CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

THE 2015 JUDICIAL ACTIVITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

By Surabhi Ranganathan*

The International Court of Justice (Court or ICJ) delivered three judgments in 2015. The first, delivered on February 3, 2015, determines claims of genocide made by Croatia and Serbia against each other. The second, delivered on September 24, 2015, addresses Chile's preliminary objection in a case brought against it by Bolivia, which asserted that Chile had violated its obligation to negotiate in good faith to secure Bolivia's sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The third, delivered on December 16, 2015, concerns the joined cases brought by Costa Rica and Nicaragua, each party alleging territorial violations and transboundary environmental harms by the other. This review highlights notable points of interest in the judgments and draws attention to particular insights and critiques afforded by the individual opinions that accompany each judgment.

I. THE COURT'S JUDICIAL ACTIVITY

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia)

The judgment in *Croatia v. Serbia* marks the end of a long list of ICJ cases arising from violence, displacement, and other issues in the disintegration and eventual dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).¹ This case concerned claims of genocide made by each party against the other. Croatia instituted an application in 1999,² invoking the jurisdictional clause of the Genocide Convention, Article IX.³ Croatia alleged that Serbia was responsible for several violations of the Convention, including commission, conspiracy, attempt, and complicity in genocide against Croats, along with failures to prevent and punish genocide.⁴ Croatia's claims focused on the period between mid-1991 and mid-1992. Serbia

* University Lecturer in International Law and Fellow of King's College, University of Cambridge.

³ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Art. IX, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].

¹ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.) (Int'l Ct. Justice Feb. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Application of the Genocide Convention]. All the materials of the Court cited in this report are available on its website, http://www.icj-cij.org.

² Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Montenegro)) (Int'l Ct. Justice July 2, 1999) [hereinafter Application Instituting Proceedings (Croat. v. Yugo.)].

⁴ Application Instituting Proceedings (Croat. v. Yugo.), *supra* note 2, para. 36.

advanced its counterclaims in December 2009,⁵ following the Court's decision on Serbia's preliminary objections.⁶ Serbia alleged that Croatia had committed, conspired in, and failed to prevent and punish acts of genocide against Serbs living in the Krajina region of Croatia in and around August 1995.⁷ The Court in 2015 dismissed both sets of claims on the merits.⁸

The factual context for the claims is well known. In the early 1990s, following economic crises and ethnic tensions in the SFRY, the republics of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina all declared independence. The remaining republics-Serbia and Montenegro, calling themselves the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)-adopted a declaration on April 27, 1992, claiming that the FRY, as the continuator of the "international legal and political personality" of the SFRY, would "strictly abide" by all the international commitments assumed by the SFRY and would remain "bound by all obligations to international organizations and institutions whose member it is."9 The Yugoslav Permanent Mission to the United Nations sent a note to the UN secretary-general on the same date, reiterating that, as the continuator of the SFRY, the FRY would "continue to fulfil all the rights conferred to, and obligations assumed by, the [SFRY] in international relations, including its membership in all international organizations and participation in international treaties ratified or acceded to by Yugoslavia."10 The FRY's claim of continuity with the SFRY was rejected in the United Nations after a period of strategic ambiguity; the General Assembly and Security Council agreed that the FRY could not avail itself of the SFRY's membership.¹¹ However, the FRY only relinquished its claim in November 2000, when it agreed to UN membership as a new state—as a successor rather than a continuator to the SFRY.¹² In the intervening period, the FRY's status was regarded as *sui generis*,¹³ and the Court's holdings in this respect were "not free from legal difficulties.'"¹⁴ The Court's ambivalence is seen, for example, in the legal consequences attached to the FRY's declaration and the note of April 27, 1992: without accepting its claim of continuity, the Court held it bound by the SFRY's treaties from that date, including the Genocide Convention (notwithstanding its formal accession to that treaty in 2001).¹⁵ The FRY changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. In 2006, the two units split, with

⁸ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 524.

⁹ UN Doc. A/46/915, Annex II, Declaration of the Representatives of the People of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro (Apr. 27, 1992), at 4 (May 7, 1992).

¹⁰ Id., Annex I, Note Dated 27 April 1992 from the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General.

¹¹ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 58.

¹² Id.

¹³ *Id.*, Decl. Xue, J., para. 9.

¹⁴ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 ICJ REP. 43, para. 105 (Feb. 26) (quoting Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, 1993 ICJ REP. 3, para. 18 (Apr. 8)) [hereinafter Bosnian Genocide].

¹⁵ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 84; *see also id.*, Sep. Op. Skotnikov, J., para. 8.

⁵ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Counter-Memorial Submitted by the Republic of Serbia, vols. I–V (Int'l Ct. Justice Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Application of the Convention, Counter-Memorial of Serbia].

⁶ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Preliminary Objections, 2008 ICJ REP. 412, paras. 23–34 (Nov. 18) [hereinafter Application of the Convention, Preliminary Objections].

⁷ Application of the Convention, Counter-Memorial of Serbia, *supra* note 5, vol. I, paras. 29, 1096–476.

Serbia alone continuing the personality of the existing state. The Court determined that the new state of Montenegro was not a party to the present case.¹⁶

While Serbia's statehood was in this process of legal clarification, the situation on the ground there and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia was marked by outbursts of ethnic conflict. Relevant to the present case, conflict broke out in the Republic of Croatia in the spring of 1991 between Croats who sought to form an independent state and Serbs who sought attachment with the Republic of Serbia. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) intervened later that year, officially to separate the two, but allegedly favored the Serbs.¹⁷ The first phase of the conflict, from 1991 to the summer of 1992, saw the Serbs, allegedly aided by the JNA, establish territorial control over a third of the Croatian territory, in part by forcibly displacing Croats.¹⁸ In the summer of 1995, Croatia carried out "Operation 'Storm,'" recovering the same occupied territory and removing Serbs from it.¹⁹ The two sets of claims related to the violence inflicted by the victorious side of each phase.

Perhaps the most debatable feature of the present judgment is the Court's first finding: dismissing Serbia's preliminary objection that the Court's jurisdiction did not extend to events prior to April 27, 1992, that is, before the FRY had declared its existence or intention to be bound by the SFRY's treaties.²⁰ The Court had joined this objection to the merits stage.²¹ Croatia advanced several arguments against this objection. It first argued that because the Genocide Convention had been in force throughout the territory of the former SFRY prior to April 27, 1992, its provisions could be retroactively applied to the FRY, which—in *statu nascendi* by the summer of 1991—emerged from the SFRY's dissolution and took control of the SFRY's organs.²² It further argued that under Article 10(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility,²³ the acts of the JNA, and various Serb groups, could be attributed to Serbia.²⁴ Article 10(2) provides: "The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its administration shall be considered an act of the new State under international law."²⁵

The Court rightly dismissed these two arguments. It found that the Genocide Convention did not have retroactive effect and could not be applied to Serbia before it had declared itself bound.²⁶ Serbia was not responsible under the Convention either for commission or for failure to prevent commission of genocide prior to April 27, 1992.²⁷ Moreover, it was not responsible for the failure to punish acts of genocide committed prior to April 27, 1992. Croatia argued

¹⁶ Application of the Convention, Preliminary Objections, *supra* note 6, paras. 23–34; *see also* Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 59.

¹⁷ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 66.

¹⁸ *Id.*, para. 69.

¹⁹ *Id.*, para. 73.

²⁰ Id., paras. 442, 524.

²¹ *Id.*, para. 9.

²² Id., para. 81.

²³ Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, *in* Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No.10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA].

²⁴ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 101.

²⁵ ARSIWA, *supra* note 23, Art. 10(2).

²⁶ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, paras. 99–100, 104.

