

The meeting next proceeded to fix the dates of meetings of the Irish Division for the ensuing year.

Having regard to the fact that the Annual Meeting of the whole Association would, this year, be held in Ireland, it was decided to abandon the Summer Meeting of the Division, fixed to be held in July next, subject to the approval of the President of the Association.

The following dates were fixed for the meetings of the Irish Division :

Autumn Meeting to be held at the Royal College of Physicians on Thursday, November 6, 1924 ; Spring Meeting to be held on April 23, 1925 ; Summer Meeting to be held on July 2, 1925.

The meeting next proceeded to discuss the present position of the Association as regards the future training and registration of mental nurses in Ireland. After a somewhat lengthy discussion, the following resolution was proposed by Dr. J. A. Greene, seconded by Dr. J. Mills, and passed unanimously :

" That we, the Members of the Irish Division of the Medico-Psychological Association of Great Britain and Ireland, again request the Government of Ireland to give proper representation on the Irish Nursing Council to medical men engaged in the active treatment of insanity, and who are and have been responsible for the training of the mental nurses in this country."

The Hon. Secretary was directed to forward this resolution to the Minister of Local Government, together with a covering letter stating that the Division was prepared to wait upon him as a deputation, whenever he could receive it, in order to express to the Governmental authorities the importance of this urgent matter.

The meeting next proceeded to discuss the circular letter of the Association to all Universities and Licensing Bodies in the Kingdom as regards the establishment of a Special Diploma in Mental Disease.

The HON. SECRETARY informed the meeting that the Conjoint Boards of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ireland had, he understood, decided to create such a Diploma, and the Hon. Secretary also reported that he had interviewed the heads of the Medical Schools of Trinity College, the National University, etc., and put forward the desirability of these Universities to establish a Diploma in Psychiatry as part of their educational curriculum.

A hearty vote of thanks to Dr. Considine for his kindness in entertaining the Division and for his hospitality was proposed by Dr. M. J. Nolan and carried by acclamation. This terminated the proceedings.

WOHLGEMUTH AND HIS REVIEWERS.

THE REFUTATION OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS.

From the numerous reviews of my book (*A. Wohlgemuth: A Critical Examination of Psycho-Analysis*, London, 1923 [Allen & Unwin, Ltd.]), it seems to be evident that I have not made myself sufficiently clear with respect to the "Unconscious." Most of my critics appear to think that my main argument is directed against the existence of the "unconscious" and all the rest is "mere garnishing." This is not the case. In the same measure as the "New Psychology" rests not so much upon the assumed existence of an "unconscious," for this is of much older date than Freud, but upon the alleged discovery of the means to penetrate into it, to gain access to it, so is my chief argument directed against these pretended means, *i.e.*, against psycho-analysis.

The question of the "unconscious" is more of philosophical interest than of psychological importance. In psychology the assumption of an "unconscious" is quite unnecessary, since all known accredited phenomena can be more satisfactorily accounted for without it. I therefore still hold that an "unconscious psychic process" is a contradiction in terms, for a psychic process is, by definition, a conscious process. Countless nervous processes are happening every moment in the brain; the very existence of the life of the organism depends upon them. But only, and only then, if the nervous processes result in, or are accompanied by, consciousness are they psychic, otherwise they are physiological. Several critics have asked, what becomes of the idea, or thought, when it ceases to be conscious? The answer is very simple: There is no thought or idea; it ceases to exist with the cessation of the process. A lighthouse sends out flashes of light

at certain intervals, but these flashes are not the same flashes, however similar one to another they may be. In the interval between two flashes there is no flash. Thus it is with an idea; with the cessation of the psychic process there is no idea, although there exists a neurone disposition to similar processes, as there is a lighthouse disposition to similar flashes. In my view the conception of the "unconscious" is the outcome of anthropomorphic tendencies with regard to the inner world, as the creation of ghosts, spirits and deities is the outcome of similar tendencies with regard to the outer world. Only if thoughts and ideas, etc., are conceived as entities can an unconscious existence be predicated of them.

