Measures of old fashioned racism include scales asking whether respondents endorse the idea that Indigenous peoples are alcoholics, on welfare, or are bad parents (Morrison et al. 2008), and scales tapping into the belief that Indigenous peoples are lazy (Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar 2016), or are "a bunch of complainers" (Langford and Ponting 1992). Walker (1994) developed an "Attitudes Toward Aborigines Scale" which includes a number of explicitly hostile indicators, including whether respondents endorse the statement: "I don't like Aborigines" (see also Pedersen and Walker 1997). In a similar vein, researchers have studied the affective component of prejudice (Fiske 1998), relying on self-reported discomfort being around Indigenous peoples (Berry and Kalin 1995) or measures of explicit dislike, such as feeling thermometer ratings of Indigenous peoples and other group members (Donakowski and Esses 1996; Harell, Soroka, and Ladner 2014).

While it is interesting to study overt prejudice (including dislike, the affective component of prejudice (Fiske 1998)), social desirability prevents many respondents from openly admitting to prejudicial attitudes. As I will show, measures of affective prejudice are not as effective at discriminating between respondents with different attitudes since most respondents

simply refuse to explicitly indicate aversions toward different social group members. As a result, more overt measures of prejudice, including explicit dislike, tend to underestimate the effect of anti-Indigenous attitudes on policy preferences.

Less work has considered *subtler measures*² of symbolic racism directed toward Indigenous peoples. By “symbolic racism” I am referring to the combination of negative affect and the belief that the target group violates cherished values of hard work and industry—what Americans call “conservative” values (Henry and Sears 2002), but what others might call “liberal colonial values” (e.g., see Arneil 2012). Under the broader rubric of “symbolic racism” I include operationalizations of modern racism (McConahay 1986), symbolic racism (Sears 1988), subtle racism (Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), and racial resentment (Enders 2019; Enders and Scott 2019; Kinder, Sanders, and Sanders 1996) (see Henry and Sears (2002) for an overview of this literature).

Existing efforts to study symbolic racism toward Indigenous peoples have relied directly on instruments designed to measure anti-Black attitudes. Some authors have used the Racial Resentment Scale items, replacing the word “Blacks” with “Native Americans” in the U.S. (Neblo 2009) or with “Aboriginals” in the Canadian context (Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar 2016). Others have used the Modern Racism Scale (Morrison et al. 2008).

However, these tools were designed to tap into White attitudes toward Black Americans, and there are reasons to believe that White settlers’ attitudes toward Indigenous peoples are distinct. Most importantly, none of the adapted measures of symbolic racism ask about land. As Dene scholar Coulthard (2014, 13) explains, processes of colonization (and decolonization) are “best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and oriented around the question of land” (see also Green and Green 2007; Simpson 2011; Singh 2019; Wildcat et al. 2014); any valid measure of settlers’ attitudes toward Indigenous peoples must tap into conflicts over land.

Relatedly, treaties between settler governments and Indigenous peoples also mean that Indigenous peoples may enjoy rights—or there may be discourses that Indigenous peoples enjoy rights—that are distinct from settlers’ rights with respect to things like taxation. As Dudas (2005; 2008) explains, Indigenous treaty rights are often framed as contrary to the values of settler countries. In the United States, discourses at times present Indigenous treaty rights as being contrary to equal rights “in that they provide to their bearers advantages without regard to their efforts or their merits—the traditional markers by which individual success in

America is legitimated” (Dudas 2008, 3–4). Indigenous treaty rights are consequently “interpreted as threats to the body politic” (Dudas 2008, 4). Indigenous peoples may also make demands that are rarely made by racial group members, including Black Americans, related to support for traditional languages.

The Political Consequences of Anti-Indigenous Attitudes

Another downside of existing research on anti-Indigenous attitudes—at least with respect to the study of politics—is that few of these studies consider the *political consequences* of anti-Indigenous attitudes (with the exception of Harell, Soroka, and Ladner (2014) and Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar (2016)). Much of the pioneering work on anti-Indigenous attitudes has been done by psychologists interested in anti-Indigenous attitudes as an outcome or the effect of anti-Indigenous attitudes on outcomes such as classroom helping behaviors (Werhun and Penner 2010). In political science, Neblo (2009) compares racial attitudes toward Black Americans and Indigenous peoples using the Racial Resentment Scale items (replacing the word “Blacks” with “Native Americans”) but does not discuss whether anti-Indigenous attitudes predict policy outcomes.

