This sketch of mental after-care organization appears to the writer, after more than thirty years' official experience, to be necessary to carry out thoroughly its share in the progress of mental hygiene in England and Wales.

Moral Imbecility. By IAN D. SUTTIE, M.B., F.R.F.P.&S.Glasg., Medical Superintendent, C.L.D., H.M. Prison, Perth.

THERE is a type of social psychology which finds the explanation of man's social behaviour in a hypothetical "disposition" of his mind. This motive-complex is conceived as specialized for the function of adapting conduct to social life, and as being in itself relatively closely integrated, developing and functioning as a whole. Of this hypothetical "gregarious instinct" McDougall goes so far as to say: "For it is highly probable that instinctive dispositions are Mendelian units" (*Journ of Abn. Psych. and Soc. Psych.*, vol. xvi, p. 316). This plainly suggests that the *unity* of the social disposition (its existence as a discrete factor in development) is to be regarded as antedating experience—that it is an ultimate datum for psychology not susceptible to analysis, and is *not* a derivative of any other known motive such as "love," "fear," or "hope of reward." This "instinct" interpretation of social behaviour has been criticized on many grounds (as unfruitful for psychology and incompatible with biological fact); but of course the demonstration of a Mendelian transmission of the social disposition would compel us to regard it as an *element* of character. Our conception of mental development and of the "socialization" of the individual, of the relative significance of upbringing as compared with organic endowment and our whole psycho-pathology depend upon our acceptance or rejection of McDougall's view. If he is right in regard to the germinal "unit" determination of the social disposition, criminological studies should offer verification. I propose, therefore, to consider how far we are justified in regarding moral insanity and moral imbecility as true "morbid entities."

Our problem may be roughly stated: How far is the social disposition of man a "unitary character," relatively integrated within the larger whole of the organism, and relatively independent of similarly integrated "impulse-bundles"? How far does it function as a discrete factor in development and in behaviour? If we are able to demonstrate pathological disintegrations selectively affecting social behaviour; if we find gross congenital defect of this function uncorrelated with defect in any other; above all,

if such defect should be transmissible in Mendelian "patterns," then the question would be settled in McDougall's favour. If not, our research might still bring to light other correlations interesting and important in themselves, and perhaps throwing light upon the nature of the social bond. We wish, therefore, to know whether social reactions are ever selectively disordered or defective, and if so, the etiology and pathogenesis of such conditions.

Clinical data, however, do not seem at first sight to decide unequivocally whether such specialized or limited abnormality does or does not occur. At least we find absolute differences of opinion among observers as to whether moral abnormality exists *per se*. Tredgold, for example, is confident not only that this is a clinical entity, but that the mind is made up of "four chief senses or sentiments," moral, religious, artistic and rational. He considers these components are independent variables. At the opposite extreme we find Healy declaring "that probably all moral imbeciles are primarily mentally abnormal." The most he allows is "that if the moral imbecile exists who is free from all other forms of intellectual defect he must indeed be a *rara avis*." Though constantly on the look-out Healy has never found one.

The conflict of opinion as to the existence of abnormality limited to social behaviour turns mainly on the question of the relation of such a moral defect to *intellectual* defect, some considering that there are instances of a congenital incapacity to appreciate moral relations without any impairment of the other functions of mind. Others, again, hold that moral defect or disorder is always secondary to intellectual inferiority. We can discern, however, a number of reasons why moral and intellectual defect should appear to be associated even though possibly independent. In the first place a wide range of intellectual inferiority is found in the general population—extreme dulness being quite compatible with a moral life. Though the proportion of intellectually defectives may be abnormally high among offenders, many causes may operate to bring this about.(1) For instance, the unintelligent are exposed to greater temptation, are less able to resist these on *prudential* grounds and are more liable to detection. Though they bulk largely in the group of convicted delinquents we cannot generalize and say probably all offenders are defective more or less. It appears to me that some writers have a tendency to do this; they overlook the great variety that is within the limits of the normal. It would be easy to devise a group of intelligence tests that would find weak spots in any average intelligence. If, therefore, we look for the mental defect until we find it, as one writer recommends, we will certainly find it wherever our preconceptions require it to be found. We must, in fact, consider

whether all incorrigible delinquents show a cognitive inferiority WHICH ACCOUNTS FULLY FOR THEIR BAD CONDUCT.