Apart from the "unconscious," most, if not all of the reviewers seem to admit, as Dr. Hy. Devine, writing in the *British Medical Journal* expresses it, that my "criticisms are damaging to some of the vital doctrines of psycho-analysis, and would certainly seem to demand a reasoned reply from the exponents of Freud's teaching." I may therefore fairly assume that Mr. J. C. Flügel's "Critical Notice" (*British Journal of Medical Psychology*, April, 1924) is intended to be such a reply, which assumption is certainly confirmed by the high scientific reputation which he deservedly enjoys. No better champion, in my view, could have been chosen, for there is no doubt of Mr. Flügel's thorough scientific training, and his work in experimental psychology is evidence of his ability. Strange to say, both he and I have sat at the same master's feet at different times, yet in our views upon psycho-analysis we differ *toto calo*. Why? Is it because I am more critical than he? Is it because he has been psycho-analysed and I have not? I cannot say. This, however, I can here repeat: My mind was quite unbiassed when, as an experimental psychologist, I began to study psycho-analysis, and although that doctrine appears to me now as quite untenable, I still preserve a perfectly open mind, and if a scientifically plausible hypothesis should be put forward I shall openly repent in sackcloth and ashes. Flügel, however, has not put forward such a hypothesis, nor has he, in my view, answered my criticisms. But that is really not his fault; it is the forlornness of the cause he endeavours to defend.

Flügel says that I differ from most other critics of psycho-analysis in that I am whole-hearted in my condemnation. The reason appears to me very simple. The critics to whom Flügel refers probably object to the fantastic results of psycho-analysis, or are outraged by the "œdipus complex" and so forth. They have not been able to discover the fundamental fallacy, and therefore, being possibly also of a mystical disposition, conclude that probably there is "something in it," but that psycho-analysts have overshot the mark. Now such considerations do not weigh with me in the least. My scientific training has been and the resulting mental disposition is such that I dispassionately search for truth which I am prepared to treat absolutely objectively. However unpalatable it may be—and I have in my career adapted myself to more than one unpalatable truth—it will always remain the truth in spite of all denials. "*Eppur si muove*." My wanderings in the psycho-analytic wilderness I have sketched in my book and need not repeat the story here. When I became at last suspicious I began all over again in a more critical mood, and I would advise Flügel to do the same, for, as I know him, I believe him to be imbued with the same love for truth as myself. Slowly step by step I went again through Freud's writings, especially the '*Traumdeutung*,' which appeared to me to be the gospel of psycho-analysis, halting at, and noting carefully, every point, and then, as I went on, I became simply dumbfounded at Freud's assurance. This sudden awakening, which came quite as a shock to me and made me ashamed of my previous superficiality, may possibly account for the vigour with which I have endeavoured to expose psycho-analysis. I would strongly advise all those who have a desire to know the truth with respect to psycho-analysis to take down again the '*Traumdeutung*' from their library shelf and not to hurry over it. It will be well worth their while to study it slowly and take nothing for granted. The result will be the same, I have no doubt, as in my case, for, emphatically, there is no proof, and the inquirer's energy might then be diverted from a pseudo-science and again directed into useful channels towards the advancement of knowledge and truth.

Referring to my "chief and constantly reiterated complaint" that in the writings of Freud I can find only assertions and never any proofs, Flügel regrets that I do not indicate more clearly what I would regard as a valid proof of the contentions of psycho-analysts. This is rather a surprising remark, coming from an experimental psychologist of Flügel's experience and reputation. My answer is that I