The main work on anti-Indigenous attitudes in political science has been conducted by Harell, Soroka, and Ladner (2014), who show that—just as anti-Black attitudes predict opposition to welfare (DeSante 2013; Gilens 1995; 1996)—negative affect toward Indigenous peoples predicts opposition to welfare.³ In my present work, I replicate Harell, Soroka, and Ladner’s (2014) main findings but also show that explicit dislike *underestimates* the effect of anti-Indigenous attitudes on opposition to welfare.

It is important to study the relationship between White racial attitudes and attitudes toward redistribution, particularly in settler-colonial contexts. The economic growth of settler-colonies and asymmetrical empowerment of White settlers was fueled by expropriating Indigenous lands and through the use of racialized unfree labor, including the enslavement of Black peoples and practices of indentured servitude and blackbirding that disproportionately impacted communities of color. Today, the fiction that hard work is rewarded by material success helps absolve White settlers from obligations to redistribute their accumulated economic and social capital. Furthermore, although redistribution is important for empowering Indigenous peoples, another policy area that distinctly

impacts Indigenous peoples is resource extraction and development. There are strong theoretical reasons to suspect anti-Indigenous attitudes and resource development are related: recall, the devaluation of Indigenous peoples and their relations to land helped European settlers justify the expropriation and exploitation of Indigenous territories (Arneil 2012; Coulthard 2014). As I show, Indigenous resentment significantly predicts support for new pipeline developments.

METHODS

Data and Analysis

Data was collected between March 2019 and May 2019. Respondents were recruited using Dynata's (formerly Survey Sampling International's) online panels. My sample is an (otherwise representative) sample of White, English-speaking Canadians ($n = 1,150$). White, English-speaking Canadians constitute a numerical majority in Canada and have historically monopolized political power at the national level and so it is important to understand their racial attitudes. Missing values on the outcomes and primary independent variables were dropped through list-wise deletion (see Table S1). I used multiple imputation by chained equations using the MICE package in R to deal with missing data on socio-demographic control variables.⁴

With respect to my analysis, for each outcome (opposition to welfare and support for pipelines), I estimate four OLS regression models.⁵ For each outcome, I first estimate an *omitted variable model* that does not include any measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes but that does include basic covariates considered important in political science research. Second, I estimate an *affective prejudice model* that predicts the effect of affective prejudice (explicit dislike) toward Indigenous peoples on each outcome, controlling for covariates. Third, I estimate an *Indigenous resentment model* that predicts the effect of Indigenous resentment on each outcome, controlling for covariates. Finally, I estimate an *Indigenous resentment and affective prejudice model* with both the Indigenous resentment scale and the measure of affective prejudice. The goal is to demonstrate that anti-Indigenous attitudes are an important omitted variable in the study of political behavior in settler-colonial societies; and furthermore, that anti-Indigenous attitudes are best operationalized using a scale of Indigenous resentment (rather than a measure of affective prejudice).

Table 1. Outcome variable distributions

Variable	Obs.	Percent
“No new pipelines should be built in Canada, even if this hurts the economy.”		
Agree strongly	120	10.80
Agree somewhat	129	11.61
Neither agree nor disagree	290	26.10
Disagree somewhat	232	20.88
Disagree strongly	340	30.60
Total	1,111	100.00
“Should the federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now on welfare?”		
A lot more	163	14.67
Somewhat more	245	22.05
About the same as now	450	40.50
Somewhat less	153	13.77
A lot less	100	9.00
Total	1,111	100.00

Outcome Variables: Policy Preferences

The first outcome of interest, *opposition to welfare*, is measured using a five-category item asking respondents to indicate if they think the government should spend more, the same, or less on welfare, coded so higher values indicate greater *opposition* to welfare spending. The second outcome of interest, *support for pipeline development*, is measured using a five-category item asking respondents to indicate their agreement with the statement that: “No new gas pipelines should be built in Canada, even if this hurts the economy.” The item is coded so higher values indicate more disagreement (more *support* for pipeline development). The outcome variables are rescaled to range from “0” to “1.” The distribution across the categories of the variables is presented in [Table 1](#).

