

statement of the problem, a succinct review of previous scholarship, and a persuasive argument that this speech is a *deprecatio* only in the narrowest, most technical sense make for a highly educational and informative contribution. Finally, Lord Justice John Laws, himself an advocate and currently a Judge of the Court of Appeal, provides for the entire work an epilogue on 'Cicero and the Modern Advocate'. This offering is certainly a salutary addition to a volume dedicated to the theme of advocacy, though readers outside the British system should be cautioned that some references (particularly those to famous barristers past and present) will be unfamiliar to them.

The Editors have included not only a bibliography of works cited, an index of passages, and a general index, but also an extremely useful appendix that lists in chronological order all Cicero's known appearances as an advocate, with an outline of details, noting his success or failure (when known) in each case. Oxford has done an admirable job in giving us an attractive, error-free volume, one that should certainly grace the bookshelves of all those interested in Ciceronian oratory.

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## AGENCY IN GREEK

GEORGE (C.H.) *Expressions of Agency in Ancient Greek*. Pp. x + 288. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Cased, £50, US\$85. ISBN: 0-521-84789-3.

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As is well known, ancient Greek expresses the agent of a passive verb using *ὑπό* plus genitive. Perfect and pluperfect passives and the forms in *-τέος* and *-τέον*, however, use a dative of agent instead. But exceptions occur: sometimes *ὑπό* + gen. is used even with a perfect or pluperfect passive or *-τέος/-τέον* form; sometimes a dative of agent appears with other verb forms; and sometimes an agent is introduced by a preposition other than *ὑπό*. This book investigates the conditions influencing the choice of expression for the agent of a passive verb. Although this question has been studied before, George provides an unprecedentedly detailed and systematic analysis on the basis of a large body of material.

The study has both synchronic and diachronic aims: we learn not only what factors influenced choices of agent marking but how these choices varied from author to author and how they changed over time. Although the main focus is on Classical Greek, the whole period from Homer to the twelfth century A.D. is taken in, with some discussion at the early end of comparative evidence for the passive voice and agent marking in Proto-Indo-European, and of the scanty attestation of passives in Mycenaean, and at the late end with reference forward to modern Greek.

Before agent marking with passive verbs can be discussed, one must decide what counts as a passive verb (rather than, say, a middle) and what counts as an agent (rather than an instrument, cause, etc.). A careful first chapter provides working criteria to identify constructions involving a passive and an agent for the purposes of this book; discussion then proceeds to the reasons why Greek authors use passives at all, and particularly passives with expressed agents.

Investigation of actual choices of agent marking begins in Chapter 2 with Homer.

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The results are different in a number of respects from those based on Classical prose and drama. A section comparing later epic (Apollonius Rhodius, Quintus of Smyrna and Nonnus) shows that these authors were remarkably sensitive to Homeric practice.

Chapter 3, on agent constructions with perfect (and pluperfect) passives, focusses on the circumstances under which Herodotus, Thucydides, Lysias, Xenophon, Plato and Demosthenes use *ὑπό* + gen. instead of a dative of agent, and traces the decline of the dative of agent from the fifth century B.C. to Polybius, the New Testament and Plutarch. Interestingly, the decline is found to be motivated chiefly by the replacement of perfect passive plus agent constructions with the perfect active: as a result of developments in the perfect system, *γέγραπται μοι* gave way to *γέγραφα*.