would regard as proof any experiment the result of which can be confirmed by a control experiment. To illustrate what I mean I may remind Flügel of an investigation of mine in which he kindly assisted me as observer. In a research on "associations" my observers had to learn series and pairs of nonsense-syllables as well as series and pairs of diagrams. When the observers were then examined I found that with regard to the syllables the results of previous workers were confirmed, *viz.*, a given syllable in a series called up rather the succeeding syllable than the preceding one; the first member of a pair called up the second member much more easily than *vice versa*. With regard to the diagrams no such difference existed; the associations were of equal value in both directions. I accounted for this extraordinary difference by the interference of motor memory in the case of the syllables, and formulated a hypothesis of physiological and psychological memories respectively. But this explanation of mine required confirmation in order to be of value. I argued that if I could eliminate the motor image and thus exclude the motor memory when learning syllables, then these ought to behave just like the diagrams, and this is exactly what they did do on performing the control experiment (*vide* my paper "On Memory and the Direction of Associations," *Brit. Journ. of Psychology*, 1913, v, pp. 447 *seq.*). Now Freud tells us—and this is the key-stone of the psycho-analytic arch—that the dream is not what it appears to be, *viz.*, an unregulated phantasy, but the symbolic representation of latent unconscious thoughts which are quite unlike the manifest dream-contents. This, everyone must admit, is nothing but an assertion, and unless we can arrive from the manifest dream-content to the latent dream-thoughts it is valueless besides. However, Freud says we *can* discover these latent dream-thoughts, and describes a technique which we know as "psycho-analysis." The dream is thus interpreted, and we are presented with a picture, the latent dream-thought, quite unlike the actual dream. But the interpretation does not carry, of itself, any conviction in spite of the five reasons that Freud adduces in support. There is, however, one of these reasons, and in fact the most important one, which admits of a control experiment, similar to that in my research referred to above. This reason given by Freud is—"The improbability that the interpretation of the dream which so completely covers and explains and fits into the life of the subject could be obtained otherwise than by tracing back previously established associations." Now this assumption, for it is nothing else—ought to have been tested by a control experiment, and strange to say, such a control experiment has been performed, unwittingly, by the psycho-analysts themselves over and over again in analysing fictitious dreams, and it has also been performed by me in analysing Pharaoh's dream with the intention, and for the purpose, of testing the psycho-analytic theory. It has proved the untenability of the Freudian contention. The psycho-analytic case would have been proved, or at least rendered very probable, if an interpretation that covered and explained and fitted into the life of this subject could have been obtained *only* when the subject himself had dreamed the dream. As it is, the control experiment sweeps the ground away from under the feet of the psycho-analysts. But I shall revert to this again later.

Next Flügel complains that I have not thought it worth my while to read Freud's *Introductory Lectures to Psycho-Analysis* and nearly all the more recent contributions to psycho-analysis. It has evidently escaped his observation that I have quoted from the *Introductory Lectures*; but apart from this I have declared openly, and I do so again, that I shall not read any more about psycho-analysis unless, or until, a sound scientific basis has been given to it. All that has grown out of it is mere vapouring and froth, a pseudo-science that is not only useless, but actually harmful in two directions, first to those to whom it is applied, and secondly to those who apply it, since it keeps their energy and intelligence away from real good sound scientific research. I have made a thorough study of the earlier and foundation-laying writings of Freud, probably more thorough and in a more critical mood than my otherwise much respected and valued critic, or he would probably not be a psycho-analyst to-day.

"It is admitted that conviction is most easily obtained," writes Flügel, "by carrying out analyses in the capacity, first of "analysand," and then of analyst. But conviction obtained in such a way is, Dr. Wohlgemuth maintains, quite worthless, as by the time assurance is reached the investigator has been subject to a long and subtle process of suggestion." This contention Flügel apparently does not controvert. He continues: "There is, of course, as Freud points out, the alternate

method of auto-analysis. Dr. Wohlgemuth has tried this method, and gives us some of his results largely, it would seem, with a view to producing the effect of a *reductio ad absurdum*. . . . In the first place it would seem pretty clear that the motive of discrediting psycho-analysis was a factor in Dr. Wohlgemuth's mind at the time of undertaking the analysis. . . . Secondly, it is evident that . . . Dr. Wohlgemuth has often failed to abandon the conscious control of his thoughts, and furthermore failed to distinguish the results obtained under conscious guidance from those obtained by free association in the psycho-analytic sense. This is strikingly the case in dealing with Silberer's treatment of symbolism in folk tales." To Silberer I shall revert presently, but let me deal first with my analysis of the Pharaoh dream. It is certainly not correct to say that the analysis was undertaken with a view to producing the effect of a *reductio ad absurdum*. The analysis was begun as a genuine control experiment by free association. I generally started with the beginning of Pharaoh's dream, and, according to the associations running in different directions at different times, I might have had as many as a dozen different interpretations. Whilst I was impressed by the ease with which I could generally arrive at a meaning of the first part, I found that the second part of that dream was never quite so easy. I do not know why, but the day I came to the kinema manager I experienced a quite uncanny emotion which, had I been of a mystical disposition, would have certainly unsettled me. When, then, later the idea struck me of seeing whether I could not find my name indicated somehow in the dream, I admit frankly that I sat down with the avowed purpose of looking for it, exactly in the same way as Freud does to "analyse" numbers, to show that the "unconscious" prompted him in the composition of the numbers. To say, then, that I started out with the idea of ridiculing psycho-analysis is not correct; that it was thus ridiculed followed as a matter of course.

