

situation in Turkey raises some important practical problems in terms of suggested sources. For example, Raw's suggestion of the website for the "Ministry of Higher Education" (YÖK) as an additional Turkish bibliographic source is problematic. Not only is there no bibliography for cinema on their website, but YÖK is not a scientific research institution, and is even recently responsible for impeding academic freedom and freedom of research. This is a pragmatic criticism and one that is evident for those more sensitive to the political reality today.

Although Raw did not set out to do a political analysis of the current Turkish cinema, he, nevertheless, did not develop all that he could have developed. It is possible that he has, in fact, considered the present Turkish political context in which he works and made a conscious decision not to, and who can criticize him for that?

I do not doubt the sincerity and personal integrity of Raw's very ambitious intentions. However, the methodology and support of his arguments remain challenging. It is difficult for a study of six filmmakers to be "the" definitive work in terms of defining one relationship with a non-native culture through an exchange with cinema, and even more difficult to try to prove how one's relationship with a cultural object can define one's "ontological existence." Perhaps concentrating more on the films themselves and their own language, without burdening them with ancient Anatolian mythology, one might arrive at a less ambitious but more deferential exchange.

CALVERT W. JONES, *Bedouins into Bourgeois: Remaking Citizens for Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). Pp. 283. \$70.84 cloth. ISBN: 9781107175723

REVIEWED BY KAREN E. YOUNG, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Washington, D.C.;
e-mail: karen.young@agsiw.org
doi: [10.1017/S0020743818000697](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743818000697)

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) that Calvert W. Jones describes in her book, *Bedouins into Bourgeois*, is in some ways a relic, a thing of the past. Her field work completed in 2010–11, with follow-up trips through 2014, predates some of the most important changes in the UAE's brief history, including its first major military intervention (and efforts at state building and reconstruction) in neighboring Yemen. The Emirati troops in Yemen included recruits from the introduction of national conscription in military service, begun in 2014. In the Emirates, there is now a new population of war veterans, some viewed as martyrs for their defense of the homeland, a service very few military personnel or diplomats considered a remote possibility before 2015. Second, the decline in global oil prices since late 2014 has led to a revolution in public finance in the Gulf states, in the reduction of subsidies on electricity, water, and fuel, along with hiring freezes in the public sector, and the introduction of a value-added tax on goods and services. The rentier model, as we have known it, is being dismantled, or at least reconfigured. And it is unfortunate that her 2017 publication could not address the impact of these changes on her thesis, but I suppose that is what a second book, or another scholar's investigation, might set out to do. The period of time that Jones describes becomes an important historical moment, especially in light of how rulers identify weakness in citizens, as if in some prescient preparation for the war and austerity to come. The unique timing of her investigation may be its enduring value as a window into the moment before everything changed for the UAE, along with her strong theoretical analysis of state tools of social engineering.

Jones sets out to explore how state social engineering projects to build a "pro-globalization" citizenry, mostly through secondary education, achieve some modest success in instilling a strong sense of patriotism, but fail in efforts to promote what she terms "pro-market" qualities such

as entrepreneurialism, productive risk-taking, industriousness, adaptability, and lessened dependence on the state. Instead, Jones finds from her survey work among Emirati high school students a deepened dependency and sense of entitlement towards state resources. She terms this the “paradox of the entitled patriot.” Methodologically, one might question the use of children as survey respondents to make a broad assessment of state–society relations, as most teenagers worldwide tend to find work and self-reliance an unattractive alternative to the parental (or state) pocketbook.

Moreover, her survey work is supplemented with elite ethnography, notably with interviews with the ruler of the emirate of Ras al Khaimah. Again, here we have a possible selection bias, as her study of the relationship of the ruler to the ruled neglects some key power dynamics among Emirati ruling families within the federation. The ruler of Ras al Khaimah, in fact, has very little authority in any federal decision making—over educational policy, defense policy, or especially the federal budget. He is, in effect, a dependent on the state himself, as Abu Dhabi (and by extension its ruling family the Al Nayhans) is the center of the federal government and in control of the country’s vast oil wealth. The northern emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, Ras al Khaimah, Um al Quwain, and Fujairah rely on the central government to cover their infrastructure expenses, and even to control their access and allotment of electricity through the national grid system. The domestic politics of the UAE do matter in an evaluation of social policy and social engineering, especially as policy formation is highly centralized in the office of the crown prince, Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan.

As Jones reiterates in her theoretical discussion of what goes wrong in top-down social engineering design, the importance of local knowledge informs both policy and analysis of policy outcomes. In her understanding of how social policy is formulated, Jones has placed perhaps too little attention on the distribution of power within the UAE and who benefits, particularly in strengthening the hierarchy of leadership within the government. It is her anecdotal description of the prominence of Jujitsu as a national sport and part of secondary sports curricula that is most telling of this oversight. Modeling appropriate behavior, state-sanctioned masculinity, and the art of defensive control, the insertion of Jujitsu into national secondary sports curricula was a decision made by Mohammed bin Zayed, reflecting his own practice and his power to mandate somewhat arbitrary influence on the nation’s youth.