 27 Id., para. 100. In addition, Serbia's obligations under the customary international law on genocide were not before the Court. Id., paras. 87–89.

that responsibility for this last omission followed from the text of the Convention—which did not limit the temporal scope of the duty to punish—supported by the existing prohibition of genocide in customary international law, the *erga omnes* character of the obligation to prevent and punish genocide, and the Convention's own objective of avoiding impunity for genocide.²⁸ The Court, however, found that neither the text of the Convention nor its negotiating history suggested any intention to obligate states to enact retroactive legislation necessary "to punish acts of genocide committed in the past" before they had become bound by its terms.²⁹

Further, the Court held that there was no point in pursuing the argument on attribution, for, even if the acts of the JNA and other Serb groups were found attributable to the FRY in accordance with Article 10(2), they could not constitute a violation of the Genocide Convention by the FRY at a time when it was not a party. Prior to April 27, 1992, there could be no question of a dispute relating to Serbia's fulfillment of the Convention, such as to engage Article IX, because Serbia was not yet a party to the Convention.³⁰

The case may have ended at this point, had the Court not decided to engage Croatia's third argument, introduced in oral proceedings, of Serbia's responsibility by succession.³¹ Croatia argued that acts prior to April 27, 1992, were attributable to the SFRY, which had breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention; when Serbia succeeded to those obligations on April 27, 1992, it also succeeded to the responsibility incurred for their violation. Croatia invoked both the general international law on state succession—particularly the *Lighthouses* arbitration in which a tribunal had held that the responsibility of a state might be transferred to a successor if appropriate on the facts—and the FRY's own declaration and note.³²

The Court does not permit applicants to insert new claims at oral hearings if they transform the subject matter of the dispute.³³ However, it held that Croatia's new argument did not amount to a new claim but merely supported its existing claims on Serbia's responsibility and the Court's jurisdiction.³⁴ The Court also decided that Article IX of the Genocide Convention comprehended succession as a possible mode of responsibility. Article IX states:

Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.³⁵

The Court noted that "Article IX speaks generally of the responsibility of a State and contains no limitation regarding the manner in which that responsibility might be engaged."³⁶

²⁸ Verbatim Record, Application of the Genocide Convention, ICJ Doc. CR 2014/12, at 44–47 (Mar. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Verbatim Record CR 2014/12].

²⁹ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 97; *see also id.*, paras. 96–100.

³¹ See Verbatim Record, Application of the Genocide Convention, ICJ Doc. CR 2014/21, at 20–22 (Mar. 21, 2014).

³² Verbatim Record CR 2014/12, *supra* note 28, at 21 (citing Lighthouses Arbitration (Fr. v. Greece), 23 ILR 81, 90 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1956)); Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 107.

³³ See Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), 2007 ICJ REP. 659, para. 108 (Oct. 8); see also Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), Provisional Measures, 1999 ICJ REP. 124, para. 44 (June 2).

³⁴ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 109.

³⁵ Genocide Convention, *supra* note 3, Art. IX.

³⁶ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 114.

³⁰ *Id.*, para. 105.

Whether and in what manner responsibility might be incurred was to be determined under the rules of general international law, including rules on interpretation, responsibility, and—now the Court added—state succession. In its view, the applicability of state succession to Serbia in respect to allegations of genocide, and even the existence of a rule of succession to responsibility, were questions relating to the merits of the claims. Such questions would need to be examined only if it were established that acts amounting to genocide had been committed and were attributable to the SFRY.³⁷ Deciding to address these questions in this sequence, the Court dismissed Serbia's preliminary objections in relation to events prior to April 27, 1992.³⁸

The Court's partial adoption of the succession thesis—finding that the text of Article IX could include state responsibility by succession, if a rule of succession to responsibility were established in international law, but bracketing the question of whether it was indeed so established—was opposed by more than a few judges.³⁹ Three criticisms are especially noteworthy. First, there is no self-evident doctrine of succession in respect to state responsibility in international law. To quote the most recent edition of a popular textbook, state succession "is an area of uncertainty and controversy [I]t is possible to take the view that not many settled rules have yet emerged."⁴⁰ Succession in respect to state responsibility is a particularly elusive concept, not mentioned in the codified rules of general international law on either treaty succession or state responsibility.⁴¹

The Court's own best example of succession was the *Lighthouses* arbitration, which turned on Greece's adoption of the unlawful act of its predecessor state.⁴² In other cases too, the assumption of responsibility by the successor state has constituted the material factor.⁴³ A doctrine of succession to responsibility may well be desirable to close accountability gaps arising from the actions of a formally extinct state (as Croatia posited). But that notion is different from asserting that such a doctrine actually exists. The Court should have discussed the evidence in support of this doctrine and its applicability in 1992, as of the date of Serbia's succession to the SFRY.⁴⁴ The Court's decision to postpone consideration of these issues until after a determination of the merits of the genocide claims⁴⁵ may have served the cause of judicial economy, but—coupled with its omission to return to them—means that it based its jurisdiction on a doctrine of dubious status, which it ultimately failed to clarify.

Second, the Court erred in placing succession on a par with attribution as the means of incurring responsibility under the Genocide Convention. In fact, as President Peter Tomka showed by reference to the Convention's text and *travaux préparatoires*, it does not contemplate responsibility by succession.⁴⁶ The Court contented itself by noting the general wording of Article IX.

³⁷ Id.

³⁸ *Id.*, para. 524.

³⁹ Id., Sep. Op. Tomka, P.; id., Sep. Op. Owada, J.; id., Sep. Op. Skotnikov, J.; id., Decl. Xue, J.; id., Sep. Op Sebutinde, J.; id., Sep. Op. Kreća, J. ad hoc.

⁴⁰ JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 424 (8th ed. 2012).

⁴¹ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, Decl. Xue, J., para. 23.

⁴² See CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 442 (citing Lighthouses Arbitration, supra note 32).

⁴³ See Patrick Dumberry, The Controversial Issue of State Succession to International Responsibility Revisited in Light of Recent State Practice, 2006 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 413.

⁴⁴ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, Sep. Op. Skotnikov, J., para. 4.

⁴⁵ See supra text accompanying note 21.

⁴⁶ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, Sep. Op. Tomka, P., paras. 8–24.

2016]

But its summary disposal of the point, without the careful analysis of text and negotiating history that it undertook on other points, does not sufficiently answer President Tomka's challenge that a limitation as to responsibility by succession is indicated in both.

Third, the Court relied on the doctrine of succession to overcome the fact that part of its evaluation on the merits concerned the conduct of a *third* state, the former SFRY, not a party to the dispute. Article IX does not provide for such adjudication. Its language should not be taken to suggest that states may submit disputes relating to the interpretation, application, or fulfillment of the Convention by a third state;⁴⁷ such an interpretation could open the way to the adjudication of a state's responsibility without its consent.⁴⁸ The Court sidestepped the point by arguing the nonapplicability of the *Monetary Gold* principle to the case of a state that has ceased to exist.⁴⁹ On the merits, it did not find the SFRY responsible for genocide, but it did not consider the incongruity of the situation in which it may have found for the SFRY's responsibility but not for the FRY's succession to the same. There, in effect, it would have ruled on the conduct of a third party, without proving the necessary link to the responsibility of the respondent.

Moreover, a finding in favor of Serbia's responsibility by succession could have had implications for the other successor states to the SFRY.⁵⁰ No prior understanding existed that Serbia would be the sole successor to the SFRY's responsibility; indeed, the former Yugoslavian republics had deferred such questions to a joint committee by an "Agreement on Succession Issues."⁵¹ Would not then the *Monetary Gold* principle apply—or at least bear consideration as to its application—with respect to the other successor states?

Several judges noted that Croatia's third argument, although framed in terms of state succession, implicitly relied upon the continuity between the FRY and the SFRY, which Croatia had strongly rejected in the past.⁵² And the manner of the Court's uptake of this argument, without a full discussion of the above issues relating to responsibility by succession, does not dispel the perception that questions of Serbia's status were once again treated with greater consideration to political expediency than legal principle.

Fortunately, this judgment brings that line of cases to a close.⁵³ Moreover, the facts are so particular that the Court's application of Article IX is unlikely to have much effect on other cases concerning the scope of that provision.⁵⁴ Rather—and hearteningly—the judgment may

⁵⁰ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, Sep. Op. Tomka, P., para. 32.

⁵¹ Agreement on Succession Issues, Annex F: Other Rights, Interests and Liabilities, June 29, 2001, 2262 UNTS 251, 293 (entered into force June 2, 2004), *available at* https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume% 202262/v2262.pdf.

⁵² Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, Sep. Op. Tomka, P., para. 25; *id.*, Decl. Xue, J., para. 15; *id.*, Sep. Op. Sebutinde, J., para. 13.

⁵³ Id., Sep. Op. Skotnikov, J., para. 9.

54 Id., Sep. Op. Tomka, P., para. 33. But see id., Decl. Xue, J., para. 26.

⁴⁷ See id., paras. 21-24.

⁴⁸ Id., para. 116 (Judgment of the Court).

⁴⁹ *Id.* (citing in part Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., UK & U.S.), Preliminary Question, 1954 ICJ REP. 19 (June 15)). According to this principle, the "Court will not adjudicate on a case where the Court would be required, as a necessary prerequisite, to adjudicate on the rights or responsibilities of a non-consenting and absent third State." Dapo Akande, *The ICC and the Crime of Aggression: The Consent Problem and the Security Council Issue*, EJIL: TALK! (May 28, 2010), *at* http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icc-and-the-crime-of-aggression-the-consent-problem-and-the-security-council-issue.

prompt greater reflection on the status in international law of a doctrine of succession to state responsibility, eventually leading to clarification of the issue.