Independent Variables

Operationalizing Indigenous Resentment

The main independent variable of interest is Indigenous resentment, measured by seven Likert-type questions tapping into anti-Indigenous attitudes ([Table 2](#)). The response options for each question range from “Disagree strongly,” “Disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Agree,” to “Agree strongly” and are coded such that the higher values indicate

Table 2. Indigenous resentment scale items**Question wording**

“Aboriginal activists are making reasonable demands.” (R)
“Aboriginals are getting too demanding in their push for land rights.”
“Aboriginals get more favours from the education system than they should have.”
“Irish, Jewish, Chinese, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Aboriginals should do the same without any special favours.”
“More must be done to protect Aboriginal languages.” (R)
“The government does not show enough respect toward Aboriginals.” (R)
“Aboriginals get unfair tax breaks.”

greater resentment. Together these seven items comprise a highly reliable ($\alpha = .89$) scale measuring Indigenous resentment.⁶ Factor analysis and a scree test show that the scale is unidimensional (see SM, Figure S2).⁷ Note also that the factor analysis results reveal that the item asking whether Indigenous peoples are “getting too demanding in their push for land rights” correlates most strongly underlying, latent factor (Beauvais 2020). In other words, of the seven items tapping into the underlying factor, the feature measuring attitudes toward land claims is most strongly related to the underlying concept of Indigenous resentment. This reinforces the intuition that Indigenous resentment is a distinct expression of racial attitudes related to settler land expropriation and settler-Indigenous conflicts over *land*.

I constructed a summated rating scale of Indigenous resentment from the seven variables tapping into anti-Indigenous attitudes (Table 2). The Indigenous resentment scale was normalized using Z-score standardization (to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1). The distribution of Indigenous resentment is presented in Figure 1. A note on terminology: although “Indigenous peoples” is used in scholarly circles, this term may be less familiar with non-academic audiences. In Australia and Canada, the term “Aboriginal” is more familiar in non-academic discourses, while in the United States, the term “Native American” is more familiar. In my survey, I asked the Canadian respondents about their attitudes toward “Aboriginals.” I define the term for respondents the first time it appears as including peoples of First Nation, Inuk (Inuit), or Métis descent.

I also included a variable tapping into affective prejudice. Drawing on Fiske (1998, 372) who defines “stereotypes as the cognitive component, prejudice as the affective aspect, and discrimination as the behavioral




FIGURE 1. Distribution of Indigenous resentment

component of (group) category-based responses,” I use a measure of respondents’ feelings toward different groups as a measure of affective prejudice. However, recognizing that the term “prejudice” is sometimes used to refer to stereotype-endorsement (which I am not measuring), I refer to this variable as “explicit dislike” or “affective prejudice” for clarity. The measure of affective prejudice was created by subtracting the difference of respondents’ feelings toward Indigenous peoples from their average feelings toward a number of social group members (Aboriginals, Atheists, Blacks, Canadians, Christians, and immigrants). Feelings were measured by asking respondents how they feel about different groups, where zero means they really dislike the group and 100 means they really like the group. Note that the plurality of respondents refused to express prejudice for *any* groups; that is, a plurality of respondents gave all social groups the exact same rating on the feeling thermometers. Like with the Indigenous resentment scale, the affective prejudice scale was normalized using Z-score standardization (to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1), for ease of comparison. The distribution of affective prejudice is presented in [Figure 2](#).




FIGURE 2. Distribution of affective prejudice

Correlates of Indigenous Resentment

Respondent age is measured with a five-category variable (18–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65 years and older). The median Canadian age category (35–44 years) is the reference category in the regression models. Education is measured using a five-category variable: no degree (the reference category), trade school diploma, four-year university or college degree, and post-graduate or professional degree. Gender is a dummy variable indicating if a respondent self-identified as man (man = 1). Only four respondents indicated a non-binary identity, which is not a sufficient number of people to include as a separate category. As such, I included women and transgender/gender non-conforming respondents together in the reference category. Excluding transgender/

gender non-conforming respondents from the analysis does not change the results and would represent an unnecessary exclusion. I consider five regions: British Columbia, the Prairies, Ontario, English-speaking Québec, and the Maritimes. In my analyses, Canada's most populous province, Ontario, is the reference category. Recall that my sample (and generalizations) is limited to English-speakers. This of course requires particular restraint when generalizing from Québec—a majority French-speaking region—since my findings only reflect the attitudes of English-speakers in Québec. I also include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent lives in a metropolitan city ($city = 1$, else = 0).⁸