There is another circumstance tending to over-emphasize the association of mental and moral defect. In our psychiatric examination of delinquents we must to some extent depend upon discussion of ethical situations. Now a stupid patient is at a disadvantage here and his incompetence to utilize abstract conceptions might lead us to underestimate his moral sense. He might, of course, be unable to explain and to criticize his conduct and yet have a sound intuitive perception of moral obligations in a concrete situation. On the other hand, a highly intelligent man will appreciate the purpose of the interview: he knows the right attitudes to adopt and the *normal* answers to give. He knows, in fact, all about morality and social life; his ethical understanding is perfect. Here we may miss a true case of moral imbecility by diagnosing it a normal criminal. Yet again a man may be so anti-social, so suspicious, so out of sympathy with his fellows in general and his examiner in particular, that he neither follows his questions with interest nor exerts himself to respond. Here there will be a tendency for the examiner to attribute, erroneously, a *deficiency of intelligence* to a case of *moral disorder*. Not only, then, does the mode of selection of our material tend to present us mainly with cases in which mental defect complicates moral disorder, but in our examination of these cases there are many circumstances that would lead us to confuse the two. It is extremely difficult to estimate the two factors separately. Our evaluation of the moral condition of the patient is largely dependent upon his intelligence; our estimate of his intelligence depends somewhat upon the emotional *rapport* (*i.e.*, social) between examiner and examinee. For test purposes intelligence is really social intelligence, and moral disposition is intelligent appreciation of social standards.

On examining the genetic relationship of moral and intellectual defect we find yet another reason for their close association. It is obvious that gross congenital defect of cognitive capacity will disable the affected individual from mastering the *principles* which govern social relationships, or even from learning and remembering the customs of his community. It seems probable, moreover, that a radical defect in the social *rapport* must have equally disastrous effects upon intellectual development. This latter process consists largely in the assimilation of tradition and in the acquisition of skill in the use of complex abstract thought symbols. Both these acquisitions depend not only upon intimate and constant contact with minds of similar interests, but also upon the existence of a DIRECT AFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEARNER AND HIS

TEACHERS. The precise nature of this bond it is the ultimate object of social psychology to discover; meantime it seems certain that in its absence *learning from others* would be impossible. Some personal attachment seems, then, a pre-condition of intellectual development, as being necessary to establish or maintain the sympathetic understanding, the identity of interest and point of view that is required if the child is to acquire and correctly apply his community's conceptual formulation of environment. We know how cross-purposes, difference in point of view, etc., stultify science and philosophy, and how the resulting misunderstandings may confound human intelligence for generations. Any such misunderstandings and disharmonies between the child mind and its teacher would render development impossible. The affective attuning of minds is then necessary, for their interaction and development requires also that interest in others which motivates the playful interactions of conversation. This co-operative play-thinking is a *sine quâ non* of mental development. It is a commonplace how even at school age the affective relations of teacher and taught affect the latter's intellectual interest and progress. Refusal to learn at this age may merely deprive the individual of school knowledge, but non-incentive to learn at an earlier age may lead to ignorance and stupidity indistinguishable from congenital defect. We see then that even in the event of a constant concomitance of moral and intellectual abnormality being demonstrated, we must not on that account jump to the conclusion that intellectual defect is necessarily primary and fundamental. We must in fact trace out the precise mechanism of the correlation, and not merely state the association of the two conditions as a statistical fact.

In this connection we may anticipate a later observation. The more intelligent of the morally defective sometimes exhibit a curious and highly specific stupidity in their *social relations*. This is not because of the complexity of the latter, which are well enough "understood." These cases fail in the INTUITIVE APPRECIATION OF OTHER PEOPLE'S ATTITUDES AND FEELINGS. They are clumsy in their social relations, because of their lack of sympathy. The stupidities into which this may lead them vary from the slightest and the most laughable maladroitness to the grossest blunders. It is sometimes possible to describe the same offence in two alternative ways, both true to fact. One of these ways may picture the action of the culprit as childlike, or stupid to the point of imbecility. The other may as plausibly regard it as the oversight of a crafty villain. Medical testimony tends to emphasize the *stupidity* of the offence as evidence of *intellectual defect* or of psychopathy. The Court, however, is often able to satisfy itself that the *general intelligence*

of the offender is up to average. The intellectualist preoccupation of both parties causes them both to overlook the fact that this stupidity indicates neither chance oversight nor radical mental inferiority, but rather a defect in social *flair*. Here is another reason for the prevalent opinion that offenders are mostly intellectually defective or mentally normal; the possibility of moral defect is overlooked.