Turning to the merits claims, the Court found that although some acts cited by each party satisfied the *actus reus* of genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention, the requirement of an accompanying mental intent, or *dolus specialis*, was not satisfied. This finding added little to the Court's previous jurisprudence. The parties raised specific contentions with respect to the criteria for evaluating *actus reus* and *dolus specialis*, and the Court settled these issues by reiterating its approach in the *Bosnian Genocide* case.⁵⁵ Those portions of the judgment make useful reading mainly as a succinct account of the Court's interpretation of the concept of genocide provided in the Genocide Convention. One place where the Court perhaps went a step beyond its previous jurisprudence was in its comments on disappeared persons. The Court accepted Croatia's argument that

the psychological pain suffered by the relatives of individuals who have disappeared in the context of an alleged genocide, as a result of the persistent refusal of the competent authorities to provide the information in their possession which would enable these relatives to establish with certainty whether and how the persons concerned died [could] constitute serious mental harm [as to contribute to the physical or biological destruction of the group, thereby falling within the definition of genocide].⁵⁶

While it did not find such a degree of suffering established on the facts, it encouraged both states to cooperate and to use all available measures "in order that the issue of the fate of missing persons [on both sides] can be settled as quickly as possible."⁵⁷

Another helpful clarification was that, in the absence of a specific plan, the Court will infer *dolus specialis*, if that is the only *reasonable* inference to be drawn from a pattern of conduct.⁵⁸ In the *Bosnian Genocide* case, the Court seemed to suggest that it would infer genocide if that were the only *possible* inference to be drawn.⁵⁹ However, the Court here clarified that the change of language did not indicate a change of standard, for the notion of reasonableness was implicit in that previous judgment.⁶⁰

The Court further offered an interesting discussion on the burden, standard, and methods of proof. Much of this discussion was again a reiteration of its previous jurisprudence. However, perhaps catalyzed by specific questions asked by Judges Dalveer Bhandari and Christopher Greenwood on the probative weight to be given to different categories of witness evidence and on the admissibility of unsigned statements in Croatian courts,⁶¹ the judgment offered a helpful elaboration of how the Court treats different types of witness testimony.⁶² Whether the Court "is faithful to its stated standard of proof" is a different matter— one raised by Judge Joan

⁵⁵ Id., paras. 162, 434 (Judgment of the Court) (quoting Bosnian Genocide, supra note 14, para. 190).

⁵⁶ Id., para. 356; see also Dov Jacobs, A Commentary on the ICJ Croatia v. Serbia Genocide Case (Part I): Some Thoughts on an Anti-Climatic Result, SPREADING THE JAM (Feb. 16, 2015), at https://dovjacobs.com/2015/02/ 16/a-commentary-on-the-icj-croatia-v-serbia-genocide-case-part-i-some-thoughts-on-an-anti-climatic-result.

⁵⁷ Id., para. 359; see also id., para. 523.

⁵⁸ Id., para. 148.

⁵⁹ Bosnian Genocide, *supra* note 14, para. 373 (noting that "for a pattern of conduct to be accepted as evidence of its existence, it would have to be such that it could only point to the existence of such intent").

⁶⁰ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 148.

⁶¹ Verbatim Record CR 2014/12, *supra* note 28, at 10; Verbatim Record, Application of the Genocide Convention, ICJ Doc. CR 2014/20, at 67 (Mar. 20, 2014).

⁶² Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, paras. 180–99.

Donoghue in her separate opinion.⁶³ Nevertheless, greater clarity from the Court on such points is to be welcomed.

The case provided further opportunity for the Court to articulate its relationship with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and, by extension, other such institutions. The Court affirmed that it regarded the ICTY's factual findings as "highly persuasive," and it gave due weight to the Tribunal's evaluations based on the facts, such as the "existence of the required intent."⁶⁴ Nevertheless, some judges, and Serbia too, suggested interesting variations on the use that the Court might make of the ICTY's work.

Judge Julia Sebutinde questioned the Court's attaching significance to the ICTY prosecutor's decision to exclude or withdraw charges of genocide from an indictment.⁶⁵ She pointed out that such decisions were discretionary and could be made for many reasons other than the probity of the charges.⁶⁶ Moreover, the lack of proceedings in respect to the criminal responsibility of individuals could not be determinative of state responsibility.⁶⁷ Her points are worthy of consideration, and, although the absence of genocide charges at the ICTY was only one of the factors relied upon by the Court, there may be an argument for it to reconsider whether and in what circumstances it will attach weight to prosecutorial discretion exercised at the international criminal tribunals.

Judge Leonid Skotnikov made almost the opposite suggestion that the Court, being illequipped to make factual findings, should wholly rely on relevant proceedings at the ICTY.⁶⁸ That is, the factual determination should be entirely outsourced, given a suitable international penal tribunal, leaving to the Court only such legal questions as attribution and state responsibility. While the suggestion is attractive in that it may reduce the Court's workload, Judge Sebutinde's arguments would stand against such an approach, *a fortiori*, if the suggestion made by Judge Giorgio Gaja—that state responsibility for genocide should be assessed by reference to different standards than individual criminal responsibility—carries weight.⁶⁹ Judge Gaja's suggestion departs from the approach taken by the Court⁷⁰ but rightly calls attention to the difference in the focus of the two institutions.

The most interesting suggestion came from Serbia, which argued that the Court need not accord greater weight to the findings of the ICTY Appeals Chamber than the findings of the ICTY Trial Chamber. It claimed that the judges of the former chamber, appointed at random and varying from case to case, could not claim greater experience or authority than those of the latter. Thus, rather than regarding an Appeals Chamber's overruling of a Trial Chamber as conclusive, the Court should form its own view of the persuasiveness of the arguments accepted

⁶⁵ Id., Sep. Op. Sebutinde, J., paras. 16–21.

⁶⁹ *Id.*, Sep. Op. Gaja, J., paras. 1–5.

⁷⁰ Judge Rosalyn Higgins, then president of the ICJ, clarified that the Court's standard of proof for genocide was not higher or lower than that applied by the ICTY but noted that it was "simply a comparable standard which employed terminology more appropriate to a civil, international law case." Statement by the President to the International Court of Justice to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly (Nov. 2, 2007), UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Sixth Committee, 23d mtg., para. 94, UN Doc. A/C.6/62/SR.23 (Dec. 6, 2007) (citing Bosnian Genocide, *supra* note 14, para. 209).

2016]

⁶³ Id., Decl. Donoghue, J., para. 9.

⁶⁴ Id., para. 182 (Judgment of the Court) (quoting Bosnian Genocide, supra note 14, para. 223).

⁶⁶ Id., para. 17.

⁶⁷ Id., para. 21.

⁶⁸ Id., Sep. Op. Skotnikov, J., para. 14.

by each.⁷¹ The background to Serbia's argument was the ICTY's judgments in the *Gotovina* case: the Trial Chamber had unanimously convicted two Croatian generals of participation in a joint criminal enterprise to commit crimes that constituted the *actus reus* of genocide.⁷² The Appeals Chamber had overturned these convictions by a majority of three to two.⁷³ Serbia contended that the ICJ should take into account the fact that, counting across both Chambers, a greater number of judges were convinced of the guilt of the Croatian generals. The ICJ rightly dismissed these arguments, noting that it was not for the ICJ to pronounce on the manner in which the Appeals Chambers. To adopt Serbia's suggestion would have been to overlook the judicial form of the ICTY altogether, a lapse of judicial comity on the part of the ICJ.

A final thought with which to close: a layperson reading the case may be struck by the parties' ready utilization of their own terrible deeds and intentions as arguments in support of their cases. Acknowledging claims of forced displacement and ethnic cleansing, the parties argued that those acts, committed only in order to gain control over the territory, did not disclose a genocidal intent.⁷⁴ This was a sound argument in a context where the Court's jurisdiction extended only to violations of the Genocide Convention. Nevertheless, not only laypersons, but also lawyers, must feel discomfort at the jurisdictional constraints that necessitate such fragmentary adjudications of responsibility as to give bite to such arguments. Indeed, that is the message in the concluding paragraphs of both the judgment and the president's separate opinion.⁷⁵

Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile)

The second judgment of 2015 concerns Chile's preliminary objection to jurisdiction in the case brought against it by Bolivia.⁷⁶ Bolivia's application, instituted in April 2013, asked the Court to find that Chile had violated an obligation "to negotiate in good faith and effectively with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean."⁷⁷ It requested that the Court order Chile to perform this obligation "in good faith, promptly, formally, within a reasonable time and effectively, to grant Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean."⁷⁸ The application invoked Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá⁷⁹ as the basis for the Court's jurisdiction.⁸⁰ Article XXXI provides for compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in disputes concerning treaty interpretation, questions of international

⁷¹ Verbatim Record, Application of the Genocide Convention, ICJ Doc. CR 2014/18, at 43–47 (Mar. 14, 2014).