Partisan politics is operationalized with a dummy variable indicating whether the respondents identified themselves as right-of-center party voters (Conservative Party or People's Party). The reference category includes all non-right party voters (voters who indicated they supported the Liberal Party, New Democratic Party, Green Party, other left parties, or were undecided). Canada's two major parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, are "big tent" parties that contain a great deal of ideological diversity. As such, I also include an 11-point measure of ideology, which asks respondents: "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right.' How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?" (Left 0 . . . 10 Right). The results of a VIF test show that collinearity is not a problem (both the measure of right-party support and ideology can be included in the regression models).

RESULTS

Opposition to Welfare

Congruent with existing literature, affective prejudice significantly predicts opposition to welfare (Table 4, Model 2). However, affective prejudice has a relatively small impact on the outcome. A one standard deviation increase in prejudice increases opposition to welfare by .04 on the measure of anti-welfare attitudes that ranges from 0 to 1. By contrast, a one standard deviation increase in Indigenous resentment increases opposition to welfare by .08 on the same scale (Table 4, Model 3). When including both affective prejudice and Indigenous resentment in the same model, only Indigenous resentment significantly predicts welfare attitudes (Table 4, Model 4). This reinforces the intuition that negative affect has little explanatory power relative to Indigenous resentment. ANOVA testing shows that

Table 3. Variable distributions

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Oppose welfare	1,111	.451	.282	0	1
Support pipelines	1,111	.622	.330	0	1
Indigenous resentment	1,111	-.000	1.000	-2.01	2.06
Affective prejudice	1,111	-.001	1.000	-3.432	5.293
Right vote	1,111	.444	.497	0	1
Man	1,111	.478	.500	0	1
Education					
No college degree	1,111	.342	.475	0	1
Trade	1,111	.294	.456	0	1
BA	1,111	.266	.442	0	1
Grad	1,111	.098	.298	0	1
Income					
\$29,999 or less	1,111	.171	.377	0	1
\$30,000–\$59,999	1,111	.252	.434	0	1
\$60,000–\$89,999	1,111	.206	.405	0	1
\$90,000–\$119,999	1,111	.169	.375	0	1
\$120,000–\$149,999	1,111	.113	.316	0	1
\$150,000+	1,111	.089	.285	0	1
Age category					
18–34	1,111	.191	.393	0	1
35–44	1,111	.219	.414	0	1
45–54	1,111	.227	.419	0	1
55–64	1,111	.299	.456	0	1
65+	1,111	.068	.253	0	1
Region					
British Columbia	1,111	.136	.343	0	1
Prairies	1,111	.193	.395	0	1
Ontario	1,111	.442	.497	0	1
English Quebec	1,111	.150	.358	0	1
Maritimes	1,111	.079	.270	0	1
Urban	1,111	.715	.452	0	1

Model 3, the Indigenous resentment model, improves over the simpler model; however, the more complex Model 4, which includes both affective prejudice and Indigenous resentment, is not significantly better at capturing the data than Model 3 (see the SM, Table S3).

Comparing the omitted variable model (Table 4, Model 1) to the models that account for Indigenous resentment (Table 4, Model 3 or Model 4) offers important insight into the political consequences of Indigenous resentment. Comparing the models reveals that Indigenous resentment mediates the impact of gender and region in important ways.