We will now consider an *à priori* argument often advanced (oftener still tacit), that the fact of misconduct *in itself* implies intellectual defect inasmuch as wrong-doing is contrary to the evil-doer's own best interests. The position that crime is insanity is made the basis of a ridiculous attack upon the principle of punishment. Partly as a reaction to this subversive movement, partly from the same rationalistic preconceptions, the law adheres steadfastly to the view that only intellectual abnormality limits criminal responsibility. Both of these attitudes to crime show an overvaluation of prudential motives and intelligence as factors in social conduct. This is, in fact, the fallacy of hedonistic utilitarianism, which finds in the reasonable calculated pursuit of pleasure, in the enlightened and rational self-interest, the whole cause of social conduct. As an ethical dogma this has fallen into disrepute; as a preconception influencing practical judgments it seems as strong as ever. The argument is this: "If the patient could understand the disadvantages and appreciate the consequences of such conduct he would abstain." Certainly for those who consider that conformity to social exigencies is solely and sufficiently motivated by prudence and the policy of honesty, it is difficult to conceive of moral imbecility without concomitant intellectual inferiority. We now know that "economic man," if not a fabulous monster, corresponds pretty closely to our conception of a moral imbecile. Rationalistic ethics regards this character as typical of the good citizen. This may of course be true, in which case the search for an affective socializing factor, instinctive or derivative (under the influence of culture) is illusory. The conception of human nature as rational or "ecomonic" is, however, thoroughly discredited, and was indeed based on a one-sided view of social obligations as comprising only those incidental demands upon self-denial in connection with which WE ARE IN THE HABIT OF EXPERIENCING CONFLICT. As is now well known, the vast majority of social reactions are, by normal adults, performed as automatically with as little conscious deliberation—"shall I or shall I not"—as reflexes. Many of these customary reactions, moreover, are highly A-RATIONAL and even disadvantageous to the individual performing them, and to the community at whose unspoken demands they are performed. A

more comprehensive view of social motive is, therefore, necessary than that offered by utilitarian ethics, and this involves a corresponding modification in our theory of antisocial conduct. If we do not wish to saddle ourselves with the task of defending an abandoned and untenable psycho-sociological theory, we must cease to look upon intellect as the foundation of social conduct and upon abnormalities of intellect as the source of all social maladaptation (2).

It may be true that the normal man in resisting a temptation applies some such formula as "honesty is the best policy." But is this judgment the real cause of his continued probity, and is the process truly intellectual? I should imagine that a purely intelligent decision would depend upon weighing the probability and value of the forbidden gain against the probability of detection and the severity of consequent punishment. This punishment, moreover, is itself largely moral rather than material, and so is not really grievous to the man who is insensitive to his fellow's feelings. Does even the business man (and we know that a modified code of morals is supposed to be sanctioned in business) weigh and consider dispassionately every possibility of gainful wrong-doing? Even if he did, this would not establish a norm, and we might have to consider this class (in the pursuit of their occupation) as enjoying (!) a *special* custom-sanctioned licence. Our problem is really this—Is intelligence the prime and general cause of moral (or social) conduct? Even the most unscrupulous business man would protest that he does not order his whole life by his business standards, unless he pretended to probity in business, or on the other hand, with Bottomley, claimed that all morality was cant. This double moral standard is quite a well-recognized phenomenon, and we must ask ourselves, are both of these moralities based on intelligence, and if so, why do they differ?

But if we do not confine our attention to commercial dealings (where varying views of rights are possible and not settled by custom, and where the only personal motive is the desire for gain), and if we consider the general conduct of life, we find that normal men do not meet temptation intellectually at all. On the contrary, where they do not yield to temptation they turn from it in horror and fear, thus resolving the conflict on purely emotional, *i.e.*, non-rational, lines. Self-interest and the real possibilities of the situation are not considered, nor is a balance of pros and cons calculated. The forbidden desire is met by an equally emotional resistance, and even where the conflict is not at once decided, it continues to be fought out on emotional lines. At most there are intervals of rationalization, but reason is rather a spectator whose approval is sought than

an effective director of action. It merely serves to bring other motives into relation with the point at issue, and of these motives long-sighted self-interest is lamentably weak even in intelligent and well-behaved people. The social sanction takes form within the mind as a compulsion or an a-rational dread. The rational examination of this sanction would generally weaken it and thus pave the way for a-moral conduct.