⁷³ Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 158 (Nov. 16, 2012).

⁷⁴ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, paras. 412–37 (esp. 435), 505, 514; *see also* Application of the Convention, Counter-Memorial of Serbia, *supra* note 5, vol. I, paras. 55–58, 975–77; Application of the Genocide Convention, Additional Pleading of Croatia, vol. I, paras. 4.31–4.36 (Int'l Ct. Justice Aug. 30, 2012).

⁷⁵ Application of the Genocide Convention, *supra* note 1, para. 523; *id.*, Sep. Op. Tomka, P., paras. 34–35.
 ⁷⁶ Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Preliminary Objection (Int'l Ct. Justice)

Sept. 24, 2015) [hereinafter Obligation to Negotiate, Preliminary Objection].

⁷⁷ Application Instituting Proceedings (Bol. v. Chile), para. 1 (Int'l Ct. Justice Apr. 24, 2013) [hereinafter Application Instituting Proceedings (Bol. v. Chile)].

⁷⁸ *Id.*, para. 32(c).

512

⁷⁹ American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá), Apr. 30, 1948, 30 UNTS 55 (entered into force June 5, 1949) [hereinafter Pact of Bogotá].

⁸⁰ Application Instituting Proceedings (Bol. v. Chile), *supra* note 77, at 10, para. 5.

⁷² Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Trial Judgement, vol. II, paras. 1967, 2600–01, 2619 (Apr. 15, 2011).

513

law, breaches of international obligation, and reparation.⁸¹ Chile's preliminary objection, however, referred the Court to Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá, which excludes recourse to Article XXXI in "matters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or . . . governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of the present Treaty."⁸² Chile contended that Bolivia's request, effectively asking the Court to order Chile to make a specific territorial disposition, concerned a matter that had already been settled by a bilateral treaty concluded between the two states in 1904.⁸³ Bolivia objected to this characterization of the dispute before the Court.⁸⁴

The factual background to the application may briefly be reprised. Bolivia, landlocked between Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru, once had a coastline along the Pacific Ocean, since lost following a war with Chile in the late nineteenth century. In 1904, the two states signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship, formalizing a comprehensive territorial settlement under which Bolivia's coastal territory became Chilean, while Bolivia was granted a right of commercial transit to Chilean ports.⁸⁵ Bolivia remained desirous of regaining a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean and has claimed that for many years Chile showed willingness to negotiate terms by which it could be achieved: Chile specifically committed itself "through agreements, diplomatic practice and a series of declarations attributable to its highest-level representatives, to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia,"⁸⁶ but retreated from this commitment in February 2011, on the basis that "Bolivia lacks any legal basis to access the Pacific through territories appertaining to Chile."⁸⁷ Bolivia claimed that its application was not concerned with the terms of the 1904 treaty but with Chile's actions thereafter that gave rise to an obligation to negotiate in good faith with Bolivia to secure its sovereign access to the sea.⁸⁸

The Court considered the appropriate characterization of the dispute to be the main issue in contention: was it merely concerned with Chile's alleged obligation to negotiate, as Bolivia contended, or was it seeking a finding that Chile was obliged to agree to a particular territorial outcome, as Chile contended?⁸⁹ Once the Court settled this question, it could determine whether the dispute was a matter excluded by Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá.

Addressing the proper characterization of the dispute first, the Court found that Bolivia's application merely concerned the existence of an obligation upon Chile to negotiate.⁹⁰ It dismissed Chile's argument that the relief sought by Bolivia entailed a finding of not only an obligation of *conduct* on the part of Chile, but also an obligation of *result*.⁹¹ Chile argued that

⁸¹ Id. (citing Pact of Bogotá, supra note 79, Art. XXXI).

⁸² Obligation to Negotiate, Preliminary Objection of Chile, vol. I, para. 1.1 (Int'l Ct. Justice July 15, 2014) (citing Pact of Bogotá, *supra* note 79, Art. VI) [hereinafter Preliminary Objection of Chile].

⁸³ *Id.*, vol. I, paras. 3.20–3.39 (citing Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Bol.-Chile, Oct. 20, 1904 (entered into force Mar. 10, 1905) [hereinafter Treaty of Peace and Friendship]).

⁸⁴ Obligation to Negotiate, Preliminary Objection, *supra* note 76, para. 23.

⁸⁵ Treaty of Peace and Friendship, *supra* note 83, Arts. II, VI, VII.

⁸⁶ Application Instituting Proceedings (Bol. v. Chile), *supra* note 77, para. 31.

⁸⁷ Id., para. 27 (citation omitted).

⁸⁸ Obligation to Negotiate, Written Statement of the Plurinational State of Bolivia on the Preliminary Objection to Jurisdiction Filed by Chile, para. 69 (Int'l Ct. Justice Nov. 7, 2014).

⁸⁹ Obligation to Negotiate, Preliminary Objection, *supra* note 76, para. 24.

90 Id., paras. 32-34.

⁹¹ This distinction was highlighted in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ REP. 226, para. 99 (July 8) [hereinafter Legality of the Threat].

Bolivia presented its claims in terms suggesting that a cession of territory by Chile was already a given, with only details—how much territory, and where—remaining to be negotiated.⁹² And this notion, Chile insisted, was contrary to the 1904 Treaty that finalized the territorial rights of both states: Bolivia could not reopen that discussion via an approach to the Court under the Pact of Bogotá.⁹³ The Court, however, considered that it would not be called upon to predetermine the outcome of a negotiation, even if it were to find for Chile's obligation to negotiate. It described the subject matter of the dispute as being "whether Chile is obligated to negotiate in good faith Bolivia's sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and, if such an obligation exists, whether Chile has breached it."⁹⁴ The Court found that the 1904 treaty did not exclude the Court's jurisdiction.⁹⁵

The Court's description of the subject matter of the dispute subtly reworded the relief sought in Bolivia's application, which had been for a declaration that Chile had (breached) the obligation to negotiate "*in order to reach an agreement* granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean" (suggesting an obligation of result).⁹⁶ The formulation in the judgment may be read as signifying that the declaration sought was simply that Chile was obligated to negotiate in good faith the *question* of Bolivia's sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean—that is, Chile had an obligation of conduct. The Court was perhaps influenced here by Bolivia's own implicit reformulation of its claim in these terms during the oral proceedings.⁹⁷

The question that follows is whether the Court, by this characterization, implicitly limited its own hand as to possible findings on the merits. In other words, is the Court now precluded from finding that the content of any obligation to negotiate on Chile's part includes the obligation to achieve a specific result? This point is important, for, as the Court notes, Bolivia, at the merits stage, will adduce evidence of Chilean practice that establishes its duty to negotiate.⁹⁸ It is plausible that Bolivia will argue that this practice further evinces recognition of the duty to provide for a certain outcome—Bolivia's sovereign access. In fact, Bolivia asserted that the "existence *and* specific content" of the obligation to negotiate were matters to be "determined by the Court at the merits stage of proceedings."⁹⁹

Did the Court restrict itself to determining only the former? Probably not: the judgment avoids accepting Chile's contention that the 1904 treaty is the final word on the territorial rights and obligations of the two states. It simply finds no occasion for it to examine that contention because the subject matter of the dispute before it is different. It emphasizes this point in response to Bolivia's alternative argument that such a contention refutes Bolivia's case on the merits "and thus [does] not possess an exclusively preliminary character."¹⁰⁰ Ordinarily,

⁹² Chile clarified this understanding in response to a question asked by Judge Hisashi Owada. Obligation to Negotiate, Written Reply of Chile to the Question Put by Judge Owada (Int'l Ct. Justice May 13, 2015).

⁹³ Preliminary Objection of Chile, *supra* note 82, vol. I, para. 3.19.

⁹⁴ Obligation to Negotiate, Preliminary Objection, *supra* note 76, para. 34.

95 *Id.*, para. 54.