Table 4. OLS models predicting opposition to welfare

	Dependent variable: opposition to welfare			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Affective prejudice		.043*** (.008)		.013 (.009)
Indigenous resentment			.083*** (.008)	.077*** (.009)
Right vote	.154*** (.018)	.145*** (.017)	.121*** (.017)	.121*** (.017)
Ideology	.010* (.004)	.008* (.004)	.001 (.004)	.001 (.004)
Man	-.014 (.017)	-.017 (.016)	-.038* (.016)	-.037* (.016)
Education				
Trade	.031 (.020)	.031 (.020)	.018 (.020)	.019 (.020)
BA	.041 (.022)	.036 (.021)	.031 (.021)	.030 (.021)
Grad	-.032 (.031)	-.024 (.030)	-.024 (.030)	-.022 (.030)
Income				
\$29K or less	-.146*** (.026)	-.146*** (.026)	-.138*** (.025)	-.139*** (.025)
\$30K–\$59K	-.049* (.024)	-.046* (.023)	-.039 (.023)	-.039 (.023)
\$90K–\$119K	-.010 (.026)	-.012 (.026)	-.015 (.025)	-.015 (.025)
\$120K–\$149K	-.008 (.029)	-.017 (.029)	-.007 (.028)	-.010 (.028)
\$150K+	.077* (.033)	.067* (.033)	.063* (.032)	.061 (.032)
Age				
18–34	-.008 (.025)	-.008 (.025)	.004 (.024)	.003 (.024)
45–54	-.025 (.024)	-.021 (.023)	-.019 (.023)	-.018 (.023)
55–64	.034 (.022)	.039 (.022)	.047* (.022)	.048* (.022)
65+	.001 (.035)	.006 (.035)	.018 (.034)	.018 (.034)
Region				
BC	-.035 (.025)	-.037 (.024)	-.061** (.024)	-.060* (.024)
Prairies	-.036 (.022)	-.051* (.022)	-.069** (.021)	-.071*** (.021)

Table 4. Continued

	Dependent variable: opposition to welfare			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
English Quebec	.012 (.024)	.001 (.024)	.014 (.023)	.010 (.023)
Maritimes	.021 (.031)	.021 (.030)	.011 (.029)	.012 (.029)
Urban	-.039* (.018)	-.042* (.018)	-.026 (.017)	-.028 (.017)
Constant	.392*** (.035)	.411*** (.035)	.457*** (.034)	.458*** (.034)
Observations	1,111	1,111	1,111	1,111
R ²	.164	.185	.232	.233
Adjusted R ²	.148	.169	.217	.218
Residual Std. Error	.260	.257	.249	.249
F Statistic	10.675***	11.767***	15.622***	15.043***

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Without controlling for Indigenous resentment (the omitted variable model), it appears that gender has no impact on attitudes toward redistribution. In fact, men express significantly higher levels of resentment (see Figure 3) and Indigenous resentment increases opposition to welfare.




FIGURE 3. Distribution of Indigenous resentment by gender

Accounting for the confounding effect of Indigenous resentment reveals that men express significantly lower opposition to welfare than other Canadians.

Similarly, without controlling for Indigenous resentment (the omitted variable model), it appears that region has little impact on attitudes toward redistribution. In fact, region is significantly related to the omitted variable, with residents of British Columbia and the Prairies expressing significantly higher levels of Indigenous resentment as compared to residents of Canada’s most populous province, Ontario (see Figure 4). Controlling for the effect of the omitted Indigenous resentment variable (Table 4, Model 3 or Model 4), we can see that British Columbian and Prairie folk express significantly *less* opposition to welfare than Ontarians; that is, Western Canadians want more government spending on welfare than Ontarians. This is an interesting finding, especially given the recent dominance of right-of-center parties in the Prairies.




FIGURE 4. Distribution of Indigenous resentment by region

Support for Resource Extraction

With respect to support for extracting natural resources, there is no evidence that affective prejudice predicts support for pipeline developments (Table 5, Model 2). By contrast, Indigenous resentment significantly increases support for pipelines. Increasing Indigenous resentment by one standard deviation increases support for pipelines by .05 points on the outcome measure which ranges from 0 to 1 (Table 5, Model 3). Although Indigenous resentment has a smaller effect on support for pipelines, ANOVA testing shows that Model 3, the Indigenous resentment model, is significantly better at capturing the data (see SM, Table S3). Controlling for both affective prejudice and Indigenous resentment in the same model hardly changes the impact of Indigenous resentment on pipeline support (Table 5, Model 4). In Model 4, affective prejudice appears to *increase* pipeline support. This is not due to collinearity but rather an unmodeled interaction between affective prejudice and income (Figure S3). This is a potentially interesting finding but not central to the aims of this present work; see the discussion in the Supplementary Materials for more details (Section S4). What matters for the present analysis is that—regardless of whether one controls for negative affect (or the interaction between affect and income)—Indigenous resentment always strongly predicts pipeline support.

