MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY IN A HIPPOCRATIC TEXT

BARTOŠ (H.) *Philosophy and Dietetics in the Hippocratic* On Regimen. *A Delicate Balance of Health*. (Studies in Ancient Medicine 44.) Pp. x + 340. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015. Cased, €135, US $175. ISBN: 978-90-04-28921-5.

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This is a valuable book, among whose merits is a well-argued 'speculation' (p. 213) that the Hippocratic author's understanding of *psyche* is based on the transmigration of souls, a concept like Plato's, which may derive from Pythagorean and Orphic thought, but which is applied to birth and the embodied life rather than Plato's focus on the soul's escape from the body in death.

Regimen 1–4, despite being one of the longest Hippocratic treatises, has not been treated well. Galen (*On the Powers of Foods* 1.1) thought the first book unworthy of Hippocrates, but was better disposed to the second. B. (pp. 4–5), noting dismissive comments by G. Kirk ('an uninventive compiler' who occasionally 'simply did not know what he meant') and J. Barnes ('a silly farrago of ill-digested Presocratic opinions'), counsels, less grandly, further thought rather than rejection of what may seem strange. His claim (p. 8) is tripartite and ambitious, bringing the treatise into the mainstream of later fifth-century thought: the author uses some of the most important philosophical ideas of the period; has one of the best-articulated accounts of the analogy between macrocosm and microcosm, as also of *physis*; and provides 'the most profoundly-elaborated' account before Plato of how body and soul relate. B. addresses both 'philosophy' and 'medical history' in his study of ancient medicine, following T. Tracy's *Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle* (1969), which sets out the biological basis of much philosophical thought. B. switches the emphasis to medical texts, a welcome shift since medical historians such as E. Craik (*Hippocratic Corpus* [2015]) see the work as organic and coherent, and the philosophers now need to reconsider, as indeed 'philosophers' within 'medicine' such as P. van der Eijk have done. B. claims the author's impact on the thought of both Plato and Aristotle, persuasively, I think.

The first chapter surveys the development of dietetics in the early Hippocratic texts well. Of the pre-Hippocratic period I am not so sure. Following G. Wöhrle (*Gesundheitslehre* [1990]), B. (p. 17) finds no *hygieia* in Homer. (I disagree: restoration of strength to weary warriors with food and drink mixed in a *kykeôn* and of mental pleasure with *mythoi* in *Iliad* 11.618–44 and elsewhere seems to anticipate Mnesitheus, fr. 41 Bertier, and Galen on *kopos* ['fatigue'] in *De sanitate tuenda* 4.) B., with Wöhrle, allows the presence of good health in Archaic literature such as Simonides, fr. 604 Page, and Pindar, *Pythian* 3.73: Hygieia is a goddess by 400 B.C. in Ariphron. This textual evidence, however, including Solon, fr. 13.62 West (add the *scholia*), draws on deep cultural traditions. We should at least ask ourselves whether the Greeks had a life beyond the texts. Solon surely did not invent the concept; rather, the Hippocratic authors developed *hygieia* from an ancient tradition previously expressed in poetry that linked health with wealth and other good things vital to well-being. This tradition is echoed in the last section of *Regimen in Health* and the first of *Affections* (B. p. 46): the Hippocratic authors were deeply aware of the cultural place of *hygieia*. Similarly, B. tells us (p. 18) that Hesiod has all diseases coming from gods; but the author of *On the Sacred Disease* in his turn says in his final chapter that all diseases are *theia*.

In discussion of previous scholarship, including the *CMG* editors R. Joly and S. Byl, B. is broadly convincing: *Regimen* was written for 'laymen' – in response to other views, B. declares (p. 47), 'as a matter of fact the author never addresses physicians'. B. adopts a broad approach, against those who would see *Regimen* as limited to a particular topic (pp. 68–9). He frequently pursues close reading of the text, and combines this with strong argumentation, for example on the tension between fire and water (pp. 72–7). The four books of the treatise are not necessarily all identical in thought (p. 88), but they are compatible with each other, from 1 to 4. Thus mental health in 4 depends on physiological functions as do diet, exercise and bathing in 2 and 3. Personal constitution is key, and (pp. 82ff.) not every constitution is in proportion or in a good mixture: 1.32 gives the principles for constitutions. (Sex is slightly different: the embryology in Book 1 is not carried through into the main regimen discussions in 2 and 3: men and women, it seems [surprisingly] are the same in dietary needs. *Regimen in Health* has a different view.) On lifestyle, B. reviews (pp. 85ff.) excesses of foods or exercises well at 3.70 and 3.73: regimen can cure more gently than drugs. B. is judicious in related discussion of dietary humours in *On Ancient Medicine* and on the other regimen books, *Nature of Man* and *Regimen in Health*. B. concludes (p. 100) that dietetics (and the theory thereof) developed dramatically in the late fifth century.

