

on preelectoral coalitions in stable parliamentary democracies. Sona Nadenichek Golder's main objective is to extend the spatial theory of political competition to include the choice of entering into a preelectoral alliance. Her central argument is that, indeed, spatial considerations weigh heavily in the rationale behind the coalition formation, though considerations of dividing offices among the partners are also profoundly important.

Why and when do preelectoral coalitions form? What compels parties to jointly appeal for the voters' support? And, turning the issue around, if they do better seeking the vote together, why would they still elect to maintain their distinctiveness in platforms and organizations? The book takes the reader all the way from the formal model of the game of party coalescing, through the in-depth case studies of party agreements in France and South Korea, and to the large-*n* testing of a set of hypotheses with an original data set that, for the most part, is also included in the book. For a preelectoral coalition to be deemed advantageous by its prospective participants, there must be a considerable policy threat from the opposition victory (large spatial difference in platforms), close compatibility between the programs of the prospective partners, a substantial improvement in the probability of winning with the coalition as compared to without, and a good prospect of divisibility of the resulting spoils, such as cabinet portfolios or other offices and office-related benefits.

Case studies of interparty coalescing in France and South Korea nicely highlight the main intuition of the formal model, illustrating the role of policy distances from the opposition and within the coalition itself, as well as the impact of the expectations for winning alone versus jointly. Cases lead one to conclude that coalitions are more likely to be formed and appear earlier in the electoral process in parliamentary than in presidential elections, because, the author argues, the office benefits in the latter are nondivisible. At the same time, the detailed accounts of interactions among the partisan players in the circumstances leading up to specific elections in these countries serve to enrich the picture that the theoretical chapter sketches for the reader. The author is knowledgeable and insightful, and the empirical hypotheses that she puts to a large-*n* test are no less rooted in the thorough examination of her main cases than they are in the abstract game-theoretic model.

Empirical analysis is based on the data set of 293 parliamentary elections in 20 developed parliamentary democracies. (Considering that the case studies indicate that a presidency impedes coalescing among the parties, the reason for not including presidential regimes in the data probably warrants more of a justification.) With her data set, the author estimates the chances of coalition formation for any given party with any other party that runs in the same election, seeing her hypotheses borne out.

Another question to the author is of a theoretical nature. Would her formal model of preelectoral coalition build-

ing be similarly applicable to describing the phenomenon of the preelectoral party formation? How could one capture the principal difference between forming a coalition and forming a party, that a coalition is precisely when, despite the advantages of running together, participants keep separate for the future, maintaining their distinctive political identities and organizations? If the decision to coalesce is driven by the goal to win enough votes to get into the parliament, and thus depends on the rules for winning and the range of offerings supplied by other competitors, then so is the decision to merge into a single party, or to campaign on a particular electoral platform. If there is one thing that I would ask the author to add, it is to draw a clearer line between when one expects to see coalitions as opposed to parties—in formal and empirical analysis.

In sum, Golder's book is a fascinating, fresh look at preelectoral strategy of interparty coalition formation. It is a timely and useful contribution, and a strong voice in the party systems literature. Both of these excellent books signify the continued usefulness of the spatial approach for understanding elections and parties, and show how spatial theory can serve as a neutral platform for adding on other analytical components that we believe to be similarly relevant in determining election results.

**Reprogramming Japan: The High Tech Crisis Under Communitarian Capitalism.** By Marie Anchordoguy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 257p. \$39.95.  
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— Nick Dyer-Witthford, *University of Western Ontario*

Over the last 20 years, Japan has passed from wunderkind of global capitalism to problem child, troubled by recession and stagnation. Marie Anchordoguy's *Reprogramming Japan* joins the growing body of analysis diagnosing this sad falling off, focusing on the crisis of the high-technology sectors where silicon samurai once seemed to reign supreme. In Anchordoguy's view, the cause of the problem is "communitarian capitalism." This is a capitalism that depends heavily on state direction—governmental support for select large firms, a social contract assuring citizens permanent employment, regular wage increases, and union-management deals for labor peace. This, she suggests, is something verging on socialism. Although it has "all the trappings of private property and profit-making institutions," the dynamism of the market is constrained by a system that "favor[s] social stability over efficiency" (p. 7). It is, in her view, "quasi-capitalism" (p. 7). Communitarian capitalism, she argues, laid the basis for Japanese success from the 1950s through the 1970s, when global economic conditions were positive, technological trajectories were clear, and foreign products could be reverse-engineered. But in the 1980s and 1990s, intensified competition, transnational outsourcing, and fiercely

enforced intellectual property rights made this system a fetter on the very forces of production it had fostered.