In this connection the voice of the people is the voice of God, and whether it is obeyed from love or from fear it is obeyed on emotional grounds. To anticipate a future article, we see here the cause of the criminality of mobs: they are their own social sanction, their own public opinion; they cease to be a psychic part of the larger community, and no longer owe deference to the laws and customs of the latter. We may go further than this and say that not only does the fear, respect or love of one's fellows and of the mystic public opinion prevent the normal man from examining intellectually a chance of wrong-doing, but that probably in the vast majority of cases opportunities of pleasurable and gainful wrong-doing PASS UNNOTICED. People are blind to the chances of doing "the things that are not done" by members of their own community. Habit will not explain this altogether, for habit can only be formed by the operation of a motive. We see, moreover, that in regard to social conduct powerful motives are always operative. The motive behind the habit cannot have been rational self-interest, for the habits of self-denial are formed at an age and in regard to activities which forbid such an explanation. It is, of course, true in a sense that all motive whatever is related to or derived from self-interest, for attachment to others is pleasurable, and dependent to begin with on the pleasure others give us. But the selfishness of such motives early disappears from consciousness, and the gain from the conduct it motivates is often non-existent. The distinction between pleasure and duty is real if not fundamental, and the reduction of all modes of conduct to the expression of the pleasure-pain principle obliterates real and useful distinctions. It is a fact that people do things for which they have no instinctive desire and which bring them no pleasure; they may even incur loss and injury without limit. Though this unselfish conduct may be derived from originally selfish motives, the change is real and important, and we wish to know how it came about. To insist on hedonistic and utilitarian interpretations of all behaviour results in straining the facts of social conduct through the formulæ of individual psychology, giving us a very incomplete view.

Consider now the case of a hypothetical moral imbecile. (He will not overlook the opportunities of wrong-doing.) He is in

the unhappy position of the "economic man," of having to decide whether each particular temptation is worth the risks that yielding to it involves. To the desire of the moment he has nothing better to oppose than prudential considerations; he is not startled and horrified by the idea of wrong-doing, and an opportunity for him is a chance to be seized rather than an evil omen. Even imprisonment means merely a period of privation, and for that matter, as a good egotist, he generally has supreme confidence in his luck. For the normal man in all crimes but murder, it is the trial, the disgrace as much as the actual punishment that is the deterrent where the deterrent is actually considered. The moral imbecile shows up well at his trial—perhaps conducts his own case. Any sort of acquittal (in Scotland, "not proven" verdict) is a triumph for him. He takes a highly legalistic view of the proceedings, and cannot really appreciate why the jury and the public should be prejudiced against him by his employing quibbles and technical evasions. We find prisoners who have made no secret of their guilt and are yet bitterly aggrieved over their conviction feel that they have put up a good defence and *deserve* to get off. For them a commonsense verdict is not "playing the game." When they have fallen into social disrepute these people are genuinely indignant, make no effort to rehabilitate themselves, and justify themselves into an increasingly anti-social attitude.

Unless social sanctions are immediate and well enforced the moral imbecile can see no reason for self-denial. In like circumstances the normal individual conforms without seeking any reason, without indeed reflecting whether social exactions are justified by social necessities. The gravity of crime is intuitively, not intellectually assessed, as is apparent from a consideration of recent conditions in Ireland. It has been accepted in our culture that crimes aiming at a change of government are less heinous than similar crimes gratifying the selfish desires of individuals. But in Ireland there was endless confusion and disagreement as to whether secret murder was or was not merely such a "political" crime. No clear distinction seems to have been drawn by either of the contestants between acts subversive of a particular and alien political authority and acts subversive of all social life. Even the lawyers and the journalists *felt* rather than thought about it—that is to say, their appreciation of the social significance of the act was purely intuitive. If, then, deliberate, professional judgments of social conduct are not intellectual, what is the sense of pretending that individuals shape and control their own conduct by an understanding of consequences? (3)

We see, then, that reason—the appreciation of practical consequences

—does not play a great part either in prescribing or enforcing social conduct. If, then, the OTHER FACTOR—whatever it may be—is deficient or disturbed, then intelligence will have a task imposed upon it to which it is not normally adapted. We must reject, then, the argument that a wrong-doer must either be intellectually deficient or else a normal man whose plans have miscarried. Theoretically, then, it is possible that a defect in the social disposition will lead an individual into wrong-doing even though there is no defect in his intelligence.