Comparing the omitted variable model (Table 5, Model 1) and the Indigenous resentment model (Table 5, Model 3) again reveals that Indigenous resentment mediates the impact of gender on support for pipelines. Without controlling for Indigenous resentment (the omitted variable model), it appears that men are more supportive of pipelines. In fact, men express significantly higher levels of resentment (see Figure 3) and Indigenous resentment increases support for pipelines. Accounting for the confounding effect of Indigenous resentment, we can see that men express similar levels of support for pipelines as the rest of Canadians.

DISCUSSION

In settler-colonial states, attitudes toward Indigenous peoples have important implications for policy preferences. For one thing, anti-Indigenous attitudes are clearly related to opposition to welfare. Including Indigenous resentment in a model estimating opposition to welfare significantly

Table 5. OLS models predicting support for pipelines

	Dependent variable: support for pipelines			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Affective prejudice		-.001 (.009)		-.025* (.010)
Indigenous resentment			.050*** (.010)	.061*** (.011)
Right vote	.089*** (.021)	.089*** (.021)	.069*** (.021)	.071*** (.021)
Ideology	.021*** (.005)	.021*** (.005)	.016** (.005)	.016** (.005)
Man	.049* (.019)	.049* (.019)	.035 (.019)	.033 (.019)
Education				
Trade	.009 (.024)	.009 (.024)	.001 (.024)	-.001 (.024)
BA	.030 (.025)	.030 (.025)	.024 (.025)	.025 (.025)
Grad	-.036 (.036)	-.036 (.036)	-.030 (.036)	-.034 (.036)
Income				
\$29K or less	-.077* (.031)	-.077* (.031)	-.072* (.031)	-.072* (.031)
\$30K–59K	-.040 (.028)	-.040 (.028)	-.034 (.027)	-.034 (.027)
\$90K–119K	-.039 (.031)	-.039 (.031)	-.042 (.030)	-.041 (.030)
\$120K–149K	.003 (.034)	.004 (.034)	.004 (.034)	.009 (.034)
\$150K+	.059 (.039)	.059 (.039)	.050 (.038)	.054 (.038)
Age				
18–34	-.040 (.029)	-.040 (.029)	-.033 (.029)	-.031 (.029)
45–54	.070* (.028)	.070* (.028)	.074** (.027)	.073** (.027)
55–64	.135*** (.026)	.135*** (.026)	.143*** (.026)	.142*** (.026)
65+	.110** (.041)	.110** (.041)	.120** (.041)	.119** (.041)
Region				
BC	-.023 (.029)	-.023 (.029)	-.039 (.029)	-.042 (.029)
Prairies	.084*** (.025)	.085*** (.026)	.065* (.025)	.069** (.025)

Table 5. Continued

	Dependent variable: support for pipelines			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
English Quebec	-.034 (.028)	-.034 (.028)	-.033 (.028)	-.026 (.028)
Maritimes	-.008 (.036)	-.008 (.036)	-.014 (.035)	-.016 (.035)
Urban	-.049* (.021)	-.049* (.021)	-.041 (.021)	-.037 (.021)
Constant	.443*** (.041)	.442*** (.041)	.482*** (.041)	.479*** (.041)
Observations	1,111	1,111	1,111	1,111
R ²	.167	.167	.185	.189
Adjusted R ²	.152	.151	.169	.173
Residual Std. Error	.304	.304	.301	.300
F Statistic	10.922***	10.394***	11.762***	11.536***

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

improves model fit. My work replicates existing research showing that affective prejudice helps explain White settlers' opposition to redistribution (Harell, Soroka, and Ladner 2014). However, my work goes beyond existing studies by showing that affective prejudice is not the best way to identify the political consequences of anti-Indigenous attitudes. From a theoretical perspective, not all meaningful, negative outgroup attitudes are captured by measures of explicit dislike. For instance, settlers may not feel strong, explicit animosity but still hold subtler attitudes that are disempowering for Indigenous peoples—such as the belief that Indigenous peoples have gone too far in their push for land rights or do not deserve to have their languages protected. From a measurement perspective, measurement error—including social desirability bias—prevents measures of overt prejudice (including negative affect) from capturing sufficient variation in anti-Indigenous attitudes.