By far the longest chapter (Chapter 4) is devoted to factors motivating the use of prepositions other than *ὑπό* to mark agents in Classical prose. The prepositions involved turn out to fall into two categories: ablative prepositions (*ἐκ*, *παρά* + gen., occasionally *ἀπό*) and locative prepositions (*παρά* + dat. and *πρός* + gen.), with the particular choices within these groups varying from author to author. Not surprisingly, where an ablative preposition introduces the agent the verb usually involves motion of the subject of the passive verb away from the agent (e.g. *δίδομαι*, *πέμπομαι*). Where locative prepositions occur, no such motion occurs and the verb is often one of thinking or believing (e.g. *νομίζομαι*, *γινώσκομαι*). A further distinction between two categories of verb cuts across this one. Some verbs normally mark the agent with *ὑπό*, but may use other prepositions when the agent (or participant one might regard as an agent) does not do much to initiate the action; such participants are hardly agents at all and are often low in animacy. Thus, *ὠφελοῦμαι ὑπό* means 'be helped by (with the helper's active participation)' but *ὠφελοῦμαι* plus an ablative preposition means 'derive benefit from (without the helper's active participation)'. Other verbs mark the agent with a preposition other than *ὑπό* as a matter of course, but these verbs use *ὑπό* for an agent of low animacy that might otherwise be mistaken for something other than an agent. Thus, the passive of *δίδωμι* is regularly construed with ablative prepositions, but if something has been given by custom, this is expressed with *δέδοται ὑπό τοῦ νόμου* (p. 172). In places, I wondered whether most examples could be fitted slightly too easily into a scheme that accommodates verbs which use *ὑπό* except for low-animacy agents (or quasi-agents) and also verbs which reserve *ὑπό* for low-animacy agents. However, several of the verbs G. examines occur sufficiently often in his corpus and with sufficiently consistent behaviour to convince me by the end of the chapter that the pattern suggested is genuine. Throughout the book but especially in this chapter, discussions of individual passages yield some nice insights. For example, Xenophon's use (*Cyn.* 13.4) of *διδάσκειθαι* with *παρά* + gen. for 'to be taught by those who truly understand something good', but with *ὑπό* + gen. for 'to be taught by those who are skilled at deceiving' is related to pessimism in Socratic circles about the possibility of teaching virtue actively (pp. 152–3).

Chapter 5 investigates the prepositions introducing agents in the trimeters of Attic tragedy and comedy. The usage of tragedy turns out to be very different from that of prose, and metrical considerations are often crucial. Choices of prepositions in comedy are much closer to those found in prose; G. suggests that the greater freedom of the comic trimeter in allowing resolutions (and hence in enabling *ὑπό* to be used more freely) is largely responsible.

A final chapter surveys developments in post-Classical Greek and argues that, contrary to previous assumptions, *ὑπό* was not replaced directly by *ἀπό* as the

dominant preposition to introduce an agent but gave way in the spoken language first to *παρά* + gen., and to *ἀπό* only after the twelfth century A.D.

G.'s work gives what is known about ancient Greek agent marking a new foundation and adds considerable detail to what has been done before. Furthermore, the work yields some altogether new results. It is likely to be the definitive treatment of its subject for a good time to come.

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## AESTHETICS AND LATIN POETRY

MARTINDALE (C.) *Latin Poetry and the Judgement of Taste. An Essay in Aesthetics*. Pp. x + 265. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Cased, £50. ISBN: 0-19-924040-X.

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Despite the word 'essay' in its title, this is an ambitious book, with both a theoretical and an empirical side to it, and an evangelistic purpose. Martindale wants to defend the aesthetic judgement of works of art against what he calls 'culturalism' or 'ideology critique'. In the first of four long chapters he argues that we should take Kant's idea of the 'judgement of taste' and his assertion that such judgement is essentially disinterested as the basis of our own practice. In the second chapter he defends this approach against the charge of formalism by arguing that the judgement of taste should be a judgement of both form and content taken together. The third chapter discusses aesthetics and politics and defends the aesthetic against the complaint that it is a 'reactionary' category (his inverted commas). The last considers what an aesthetic criticism of Latin poetry in the coming century might look like, and champions Walter Pater as a model for both theory and practice. Pater and Kant are, in M.'s own words, the deuteragonist and the protagonist of his essay (p. 237). The book is diversified by a number of digressions (kept within bounds) and by pieces of practical criticism, which suggest a fine literary mind (the discussions of Horace are especially interesting).

An authoritative assessment of M.'s account of Kant would require another reviewer than this one, but I venture some tentative thoughts. First, though Kant may be the foundation of modern philosophical aesthetics, he can hardly be entirely right; his achievement, as with his moral theory, is more to expose the problem than to solve it. As his theory of the will states a grand contradiction (we are determined on the phenomenal level, free on the noumenal level), so his aesthetic theory seems to make the judgement of taste both subjective and objective: on the one hand, aesthetic value does not inhere in the object, as redness inheres in a red ball; on the other, a judgement of taste calls for universal assent, and great art is created by a quality within the artist called genius. Second, Kant is trying to define what any aesthetic experience (including the experience of natural beauty) actually is: his *Geschmacksurteil* is a descriptive not an evaluative term. M. shifts it to mean fine discrimination, or good taste; it is not clear to me whether he understands that he has made this shift. M.'s call to Latinists (and others) to pay more attention to aesthetics is to be applauded; but it may be doubted both whether Kant provides a firm base on which to stand and whether his theory entails any particular way of discussing literary texts.

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