I now revert to Silberer's folk-tale analysis. Flügel writes: "Dr. Wohlgemuth has often failed to distinguish the results obtained under conscious guidance from those obtained by free association in the psycho-analytic sense. This is strikingly the case in dealing with Silberer's treatment of symbolism of folk-tales. After criticizing Silberer's 'analytic' and 'anagogic' interpretations he himself contributes two further . . . interpretations of his own, the 'oneirocritic' and the 'creopolic' interpretations." Here follows a quotation from p. 193 of my book, wherein I advise my reader suffering from *ennui* to try a "cricketecritic," etc., interpretation, promising him pleasure from the ease with which it can be done. I tell the reader that "he may be sure it is correct, for are we not told over and over again that such a solution is a proof in itself of its correctness, and that such an agreement cannot be due to chance." Upon this sarcasm Flügel comments: "The last sentence shows clearly enough that he (*i.e.*, I) has failed to keep in mind the above-mentioned all-important distinction between 'free' and 'consciously-controlled' associations." Of course I have done nothing of the sort. Of course the "oneirocritic," the "creopolic," the "cricketecritic" interpretations are all "controlled," and so are the "analytic" and "anagogic" of Silberer and Hitchcock. Silberer sat down to interpret the folk-tale in a psycho-analytic sense. Hitchcock sat down to interpret it in an "anagogic" sense, and I did the same in a "creopolic" sense. Flügel might sit down and interpret Hamlet in a "psycho-analytic" sense and I in a "methustikian"; we should probably both get something intelligible, but he would be a rash man who expected anything useful. If one were to try by free associations to interpret a folk-tale every would-be interpreter would get a different result, and the same interpreter different results at different times. Further, these results would have nothing in common with the reasons or causes that originally gave rise to the tale.

"Another feature of my analytic methods," writes Flügel, "is also familiar to analysts through clinical experience, namely the desire on the part of the patients to exchange *rôles* and turn the tables on the analyst by becoming far more interested in the personality of the latter than in their own concerns." This has reference to my advice to my readers to have no hesitation in telling their dreams; the interpretation would afford a sure indication to the type of mind of the interpreter. Now, I hope Flügel will excuse my saying that he is only repeating once more one of those threadbare psycho-analytic confidence tricks, like that about "resistance," which have now lost their force, if they ever had any. This remark of mine, like my completing of Freud's dictum, "Dream analysis is the *via regia* to

the 'unconscious,' by adding "of the psycho-analyst," was prompted by purely objective considerations. If a dream of mine were analysed by Freud he would doubtless unearth some sexual complex, whilst Jung, with the same dream, would discover some "prospective and teleological function," and Adler would find the "will to power, the masculine protest." This, I think, is sufficient proof that the result is due to the psycho-analyst and that the dream-interpretation is the *via regia* to the analyst's "unconscious." Besides, Freud, in an unguarded moment, has admitted as much himself. Here, once more, are Freud's own words: "DURING THE ANALYSIS . . . IDEAS HAVE TO BE SUGGESTED TO HIM (the patient) WHICH HAVE NOT AS YET OCCURRED TO HIM; HIS ATTENTION HAS TO BE ADJUSTED IN THOSE DIRECTIONS FROM WHICH (the psycho-analyst) ANTICIPATED THAT WHICH WAS TO COME. . . . BUT IN EVERY ANALYSIS ONE HAS TO PROCEED LIKE THIS. A PSYCHO-ANALYSIS IS NOT AN UNBIASSED SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, BUT JUST A THERAPEUTIC INTERVENTION. THE PHYSICIAN GIVES IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS EVERY TIME TO THE PATIENT THE RESPECTIVE EXPECTATION IDEAS BY MEANS OF WHICH HE (the patient) SHALL BE ENABLED TO RECOGNIZE THAT WHICH IS UNCONSCIOUS AND TO SEIZE IT. . . . WITHOUT SUCH HELP NO ONE CAN GET ON." Can there be a more emphatic justification for my modification of Freud's dictum than what is here admitted in Freud's own words?