The tools we use impact our results and the conclusions we draw. Because affective prejudice *underestimates* the effect of anti-Indigenous attitudes on opposition to welfare, a researcher might be tempted to conclude that prejudice has a significant but not a substantive impact on redistributive attitudes. However, as my analysis shows, using the proper tool—the Indigenous resentment scale—reveals that, in fact,

anti-Indigenous attitudes have a significant and *substantive* impact on redistributive attitudes.

My paper also shows that White settlers' attitudes are related to another important policy area that disproportionately impacts Indigenous peoples: exploiting natural resources. Indigenous resentment significantly increases support for building pipelines, even controlling for related covariates such as region, vote choice, and ideology. Including the Indigenous resentment scale in a model predicting pipeline support improves model fit, compared to the omitted variable model. Even when controlling for affective prejudice (and the interaction between affective prejudice and income (see SM, Figure S3 and Table S2)), Indigenous resentment significantly predicts pipeline support. This offers evidence for the argument made by many Indigenous scholars and activists that any real efforts to address climate change also require decolonization.

Our present analysis does suffer certain limitations. First and foremost, my study only includes Canadian respondents. My work likely extends—albeit to varying degrees—to other Anglo-colonial contexts such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. However, future comparative studies are needed to clarify the impact of anti-Indigenous attitudes on policy attitudes in other Anglo-settler democracies. It would also be interesting to compare anti-Indigenous attitudes in Anglo-settler democracies to settler societies in the global south. Second, my analysis is limited to English-speaking, White Canadian settlers. Future Canadian research should endeavor to include settlers of color and French-speakers.

Our present work is also potentially open to the criticisms leveled at measures of symbolic racism—notably racial resentment—in the U.S. context. According to critics of the racial resentment scale, responses to the items that comprise the scale reflect “principled conservatism” (conservative ideology) instead of racial prejudice (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). However, recent U.S. research empirically tests whether the racial resentment survey items exhibit differential item functioning and finds that, even correcting for the influence of conservative principles, the racial resentment scale significantly predicts attitudes toward government spending (Enders 2019). In fact, Enders (2019) finds no statistically significant differences between the effects of the uncorrected or corrected scales on any outcomes, including spending preferences. There is little reason to be concerned that racial resentment is merely an expression of “principled conservatism.”

CONCLUSION

My analysis uses original survey data and a novel scale measuring Indigenous resentment to offer an empirical look at the political consequences of White settler attitudes toward Indigenous peoples. Drawing on Indigenous and settler-colonial theory, I make the case that a valid measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes must be attentive to the distinct contours of settler-Indigenous conflicts—particularly with respect to conflicts over land. My analysis demonstrates the usefulness of using a measure of Indigenous resentment—a more subtle and valid measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes—in political science research. I show that Indigenous resentment predicts important policy attitudes: opposition to welfare and support for extractive policies (building pipelines).

Furthermore, I show that Indigenous resentment is a better predictor of support for these policies than a measure of affective anti-Indigenous prejudice. Replicating existing findings, I show that anti-Indigenous prejudice has a significant but small impact on opposition to welfare; measures of negative affect *underestimate* the impact of anti-Indigenous attitudes on opposition to welfare. I also show that by itself, affective prejudice does not significantly predict support for pipeline developments (although accounting for the interaction between affective prejudice and income it does appear that, among the highest earning Canadians, dislike does predict pipeline support (Figure S3 and Table S2)).

Going forward, future studies should endeavor to study anti-Indigenous attitudes in other post-colonial contexts to compare differences across contexts, both comparing attitudes in Anglo-settler states and comparing attitudes in former colonies in the global south. It would also be interesting to study Indigenous resentment over time in Canada. Indigenous peoples are the fastest growing population in Canada, and overtime analyses of settler attitudes could help identify how changing demographics impact settlers' racial attitudes. In addition to studying Indigenous resentment (measured in this study as a White out-group attitude), it would be interesting to consider whether demographic changes stemming from growing Indigenous populations also activate the salience of White in-group attitudes, or White consciousness. U.S. research shows that when the proportion of White people in a population decreases due to immigration, White consciousness—White peoples' identification with their in-group—increases (Jardina 2019). Identifying whether demographic changes stemming from growing Indigenous populations also activate White consciousness would clarify whether it is immigration (an increasing foreign-born

population) or race (an increasing *non-White* population) that activates White consciousness.