Anchordoguy then supports her argument with case studies in Japanese high-technology industries. In telecommunications, the reluctance of NIT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company) to fire workers and abandon longtime suppliers, and the reluctance of the government to abandon NIT in favor of foreign companies, created “obsolete institutions” (p. 65). In computer hardware, attempts to build a domestic industry produced the world’s fastest computer, but left Japan still importing more than it exports. In semiconductors, government subsidies for big companies succeeded until the late 1980s, but then failed in a crisis of global supply. In the software industry, Anchordoguy admits, the picture is more mixed. The Japanese videogame industry revived an American industry that had imploded in the early 1980s, and Nintendo and Sony maintain a leading presence even in the face of Microsoft: She says this is because they developed in a freewheeling mode largely outside state corporatism. Elsewhere, she finds a lack of flexibility and innovation. Overall, she faults Japan’s system for protectionism, cozy corporate–state relations, accommodation with trade unions, and a reliance on incremental change.

This is a scrupulously researched, readable study, and it provides a wealth of information about the operations of contemporary Japanese capitalism. But there are major questions to be raised about its overall perspective. Anchordoguy’s argument is based on an unfavorable comparison of communitarian capitalism with the supposedly free market neoliberalism of the United States. If Japanese capitalism is quasi-capitalism, then American capitalism, supposedly focused on “competition and efficiency, encoded on neoclassical economic and rational choice theory” (p. 7), would be the real thing. The author says that Japan need not become a “clone” of the United States, and carefully notes that the sacrifice of community and worker interests to those of corporate owners and shareholders is “inconsistent with Japan’s historical experience and values” (p. 234). Nonetheless, she thinks Japan’s deviations from neoliberal doxa calls for “reprogramming” (the term is reminiscent of dubious cures for cult members). And the program it should get with is the Washington consensus model of deregulation, privatization, and trade liberalization, moving toward a social order “more flexible, market-driven, and less equalitarian” (p. 65).

This argument, however, is eroded by her avoidance of the “elephant in the room” of supposedly free market U.S. capitalism—military Keynesianism. Far from being a model of laissez-faire dynamism, the U.S. high-technology sector grew out of and has flourished on the massive support of a military–industrial complex. This complex incubated the computer industry and the Internet (see Paul Edwards, *The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse*

*in Cold War America*, 1997). Today, with the Pentagon budget pushing \$500 billion annually, this military matrix lavishly supports corporations involved in surveillance, smart weapons, advanced robotics, and all kinds of more routine computing requirements. The contrast between state-supported communitarian capital and free market capital is largely mythological. The real contrast is between welfare-state and warfare-state capitalism. And, apparently, the warfare state is better for business.

Moreover, while American high-tech capital has recently been more profitable than Japan’s, the question of its long-term success, even by market criteria, is uncertain. Huge budget and trade deficits and slowing growth hardly seem a recommendation for the U.S. model as a whole. And if one steps outside the box of *homo economicus*, the questions become more acute. It is far from clear that the social and environmental costs of stagnation in Japan are any higher than those of fast-growth U.S. capital. Some years ago, Tessa Morris-Suzuki (*Beyond Computopia: Information, Automation and Democracy in Japan*, 1988) analyzed Japan’s unique trajectory within a critical perspective on the overall costs of information capitalism. A similar breadth of perspective would have been welcome in this study. As I write, the news is out that for the first time, Toyota has overtaken General Motors as the world’s largest car manufacturer. This is bad news for Anchordoguy’s argument on two counts. First, it suggests that the neoliberal model may not be as superior to Japanese communitarian capitalism as she suggests. But, second, since cars are a major contributor to a planetary crisis of climate change, it reminds us that market buoyancy is not the best measure of system success. Neither communitarian nor neoliberal capital has a good answer to the contradictions between profit and socioenvironmental sustainability. Detailed and informative as this study is, evaluation of different forms of capitalism, American or Japanese, calls for a wider and more deeply critical vision.

#### **After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States.**

Edited by Lowell W. Barrington. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006. 306p. \$75 cloth, \$29.95 paper.  
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— Edward W. Walker, *University of California, Berkeley*

As the editor states clearly in the introduction, the central question taken up in this useful volume is “What happens to nationalism after independence?” Its premise is that most scholarship on nationalism has attempted to trace or explain the emergence of the popular sentiments of solidarity that account for the formation of national consciousness, the rise of nationalism as a modern and highly potent political ideology, and the contribution of nationalism to the proliferation of states. Although there are excellent case studies of postindependence nationalisms in individual countries, less comparative and theoretical attention