⁹⁶ *Id.*, para. 1 (emphasis added) (quoting in part Application Instituting Proceedings (Bol. v. Chile), *supra* note 77, para. 1).

⁹⁷ Judge *ad hoc* Louise Arbour makes the point about Bolivia reformulating its claim. *Id.*, Diss. Op. Arbour, J. *ad hoc*, paras. 13–14.

⁹⁸ *Id.*, para. 33 (Judgment of the Court).

⁹⁹ Obligation to Negotiate, Bolivia's Response to the Question of Judge Owada (Int'l Ct. Justice May 13, 2015) (emphasis added).

¹⁰⁰ Obligation to Negotiate, Preliminary Objection, *supra* note 76, para. 52.

considerations of judicial economy imply that having accepted Bolivia's principal argument, the Court need not address the alternative. Here, by doing so, the Court reinforces its silence on the merits of Chile's contention.

Nevertheless, the Court has taken a convoluted route to settling the preliminary objection. Judge Gaja outlines a better approach: he concludes that Bolivia's application articulates the possibility that a matter once considered settled by the 1904 Treaty was "*unsettled*" by subsequent practice occurring between 1905 and the conclusion of the Pact of Bogotá and so was not excluded by Article VI.¹⁰¹ Whether or not these claims carry weight—that is, was the matter was in fact unsettled, and to what extent—is a question bearing on the merits. Chile's objection, therefore, lacked an exclusively preliminary character and should be addressed alongside the merits. A simple order on joinder, as recommended in a number of individual opinions, ¹⁰² not only would have had the charm of brevity but also would have been in keeping with the Court's likely approach at the merits stage where it will presumably evaluate the 1904 Treaty alongside other practices to determine the existence and content of Chile's obligation to negotiate.

A final point should be raised on the likely scope of the merits arguments. Bolivia claims that it will prove that, "beyond its general obligations under international law, Chile has committed itself... to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia."¹⁰³ Implicit here is the assertion that international law also imposes a general obligation to negotiate, binding upon Chile. Bolivia has not clarified the basis for this assertion, but, if proved, it could avoid all difficulties of establishing Chile's specific obligation. Is there a legal basis for such an obligation? In the context of negotiating *sovereign* access (if that term implies territorial control), this author cannot readily recall any such doctrine.¹⁰⁴ Eyal Benvenisti offers the interesting observation—applying the idea of sovereignty as trusteeship—that "[a] coastal state . . . must allow access to a landlocked neighbor if such access entails no harm to itself (for example, a one-time emergency flight over its airspace, or even a tunnel below its territory)."¹⁰⁵ However, although Benvenisti has linked this argument to Bolivia's claim against Chile, he does not refer to a duty to negotiate cession of territory.¹⁰⁶ His measured tone, referring only to flight or tunneling underground, rather confirms that, under general international law, Bolivia's best claim would be for

¹⁰¹ Id., Decl. Gaja, J., paras. 3, 4 (emphasis added).

¹⁰² Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade and Judge Mohamed Bennouna recommended this approach. *Id.*, Sep. Op. Cançado Trindade, J., paras. 12–15, 32–35; *id.*, Decl. Bennouna, J.; *see also id.*, Diss. Op. Arbour, J. *ad hoc*, para. 27.

¹⁰³ Application Instituting Proceedings (Bol. v. Chile), *supra* note 77, para. 31.

¹⁰⁴ But the duty to negotiate transit has a legal basis. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 125, *opened for signature* Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, 21 ILM 1261 (1982) (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Bolivia, presumably, wants more than the right of transit. The Court has occasionally inferred an obligation to negotiate from the rights and obligations of states in specific contexts. *E.g.*, North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ REP. 3, para. 85 (Feb. 20); Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Ice.), Merits, 1974 ICJ REP. 3, paras. 74–75 (July 25). The latter case, highlighting as a material point Iceland's exceptional dependence upon a particular use of the sea, might even suggest a weak analogy, but, given that even UNCLOS only recognizes a right of transit for a landlocked state, it is unlikely to support a claim that Chile is under a general duty to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea.

¹⁰⁵ Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AJIL 295, 320 (2013).

¹⁰⁶ Eyal Benvenisti, *Landlocked Bolivia Takes Chile to the International Court of Justice Seeking Access to the Pacific Ocean*, GLOBAL TRUST BLOG (May 23, 2013), *at* globaltrust.tau.ac.il/landlocked-bolivia-takes-chile-to-the-international-court-of-justice-seeking-access-to-the-pacific-ocean.

negotiation of the sort of transit rights that it already enjoys with Chile. Proving Chile's specific obligation to negotiate enhanced access thus appears unavoidable for Bolivia and indicates the probable focus of its merits arguments. Securing a tract of territory is surely the motivation underlying Bolivia's application, though it may have disavowed this interest to win at the preliminary objection stage.

Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River* (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica)

The Court's third judgment involved a frequent litigant, Nicaragua. In this instance, however, the joined cases between Nicaragua and Costa Rica did not serve as the occasion for a significant pronouncement on legal doctrine or principle. The disputes, which included claims of territorial infringement and transboundary environmental harm on both sides, mainly turned on the facts. The Court ruled in favor of Costa Rica's claim of sovereignty over a disputed territory, and its violation by Nicaragua; and it found in favor of Nicaragua's claim that Costa Rica had failed to carry out a necessary environmental impact assessment (EIA). It dismissed not only Nicaragua's claim that Costa Rica had infringed on Nicaraguan territory but also Costa Rica's claim that Nicaragua had not carried out a necessary EIA. The Court's (perhaps excessive) regard for judicial economy led it to leave unexamined several other claims. Its only other findings were related to Nicaragua's breaches of provisional measures and to Costa Rica's navigational rights.¹⁰⁷

Given the complex factual backdrop of the joined cases, it may be helpful to first outline the facts together with the claims and findings and then discuss some important points. Costa Rica's claims against Nicaragua concerned its activities relating to the San Juan River.¹⁰⁸ As shown below in Figure 1, the river's southern bank constitutes a major stretch of the boundary between the two states; its waters fall within Nicaraguan sovereignty, while Costa Rica enjoys rights of navigation.¹⁰⁹ At a point close to the Caribbean coast, the river divides into two branches.¹¹⁰ From here, the border runs along the right bank of the north-flowing branch, the Lower San Juan—although, until this judgment, there was confusion as to whether the border and the river diverged in the last few miles. The reason for the confusion was that, due to natural geological modifications over time, the boundary line described in arbitral awards of the nine-teenth century no longer exactly corresponded to the river's flow. Nevertheless, the criterion underlying that boundary line—that it should run along the right bank of the navigable channel of the river—was accepted by both parties.¹¹¹ They disagreed, however, as to which channel

¹⁰⁹ Costa Rica's navigational rights were the subject of a recent judgment. Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 2009 ICJ REP. 213 (July 13).

¹¹⁰ Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, *supra* note 107, at 31 (Sketch-Map No. 1).
 ¹¹¹ *Id.*, para. 68.

¹⁰⁷ Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.)/Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), para. 229 (Int'l Ct. Justice Dec. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Certain Activities/Construction of a Road].

¹⁰⁸ Application Instituting Proceedings, Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), para. 41 (Int'l Ct. Justice Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Application Instituting Proceedings, Certain Activities]; *see also* Sienho Yee, *The 2013 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice*, 109 AJIL 339, 349 (2015).




FIGURE 1. MAP DEPICTING DISPUTES BETWEEN COSTA RICA AND NICARAGUA.

Source: Sketch-Map No.1, Geographical Context, Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), at 31 (Int'l Ct. Justice Dec. 16, 2015).

was indicated: Costa Rica referred to the "main channel,"¹¹² while Nicaragua referred to the "first channel" to the right of the main river that it claimed to have dredged (beginning in 2010) to *restore* navigability.¹¹³ Costa Rica contended that Nicaragua had artificially created this channel in Costa Rican territory.¹¹⁴

Many of Costa Rica's other claims flowed from this claim: if the channel dug by Nicaragua was an artificial one, then (Costa Rica alleged that) Nicaragua indeed had trespassed upon Costa Rica's territory; had violated Costa Rica's sovereignty and territorial integrity; had used the San Juan River to commit hostile acts (contrary to a specific obligation not to do so¹¹⁵); and, worse, had sent its military into that territory, breaching Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, making that territory the object of a military occupation.¹¹⁶ Nicaragua claimed that it was merely clearing an existing channel, one that appropriately marked the boundary between the two states; hence, no violation of territorial sovereignty or any other obligation had occurred.¹¹⁷

The Court first pronounced on the territorial dispute. Finding no evidence to support Nicaragua's claim that the channel it was clearing was a natural one, the Court ruled in favor of Costa

¹¹² Id., para. 77.