Chapter 2 addresses the philosophical contribution of *Regimen*: deep physical principles lie behind daily activity and technical processes (p. 124), these latter are used to provide analogies for the physiology of health. The unity of opposites is particularly important, with fire and water maintaining a dynamic tension between each other. B. reviews the Presocratic background on which the author draws eclectically, declaring (p. 163) that this Hippocratic author is the essential link between Heraclitus and company and Plato. B. is particularly strong on the author's use of analogies between *technai* and *physis* – often better than previous analyses. On music and cooking compared with *physis* in 1.18 B. is convincing on both text and concepts of harmony. On the analogy of the body with iron at 1.13, B. is uncertain (pp. 157–8 and n. 237): bathing after exercise is surely meant, like tempering iron in water – Galen, *De sanitate tuenda* 3.4 explains how such bathing works.

Chapter 3, on pre-Platonic discussions of *soma*/*psyche* (p. 169), offers (p. 178) interesting contrasts with Democritus (who divides body and soul) and is strong on the coherence of the body–soul connection through the four books, linking, for example, 1.35 on the constitution with 3.71 on exercise and 4.89 on the soul and dreams. Discussion of Book 4 is well done (pp. 204–7), as is embryology (pp. 207ff.).

The last chapter deals with the transmigration of souls (anticipating Plato) and innate heat and the enkindled soul (anticipating Aristotle). Following J. Jouanna, B. argues (pp. 240–1) for Plato's *Timaeus* drawing on *Regimen* for the idea of soul and body interacting, though Plato modifies the non-moralised *Regimen* into a 'moralized dietetics'. On Aristotle, B. argues that an ambivalent approach to medicine did not prevent him from drawing on the innate heat of *Regimen* as a concept to be developed in his biology. B. succeeds in showing that far from being an outlier in medical or philosophical studies, the author of *Regimen* was at the heart of the debate about nature; about the relationship of body and soul; and about the biological function of heat – before the hugely influential works of Plato and Aristotle.

Underpinning such claims, B.'s argument is careful, persuasive and generous. Only occasionally, for example in an appendix on the 'unfortunate story' of a much-repeated confusion of one Hippocratic treatise for another in W.D. Ross' *Parva Naturalia* (1955), does a note of severity creep in. The expression is generally clear, but there are occasional small lapses such as the use of 'undermine' where 'underline' is surely expected (p. 219

etc.). A final edit was also needed to iron out typos and the unidiomatic use of the troublesome article in English.

The bibliography is extensive, but I could not find S. Laser 1983 (p. 17), J. Ducatillon 1969 (p. 52) or G. Sörbom 2002 (p. 129).There is a tiny general index and a good *index locorum* and *nominum*.

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PLATONIC VIEWS ON EPISTEMOLOGY

TRABATTONI (F.) *Essays on Plato's Epistemology*. (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1, 53.) Pp. xxvi + 308. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016. Cased, €80. ISBN: 978-94-6270-059-8.
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This volume is a collection of fourteen previously published essays, many of which have been revised and translated into English for the first time. As a collection it is to be commended for its consistency and unified methodology. The work culminates in a reading of Plato's views about the limits of human reason: knowledge, understood as direct or unmediated apprehension of the forms, is impossible for embodied human beings. T.'s sustained effort to defend such a weak epistemology on the part of Plato will prove useful and interesting, if only as a foil, for all those investigating the structure of knowledge in the dialogues.

The first six chapters advance an interpretation of the *Theaetetus*, according to which *epistêmê* is doxastic in nature and therefore fallible. The three chapters that follow examine the *Cratylus* and the central books of the *Republic*, mounting an attack on the intuitionist view, which claims that knowledge is possible through direct apprehension of the forms. The central arguments of the volume conclude in a reading of the *Parmenides*, whereon Plato's forms are not metaphysical realities; rather, they are inferred from sensible particulars without independent confirmation. The final chapters bolster this deflationary metaphysical interpretation with evidence from Aristotle, re-examine the Third Man Argument in its light, and address the challenges of reconciling such a weak metaphysics and epistemology to the ambitious philosophical projects described in the *Republic* and *Laws*.

Given the breadth of the work as a whole and the space restrictions of this format, it will be best to avoid the finer points of T.'s interpretation of any one dialogue. These remarks focus instead on the central claim of the volume, developed in the first six chapters and expanded upon in the rest of the work, that *epistêmê* is inescapably doxastic in nature.

In Chapter 2, 'Logos and Doxa', the failure of the three definitions of *epistêmê* in the *Theaetetus* is taken as evidence for the view that *logos*, and knowledge therefore, can never 'fully transcend' or 'free itself' from *doxa* (p. 28). Knowledge is necessarily doxastic, on this view, because 'it is only through *logos* (i.e. through reasoning of some sort, albeit [sic] only embryonic reasoning) that the soul acquires the possibility of distinguishing – by granting its assent – between opinions which strike it as true and opinions which strike it as false' (p. 28). That knowledge requires a *logos*, then, seems to be what renders it fallible.

However, it is worth considering why *logoi* are, on this account, responsible for the fallibility of knowledge. Unfortunately, the arguments for this claim are somewhat opaque. In