I come next to the question of the "unconscious." Flügel writes: "The root of Dr. Wohlgemuth's unwillingness to see anything of value whatsoever in psycho-analysis lies, it would seem . . . in his inability to understand or use the concept of the 'unconscious.'" First of all let me point out that there is no question of "unwillingness to see anything of value whatsoever in psycho-analysis" on my part, but nothing except sheer inability. In using this term with respect to me, Flügel's "unconscious" must have played him a trick. It imputes to its possessor's antagonist the "unwillingness" to be convinced, whilst it itself is swayed by the "will to believe." Next I wish to point out that Flügel is mistaken in considering my refusal to see anything of value in psycho-analysis has its root in my inability to understand or use the concept of the "unconscious." If this had been the case I could never have taken favourably to psycho-analysis as I did at first. Whilst still holding my view that the conception of an unconscious mind, if taken to mean more than a figure of speech, is not only self-contradictory, but also unscientific and unnecessary, its denial or acceptance does not materially affect the validity of my criticism of psycho-analysis. From my point of view it is only of academic interest, and we need not dissipate our energies by unduly enlarging this discussion. Personally I am quite prepared and desirous of discussing the "unconscious" apart from psycho-analysis. For the "unconscious idea or thought" of the psycho-analyst we have only to substitute my "neurone-disposition," and much, I believe, would practically remain unaltered. But be this as it may, I am prepared, if only for the sake of argument, to grant to the psycho-analyst his "unconscious." Nevertheless the psycho-analytic doctrine remains, as I have proved (*proved* in the scientific, not in the Freudian sense) by my control experiments, futile and illusory. There is absolutely no adequate reason, beyond the desire to do so, to believe that the results obtained have anything to do with the alleged "unconscious." The "unconscious," then, is not the essential part of psycho-analysis. But the *technique* of penetrating into it, of interpreting it, of making it conscious, is the keystone to the psycho-analytic arch.

"Among the objections brought forward," says Flügel, "there are some which are very difficult to understand, inasmuch as they seem fairly to play into the hands of the enemy. Thus the following incidents, apparently quoted as evidence against psycho-analysis, seem to cry out for a psycho-analytic interpretation." I give the first of Flügel's quotations from my book because Flügel has left half of it out, and it has no sense in this mutilated condition.

"Quoting a line from Shelley's *Edipus Tyrannus* [a friend] wrote: 'All is sealed up with the broad seal of Freud.' Turning up the passage I found that it ought to have been: 'All is sealed up with the broad seal of fraud.' Freud—Edipus—Fraud? When I met my friend the following day, and drew his attention to the *lapsus calami*, he smiled, but declined to be psycho-analysed."

"With regard to these cases," Flügel sums up, "we are surely justified in quoting Dr. Wohlgemuth himself in another connection to the effect that 'comment is superfluous.' Of course it is. Can it be possible that Flügel has failed to realize

that, as the *Lancet* reviewer terms it, I am merely 'guying' the psycho-analysts, or is he in turn trying to 'pull my leg'?"

Next Flügel discusses my introspective experiments with reference to Freud's assertion that there are homosexual tendencies in all, even normal, human beings. As he rightly remarks, my argument does not touch the real point at issue, it does not disprove that such tendency exists in me unconsciously. But what reason is there that should prevent us from multiplying such unconscious tendencies. If there is an unconscious tendency in me to eat coke, and another to paint pillar-boxes blue, Flügel could not disprove their existence. But is that psychology? Yes, the "New Psychology"!

Coming to my chapter on symbolism Flügel writes: ". . . most of the chapter on symbolism is taken up in showing that symbols (particularly phallic symbols) may have other meanings than those stressed by psycho-analysts, and that these latter meanings may occur without the accompaniment of the corresponding symbols. Neither of these facts has ever been denied by psycho-analysts. . . ." In reply I refer my critic to the following passage of Ernest Jones (*Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, 1918, p. 143): "The idea of a snake, which is never consciously associated with that of the phallus, is regularly so in dreams, being one of the most constant and invariable symbols; in primitive religions the two ideas are quite obviously interchangeable, so that it is often hard to distinguish phallic from ophtic worship." I have no doubt that other passages from the same author could be found where such assertions are qualified and less sweeping, but these inconsistencies obtain with most psycho-analytic writers.