With respect to outgroup attitudes and policy preferences, it would also be interesting to study the intersection of Indigeneity and immigration. Since President Donald Trump took office in the United States, five out of the six children who died while they were in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security were Indigenous (Nolan 2019). Often, border agents only provide translations in Spanish—forgetting the existence of Indigenous peoples in the Americas is resulting in tragic consequences. The death of Indigenous children in the custody of Anglo-settler state institutions did not end with the closing of the last Indian residential school. My present work has focused on the political consequences of anti-Indigenous attitudes—both affective prejudice and Indigenous resentment—but future scholars might also consider the political consequences of *non-attitudes* toward Indigenous peoples (e.g., ambivalence, explicit lack of caring, lack of awareness, or endorsing the belief that Indigenous peoples or their cultures have “disappeared”).

Settler-colonialism is an important axis of inequality and should not be omitted from political science research. My work sets the groundwork for a new research agenda on White racial attitudes and political behavior in settler-colonial contexts. In particular, I hope to illustrate the value in turning our gaze away from a strict focus on the perceived deficits of Indigenous peoples (Walter and Andersen 2013). Instead, more attention should be paid to the attitudes of the settlers who imagined the Indian problem into existence and to the lasting impact that White settlers’ racial attitudes have had—and continue to have—on politics in settler-colonial states.

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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit <https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2020.25>.

NOTES

1 A note on terminology: “Indigenous peoples” is commonly used in international or scholarly discourse. When possible I try to use the distinct nation names that peoples commonly identify themselves by (such as Anishinaabe, Dene, or Haida) but where a global term is appropriate I use the term Indigenous. By “settlers” I am referring to any non-Indigenous peoples residing on Indigenous lands in settler-colonial states, regardless of generation.

2 Yet another line of research considers *implicit measures* of anti-Indigenous attitudes (e.g., Chaney, Burke, and Burkley 2011; Devos, Nosek, and Banaji 2007; Saminaden, Loughnan, and Haslam 2010). The purpose of this present work is to develop a scale that taps into a set of subtler anti-Indigenous attitudes, not implicit associations. By *subtler attitudes* I mean attitudes that people are aware of (these attitudes exist at the level of cognitive awareness—they are *not* implicit associations that manifest below the level of cognitive awareness) but these attitudes are subtler in the sense that they are not explicitly *hostile* (they are not expressions of “old-fashioned racism” or explicit dislike).

3 In excellent comparative experimental work, Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar (2016) use an experiment to show that Canadians are less willing to redistribute when target group members are Indigenous.

4 There was relatively little missing data (Table S1). Still, multiple imputation is generally preferable to list-wise deletion because it accounts for uncertainty and thus yields more accurate standard errors (Azur et al. 2011). However, imputing missing data on outcome variables is controversial; since this is not a hill I want to die on, I dealt with missing on the DV and primary IV through list-wise deletion. As a robustness check, I also estimated my models with the original, non-imputed data (dropping all missing through list-wise deletion). Despite the slightly smaller *n*, the results are not substantively different. The original, non-imputed data is published with the imputed dataset and scholars can replicate the analysis on either.

5 Treating the outcomes as categorical and estimating ordered logit models does not change the substantive results (see Supplementary Material (SM), Tables S4 and S5).

6 Item analysis reveals that the reliability of the Indigenous resentment scale would decrease if any of the items are excluded (see Beauvais (2020) for more details). However, although all the items are significantly correlated, none of correlation coefficients between any two items exceed .67 (see SM, Figure S1). This addresses the concern that some of the items are *too* similar and might be inflating the α . A smaller subset of items, the four-item “shortened Indigenous resentment scale,” comprising of the items tapping into attitudes toward land claims, protecting Indigenous languages, no special favors, and unfair taxes, also comprises a highly reliable scale. See Beauvais (2020) for a discussion of the creation of the full scale, the shortened scale, and the single-item measure.

7 I did not include a measure of political sophistication, so cannot check whether there is attribution bias as there appears to be in the anti-Black racial resentment scale items (Gomez and Wilson 2006). Whether the Indigenous resentment measure behaves in a similar way is an interesting question for future research.

8 “Else” includes both respondents who live in rural areas and suburbs. Although suburban life may be more similar to city life in many respects, when it comes to attitudes toward Indigenous peoples (the primary concept of interest), suburban dwellers’ attitudes are more similar to rural than city folk.

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