¹¹³ *Id.*, para. 78. Both parties relied upon the same legal authorities: Treaty of Limits, Costa Rica-Nicar., Apr. 15, 1858 (entered into force Apr. 26, 1858); Cleveland Award, Mar. 22, 1888, 28 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards [RIAA] 189; Alexander Awards I–II, Sept. 30, 1897–Dec. 20, 1897, 28 RIAA 215–25. *See* Application Instituting Proceedings, Certain Activities, *supra* note 108, paras. 1, 9, 21; Application Instituting Proceedings, Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), paras. 47, 49 (Int'l Ct. Justice Dec. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Application Instituting Proceedings, Construction of a Road].

¹¹⁴ Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, *supra* note 107, para. 63.

¹¹⁵ Treaty of Limits, *supra* note 113, Art. IX.

¹¹⁶ Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, *supra* note 107, paras. 48, 49.

¹¹⁷ *Id.*, para. 63.

Rica's assertion that its boundary line was determined by the right bank of the main river.¹¹⁸ The disputed territory was Costa Rican, and Nicaragua was in breach of its obligation to respect Costa Rica's sovereignty.¹¹⁹

The Court decided not to "dwell" upon Costa Rica's related submissions: it did not examine whether Nicaragua had breached Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and it did not consider whether Nicaragua's actions constituted a military occupation.¹²⁰ It found Costa Rica's claim of Nicaragua's hostile use of the river unsupported by the evidence.¹²¹

Costa Rica also claimed that Nicaragua's channeling and dredging activities violated applicable environmental law, including the obligations to conduct an EIA, to notify and consult with Costa Rica, and to not cause harm to Costa Rica's territory and protected wetlands.¹²² The Court observed that "general international law" now imposes a requirement "to undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context."¹²³ However, it was satisfied on the facts that Nicaragua's preliminary assessment had not revealed a risk of significant transboundary harm, and thus Nicaragua was not required to carry out an EIA.¹²⁴ Correspondingly, Nicaragua had not breached its notice and consult obligations.¹²⁵ The Court further found Costa Rica's claim of actual environmental harm to be unsupported by the evidence. It did not answer an interesting legal point raised by Nicaragua that, under the terms of the 1888 Cleveland Award, it was entitled to dredge, even if it caused some environmental harm to Costa Rica, for this entitlement constituted a *lex specialis* to its general obligations under environmental law.¹²⁶ The Court merely noted that it had no reason to decide whether the development of the obligation not to cause transboundary harm had superseded the earlier regime (if indeed it corresponded to Nicaragua's description), for no harm had been proven on the facts.¹²⁷

Although it dismissed Costa Rica's environmental claims, the Court made two other findings in its favor. First, on evidence not contested by Nicaragua, it found that Nicaraguan officials had breached Costa Rica's navigational rights on two occasions.¹²⁸ Second, it also determined that Nicaragua had breached provisional measures indicated in 2011: the Court had asked both parties to refrain from maintaining military, police, or civilian personnel in the disputed territory and from undertaking any action that might exacerbate the dispute.¹²⁹ Nicaragua had established a military presence and excavated two additional channels in the disputed

¹¹⁸ *Id.*, para. 76.

¹¹⁹ *Id.*, para. 229(1), (2).

¹²⁰ *Id.*, para. 97.

121 Id., paras. 95, 229(7).

¹²² *Id.*, para. 48.

¹²³ *Id.*, para. 104 (quoting Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 ICJ REP. 14, para. 101 (Apr. 20)).

¹²⁴ Id., para. 105.

¹²⁵ *Id.*, para. 108. Moreover, the Court did not find any breach of notice and consult obligations under specific treaties such as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, 996 UNTS 245, 11 ILM 969 (1972) (entered into force Dec. 21, 1975). Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, *supra* note 107, para. 110.

¹²⁶ Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, *supra* note 107, para. 107.

¹²⁷ Id., paras. 109, 110.

¹²⁸ Id., paras. 136, 229(2).

¹²⁹ See id., para. 229(3) (citing Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Provisional Measures, 2011 ICJ REP. 6 (Mar. 8)).

2016]

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

territory, violating both parts of the order.¹³⁰ On a point of principle, the Court also clarified that a "judgment on the merits is the appropriate place for the Court to assess compliance with the provisional measures" and to make a finding of responsibility for their breach (although Nicaragua had suggested that such a finding would be redundant by this stage).¹³¹

However, the Court declined to award the costs of the further proceeding on provisional measures (leading to an order in 2013¹³²) that Costa Rica claimed had resulted directly from Nicaragua's breach.¹³³ The Court, which has not yet awarded costs in any proceeding, decided to follow the general rule (as stated in Article 64 of its Statute) that parties should bear their own costs.¹³⁴ It awarded other relief to Costa Rica, in the form of declarations of Nicaragua's violations, and a finding that it was entitled to receive compensation for material damage caused to its territory.¹³⁵ The Court asked the two states to negotiate the amount of compensation between themselves but also provided for a judicial determination at the request of either state if they are unable to agree within twelve months.¹³⁶ It declined to order assurances and guarantees of nonrepetition, preferring to maintain its rather sparing recourse to these forms of reparation.

Nicaragua's claims against Costa Rica arose from Costa Rica's construction of a major roadway along the right bank of the San Juan River.¹³⁷ The construction began in December 2010, and, in early 2011, Costa Rica proclaimed a state of emergency on the San Juan border area, in light of Nicaragua's activities.¹³⁸ In response to Nicaragua's claims as to breaches of applicable environmental law, Costa Rica argued that the emergency exempted it from the obligation to conduct an EIA before beginning construction.¹³⁹ It further argued that it did, in fact, carry out environmental impact studies during the construction, which fulfilled the requirement, and it rejected Nicaragua's further claim that its actions had caused transboundary harm.¹⁴⁰

The Court offered a rather more elaborate response to Nicaragua's environmental claims than it had to Costa Rica's environmental claims, although its fact-focused answers once again did not address some interesting legal points. It found that the construction project posed a risk of substantial transboundary harm, triggering Costa Rica's obligation to conduct an EIA.¹⁴¹

¹³⁰ Id.

¹³¹ Id., paras. 126, 229(3).

¹³² Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.)/Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), Provisional Measures, 2013 ICJ REP. 230 (July 16).

¹³³ Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, *supra* note 107, para. 229(4)(c).

¹³⁴ Id., para. 144 (citing Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 64).

¹³⁵ *Id.*, para. 229(5)(a). Nicaragua had already withdrawn from the disputed territory in response to the 2013 order. The Court considered that its declaration of Nicaragua's territorial violation provided adequate satisfaction for the nonmaterial injury suffered by Costa Rica.

¹³⁶ *Id.*, para. 229(5)(b). If the Court does ultimately fix the amount of compensation, it will mark only the third occasion on which it would have done so; the others were *Corfu Channel* (UK v. Alb.), Assessment of Amount of Compensation, 1949 ICJ REP. 244 (Dec. 15), and *Ahmadou Sadio Diallo* (Guinea v Dem. Rep. Congo), Compensation, 2012 ICJ REP. 324 (June 19).

¹³⁷ Application Instituting Proceedings, Construction of a Road, *supra* note 113, paras. 49–52.

¹³⁸ Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, *supra* note 107, para. 64.

¹³⁹ Id., para. 148.

¹⁴⁰ Id., paras. 149, 219.

¹⁴¹ Id., paras. 156, 161, 229(6).