Bearing this conclusion in mind, we may proceed to examine whether there is a definite group of cases characterized by primary moral defect, and if so whether such defect is congenital. We will not expect to find such a group clearly and sharply defined. The conflict of opinion regarding its existence would have warned us against such an anticipation, apart altogether from the considerations previously adduced, showing how moral and intellectual defect tend to implicate each other and to be confused by examination methods. We must, nevertheless, see how far it is possible to discover a clinical entity corresponding to the conception of moral imbecility.

We must begin by ruling out the following groups of cases which bear a superficial resemblance to moral imbecility:

(1) Those who are primarily and substantially defective or disordered in intellect, so that their *understanding* of their actions or of the complex social situation and exigencies to which they must adapt is seriously impaired. Any mental defect implies inefficiency and some consequent privation in life, hence special temptations to illicit gratification where normal satisfaction and even necessities are hardly attainable. We must therefore distinguish from moral imbeciles the large heterogeneous group of *defective* delinquents, the shiftless, the vagabonds, the catspaws, the economically inefficient.

(2) Post-psychotic deteriorations, abortive dementia præcox, form an important group which may have important etiological relations with moral imbecility; they should, however, be tentatively excluded until we determine whether moral abnormality exists in more specific form, *i.e.*, without general affective deterioration.

(3) It is conceivable that a morally normal person might become a habitual criminal through lack of opportunity, lack of strength and stability of general character to rehabilitate himself socially. I would regard such cases as moral deteriorations consequent upon a disruption of social relations.

(4) We must also exclude "gangsters," and bred criminals who do possess social sentiments of a sort. These differ from moral

imbeciles in being loyal members, good citizens (!) of their own little predatory communities. They are not a-social, and defend the anti-social activities of their group. The frankly criminal gang spirit does not in Great Britain reach quite the same corporate and explicit development as in Italy, Ireland, America or China, though *class* anti-social activities are common enough. For really good examples of a criminal tradition we must go to the criminal tribes of India, though as minor factors in crime the criminal family and group do play a part in this country also. The criminal, then, may only be relatively a-social and a-moral, the moral imbecile *ex hypothesi* absolutely so.

(5) Again we find in anarchical revolutionaries individuals whose behaviour is violently and consistently anti-social, whose anti-sociality (generally disguised as antipathy to certain specific institutions) is an end in itself, conscious and deliberate, and not merely evinced as self-indulgence and grudges against those who punish it. Such individuals indeed may be ascetic. Though some cases classed as moral imbeciles may be genetically related to this group, I think the latter are purely psychopathic. A radical antagonism fastening upon certain forms or institutions of society does not imply the absence of any social *rapport*; on the contrary, it implies its presence in a negative or distorted form. It might be regarded as a moral insanity but not as imbecility.

Having defined this group by exclusion, following as far as possible current opinion, we must consider its contents. We find a variety of cases described as moral imbeciles; in order to classify these we must distinguish four groups (nearly identical with Tredgold's):

(i) Mischievous, antagonistic, actively, intentionally anti-social individuals.

(ii) Insensitive, selfish, a-social cases.

(iii) Facile cases who respond to the suggestion of the moment, who know right from wrong and who are even capable of kindly and generous feeling. Their sentiments either are not aroused in the moment of temptation, or if they are, are unable to control conduct.

(iv) " Explosives " whose intelligence and social nature are even better developed than in the above, but who, under the influence of passion, lose all control of themselves. They are more dynamic than class iii, but are like these in their instability.