With reference to my criticism of the "censor," Flügel thinks that "there are possibly incautious or inexact expressions on the part of psycho-analytic writers," but that my strictures would "scarcely affect the underlying doctrine." Ernest Jones had defined the censor as "the sum total of repressing inhibitions," and Flügel further defines now the "inhibitions" as "active tendencies or wishes." I do not see how this can meet my criticism in the least. It is still beyond my understanding how "active tendencies or wishes," any more than a "sum total of repressing inhibitions," can manifest a greater intelligence than the individual in whom they are active, or how they can more effectively interpose doubt in the subject's mind, or how they can possess an *esprit d'escalier*. The fact remains simply this: Freud conceived his censor as an entity, somewhat after the style of Maxwell's demon, and makes him act and conduct himself accordingly. All the exegetics of Freudian apologists will not alter this fact, for all that which Freud predicates of his "censor" can only be affirmed of such a mystic entity, but not of a "sum total of repressing inhibitions," nor of "active tendencies or wishes."

Then follow some remarks charging me with endeavouring to obtain a dialectical advantage over Freud. I do not agree with Flügel. If it had been possible for the passage referred to to have emanated from Flügel's pen I would, convinced of his solid psychological knowledge, certainly have passed it over as an elliptical way of expression, but I have given so many other instances which betray the flimsiest superficial acquaintance of Freud with psychology, and which Flügel passes over in silence, that there is no reason to assume that Freud's knowledge in this particular case had a sounder foundation.

Flügel gives next an extract wherein I endeavour to show the absurdity of Freud's dictum that "the dream is the protector of sleep, not its interrupter," and comments as follows: "To this criticism the psycho-analyst will naturally reply that the assumption of the author's sleep *not* having been protected when it was dreamless or uninterrupted is an unproved one. . . ." Of course it is unproved; I frankly admit it; but what I do not admit is the psycho-analytic logic which implies that consequently Freud's assertion is correct. A better way out of the difficulty for the psycho-analyst would be to assert that *the dream I did not dream was an unconscious dream*, and therefore my sleep was still protected.

In the next paragraph Flügel tackles the difficult problem of "suggestion." It appears to me that he, too, often confounds the two meanings of the term, namely, the means employed to produce suggestion and the effect produced. Nevertheless the paragraph is worth reading carefully, for Flügel evidently realizes the quandary in which he finds himself, and from which he is unable to extricate himself. He says: "It is hard to convince a sceptic that the so-called results of psycho-analysis] are not put into the patient's head by the analysts." Of course it is quite impossible to convince anyone of this who has before him the

analysis of "Little Hans," and Freud's own admission that *no one can get on without telling the patient "many things which he himself does not know to say; ideas have to be suggested to him which have not as yet occurred to him; his attention has to be adjusted in those directions from which he (the psycho-analyst) anticipates that which is to come . . . but in every analysis one has to proceed like this. A psycho-analysis is not an unbiased scientific research, but just a therapeutic intervention. The physician gives in psycho-analysis every time to the patient the respective expectation-ideas by means of which he (the patient) shall be enabled to recognize that which is unconscious and to seize it. . . . Without such help no one can get on."* What is the use of arguing after this and saying to the critic, "You are unacquainted with the intimate working of the analytic method and can therefore form no judgment." With the method itself one can become thoroughly conversant from the study of the literature, but to be conversant with its "intimate working" one has to be psycho-analysed, and to be effectually psycho-analysed one must believe in it; hence unless one believes in the intimate working of psycho-analysis one can form no judgment, and must not criticize psycho-analysis. Was there ever such a travesty of scientific reasoning?

Flügel proceeds to argue that since demented and paranoiacs are free from suggestibility and some have been analysed by psycho-analysis, "a careful examination of the psycho-analytic findings in these cases should therefore be one of the chief points of attack by those who maintain that the discoveries claimed by psycho-analysts are really only artefacts due to suggestion. Such an examination is unfortunately not undertaken in the present work." Now while it is difficult to obtain hypnosis in the cases of demented and paranoiacs, it does not follow that they are proof against the more subtle form of suggestion as is operative in psycho-analysis. Moreover, the results are the interpretations of psycho-analysts, and would be of the same kind as those they get by the study of mythology and folklore, which is the next bastion which Flügel tries to hold. This, however, I have already undermined above when answering Flügel's strictures on my comments on Silberer's analytic and Hitchcock's analogic interpretations.