Moreover, Costa Rica had not established that it conducted any preliminary assessment that suggested otherwise.¹⁴²

It then addressed Costa Rica's argument as to the effects of an emergency. Costa Rica had proposed two distinct bases for its claim that an emergency may exempt a state from the requirement to conduct an EIA: first, because international law contains a *renvoi* to domestic law on this point;¹⁴³ and second, because international law includes an exemption for emergency situations.¹⁴⁴ The Court initially found that its previous pronouncement that it was for each state "to determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization process for the project, the specific content of the environmental impact assessment required in each case,' having regard to various factors," did not extend to the question of whether an EIA should be undertaken.¹⁴⁵ The international obligation to conduct an EIA was not affected by an emergency exception in domestic law.¹⁴⁶ The Court did not address the second point but simply noted that the facts did not indicate the existence of an emergency necessitating the immediate construction of the road.¹⁴⁷

The Court further found that Costa Rica's impact studies did not fulfill the obligation to conduct an EIA; that obligation "require[d] an *ex ante* evaluation of the risks of significant transboundary harm,"¹⁴⁸ and Costa Rica was thus in breach. The Court did not contemplate Nicaragua's related claims as to Costa Rica's failure to notify and consult with Nicaragua, perhaps again as a matter of judicial economy.¹⁴⁹ It found that Costa Rica's actions related to increased sediment concentrations had not caused significant transboundary harm, and it dismissed as unfounded a standard of evaluation proposed by Nicaragua—that any detrimental impact capable of being measured would constitute significant harm.¹⁵⁰

Finally, the Court also dismissed Nicaragua's claim that Costa Rica's construction had led to the creation of deltas in the river that amounted to "physical invasions, incursions by Costa Rica into Nicaragua's sovereign territory . . . through the agency of sediment."¹⁵¹ It described the "theory" of territorial infringement via sediment as unconvincing and, in any event, unsupported by the facts.¹⁵² Thus, finding in Nicaragua's favor only in respect of the obligation to conduct an EIA, the Court awarded it declaratory relief on this point and dismissed its other requests for reparation.¹⁵³

What insights can be taken from the above summary of the facts, arguments, and findings in the joined cases? Perhaps most striking is the Court's embrace of judicial economy, particularly in not deciding on Costa Rica's claim of the use of force by Nicaragua.¹⁵⁴ This allegation

¹⁴² Id., para. 161.
¹⁴³ Id., para. 148.
¹⁴⁴ Id., para. 158.
¹⁴⁵ Id., para. 157 (quoting Pulp Mills, *supra* note 123, para. 205).
¹⁴⁶ Id.
¹⁴⁷ Id., para. 159.
¹⁴⁸ Id., para. 161.
¹⁴⁹ The Court did not find a breach of specific notice and consult obligations under the Ramsar Convention. See id., para. 165, 172.
¹⁵⁰ See id., para. 192.

- ¹⁵¹ *Id.*, para. 221.
- ¹⁵² *Id.*, para. 223.
- ¹⁵³ *Id.*, para. 229.
- ¹⁵⁴ *Id.*, para. 97.

was serious, involving, at an extreme, the breach of a peremptory norm. While the Court has long asserted a "freedom to select the ground upon which it will base its judgment,"¹⁵⁵ it is not self-evident that a selection is appropriate between claims that represent rather different orders of responsibility. Selecting a claim involving a lower-order breach seems hardly sufficient to vindicate the rights of a state that may have suffered a violation of a peremptory norm.¹⁵⁶ Yet the Court appeared to find its choice sufficient, for it based its explanation not on the freedom to select (which, though problematic, is at least unfettered by criteria for application¹⁵⁷) but on the statement that, by its judgment and Nicaragua's consequent evacuation, "the injury suffered by Costa Rica 'will in all events have been sufficiently addressed."¹⁵⁸

This approach is unsatisfactory. As Judge Patrick Robinson argues in a detailed opinion, the Court's judicial function, as a UN organ, is to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, by way of peaceful settlement of international disputes.¹⁵⁹ This task entails deciding all nonfrivolous claims of breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that are asserted before it—both to clarify for all states the contours of that provision, regarded as the Charter's "cornerstone," and to determine the appropriate reparation owed to the injured state.¹⁶⁰ Here, the Court's approach subsumed Nicaragua's breach of Article 2(4) under a lesser infringement and denied Costa Rica the remedy of satisfaction for that breach.¹⁶¹

The Court's decision not to pronounce upon the existence in international law of an emergency exception to the obligation to conduct an EIA is more understandable. In this instance, the Court first determined that the factual basis for the claim did not exist (unlike with respect to Costa Rica's claims on Nicaragua's use of force).¹⁶² Further consideration of an emergency exception would have been superfluous, and a pronouncement on its legal status would have been an *obiter dictum*. Nevertheless, we might wish that the Court had made the pronouncement given the importance of the issue and the paucity of legal writing upon it. Whether states may claim an emergency as the basis for exemption from legal obligations remains an area of uncertainty, on such issues as the scope of the exception, the norms to which it may be applied, the conduct permitted, and, most importantly, the question of who decides. The law has consolidated around specific devices, such as rules on derogations from human rights obligations¹⁶³ and the defense of necessity formulated in the Articles on State Responsibility,¹⁶⁴ but

¹⁵⁵ The Court first used the phrase in *Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants* (Neth. v. Swed.), 1958 ICJ REP. 55, 62 (Nov. 28), but previously employed the approach in *Fisheries* (UK v. Nor.), 1951 ICJ REP. 116, 126 (Dec. 18). Alexander Orakhelashvili, *The International Court and 'Its Freedom to Select the Ground upon Which It Will Base Its Judgment*, '56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 171, 173 (2007).

¹⁵⁶ See also Tom Ruys, The Meaning of "Force" and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are "Minimal" Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 AJIL 159, 160–63 (2014).

¹⁵⁷ Orakhelashvili, *supra* note 155, at 183.

¹⁵⁸ Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, *supra* note 107, para. 97 (quoting Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 ICJ REP. 303, para. 319 (Oct. 10)).

¹⁵⁹ *Id.*, Sep. Op. Robinson, J., para. 30. On the Court's approach to cases concerning the use of force, see Christine Gray, *The International Court of Justice and the Use of Force, in* THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 237 (Christian J. Tams & James Sloan eds., 2013).

¹⁶⁰ Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, *supra* note 107, Sep. Op. Robinson, J., paras. 27, 37–38.

¹⁶¹ Id., paras. 37–39.

¹⁶² *Id.*, para. 159.

¹⁶³ See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).

¹⁶⁴ ARSIWA, *supra* note 23, Art. 25.

2016]

it is not clear that such enumerated grounds exhaust the possibilities of invoking an emergency. At its heart, the question engages the perpetual debate on the proper relationship between sovereignty and international order, and the extent to which they accommodate each other. While the Court may not have offered any substantial contribution to this debate, it could have advanced our understanding on the applicability of an emergency exception to environmental obligations.¹⁶⁵ In any event, the judgment confirms two points. First, the existence of an emergency exception in domestic law does not suffice to exempt a state from international legal obligations. And, second, the Court will make its own factual determination as to whether an emergency exists that justifies the measures taken.¹⁶⁶

Some might choose to contrast the Court's economical approach to arguments on the merits with its more expansive approach to admissibility because it permitted two submissions by Costa Rica that had not been part of its original application. One was on Nicaragua's breaches of Costa Rica's rights to navigation, a claim that the Court rightly considered could be read into the general language of Costa Rica's requested remedies.¹⁶⁷ The second related to the question of who had sovereignty over the disputed territory, which was raised by Costa Rica only at the stage of the oral argument (but became the subject of the Court's first operative conclusion).¹⁶⁸ Judges Kirill Gevorgian and Gilbert Guillaume argued that the Court should not have decided this issue, with Judge Guillaume, in particular, suggesting that the Court should have found Costa Rica's submissions on this point inadmissible because they transformed the character of the dispute.¹⁶⁹ However, the Court's own view, that it needed to settle the territorial dispute to determine whether Nicaragua had incurred responsibility,¹⁷⁰ is more persuasive. As such then, the Court's approach to admissibility does not present any novel considerations.

But the Court's decision not to award costs to Costa Rica does call for appraisal, and it has been subjected to reproach by at least several members of the Court. President Tomka, Judges Greenwood and Sebutinde, and Judge *ad hoc* John Dugard argue in a joint declaration that the relief was merited. Costa Rica had claimed costs only for the proceeding on provisional measures necessitated by Nicaragua's noncompliance with a previous Court order.¹⁷¹ The Court had found Nicaragua in breach, and the present judgment clarifies that Nicaragua owes compensation to Costa Rica for any damage caused by its breach.¹⁷² It seems incongruous that Costa Rica was then denied the opportunity to recover "what may well be the largest expense it was obliged to incur, namely the costs of nearly a week of hearings before the Court."¹⁷³

¹⁶⁵ In another context, the Court has clarified that certain treaty obligations to protect the environment were not obligations of total restraint during military conflict. Legality of the Threat, *supra* note 91, paras. 25, 30.

¹⁶⁶ The Court has previously asserted that the necessity of measures taken to protect its essential security interests is "not purely a question for the subjective judgment of the party." Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ REP. 161, para. 43 (Nov. 6) (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14, para. 282 (June 27)). In both cases, it found the measures unnecessary for the purpose, although it did not directly challenge the United States' determination that its essential interests were threatened (but expressed skepticism in the Nicaragua case). In the present case, the Court appears to doubt Costa Rica's claim of an emergency.