On the question of social engineering of a “pro-market” mentality, there is also some important variation within the case. The UAE is the most diversified economy of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, but this is less due to the success of the national curriculum, or even the centralized authority of the Abu Dhabi leadership. Rather, it is the historical economic development model deployed in Dubai, which has little oil wealth and has devoted itself to a project of Arab liberalization driven by state-led real estate investment and, in many cases, gambles on tourism and openness, at least in the sense of its reliance on foreign human capital and idea flow. The proof is in the deal flow. In 2017 Dubai led the Middle East in investment flows and new company stock listings, mergers, and acquisitions, in both the number of deals and their financial value. Where there is entrepreneurship in the Middle East, it has thrived in Dubai, especially in e-commerce and fintech deals. The variation within the UAE suggests that something is driving this pro-market, entrepreneurial behavior, and that it is not necessarily dependent on—nor exclusive of—Emirati nationals. It is the complexity of demographics and openness to outsiders, which is both a policy and a culture, that has enabled this growth. Jones does not engage substantially with the issue of demographic imbalance, and how the embrace of foreigners (as much as 90% of the population in Dubai) works in parallel with proliberalization social engineering. The demographics of foreigners to citizens is not uniform across the UAE, and in her subsample space of Ras al Khaimah, the difference is notable.

Perhaps the most important tension in the making of citizens, regardless of the ambition by the state to make them “pro-market” or simply “patriotic,” is the effort to distinguish citizens from foreigners. In the cultural pressure to assume national dress (women in black abayas, men in

white thobes), arguments over appropriate use of English in schooling, and stigma in assimilation through divorce rates and intermarriage, there are constant and sharp decisions citizens make in daily life over identity and their presentation and visibility as “nationals.” Jones is correct to investigate the drivers of these pressures, and to try and single out the state’s role and interest in creating nationals of a certain economic and cultural perspective. This book is a unique window, both into a moment of state–society relations in the United Arab Emirates, and as a continuum of social theory studies that tries to isolate and measure the science of state-led social engineering. I recommend this book for its research design, strong theoretical grounding, and contribution to a growing rich ethnography of life in the Gulf states.

MANSOUR NASASRA, *The Naqab Bedouins: A Century of Politics and Resistance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017). Pp. 288. \$60.00 cloth. ISBN: 9780231175302

REVIEWED BY AHMAD AMARA, Polonsky Academy Fellow, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Jerusalem; e-mail: ahmadamara@gmail.com
doi: [10.1017/S0020743818000703](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743818000703)

The Bedouin inhabitants of Palestine, including those of today’s southern Israel, have long been marginalized in mainstream scholarship. Recently, however, new literature has appeared, most notably work produced by native scholars covering a wide range of questions pertaining to history and politics. *The Naqab Bedouins* is one of those new scholarly works. It makes an important contribution to the field, and is the first to provide a comprehensive account, temporally and thematically, of the Bedouin communities of the Naqab area. The book extends from the very end of Ottoman rule (1900–1917) through to the present, though its bulk is on the years of Israeli military rule between 1948 and 1966. Within this period, Nasasra looks at state–society relations and documents a rich record of what he terms “Bedouin struggle” around questions of state making and governance such as policing, urbanization, displacement, education, cross-border relationships, and political participation.

The book argues for the significance of Bedouin history and politics to understanding the present conditions of the Naqab Bedouins in Israel, and more broadly to better study the relationship between state and indigenous peoples. Nasasra undertakes a subaltern approach to argue against prevailing assumptions that depict the Bedouin as passive victims and denies them agency in making their history. Thus, the author explores the various forms and actions of the Naqab Bedouins in defending their community and identity, and thus resisting state domination in various eras. For example, he shows how the Bedouin were active participants in the founding of the Ottoman Beersheba subdistrict by serving in the administration and by making donations to build schools. Most notably, the author demonstrates Bedouin participation and activism in the Palestinian national movement and struggle during British rule, mainly their role during the Great Arab Revolt (1936–39). The book’s findings are groundbreaking in demonstrating the multiple identities of the Bedouin, including the local and the national, and their role in the anticolonial Palestinian struggle. Then, Nasasra discusses various developments pertaining to the Israeli rule including, the social destruction of the community, whose vast majority was expelled or fled the 1948 conflict, and the displacement and concentration of the remaining Bedouins into an enclosed zone to be then subjected to military rule until 1966. Despite the cruelty and oppressive nature of military rule, the author shows how Bedouin residents, among other actions, refused some military orders, wrote petitions to the Israeli authorities to pose various demands, and maintained cross-border relationships with their Bedouin fellows and families. Further, most of the Bedouin