A valuable confirmation of my contention that suggestion is the therapeutic agent active in psycho-analytic treatment has been supplied by Dr. W. H. B. Stoddart. In a correspondence in the *Lancet* on "Vertigo and Seasickness," Dr. Stoddart had attributed the latter to infantile complexes, the rolling sea reminding the patient of the heaving of the mother's bosom, etc. Writing in the *Lancet* of June 14, 1924, Dr. Stoddart says: ". . . This explanation of seasickness will never cure the patient suffering from it. To be effective he must discover the explanation for himself out of his own mind. Otherwise he will simply refuse to believe it." We may reasonably assume, since, as Freud tells us, "without such help no one can get on," that Dr. Stoddart, to enable his patient to "discover the explanation for himself out of his own mind," just gives him the "respective expectation-ideas by means of which, as Freud says, he shall be able to recognize that which is unconscious and to seize it." But what is so helpful in this controversy, as helpful almost as Freud's "Gradiva" analyses, is Dr. Stoddart's statement that "otherwise he [the patient] will refuse to believe it." Evidently, then, the *believing* is the indispensable prerequisite to the cure—that is, EFFECTIVE SUGGESTION. Exactly what I have been contending all along the line; the therapeutic factor in psycho-analysis is *suggestion* pure and simple.

Flügel then reverts to Freud's Gradiva analysis, which I look upon as, what in fact it is, a control experiment, and in turn is shocked at my perversion. "But surely," he says, "it is permissible to apply explanations that have been obtained from cases with full data—in this case free associations—to other cases where the data are incomplete, with a view to seeing how far these explanations will work with the limited data available. Such process is carried out constantly both in every-day matters and in science, particularly in comparative science." Flügel imagines, then, a certain objection I would make and proceeds to demolish it. As it is, however, my objection is quite different. It is this: Just now Flügel tried to shore up the tottering structure of dream-analysis by the analytic results from mythology and folk-lore, etc., and now he endeavours to underpin these analyses with the results of dream-analysis—an example of *petitio principii* good enough for a text-book on logic. Besides, where are the results obtained by "free associations," when Freud himself, as quoted above, states that no one can get on unless he gives "every time to the patient the respective expectation-ideas." The day

Freud published his Gradiva analysis he committed psycho-analytic suicide; when he published the analysis of "Little Hans" he put the last screw into the psycho-analytic coffin, and with the above-quoted apology he gave that screw the last turn.

In the next paragraph Flügel tries exactly the same process with reference to "suggestion" and "transference," which therefore need not detain me.

With regard to my demonstration that the nature of the feeling-tone, whether pleasure or unpleasure, has no influence upon memory, Flügel admits: "This seems to be in genuine contradiction to the views held by psycho-analysts," viz., that unpleasant experiences are more easily forgotten than pleasant ones. As to his remarks respecting my want of appreciation of Whately Smith's experiments I have no reason to modify this, especially after the admirable "Note on the Psychological Significance of the Psycho-Galvanic Reaction" by Honoria M. Wells, published since in the *Brit. Journ. of Psych.*, General Section, vol. xiv, p. 300.

In the next paragraph Flügel frankly admits the necessity of control experiments in such matters as the analysis of numbers. This, of course, Freud ought to have done *before* he ventured to bring his fantastic theories before the public, and would have done, if he had had any idea of scientific method. Incidentally Flügel repeats his charge of my neglecting to distinguish between free and controlled associations, which charge I have already refuted above. Freud, after writing down a number, sat down with the set purpose of finding some relation of the variously arranged digits to his past experiences, and I did exactly the same with Freud's own numbers with similar results. These experiments of Freud's, like his examples of forgetting, slips of the tongue, slips of the pen, symptomatic actions, errors and so on were intended to confirm his assertions about the action of the "unconscious." In admitting my criticism of the former and ignoring that of all the latter, the whole of Freud's "*Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens*," and all that has grown out of it and aroused such an interest in psycho-analytic literature, becomes valueless.

I am truly sorry for having hurt my kind critic's feeling by speaking in the concluding sentences of my book of "the propaganda of the psycho-analysts in the press." I have no evidence of the psycho-analyst but only of the propaganda; so I ought to have spoken merely of "the psycho-analytic propaganda in the press."

Here finishes Flügel's criticism. It must, however, have struck the student who has read my book that Flügel omitted to refer to several matters that I had criticized rather severely. I have already referred to forgetting, slips of the tongue, slips of the pen, mistakes in spelling and reading, misplacing, etc. There are, further, Freud's frequent examples of reasoning by analogy, which are so potent a factor in impressing the superficial. But the most important, I think, is my exposure of Freud's "psychology." Not only did I tear his "schema of ψ systems," upon which the '*Traumdeutung*' depends, to tatters, but I showed also that it is quite unintelligible. In fact, it has occurred to me that Freud could never have written it himself, and that it might be the composition of one of his paranoiac patients. And if we consider Freud's propensity for puns and dubious jokes, as well as his delusions about himself with respect to Darwin and Copernicus, this would certainly be the more charitable view to take.