(i) In regard to the first group, any cases of repeated " malicious mischief " I have seen, have either been grossly defective in other ways, or have developed a very definite anti-social grudge in response to punishment and hardship. Fire-raising and other

spectacular forms of destruction are, of course, very attractive to the defective mind. Here, however, the motive is not to do harm to others, but simply the desire for a certain sensuous enjoyment. It does not indicate any special affective attitude to fellow-beings. Such a case I would describe as having perverse or perhaps obsessive desires which he does not control, since his general defect has prevented his acquiring the necessary moral knowledge and sentiments. He is merely a delinquent defective, not a moral imbecile. His intellectual defect is primary, his destructiveness has no anti-social motive. On the other hand, cruelty and malice indicate plainly an abnormality centring in affective relationships to fellows. Whether this cruelty has the object of enhancing the feeling of power or whether it is of directly sadistic motivation, in either case it depends upon an affective bond, and implies the existence of some appreciation, however abnormal, of the feelings of others. These cases should be included in our group, though it is difficult to draw the line between them and other cases where intellectual defect is primary. Their relation to the neurotic anti-social group will be noticed.

(ii) The insensitive group includes a number of highly intelligent but utterly unscrupulous individuals—the moral defectives proper. These people know well the difference between right and wrong, and the proper application of these terms; they are keenly aware of the consequences of detection in wrong-doing, and may show great ability in avoiding it. They are not cruel or hostile, nor proud and revengeful; they are not, to begin with, anxious to do harm; they are selfish, not self-centred. The self-centred may be constantly pre-occupied with social judgments and standards as applied to himself—troubled about what other people are thinking or might think about him. Self-consciousness is the reaction of a highly socialized disposition. The selfishness of these cases is naïve, unreflective like that of a child; they regard others either as competitors or as tools.

By the time they are adult these insensitives have mostly learnt the importance of keeping within the law. They may even be alive to the value of a good reputation; their indifference to the rights and feelings of others need not, therefore, be so flagrantly shown as to interfere with their economic efficiency. Up to a point they may be good business men and take kindly to the rules of commercial morality. But they carry their sharp practice too far; they have not the intuitive caution of their fellows; they never know where to stop, and sooner or later they take risks with the law, with public opinion or with their customers or friends, which are out of all proportion to possible gains. Their defect also shows

itself in tactlessness; they make enemies needlessly, and do not get the best work out of subordinates and those with whom they have dealings. This nullifies the advantage of an often striking manner and personality, which is due to a lack of deference for others and of self-consciousness. The over-valuation of self characteristic of these cases is impressive: they are brazen and convincing liars, act a part very well, and can study an intended victim very shrewdly, being well aware of the effect of appeals to the lower nature and unashamed to make them. All these and other characteristics make up a personality that is often very striking in its way, and which is the true reason for the frequently amazing success of their frauds.

No clear line can be drawn between this class and the normal; their imperfect appreciation of social conditions and their recklessness—as it appears to ordinary men—may be foolish, yet no tests or interrogations can establish a definite intelligence defect. They are accordingly subjected to penal discipline until the obvious failure of this method, and perhaps secondary deterioration due to imprisonment, finally convinces the authorities that they are dealing with abnormal individuals.

(iii) The characteristic defect of the group of facile cases is instability and lack of continuity. Their ideals and sentiments expend themselves in feeling—in relation, that is to say, to the mental life rather than to behaviour. They alternately reform and relapse; they go on turning over new leaves with enthusiasm and the best intentions to the end of the book. By calling them weak characters we indicate our intuitive perception of a moral defect—a defect of integration of the sentiments into personality, without which synthesis life is lived as a succession of impulsive reactions rather than as a coherent whole.

(iv) The explosives have the characteristic peculiarity that as soon as any passion reaches a certain intensity it appears to increase automatically, discharging itself in a paroxysm during which the rest of the personality seems in abeyance. The whole organism, body and mind, is dominated by the emotion of the moment. No other stimulus is felt, no inhibiting or indifferent thought can reach consciousness. At ordinary times such cases appear not only to have normal sentiments, but even to have good self-control. As soon as the limit of the latter is passed, however, it vanishes utterly, and does not reappear at all until the storm has spent itself. The impression conveyed by such cases is that of an excited emotivity. The normal tendency for any active emotion to become dominant is here quite unchecked, and the emotion seems to increase in a sort of vicious circle; the active emotion appears to inhibit all the others. I see no reason to suppose that the emotions are stronger

than normal, as some writers insist. It is the integration that is defective, allowing each emotion unchecked and maximal expression.

