

maps used in the struggle over territories and identities. As a result, cartography as a science and as a political technology (linked to the development of national libraries, state archives, and map collections) became the language of politics as states became nationalized and renationalized, territorialized and reterritorialized.

Aesthetically, the book is also superb. It is based on detailed work in rich map archives in eleven languages. There are 60 black-and-white figures and 17 superb full-color plates of maps. The 55 single-spaced pages of notes are a treasure trove of rich citational and analytical material, and the 26-page index is excellent.

Mapping Europe's Borderlands is also a testament to the value of international research funding in the humanities and social sciences and how the resulting archival and field work depends on extensive contacts, support networks, and archival access. That Seegel is able to work across nearly a dozen languages is further evidence of the necessity of deep investments in extensive training in the humanities and social sciences, particularly at this time of cuts in funding. The book's acknowledgements should be required reading for scholars and students alike as a model of engaged archival and field research to which many can only aspire.

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Metternich, the Great Powers, and the Eastern Question. By Miroslav Šedivý. Pilsen: University of West Bohemia Press, 2013. 1,033 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Figures. Hard bound.

A thousand-page book on Metternich's policies toward the Ottoman empire from 1821 to 1841 might seem like a bit much, but this is an excellent piece of scholarship, thoroughly researched, clearly presented, and nicely written. I must admit that I found Miroslav Šedivý's work particularly engaging because he agreed with my own views on Austria's eastern policies in the eighteenth century and how they carried over to the first half of the nineteenth century. Metternich had no interest in annexing any of the Balkans, because it would have been a drain on the monarchy in every way imaginable. He did not want the Ottoman empire expelled from the Balkans, because that might have opened that area to national states, which would have enticed the Habsburg Serbs and Romanians to join them. Or it might have led to Russian expansion, which would have placed Russia on Austria's eastern and southern borders. Metternich believed that international security depended on the maintenance of the Ottoman empire. As to his day-to-day diplomacy, he focused on what was achievable, always keeping these overall goals in mind.

From 1821 to 1831 Metternich focused on the Greek issue. He was opposed to great power interference in the Greek Revolution, especially anything that supported the revolutionaries. He believed that the Greek uprising was an internal matter for the Ottomans and that outside interference violated international custom. The British, he noted, would be most unhappy if the great powers passed resolutions and signed agreements calling upon the British government to accept outside mediation in its dealings with the Irish. At the same time, however, he saw as events rolled along that the only way to defuse the Greek crisis was to persuade the sultan to make concessions.

After Turkey's defeat by Russia in 1829, Metternich favored an independent Greece because an autonomous Greece would be nothing but trouble for the sultan. However, he also thought the new Greece should remain small—not much above the Isthmus of

Corinth. As to which prince should rule Greece, Metternich studiously avoided suggesting anyone. When the British sent him a list that included the names of two Austrian archdukes, he asked that their names be removed.

Šedivý also explores Metternich's views on religion, especially Islam. He regarded it as a faith that did not proselytize and whose laws had little to do with non-Muslims. Real religious intolerance he found to be among Christians. The Armenian Orthodox (as Šedivý labels them) were intolerant of Armenian Catholics and the Greek Orthodox intolerant of Greek Catholics. He opposed any Christian protectorate over the Holy Land, because Christian groups were more likely to persecute other Christians than Muslims would persecute anyone. Besides, the Holy Land was sacred to all three Abrahamic faiths, and the least likely to be intolerant toward others were the Muslims.

In the 1820s Metternich regarded the greatest threat to the existence of the Ottoman empire as coming from Russia. In the 1830s, as the Greek question faded and France invaded Algeria and supported Muhammed Ali of Egypt, he viewed France as the empire's most serious threat. As in the case of Russia, he believed that the French threat could be neutralized by effective diplomacy, and in the end it was.

Metternich comes across as a progressive. He was as interested in the economic development of the Austrian monarchy and the Ottoman empire as he was in political stability. He favored improved commerce on the Danube, and his agents lobbied in Constantinople for the Ottomans to clean up the portion of that river below the Iron Gates, although with little success.

He, like other European statesmen, was interested in Ottoman reform, especially since most agreed that it was best for the Concert of Europe if the Ottoman empire were not only preserved but strengthened. Metternich encouraged reform in Turkey, much like Alan Reinerman has portrayed his interest in reform in Italy. If the empire would pursue improvements and especially fairness in administrative, judicial, economic, and humanitarian matters, the public would not be inclined toward revolution or to demand participation in government.

Metternich argued that Mahmud II, the most important reformist sultan of this period, had to institute reforms that conformed to Ottoman custom and tradition rather than merely plunk down western institutions and ideas in a society that did not understand them. And Metternich insisted that the one institution that underlay Ottoman custom and tradition was Islam. Reform had to conform to Islam, which was the only unifying ideology in the empire. Such thoughts might have benefitted American and NATO policies in the 2000s.

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The Afterlife of Austria-Hungary: The Image of the Habsburg Monarchy in Inter-war Europe. By Adam Kożuchowski. Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013. viii, 219 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. Photographs. Maps. \$29.95, paper.

The author began this study as a Polish doctoral dissertation, and the Institute of History at the Polish Academy of Sciences, where he is an assistant professor, published a book version in Polish in 2009. The University of Pittsburgh Press has now issued a revised edition in English. Overall, the approach taken reflects the analytic modes of cultural studies rather than conventional intellectual and cultural history.

Adam Kożuchowski traces the development of understandings of the Habsburg