¹⁶⁷ Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, *supra* note 107, paras. 130–32.

¹⁶⁹ Id., Decl. Guillaume, J. ad hoc, para. 16; see also id., Decl. Gevorgian, J., para. 3.

- ¹⁷⁰ *Id.*, para. 69 (Judgment of the Court).
- ¹⁷¹ *Id.*, para. 143.

¹⁷² Id., para. 229(5).

¹⁷³ Id., Joint Decl. Tomka, P., Greenwood & Sebutinde, JJ. & Dugard, J. ad hoc, para. 7.

¹⁶⁸ Id., para. 229(1); see also id., para. 49(2)(a).

Given these facts, the Court should have explained why costs should not be awarded. Instead, it offered only a rather "Delphic pronouncement."¹⁷⁴

Finally, a word on the obligation to conduct an EIA: the judgment confirms that states have such an obligation when a risk of significant transboundary harm exists and, moreover, that this obligation stems from a broader due diligence obligation to prevent such harm. It also confirms, more or less, that the Court will evaluate for itself the risk of significant harm, based on the materials supplied by the parties: it does so with respect to claims against both parties. However, its standards for evaluation are less clear. In the case against Nicaragua, the Court relies on Nicaragua's own study, which it finds confirmed by the experts produced by both parties,¹⁷⁵ and concludes, with almost no discussion, that there was no risk of substantial harm.¹⁷⁶ In the case against Costa Rica, in contrast, the judgment offers a more expanded discussion, outlining the considerations and factors that are relevant.¹⁷⁷ The reason for this extended evaluation was perhaps the Court's finding that Costa Rica had not conducted a preliminary risk assessment (which "is one of the ways in which a State can ascertain whether the proposed activity carries a risk of significant transboundary harm"¹⁷⁸). But the Court does not clarify whether that is indeed its reason for the different treatment of the two claims and whether that reason grounds a general approach. Nor does it clarify what would amount to a satisfactory preliminary assessment. The whole becomes particularly puzzling if Judge ad hoc Dugard's criticisms of Nicaragua's risk assessment are again considered.¹⁷⁹ To the extent that they are merited, it does not seem that Nicaragua had satisfactorily evaluated the degree of risk to Costa Rica's environment. Why then is the Court persuaded? The judgment might have done more to clarify matters.

The Court also introduces some uncertainty in relation to the obligation to notify and consult. As Judge Donoghue notes, the judgment uses language that appears to unduly narrow the scope of this obligation in suggesting that it arises only if the EIA confirms a risk of significant transboundary harm.¹⁸⁰ But if the notice and consult obligation is part of a broader due diligence obligation to prevent transboundary harm, then it should operate vis-à-vis a potential affected state even prior to the assessment of risk.¹⁸¹ The participation of such a state may well be indispensable for the proper conduct of a risk assessment.

The Court's approach as regards the content of the EIA,¹⁸² however, should be affirmed. It rightly leaves each state to determine such content in light of the particular circumstances; stipulating more specific content could have amounted to overprescription. Instead, a more detailed elaboration of the standards by which a state must determine whether to conduct an EIA in the first place would represent a better and more modest intervention.

¹⁷⁴ *Id.*, para. 9.

¹⁷⁵ Id., para. 105 (Judgment of the Court).

¹⁷⁷ See Diane Desierto, Evidence but Not Empiricism? Environmental Impact Assessments at the International Court of Justice in Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 26, 2016), at http://www.ejiltalk.org/evidence-but-not-empiricism-environmental-impact-assessments-at-the-internationalcourt-of-justice-in-certain-activities-carried-out-by-nicaragua-in-the-border-area-costa-rica-v-nicaragua-and-con.

¹⁷⁸ Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, *supra* note 107, para. 154.

179 Id., Sep. Op. Dugard, J. ad hoc, paras. 21-35.

¹⁸⁰ *Id.*, Sep. Op. Donoghue, J., para. 21.

¹⁸¹ Id.

¹⁸² Id., paras. 104, 157 (Judgment of the Court).

¹⁷⁶ Id.

II. CONCLUSION

The judgments covered in this review add to the corpus of international law in incremental rather than fundamental ways. *Croatia v. Serbia* slightly expands the concept of genocide, elaborates the Court's approach to evaluating evidence, and clarifies the inapplicability of the *Monetary Gold* principle to extinct states. Moreover, it opens the way for further assessment of the concept of state responsibility by succession and eventually may indeed catalyze doctrinal development. *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* settles a territorial dispute, offers some clarification on the obligation to conduct an EIA, confirms that a domestic provision for emergencies cannot on its own qualify a state's international obligations, and indicates that the Court will evaluate for itself whether a state of emergency exists, necessitating specific measures. The case also confirms the Court's reluctance to grant costs. *Bolivia v. Chile* did not provide occasion even for small pronouncements; rather, it just offers notes on the Court's approach to characterizing the subject matter of the dispute and its reluctance to join Chile's preliminary objection to the merits.

The cases are perhaps most noteworthy in revealing the Court's preference for judicial economy. In both Croatia v. Serbia and, especially, Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, the Court preferred to make factual findings first to determine where pronouncements on the legal positions were necessary. The judgments are remarkable for the legal possibilities that were canvassed but not clarified for the lack of factual necessity: responsibility by succession, Nicaragua's use of force, and the existence of an emergency exception in international law. The Court's approach may be due to its focus "on deciding the case rather than developing the law";¹⁸³ certainly, the judgments determine significant claims (e.g., genocide and territorial rights) that must have held the Court's attention. Nevertheless, in other cases, the Court has offered a more comprehensive discussion and influential obiter dicta.¹⁸⁴ The election for judicial economy in the present cases-particularly where it entailed an abortive discussion of an unestablished doctrine (succession to responsibility) or an omitted decision on a claim of use of force—is thus not easily explained. The Court also skated lightly over points that did not involve concerns of judicial economy, such as the standards for evaluating the conduct of a preliminary risk assessment, the criteria for giving weight to scientific evidence in relation to the finding of environmental risks, and the basis for its decision not to award costs. The Court's omissions make it difficult to understand its reasoning, potentially damaging the reception of its findings.¹⁸⁵ These omissions also deny states valuable guidance as to appropriate standards of conduct (such as in carrying out a preliminary risk assessment).

In contrast, two aspects of the judgments promote rather than constrain opportunities for a reasoned debate. First, the Court's generous approach to admissibility—allowing new arguments even at late stages if they do not transform the character of the dispute—may be justified as ensuring that state parties have the chance to articulate all arguments in support of their positions. Second, it is important to note that the numerous separate opinions, by which individual

¹⁸³ Franklin Berman, *The International Court of Justice as an 'Agent' of Legal Development?, in* DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, *supra* note 159, at 7, 12.

¹⁸⁴ Famously, Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, 1970 ICJ REP. 3, paras. 33–34 (Feb. 5).

¹⁸⁵ But see Christian J. Tams, The ICJ as a 'Law-Formative Agency': Summary and Synthesis, in DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 159, at 377, 390–91.

2016]

judges may not only offer fuller explanations of the judgments, also serve as the Court's interlocutors over time. Noteworthy examples of judges serving the interlocutor role include President Tomka raising questions about the Court's embrace of the succession thesis; Judge Donoghue querying in Croatia v. Serbia whether the Court had faithfully applied its own stated standard of proof; Judge Gaja encouraging the Court to adopt a different standard for state responsibility for genocide than that applied to individual criminal responsibility; Judge Robinson discussing the Court's duty to pronounce on violations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter; Judge ad hoc Dugard dissecting the Court's assessment of Costa Rica's and Nicaragua's conduct in relation to their obligations to undertake EIAs; and his joint declaration with President Tomka and Judges Greenwood and Sebutinde, challenging the Court's decision not to award costs to Costa Rica and calling attention to its failure to give reasons. Although commentators differ as to the proper role of separate opinions—with some cautioning against "judicial overkill" resulting from overinventive opinions-it is understood that they provide means for checking anomalies and elisions in the Court's reasoning and may nudge the development of international law in particular directions.¹⁸⁶ The opinions mentioned above are all careful critiques of the Court's judgments that not only highlight points for further consideration by scholars but may also push the Court towards a more thorough discussion when further opportunity arises.

¹⁸⁶ Berman, *supra* note 183, at 12–13; *see also* Robert Y. Jennings, *The Role of the International Court of Justice*, 1997 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 28–30; GLEIDER I. HERNÁNDEZ, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION 95–125 (2014).