

dimensions of Castro's political thought besides the military aspect was lacking, however, perhaps because they were not prominent in Castro's moral thinking, which it seems tended to centre on the single dimension of violence and military practice. Indeed, this suggests that Castro's contemporary relevance to the complex ethical-political issues of violence, power, resistance and revolution is not as great as the author suggests. There are also serious questions about the kind of moral agency permitted by Castro and his tightly controlled state, and these raise important issues about the moral legitimacy of the Cuban project irrespective of its superiority relative to other political-economic systems.

One of the most important moral-political philosophers of the last 30 years, Alasdair MacIntyre, has powerfully critiqued the philosophical cogency of the ethical dimensions of modern state-centred politics and Marxism as well as the latter's claim to a morally distinctive standpoint. For MacIntyre, 'large-scale politics has become barren. Attempts to reform the political systems of modernity from within are always transformed into collaborations with them. Attempts to overthrow them always degenerate into terrorism or quasi terrorism' ('An Interview with Giovanna Borradori', in K. Knight (ed.), *The MacIntyre Reader* (1998), p. 265). I would suggest, however, that Jayatilaka provides strong evidence against this in the case of Cuba, and at the level of theory he implicitly posits *Fidelismo* as the kind of ethical-political-social theory/tradition that MacIntyre sees as the necessary intellectual framework for rational moral-political inquiry – for example, in his *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (1990). In my view Jayatilaka makes a strong case that Fidel Castro's moral-political thought not only constitutes an important theoretical contribution to political philosophy but is itself also a moral-political tradition partly born of concrete political-social practice. This tradition takes ethics out of the liberal domain of ahistorical morality and the problematic modern fragmentation and incommensurability of moral discourse diagnosed by MacIntyre, embodying not just a rival theory but also a rival mode of socio-political-military practice through which moral criteria regain rational purchase and can once again play a role in guiding social-political relations and the search for social justice.

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Gary Williams, *US-Grenada Relations: Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. xii + 298, \$84.95, hb.

Published 24 years after the combined United States and Caribbean invasion of Grenada, Gary Williams' book provides the most comprehensive and detailed examination that I have read of the events leading up to the overthrow of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) on October 25, 1983. Drawing on an astonishing range of primary and secondary sources (the bibliography runs for 37 pages), this book provides the definitive account of the discussions and negotiations which took place prior to the invasion. For anyone with an interest in either the Caribbean or US foreign policy in the region, this book is a must-read.

The book is divided into seven chapters excluding introduction and conclusion, an epilogue and four appendices. The first chapter of the book, 'United States' Intervention in the Caribbean Basin', is the weakest. It provides a very brief

overview of US policy in the region, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine and ending with discussion of the post-Cold War period. The intention of this brief chapter is to contextualise the decision to invade Grenada. Unfortunately, it does not provide a very clear framework and could be better connected to the policy choices which Williams discusses in so much detail later in the book. This is connected to the one criticism I would have of the book, which is that the formulation of the key arguments could have been more usefully described in the introduction. While this omission at the beginning of the book is completely rectified at the end in a strong, coherent and succinctly argued conclusion, it would have helped the reader to know at the beginning where this very detailed examination was leading.

Aside from this criticism, the book is excellent. Chapter 2, 'Prelude to a Revolution', provides a good overview of the Gairy regime, the formation of the New Jewel Movement and the events that led to the revolution in March 1979. However, it is Chapters 3 to 7 that make a major contribution to the debate about US intervention in Grenada. The key thrust of Williams' argument is that the invasion was not inevitable but can be explained by the desire to protect American students, restore democracy and undermine the Cuban-Soviet presence in the region. I began unconvinced by the 'protection of American citizens' argument, but throughout the book Williams builds a very solid case providing detailed evidence of the day-to-day policymaking process within the US administration. Indeed, this is a key strength of the book.

Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on relations between Grenada and Presidents Carter and Reagan. In essence, although the Reagan administration exhibited a more hard-line approach to the revolution, the continuity in foreign policy was remarkably apparent, particularly as Grenada deepened its relations with Cuba. Throughout the book, Williams takes an even-handed approach. While he is critical of the People's Revolutionary Government in terms of its handling of US relations under both presidencies, he rightly points out that the US approach increased pressure on the revolution, particularly through its attempts to manipulate the International Monetary Fund and the propaganda about the Port Salines airport. Chapter 5 presents the events leading up to the murder of Maurice Bishop and seven of his colleagues, and highlights the almost immediate calls by the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) for US involvement in a military invasion to overthrow the RMC. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the development of events from 20 October through to the invasion on the 25th. In rich detail, Williams guides us through the decision-making process of US officials while at the same time emphasising the role of the OECS, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Cuba and the Soviet Union. In doing so, he presents a comprehensive analysis of how the decision to invade the island was reached. His account gives weight to the argument that the invitation from the OECS was crucial in determining US responses, although it is also made clear that the protection of American citizens was another key factor. In fact, Williams points out a number of times that 'hostages was arguably Reagan's greatest concern throughout his presidency' (p. 166), due principally to the Iran hostage crisis during the Carter administration. The conclusion provides a succinct and convincing summary of the key arguments.

This book is a comprehensive, meticulously researched and well-written examination of the period leading up to the invasion of Grenada. It draws together a very impressive range of perspectives to provide a coherent and convincing argument. Williams' original contribution is to highlight the nuances of foreign policy making

within the US administration. While it is tempting to view the US decision to invade Grenada as part of a wider neoconservative, Cold War Reagan doctrine, Williams highlights the point that the factors leading to this decision were much more complex, involved a variety of actors and were driven by a number of considerations. I would highly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the Caribbean, US relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, and US foreign policy making.

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Sean W. Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), pp. xiii + 229, \$65.00, hb.

This book reflects important work and displays innovative characteristics in dealing with fundamental themes in Brazilian foreign policy, particularly during the 1990s, over the course of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's two-term administration. It takes up historical elements of the formulation of Brazil's international positions and extends to the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and concentrates on Brazil's difficult relations with the South American region. The tension that permeates the book is determined by the search for the answer to the question of 'what foreign policy strategy Itamaraty implemented between 1992 and 2002 to continue preserving and protecting national autonomy amid the changing pressures created by the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalization'. The use of analytical instruments formulated by Susan Strange, particularly the notion of structural power and its supporting idea of economic security, form the skeleton of the book. Still on the theoretical plane, the concept of consensual hegemony, based on Gramsci, emerges as fundamental.

The book is underpinned by thorough research, including 58 interviews, though most were not used directly by virtue of the confidentiality agreed with interviewees. At the same time, Burges came upon difficulties in consulting the Ministry of External Relations archive. Chapter 1 reviews the fundamentals of Brazilian foreign policy, concentrating – as Burges does throughout – on relations with South America. He shows how the action of the Cardoso government had clear elements of historical continuity, but what is more directly revealed is the tendency to hegemony, though not with a strong character. On the contrary, hegemony would seek to be consensual, a result not of leadership but merely of the weight of objective facts. At the same time, Burges presents hegemony as the object of a construct with roots in the past, but which was intensified during the period covered by the book. To this end, Burges relies on statements made, among others, by President Cardoso after leaving office. Approaching this question requires more depth and the examination of documents, which the author has attempted, though unsuccessfully. According to Burges, on Brazil's part there exists a quest for recognition of a singular role in the region, with the avoidance of any accusation of hegemonism or imperialism as the constant backdrop. Explaining the search for this balance constitutes the work's central tension. This concern leads the author to the discussion in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, grounded in the analytical instruments adapted from Strange.

With regard to ideas, Burges shows that although they are not enough in themselves, they are indispensable for the construction of any type of hegemony, in line with Gramsci's formulation. Regionalism, the search for an open integration, would