These four groups together present a very heterogeneous assortment of cases. It is not easy to find in them any common concrete psychological character, while the differences they cover are profound. Of supreme importance—at any rate for our present inquiry—is the question of the nature and strength of the affective attitude to fellow-men. In the first group this *rapport* is variable and disordered; in the second it is weak; in the other two it is not markedly abnormal, *but defective integration of personality or an unregulated emotional mechanism prevents its controlling conduct.* The most striking difference is that between the group of cases (ii) in which the social disposition is weak, or insufficiently developed, and the other three groups in which it is perverted or thwarted in some way. This difference strongly suggests a radical difference in ætiology or pathogenesis. These four groups, however, are only descriptive; they are not even empirically well defined, and have no claim to be regarded as psycho-pathological entities. Since our purpose is to discover to what extent defect or disease can selectively affect the social disposition (*i.e.*, without a general mental abnormality), we must push our analysis and definition further, even at the expense of further limiting the application of the conception of moral psychopathy.

We have already noticed that cruelty and malice actually vouch for the presence of a special social *rapport*, though perverse. The bully craves a sort of admiration, the sadist appreciates the feelings of his victim—they have a form at any rate of organic sympathy. It is probably permissible to regard the former as a secondary perversion, or even, as in some cases, a reaction to a sense of inferiority, or a resentment of punishment and privation not comprehended and acquiesced in. The class of moral psychopath characterized by these cruel and malicious reactions is therefore probably not pathologically distinct though socially conspicuous. We will accordingly devote no further attention to it as a class, and in the same way we will assume that the explosive type has no fundamental defect or disorder of his moral sentiments and feelings, but that his abnormal tendency to an all-or-nothing, one-way discharge of emotion (and consequently to its crude physical expression) is the consequence of a faulty physical or psychical make-up.

It is a commonplace that there is a normal tendency for every instinct to inhibit all activities irrelevant to its purpose, and to make use of all the resources of the organism until its ends have

been achieved. The emotion of an instinct, by flooding the mind, holds up mental activities which might compete or criticize. Homologous with this all-or-nothing reaction for the organism as a whole we find in the intellectual sphere the dominance of one interest in attention. Mental concentration, however, is wholly good, for thought processes are merely experimental, *i.e.*, they do not commit the organism to irrevocable action and to the expenditure of much energy, but work out ideal plans of action of which one alternative is chosen for realization. In the course of development we find mental processes "taking over" to a certain extent from the primitive organic reaction, and in this way bringing the interest-emotion of the moment into relation with other interests. The feelings and desires evoked by the state of the organism and its environmental opportunities are then less dominant; they are integrated into life-purposes and regulate behaviour on a longer view. This integration, though achieved under social direction, does not appear to me to be simply a function of the social disposition. Failure of affective integration is not, therefore, synonymous with failure of the social *rapport* or moral imbecility. Tentatively, therefore, I exclude this group from that of moral imbeciles, though the pathogenesis of the condition must be related, and though the explosives and the faciles are both essentially unstable.

Our search for an abnormality limited to the social sentiments is now narrowed down to groups 2 and 3—the a-social and the facile. If a specific moral defect or disorder exists, we should find it here. Theoretically and in well-marked instances, the distinction between these groups is fairly definite. In the first the social sentiments are imperfectly developed, in the second they appear ineffectively articulated with every-day life; actually, however, we cannot regard the latter as having normal social sentiments, and cases exist, for example, which really belong to the first group, and which seem, nevertheless, to have genuine religious feeling. The analysis of clinical data should, however, be postponed until after a consideration of the social *rapport* as manifested in mob behaviour.

(1) See, however, Cyril Burt, "Delinquency and Mental Defect," *Brit. Journ. Med. Psych.*, 1923, p. 169.—(2) It will, of course, be asserted as usual that no one supports the utilitarian ethical theory, etc. Both in writings and in testimony, however, there is abundant evidence of the belief that the folly of wrong-doing connotes defect of intelligence.—(3) It is interesting to note that the early Norse settlers of Iceland recognized the *special* gravity of an *unavowed* manslaughter (*Saga of Burnt Njal*). If the killer avowed the deed he had to reckon merely with the blood feud and was not despised. If he did not declare himself he was a murderer —an offender against *public* security.