I am pleased to see that Flügel is convinced of my good intentions although my attack be "fierce." I assure him that I have the greatest respect and the friendliest feeling for all those psycho-analysts with whom I am personally acquainted. In fact, it is not the psycho-analysts that I attack, but psycho-analysis, and the "fierceness" of my criticism is merely a measure of my regret to see their great energy and undoubted ability wasted on the teachings of a shallow and superficial thinker. I would have my psychological and psycho-analytic friends swear the oath of Hippocrates, which future doctors at Montpellier used to swear until recently(!):

"I swear that, whatsoever my faith or lack of faith, it shall be of no account in my research.

"I swear to be disinterested, to hold myself aloof alike from polemics and propaganda.

"I swear to be honest, to omit nothing of what I see, to add nothing, to attenuate nothing, to exaggerate nothing.

"I swear to be respectful, not to mock at any belief of the past nor of the present.

" I swear to be courageous, to maintain my opinion fearlessly against any hostile belief that refuses to tolerate it.

" And I swear to renounce it the moment I see or am shown a convincing reason for doing so."

A. WOHLGEMUTH.

(¹) Quoted from P. L. Couchond : *The Enigma of Jesus*. With an Introduction by Sir James Fraser. London : Watts & Co., 1924.

A ROYAL COMMISSION ON LUNACY LAW.

THE King has been pleased to approve the appointment of a Royal Commission with the following terms of reference :

(1) To inquire as regards England and Wales into the existing law and administrative machinery in connection with the certification, detention and care of persons who are or are alleged to be of unsound mind ;

(2) To consider as regards England and Wales the extent to which provision is or should be made for the treatment without certification of persons suffering from mental disorder ;

And to make recommendations.

The Commission will be composed as follows :

The Right Hon. H. P. Macmillan, K.C. (chairman), the Earl Russell, Lord Eustace Percy, M.P., Sir Thomas Hutchison, Bt., Sir Humphry Rolleston, K.C.B., M.D., D.C.L., LL.D., Sir Ernest Hiley, K.B.E., Sir David Drummond, C.B.E., M.D., D.C.L., Mr. W. A. Jowitt, K.C., M.P., Mr. F. D. MacKinnon, K.C., Mr. H. Snell, M.P., Mrs. C. J. Mathew, Miss Madeline Symons, with Mr. P. Barter, of the Ministry of Health, as Secretary.

All communications regarding the Commission should be addressed to " The Secretary, Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder, Ministry of Health, Whitehall, S.W. 1."

Applications to give evidence before the Commission should be made in writing ; personal interviews cannot be granted in this connection.

OBITUARY.

RICHARD HENRY HEURTLEY SANKEY, M.R.C.S., L.S.A.

The *doyen* of our Association died on May 13, 1921, at the age of 90. He was appointed Assistant Medical Officer to Dr. Leigh at Littlemore Asylum (Oxford and Berks County Asylum) in 1854. After serving as Assistant Medical Officer for seven years he was appointed Medical Superintendent. This post he held until he retired in 1906, after 52 years' service. He retained his faculties until the end of his life. His sight, hearing and memory were very good. He was always bright and cheerful and never depressed. He married in 1869 and had one son and two daughters. His wife died in March, 1914.

ALBERT IRWIN EADES, L.R.C.P.&S.Irel., Medical Superintendent, North Riding Mental Hospital.

THE tragic death of Dr. Albert Irwin Eades on Easter Monday caused widespread distress amongst all who knew him.

Eades was a man who required knowing.

A first impression was apt to be that of a cold, austere person, entirely self-sufficient, whereas this was very far removed from the true nature of the man. He was warm-hearted, generous to a degree, and possessed a store of dry humour which made him a most entertaining companion.

He was essentially a man's man, and enjoyed nothing better than a quiet evening round the fire with a friend and a pipe, and if that friend were in his specialty, so much the better, for he was entirely bound up in his work, and never wearied of discussing ways and means of improving the lot of his patients.

He was a shrewd judge of character, and his reminiscences of the various colleagues he had served with in the course of his career at Nottingham, Prestwich